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Introduction
Islam’s recent arrival in Europe by means of migration, violence and media images
has kindled a wave of interest in Europe’s past and present relations with Islam.
Publications on these subjects are prolific, sowhy another book on ‘Islam inEurope’?
There are three reasons: to provide the first comprehensive overview of the entire
thirteen-century history of Islam in Europe from 700ce until now (most existing
literature covers only a part of this history); to identify the role of ‘Islam’ during
this period; and to look into the impact of this long history on the current discourse
and situation of Islam in Europe. My endeavour is to present a framework by which
we can conceptualize the notion of ‘Islam in Europe’ in time (the eighth to the
twenty-first centuries ce) and space (‘Europe’), and that will allow us to sample and
interconnect the enormous corpus of existing knowledge on Islam in Europe and
to put it in chronological and thematic order. This framework should provide the
reader with novel insights into the history of Islam in Europe.
Given the comprehensiveness of this book, its approach is by default multidis-
ciplinary. The secondary literature used to write it is that of specialists of regions
(Europe, Spain, Sicily, the Balkans, theOttomanEmpire, theMediterranean), periods
(MiddleAges, Renaissance, colonial period,modernEurope), and specific disciplinary
subjects (religion, economics, social sciences, political sciences, law, art, agriculture).
The ambitious set-up that squeezes thirteen centuries into a single volume requires
a clear perspective on what story this book wants to tell, how that story is told, and
why it needs to be told in the first place. These questions will be addressed in the
following.
1. The Link to Today
In discussions nowadays on the role of Islam in Europe, direct or indirect references
are often made to events of the past that allude to a history of perpetual conflict
whereby ‘Europe’ and ‘Islam’ stand for entities that collide because, according to
some observers, they represent different value systems or, in the eyes of others,
because Islam is by nature aggressive and has put Europe on the defensive ever since
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the ArabMuslims rode out of the Arab Peninsula in the seventh century in search of
conquest. To the proponents of these views the current presence of large numbers of
Muslims in Europe is a reason for concern, and they justify their anxieties with ref-
erences to history.1 There are also other observers, however, who hold a much more
positive historical view on Islamic-European relations, referring to the knowledge
that has passed on from the medieval Islamic civilization to Europe: their emphasis
is on the intellectual interaction between the two realms rather than on their bel-
ligerent relations.2
Such opposing views are not reserved for political debates, but have also perme-
ated academic discussions. Two eminent contemporary scholars of Islamic history,
the American professors Bernard Lewis and Richard Bulliet, provide a case in point.3
Bulliet argues that Islam and Christianity share the same cradle of a common civi-
lization from which they parted “as siblings” in the sixteenth century, while Lewis
asserts that the two civilizations have always been at loggerheads. Bulliet stresses
the similarities in the developments and experiences of the two civilizations, while
Lewis emphasizes their differences. Bulliet refers to religion as only one of themany
factors that shaped Muslim identity, while Lewis puts religion at centre stage for
understanding the Muslim. And Bulliet argues for a legacy of a Christian-Islamic
heritage,while Lewis differentiates between an Islamic civilization, on the one hand,
and a Judeo-Christian civilization, on the other. Lewis’ view has gained popularity
since the attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, and
seems to be corroborated by the mounting reports on the apparent lack of integra-
tion of Muslimmigrants in Western European societies. Bulliet’s view, on the other
hand, is shared particularly bymany historians of theMiddle Ages who point to the
parallels between the two civilizations and the ways in which Europe is indebted to
Islamic civilization.
As everyhistorianwill confirm,history canprovide sourcematerial thatmay lead
to very different interpretations. In the case of Islam, however, historical facts and
terminology are not always a source of academic interplay between rival historians,
but are sometimes rewritten in public discourse or, worse, become a demagogic tool
against Muslim Europeans. One example is the claim that Europeans are part of a
‘Judeo-Christian civilization’ (sometimes with the addition of ‘Humanist’) which,
as we have seen, is used as a premise by Bernard Lewis but is a notion challenged
by Richard Bulliet. In 2005, however, this academic debate spilled over into political
reality when, in the final drafting phase of the new European Union Convention,
known as the ‘EU constitution’, there was deliberation about introducing this term
in the preamble.4 The implicit aim of this political manoeuvring was to put up a
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wall against the alleged Islamicization of Europe by its expanding Muslim popula-
tion. The proposed amendment did not come to pass, whichwas probably the smart
thing to do, because such an identity-marker would not only deny the influences
of Islamic civilization, but also the value of Greek, Roman, Ottoman and all other
non-Judeo and non-Christian elements that have contributed to European civiliza-
tion.
CollectiveMemory
Thehistory (bywhich Imean the amalgamof transnational and transcultural, politi-
cal, social, economic, intellectual and other forms anddisciplines of history) of ‘Islam
in Europe’ provides, from the perspective of current European affairs, therefore, an
interesting example of what has been called ‘collective memory.’ This term received
much attention from historians in the 1990s and consequently developed into mul-
tiple meanings, but for the purpose of this book we will use this notion to mean
the ways in which people construct a conception of the past, and from which they
derive anawareness of their present sense ofunity andpeculiarity.5Acollectivemem-
ory provides a people with a common identity that can be traced back into history,
regardless of the accuracy of the historical events or the causal connection of these
events to the identity of the people holding the collective memory. The concept of a
Judeo-Christian heritage to underpin European unity is a perfect illustration of this.
In a similar vein Tony Judt analysed how the memory of the wartime experience in
continental Europe was “distorted, sublimated, and appropriated, [and] bequeathed
to the postwar era an identity that was fundamentally false, dependent upon the
erection of anunnatural andunsustainable frontier between past and present in Eu-
ropean public memory”.6
An important aspect of this collective memory, therefore, is the distortion of
history into mythology or imagery. Several contemporary medieval historians have
made interesting compilations and analyses of the European medieval image of Is-
lam as a threat, whether as a religion, a belligerent ideology or a dominating culture,
and argued how this imagery has continued into the present age.7 The argument
these historians by implicationmake is that present-day Western (and in particular
West European) anxieties about Islamare relatednot only to the recent phenomenon
ofMuslim immigration and Islamic terrorism, but also to a perpetuating image that
is centuries old, an image that often has little to dowith reality but all themorewith
the perception of the Muslim as the embodiment of everything that the Westerner
is not.
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What, then, are the historical experiences that Europe has had with Islam, and,
more importantly, in what form are they lodged in today’s collective memory? An
example is the Frankish victory at Poitiers against one of the many plunder raids
conductedby SpanishMoors: inEuropean collectivememory this battlehas acquired
the historical significance of halting the Muslim onslaught on Europe and conse-
quently saving Europe from Islamic domination. In chapter one we will discuss the
historical evidence that proves this analysis to be incorrect. Equally interesting is the
obverse of this samequestion:what are the ‘memoryholes’, or thosehistorical experi-
ences that have been erased from or not admitted into European collectivememory?
An example is the ample study of the six centuries ofMuslim life in Catholic Spain as
opposed to thenear lackof such interest in the six centuries ofMuslim life inCatholic
Poland and Lithuania.8 Another example is the European collective memory of the
Barbary corsairs and the hundreds of thousands of Christian slaves they kept, while
neglecting the fact that enslavement of Muslims by means of piracy was conducted
on a similar scale by the Christian European side.9 This is not to say that such omis-
sions in our collective memory or in our academic interest happen deliberately; but
it is in itself interesting to note that one is selective when discussing ‘Islam in Eu-
rope’. In this book we therefore want to provide a story of Islam in Europe that is
as comprehensive as possible. The purpose is not to single out the distortions and
the omissions in our current collectivememory of Islam in Europe; the endeavour to
give the full storywill itself highlight these omissions as the readermay be surprised
with events, facts and numbers that were hitherto unknown to him or her.
Of paramount importance when telling these stories and histories is to be aware
of who told them then, who tells them now, and who they are addressed to, because
the collective memory of a people will resonate with certain stories, but not with
others. To Catholics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the ‘Turk’ was the
great enemy, while many Protestants saw more similarities with Islam than with
Catholicism and some Protestants even claimed to prefer Ottoman rule to that of
the Catholics. Nowadays, on the other hand, most Protestants will feel closer to
Catholicism than to Islam. In the seventeenth century, the fall of Vienna might
have been a disaster for the Holy Roman Empire, but such event would have been
applauded by the Empire’s enemy France.Nowadays, on the other hand, Frenchmen
may concur with the view that the breaking of the Ottoman siege of Vienna saved
Europe from Islamic domination.
This coexistence of different collective memories in the past is recurring again
in present-day Europe, not only because of different experiences in the various geo-
graphical parts of Europe, but also because of the presence of a relatively large num-
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ber of immigrants of foreign origin, many of whom are Muslim. Even those among
themwho are born, raised and educated in Europe have inherited a collective mem-
ory that has stored different images, events and notions from that of their fellow
Europeans. For instance, whenmentioning the battles of Poitiers and Vienna where
respectively Moorish and Ottoman armies were defeated, many of my students of
Dutch origin nod their heads in recognition of these names, while my Dutch Mus-
lim students of foreign originwill giveme blank stares. Conversely, when Imention
the battle of Hittin, where Saladin brought defeat to the Crusader armies, myMus-
lim students look up in recognition while the others do not. The different reactions
are remarkable given the fact that all these students have taken the same Dutch
state exams, and none of these historical events is part of the Dutch school curricu-
lum. Collectivememory, therefore, is powerful, perhaps evenmore so than acquired
knowledge.
2. ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’
AMethodological Framework
Based on these considerations, the topic of ‘Islam in Europe’ ismore than a story told
by stringing together historical events. It is a story about us, Europeans, whether
Muslim or non-Muslim, of native or foreign origin, and how we struggle with our
past and our present in the continent called Europe, howwe shape our identity and,
particularly, the uneasy relationship betweenwhowe are andwhowewant to be. In
the many years of studying this topic and engaging in public and academic debates
on it, I became convinced that the only way to conceptualize the notion of ‘Islam in
Europe’ is to apply a strict framework of notions set within certain timelines that
allow us with each event in each epoch to ask ourselves the basic questions: What
is the nature of the interaction between ‘Europe’ and ‘Islam’? What do we mean by
Islam in this particular instance? To what extent do Muslims or Islam play a role in
the events before us?What is real andwhat is imaginary? The aim of this framework
is, in short, to structure our thoughts and arguments when discussing ‘Islam in
Europe’ and to avoid being drawn into the myriad of events and details of thirteen
centuries of interaction between Europe and Islam.10
In brief, the structure of the framework is as follows: we limit ourselves to the
European perspective on Islam, and from that perspective look at thirteen centuries
of interaction between Europe and Islam, whereby we can divide this long period
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into five periods, and for each period provide an analysis of that interaction based
on certain categories of interaction and on a limited number (three) of approaches.
This all sounds quite abstract, so let us elaborate these different composites of the
framework.
First and foremost, itmust be emphasized that the object of inquiry in this book
is the European perspective on its history with Muslims and Islam. We will, so to
speak, pitch our camera on the European continent and from that angle look at Eu-
ropean interactionswithMuslims and Islam. TheMuslim reactions and experiences
with Europeans, although equally interesting, will be a story left for others to tell.11
Also, we will take the ‘in’ of Islam in Europe quite literally: European relations with
Muslims and Islam will be discussed only insofar as they take place on the Euro-
pean continent. European experiences during colonial times with Muslim societies
in North Africa or Asia will play only a minor role in this book.
Next we need to be very clear on the terminology that we will use. So far we
have used the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ because they have become quite common
in political and public debates of today: ‘Europe’ is under threat of ‘Islam’, ‘Islam’
is an obstacle to integration, ‘Islam’ is anathema to ‘European culture’, ‘Europe’ is
indebted to ‘Islamic civilization’, etc. Even the title of this book alludes to a self-
evidence that is actually unwarranted, because the use of the two terms ‘Europe’ and
‘Islam’ as individual entities or notions is a highly problematic representation of the
interaction (or confrontation) between the two. A clarification of these two terms is
therefore in order.
Europe
Defining ‘Europe’ is the typical headache hurdle for every politician or academic. If
one conceives Europe as the heir to the Christian commonwealth of the laterMiddle
Ages, then the question arises howone is to consider ChristianOrthodoxy and its ge-
ographical realm that extends into Russia and theMiddle East. If, on the other hand,
one is to conceive of Europe in a modern setting, one may consider an economical-
legal entity like the European Union or the geographical and political-legal Council
of Europe. Both have their disadvantages for what we want to do here, however: the
European Union is geographically too narrow as it does not contain countries like
Iceland,Norway, Switzerland, Albania, Serbia or Bosnia-Hercegovina; and the Coun-
cil of Europe as a frame of reference for ‘Europe’ is geographically toowide because it
includes countries as far east as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Feder-
ation.
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For the purpose of this book we will first define Europe in accordance with the
geographical area bordered by waterways, that is the Polar Sea in the north, the
Atlantic in the west, theMediterranean in the south and the Black Sea and the rivers
Dnieper and Volga in the east. We will further use terminology like ‘western’ or
‘south-eastern’ Europe with the explicit mention that these are not political but
mere geographical indications.
This definition has as a result that, on the one hand, we will restrict our discus-
sion of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires to their dominions in south-eastern
Europe (the ‘Balkans’) and not those in theMiddle East and, on the other hand, that
we will include in our account the stories of north-eastern European countries like
the Baltic states. These and other eastern European countries have had long encoun-
ters with Islam andMuslims, as we will see later, and we have already observed that
these interactions have received little academic attention from Western historians.
This shows that ‘Islam in Europe’ is mostly studied and reflected upon from a west-
ern Euro-centred point of view – a perspective that is in need of revision if we truly
want to do justice to the concept of ‘Islam in Europe’.
In addition to Europe as a geographical area we will also consider Europe in its
capacity as a single civilization, or a unity of values, or any other uniform identity
for its inhabitants. However, as we will see in the following chapters, the unity of
these values or identities was not always concrete, let alone existent, as they changed
through the centuries. Europe has been perceived in the eyes of its inhabitants as
a Christian Commonwealth, gradually transformed into the notion of a ‘European
Commonwealth’ (a term coined by Edmund Burke in the late eighteenth century),
and from the nineteenth century onwards Europe was equated by its inhabitants
with the highest form of civilization in any sense if its meaning – legally, politically,
culturally, technically. Rather than trying to come here to a definition of European
identity, we will regard the situation and state of mind of ‘Europe’ in accordance
with each epoch.
Islam
The term ‘Islam’ is as problematic as ‘Europe’, as it often includes several represen-
tations of Islam that may be different or even mutually exclusive. In this book we
conceptualize the term ‘Islam’ in four meanings: its adherents, the Muslims; Islam
as a culture and civilization; Islam as a religion; and Islam as an image.
First, Islam may represent its adherents, the Muslims, either as powers or as
individuals and communities. The presence of Muslim powers within Europe has
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been longstanding: 800 years in Spain, 500 years in Greece, 300 years in the Balkans,
and more than a century in countries like Sicily, Hungary, Romania. Muslim people
have sometimes been present longer, for they often stayed on even when Muslim
sovereignty had ended. As subjects under non-Muslim rule, Muslims lived in Spain
for 800 years (and an additional 100 years in secrecy) and in Sicily 400 years, and they
still live inLithuania andPolandwhere theyhavebeen for over 600years, as theydo in
most Balkan countrieswhere they have lived formore than 500 years. In other places,
such as Sicily and Spain, on the other hand, the entireMuslimpopulations have been
expelled or forced to convert, while certain elements of their civilization and culture
have remained after their disappearance (thinkof architecture, language,music, cus-
toms, food). Since the late sixteenth century very few – if any –Muslims have resided
in the European regionwest of the lineWarsaw-Vienna-Trieste (a region thatwewill
hereafter refer to as ‘western Europe’). This changed with the large-scale immigra-
tion of Muslims in the twentieth century, particularly from the 1970s onwards.
It must be kept in mind that the notion of Muslim as used here is nothing
more than an identity marker used by either the European or theMuslim, and does
not necessarily relate to the degree of religiousness of that particular person. This
brings us to yet another problem of terminology, since from a historical point of
view the term ‘Muslim’ is a novelty. During the Middle Ages reference was made
to Saracens, and in Spain more specifically to Moors.* Europeans in the Middle Ages
alsousednames like ‘Hagarenes’ or ‘Ishmaelites’, referring to theArab-Muslimclaim
to be Abraham’s offspring through the line of Hagar and her son Ishmael. Later,
with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the commonly used termwas ‘Turk’ (‘turning
Turk’ was the expression for conversion to Islam). During colonial times, Europeans
sometimes referred to Muslims as Musulmans, but more often as Mohammedans,
or followers of Mohammad, erroneously analogous to the term ‘Christians’ as the
followers of Christ. And until twenty or thirty years ago, Muslims in Europe were
spoken of, and spoke of themselves, in ethnic and national terms: Arabs and Asians,
Turks andPakistanis,Kurds andBerber.The term ‘Muslim’ is onlyof very recentdate,
and it is therefore historically awkward to use twenty-first century terminology to
describe people five, ten or thirteen centuries ago,when in those times different, and
* While the etymology of Moors is ‘dark people’, the name Saracene has been given different origins,
ranging from the Arabic ‘sharqiyin’ (‘Easterner’) to the Greek ‘skene’ (‘tent dweller’) or the Greek ‘sara
kene’, meaning ‘empty Sarah’, referring to Abraham’s wife Sarah who gave birth to Isaac, the founding
father of the Israelites, and who was therefore not related – ‘empty’ – to Ishmael, who was fathered by
Abrahamwith his slave womanHagar, and who is claimed by the Arabs as their founding father.
introduction | 21
mostly non-religious, terminology was used. Still, even though we might try to be
historically true in terminology, references to ‘Muslims’ cannot be avoided.
The second representation of ‘Islam’ is that of a culture and civilization. We can
observe this in the institutions of typical Islamic nature, either as physical build-
ings like mosques, hospitals and caravanserais, or as non-physical institutions such
as forms of government, judiciary, or a legal or social system. In addition to these
institutions, Islam as a culture or civilization can be found in the cultural and sci-
entific achievements of the Muslims, such as irrigation and navigation techniques,
sciences, arts. Islam in this sense can also exist long after Muslim presence has dis-
appeared, either as a heritage of forlorn times, as is the case in Spain and Sicily where
tour guides advertise ‘Islamic civilization’, or as a legacy of arts, sciences and tech-
nologies that over the centuries have been adopted and assimilated by Europeans.
The third representation of ‘Islam’ is that of the religion itself, meaning the
theological doctrines that can be found in scripture and texts, and the religious
practices of Muslims. The historian Hudgson in his seminal Venture of Islam had
introduced the term ‘Islamdom’ and the adjective ‘Islamicate’ to denote Islam as a
culture and civilization, separate from the notion of ‘Islam’ as religious doctrine.12
Unfortunately, this useful distinction never really caught on. And indeed, one of the
unfortunate effects of post-9/11 developments is that the understanding of ‘Islam’
and the way it is being discussed has become reduced to that of religious doctrine –
not only in the West, but also in the Muslim world. By consequence, the religion of
Islam is by many considered essential to understanding the Muslim, disregarding
all the other aspects that have shaped the identity, character and mind-set of this
same Muslim. Equating Muslims with the theological tenets of Islam is even more
problematic if we want to make sense of the past thirteen centuries of European
interaction with ‘Islam’, as we will see in the coming chapters.
Finally, there is a fourth notion of Islam, which is its imaginary representation
in theminds of eitherMuslims or Europeans. Such representationmay be emanant,
in that it reflects something ‘out there’ like a historical civilization, an apocalyptic
threat or a great religion. But more often the representation is immanent in that
it reflects a notion of Islam that relates to people personally. For Muslims such
immanent representationmay take on the form of identity: being a ‘Muslim’makes
one part of a greater identity called ‘Islam’, which may take on all kinds of forms,
ranging from a great civilization to a global religious community. For non-Muslim
Europeans, on the other hand, ‘Islam’ often takes on the representation of a photo
negative of themselves and as such constitutes what is also called the European
Other. We will elaborate on this below, since the concept of ‘Othering’ is one of the
central themes in this book.
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3. Europe’s Interaction with Islam
While these descriptions of the terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ may give us a fair impres-
sion of what we are talking about, we must now address their interaction, because
that is the main focus of this book: Islam in Europe is not a static situation, but an
interaction of the two. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapters, from a Eu-
ropean perspective much of the interaction with ‘Islam’ took place on the level of
knowledge, ideas or images, and this wasmostly donewithout any physicalMuslim
counterpart. In other words, talking and writing about ‘Mahomet’ and the ‘Turk’
was mostly done by Europeans who had had no encounters with Muslims them-
selves. In modern times we see a similar phenomenon, with Europeans conducting
heated discussions about Islamic theology or the presence of mosques or Muslims’
integration in European societies, but engaging remarkably little with theMuslims
themselves, even though they are now physically present. The distinction between
the physical encounter with ‘Islam’, on the one hand, and talking and thinking
about Islam, on the other, is therefore essential when discussing Islam in Europe.
In the framework of this book we will treat these two forms of interaction sepa-
rately under the titles of what I suggest calling ‘physical’ and ‘virtual’ Islam, respec-
tively.
‘Physical’ and ‘Virtual’ Islam
‘Physical Islam’ is represented by themere presence of people calledMuslims, on the
onehand, and the visibility of their presence that canbe identified as ‘Islamic’, on the
other. The visibility shows inbehaviour ofMuslims that can somehowbedenoted as,
to use Hodgson’s terminology, either religiously ‘Islamic’ or culturally ‘Islamicate’.
The visibility further shows in theMuslim’smaterial expressions of his or her Islam,
such as clothes, arts and buildings, but also the records of intellectual and cultural
life and ideas, ranging from the medieval philosophical texts to modern rap clips
on youtube. To bring some order to the manymanifestations of physical Islam over
a period of thirteen centuries, we will limit ourselves in this book to the following
forms of interaction: armed conflict likewar, raids, piracy; trade and diplomacy; gov-
ernment and rule; and coexistence within a single society (including discrimination
and persecution). Interestingly, travel and exploration is not one of these categories:
whereas Europeans have travelled extensively intoMuslim countries for a variety of
reasons, Muslims have done almost no travelling into Europe, for reasons that will
be explained in due course.
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‘Virtual Islam’ comprises all immaterial or non-physical aspects of Islam, such
as the tenets of Islamic orthodoxy and the culture, ideas, messages and knowledge.
Put differently, virtual Islam is all manifestations of Islam that are transmitted
by the physical forms of Islam. Virtual Islam therefore also includes the images
and visions of what is considered ‘Islamic’, by Muslims as well as non-Muslims,
including imagined or real notions of conflicts between what is considered ‘Islamic’
and ‘European’. For example, amosquepertains to physical Islam,while thedifferent
meanings itmay convey – religious grandeur,Muslimdomination, symbol of piety –
are what we call virtual Islam. In this book we will discuss the following domains of
interaction related to virtual Islam: culture (including science and scholarship); the
study of Islam; and issues of imagery and identity.
The merit of the distinction between physical and virtual Islam is that it al-
lows us to distinguish between the neutral observation of physical appearances, be-
haviour and expressions of Muslims, on the one hand, and the assessment of the
interpretations, meanings and values thereof, on the other. For instance, the pres-
ence of Muslims in contemporary European societies is often expressed in terms of
numbers,with the implicitwarning that thesenumbersmay reachdangerous levels:
“[b]y 2050, the number of Muslims in Europe will reach 20 per cent!”13 Similarly, the
building of mosques, and in particular their height and ‘Oriental’ architecture, has
received severe criticism in contemporary Europe. The distinction between physical
and virtual Islam allows us to deconstruct the multiple issues that are condensed
in these controversies. From the perspective of physical Islam, we may observe that
there is the physical presence of a certain number of people calledMuslims that live
and work in European societies, manifest their religious beliefs bymeans of dress or
behaviour, and establish certain institutions like amosque or a sharia council. From
the perspective of virtual Islam, on the other hand,wewill be able to attributemean-
ing to these manifestations: on what basis are people identified by themselves or
others as ‘Muslim’, how do Europeans form their opinions about these ‘Muslims’,
what are the reasons for supporting or criticizing an ‘Oriental’ style in modern Eu-
ropeanmosque architecture?
We have seen that there is already a considerable volume of academic litera-
ture on European writings and representations about Muslims and Islam. I will
gratefully make use of their findings, but will widen the scope of ‘interaction’ by
posing the question how the themes of this European discourse relate to the prac-
tices and experiences of Europeans with Islam and Muslims. The long European
history of talking and writing about Muslims, their civilization and their religion
is one thing, but the history of Europeans interacting with Muslims through war,
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diplomacyorby living in the samecity is quite another.The two influence eachother,
of course, but also very oftendonot.Wewill see that interactionwithMuslims them-
selves (‘physical Islam’), on the one hand, and images and discussions of Muslims
and their religion (‘virtual Islam’), on the other, often run on parallel but separate
tracks.
In addition, rather than looking into a specific period, we will look into these
interactions over a timeline of thirteen centuries, to see if there are any patterns
that reflect on the situation of today. To do so, we will make use of a chronologi-
cal narrative, so that we can see whether there is a continuation, accumulation or
discontinuation of certain kinds of interactions, images, and the like.
Five Periods
Wewill see in the next chapters that the position of theMuslim as well as the image
of Islam has undergone all kinds of metamorphoses during the thirteen centuries
of interaction with Europe. The Muslim has acted on the European stage as a ruler
and as a subject, as the antichrist and as an ally, corsair and tradesman, slave and
master, terrorist and fellow citizen. The image of Islam has varied accordingly, as
a religion that was feared as an enemy or embraced as a partner against heretic
Christians, despised as an abomination or admired as a civilization, as a source
of violence and of social civility, and studied for missionary, academic, colonial or
security purposes. Whether we can speak of a continuing story of Islam in Europe
that canbe extrapolated into our present age is a questionwewill leave for discussion
in the epilogue.
What we can say beforehand, however, is that the European attitudes and expe-
riences vis-à-vis Muslims and Islam were being shaped by internal European expe-
riences rather than by external Islamic influences. This is in no way meant to argue
that Muslims and Islam were mere passive objects of European actions and experi-
ences. On the contrary: Muslims in many instances played a very active role and at
times determined the agenda of European history, driven by religious, belligerent
or cultural motives. These facts obviously are of huge importance and will be given
due attention, but the main objective of this book is the analysis of the interaction
by Europeanswith themanifestations of Islam in Europe. From that perspective it is
my contention that these interactions can bemostly explained by the state of affairs
within Europe and the ensuing Europeanmind-set at a given time in its history.
Based on that premise, we can discern five periods, each characterized by specific
European relations with and attitudes toward Muslims and Islam: Uncivilized Eu-
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rope (700–1000), Crusading Europe (1000–1500), Divided Europe (1500–1700), Powerful
Europe (1700–1950), and Struggling Europe (1950-now). These periods are admittedly
artificial and simplistic, and theirnames are ratherprovocative, but it serves ourpur-
pose of highlighting how the situation of Europeans at certain times shaped their
relations with Islam. We will use this periodization to structure this book, by de-
scribing each period in a separate chapter. The chapters will be further divided into
three sections: the first will ‘set the stage’ with a brief overview of the major events
and characteristics of that period, followedby a sectiononEuropean interactionwith
physical Islam and one on European interaction with virtual Islam.
Three Themes: Religion, Toleration, Othering
So far, we have made the discussion of the thirteen centuries of Islam in Europe
manageable by dividing it up into periods, and further into the domains of physicial
and virtual Islam. The final part of this book’s framework is the use of a specific
scope to discuss the historical material. We will do so by using three interrelated
approaches that will form the themes of our narrative. Given the subject-matter
of this book – ‘Islam’ – we will raise the question of the religiosity of events and
actions relating to ‘Muslims’ or ‘Islam’. Religion is therefore the first theme. The
other two themes are related to the notion of interaction: in the case of physical
interaction of people we will face the question of (in)tolerance, while in the case of
virtual interactionwedealwithwhathasbecomeknownas theprocess of ‘Othering’.
We will see that in the specific case of Islam in Europe the notions of (in)tolerance
andOthering are intrinsically related to religion. These three themesmust be briefly
introduced to get a firmer grip on the historical narrative in the following chapters.
Religion. We have already remarked that not all that Muslims do can be considered
Islam, just as not every act by Europeans can be considered an expression of Chris-
tianity. A recurring question in this book will therefore be: to what extent was a
particular situation or action related to religion? For instance, modern historians
of the European Crusades and of Arab and Ottoman jihads have questioned the re-
ligiousness of these wars, arguing that the call for a ‘holy war’ often served practical
rather than religious purposes. On the other hand, religious discourse has always
been important to some degree in most wars in Europe, up to the Yugoslavian civil
wars of the 1990s. One of the issues raised and discussed in the following chapters
will therefore be whether it is valid to speak of the presence or absence of religion, as
well as the use, misuse or abuse thereof.
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But even if at times we are going to dismiss the religiousness of certain actions,
our point of departure is to look into interactions that are prima facie of a religious
nature or justified by religion. We will use the notion of religion in two ways: as a
doctrine and as a cultural system.Religion as a theological doctrine claims to be fixed
and eternal and in the cases of Islam and Christianity is recorded in Holy Scripture
and in the theologicalmanuals of the scholars. Religion as a cultural system consists
of the patterns of symbols and power structures produced by the faithful and the
ways that this system motivates people to conceptualize their social environment
and tomove them into action in accordance with that worldview.14 The two notions
of theological doctrine and a cultural systemshould ideally overlap, but oftendonot.
From this perspective, religion is not considered absolute in the trans-historical
and transcultural sense, but subject to historical and cultural differences. In other
words, when we speak of ‘Christianity’ or ‘Islam’ it is with the understanding that
these notions and their interpretations are specific to their time and place, whether
as a doctrine or a cultural system. This is not as self-evident as it may seem. Modern
Christians may still identify with their Christian heritage (for instance, when they
speak of Christian democracy or the Christian duty to give development aid), but
may at the same time be very critical of certain interpretations or dismissive of
certain practices that are part of that heritage (such as the persecution of heretics or
slavery). The same holds for Muslims. If we want to understand their heritage and
presence in Europe, now and in history, we must understand the dynamics of the
historical narrative of religion.
An issue that is important to many social scientists who study religion is its
meaning to the individual, and how that meaning is expressed in symbols, rituals
and societal structures, onbothan individual anda communal level. Although inter-
esting in the case of Islam in Europe, this is too wide a range of aspects to be covered
for a period of thirteen centuries. Since the purpose of this book is to understand the
interaction between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’, we will conceive the history of European
and Christian interactionwith theMuslim and Islam as a continuumof delineating
each other’s space and position. Religion, with its claims on the ultimate worldview
and its resulting directives on human behaviour, plays an important – at times the
most important – role in this ordering process. Both the conceptualization and the
means of ordering society and relationships are rooted in a worldview that is trans-
lated into a political, legal and cultural system. In this particular process religion
serves as an instrument of power.15The stronger party – not necessarily themajority,
as we will see – will apply a certain religiously founded logic or conceptualization to
how society should be ordered, or how trade or war is to be conducted. These power
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structures yield questions that are reflected in the other two themes: how to livewith
others (the notion of tolerance) and how to reflect on those who are ‘not like us’ (the
notion of Othering).
Toleration. Tolerance literally means to bear something, implying that it is some-
thing one would prefer not to do. In contemporaryWestern literature, tolerance has
been defined as “a deliberate choice not to interfere with the conduct of which one
disapproves”.16 Or, in other words, tolerance is an attitude of putting up with that
which one opposes, even when it “shocks, enrages, frightens, or disgusts.”17 The key
notion is the verb ‘putting up with’, which consists of two elements. First, tolerance
is mainly exercised in matters involving firmly held beliefs. It implies that the tol-
erator strongly objects to a certain behaviour or opinion, but decides to accept it.18
The second element of tolerance is its exercise by someone who has the power also
not to tolerate the conduct of which he or she disapproves. In other words, when cer-
tain behaviour is tolerated or rights are granted, the tolerator merely indulges him-
or herself. The important feature of this aspect of tolerance is that it puts tolerance
in the context of a power balance. Tolerance is by definition a quality – and often
perceived as a virtue – of those in power. Only those holding power have the luxury
of being benevolent and tolerant.19 Those who are subjected to the dominant power
do not have the chance to be tolerant, for the simple reason that they are not in the
position to decide whether or not they are willing to accept unwanted behaviour by
those in power.
An important question is why one would tolerate unwanted behaviour in the
first place. The twomain arguments used inWestern literaturewhen answering this
question are pragmatism and moral principle. The pragmatic view holds that the
alternative to tolerance is conflict or war. Amore cynical variation on this pragmatic
view is that, even if those in power are willing to risk violent conflict in order to get
rid of an unwanted people or community (and we will see many examples of such
desires), the impossibility of such cleansing operationmight prompt those in power
to settle for second best, which is some form of tolerance, even if it were oppressive.
Tolerance, in other words, is the only way to maintain a peaceful coexistence.20 The
principled view, on the other hand, holds that tolerance arises, or should arise, from
a moral principle.21 Tolerance is then a virtue or moral obligation that goes beyond
the indifference of merely accepting disagreeable differences, but should engage in
a form of recognition.
Religion and tolerationmake for an interesting concoction. Typical for religions
like Christianity and Islam is that they have universal claims (salvation is only
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for those who embrace that faith) and are exclusive (the world is divided between
believers and unbelievers). While many observers explain the alleged confrontation
between the two by their universal claim,22 I would argue that the main conflict
is in their exclusive nature, for it divides the world (and the Afterworld, for that
matter) into believers and unbelievers, us and them. Even themost tolerantMuslim
orChristianwill, as a believer, come to the pointwhere he needs to acknowledge that
the unbeliever may be a great colleague or friend but nevertheless is missing out on
a world view that is essential to him, the believer. During the centuries, as we will
see, this acknowledgement has been a reason for war and bloodshed at worst, and
tolerant segregation at best. Europe has a long history in this respect with regard
to Judaism, Christian heresies and denominational factions, but also in its relation
withMuslims and Islam.
We will see in the following chapters that in the case of coexistence – i.e., differ-
ent communities sharing a single territorial space – Muslims and Christians struc-
tured most of their legal, political and social interactions on the basis of religious
categories. The exclusive nature of both Islam and Christianity created ‘natural’ de-
marcation lines between communities. Only under certain circumstances were de-
viations from and exceptions to these structures allowed. For instance, Christian
and Islamic law does not allow for the non-believer to be in a position of authority
over a believer, but there have beenMuslim and Christian palace courts where infi-
dels held high positions. Outside the courts, religious differences were often of little
consequence and religious communities lived, worked and socialized together. But
whenever there was social change or upheaval, the underlying structures prompted
people to identify with a religious label, because that label marked their social, po-
litical and legal status.23 And even when the religious categorization was formally
abandoned by the Ottoman Empire and European states from the late eighteenth
century onwards, we will see that religion remained an important factor of demar-
cation,whether culturally (Jews, and laterMuslims,werenot consideredby everyone
as belonging to the ‘Christian’ civilization of Europe), or as the schism between the
religious and the secular.
Othering. The division between believers and unbelievers in the case of the inter-
action between Europe and Islam is more than a theological, political, social and
legal construct that may be considered discriminatory or tolerant or otherwise. In
addition to these practical and theoretical distinctions, there is also a cognitive di-
mension that gives rise to a perceived division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is what
in the social sciences is knownas theprocess of ‘Othering.’ TheOther is notmerely an
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indication of a category of personswho are different, but primarily serves as a process
to identify and profile oneself as opposed to that other. The Other embodies every-
thing that We are not, and as such represents everything that We scorn or deny or,
to put itmoremildly, prefer not to be. As wewill see in the next chapters, the notion
of Othering is very helpful to describe the relationship between Islam and Europe.
From a European perspective, Muslims and Islam represented more than a false re-
ligion or incidental interactions of warfare, commerce or science; they represented a
permanent European Other.
In social sciences, the process of Othering is researched on numerous levels: man
versus woman, white man versus black man, sane person versus madman, civilized
person versus barbarian, occidental versus oriental, etc. In the context of this book,
we find that most relevant research in this context has been conducted in the dis-
cipline of International Relations where the notion of Othering is discussed as a
factor of interaction among European nation-states as well as the interaction be-
tween those states and non-European states.24 An interesting point made by most
of these scholars is that the centuries of Otheringwithin Europe – that is, among Eu-
ropean nations – have never undermined the prevailing sense of a single and unified
European identity. Tony Judtnotes the ‘curious’ characteristic of Europeans that em-
phasizing their mutual differences is precisely the factor that binds them: “Indeed,
drawing distinctions among and between themselves has been one of the defining
obsessions of the inhabitants of the continent.”25 This notion of a Europeanness as
a diversity-in-unity has resulted in a process of Othering that was mainly directed
outward, towards the non-European Other, pitting the ‘West’ against ‘the Rest’.26
Here, the Other was the primitive or savage, as opposed to the ‘civilized’ world of
Europe. Europe perceived itself as rational, organized and cultured, characteristics
that had propelled it into its state of power and prosperity. The notion of the un-
civilized Other not only had a “reinforcing effect on the collective of Europe”27 but
has also been elaborated by postcolonial scholarship as “critical for the formation of
Westernmodernity –without it, theWestwould not have been able to recognize and
represent itself as the summit of human history”.28
In addition to European Othering in terms of nation-states and civilizations,
religion played a key role from the early Middle Ages onwards. European Christians
divided the world into three categories: Christians, heretics (Christians who had to
be brought back into the fold of the true Church) and infidels (non-Christians). This
categorization may explain the unity-in-diversity among Europeans: they might
fight and hate each other, but would always share the same Christian roots. The real
Other was the infidel non-Christian. Christian scholars came to accept the notion of
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other religions as more or less equal belief-systems only in the eighteenth century,
whenEnlightenment prompted them to be critical of their own religion and to open
their eyes to theworld. And even though centuries of religious conflict and religious
wars, culminating in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), appear to argue the opposite
of the unity-in-diversity, the notion of Europe-as-Christendom has been called the
‘grand narrative’ of European identity: this narrative “possesses a sufficient degree
of continuity and coherence to be a powerful factor both in intellectual history and
in the collective unconsciousness of contemporary Europeans.”29 Indeed, such grand
narratives canhardlybe challenged“partlybecause their greatestpower is at the level
of the unconscious mind, collective and individual.”30 So powerful is this narrative
that it has even survived the secularization of Europe since the nineteenth century.
From that moment onwards, the Other was mostly defined in terms of culture and
civilization, butChristendomwas still considered an intrinsic part, and to some even
the main propellant, of that European superior civilization.31
The question we want to address by using the approach of Otherness is: does
Islam function as the European Other and, if so, how, when, and why at that par-
ticular moment, in that place? We will see that the image of Islam as the Other
transforms through time, subject to the transformations that Europe is undergoing.
And that brings us to another question: is Islammerely another Other in European
self-identity, or does it play a special role in European history? At first glance, Islam
doesnot appear to be very different fromthe otherOthers:Muslims aswell as Islamic
civilization have served as the anti-Christian archetype inmedieval times and as the
uncivilized Other during colonial times, and nowadays Islam is often perceived as
the antithesis tomodernity and its products of Enlightenment, freedomanddemoc-
racy. In this respect, Islam is not an exceptional Other compared to the barbaric
pagans of medieval Europe, the savages in foreign lands during colonial times, the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, or any other form of social or political Othering.
However, I would argue that within the notion of European Otherness, Islam takes
a special position in several respects. First, its interaction with Europe has not been
incidental or contingent, like the Communism or colonialism, but continuous, al-
beit in different forms for a period of thirteen centuries. Second, as a civilization,
Islam has for several centuries been superior to Europe in numerous ways – mili-
tarily, economically, technically, intellectually, culturally – and consequently had a
position different from that of the conventional Other who is to serve as the lesser
alter ego. Third, Islam as a religion has always been a topic of discussion in European
polemics, unlike other religions such as Judaism, Hinduism or animism. Moreover,
these polemics did not confine themselves to theological dogma, but extended freely
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into the Islamic ‘mind’, ‘nature’ or ‘culture’ of its believers. The combination of these
factors, through a period of thirteen centuries, has given Islam its special position as
the European Other.
The aforementioned scholar Bernard Lewis also observes distinct characteristics
of Islam that distinguishes it from “the European images of the Chinese or Indian,”
but for different reasons from those I have just mentioned. The difference, Lewis ar-
gues, is that the “Indians, after all, have never invaded Spain or crossed the Pyrenees;
the Chinese had never conquered Constantinople or besieged Vienna”, they never
made attempts to convert Christians to their religious beliefs, and never had they
condemned the Bible as obsolete and offered a new scripture to take its place; Europe
and Islam, Bernard states, “were old acquaintances, intimate enemies”.32 This im-
agery represents a widely held European view of Islam but, as the next chapters will
make clear, Lewis takes liberties with history, in particular by attributing the Mus-
lims (andhence Islam, for he uses the two terms interchangeably)with an aggressive






I. Setting the Stage
Europe encountered Islam shortly after this new religionwas established in the Arab Peninsula.
The death of the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, in 632ce caused only a brief period of inter-
nal strife among Muslims before the prophet’s successors (caliphs) sent small but determined
armies northwards, aimed at conquest. Their timing was perfect, although not intentionally
so, because the two empires that they met on their way, the Byzantines in theMiddle East and
North Africa and the Sassanids in Iraq and Iran had by then worn each other out in centuries
of military strife. Within years, theMuslim armies had vanquished these two empires and con-
quered vast territories.When the Islamic caliphatemoved its capital fromMedina toDamascus
in 661ce, its empire reached from present day Libya to Iran.
The sudden expansion of this newpowerhardly affected the inhabitants ofEurope, however,
because the Muslim conquests took place mainly outside the continent, with three exceptions:
the (failed) attacks on the Byzantine capital of Constantinople which lies on the European
side of the Bosporus, the quick conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711ce and the laborious
occupation of Sicily a century later. Villages on the European coastlines of the Mediterranean
had to fear pirates, some of them Muslims operating from Tunisia or from one of the many
Mediterranean islands. Beyond these regions, Europeans were aware of Muslims and Islam,
but only in very vague terms and by means of crude images. The vast majority of Europeans
could not care less: they were too busy surviving one of the most insecure and chaotic periods in
Europe’s history.
1. Europe at the Dawn of theMuslim Conquests
To explain the background to this period we must go back in time, to the fifth
century. The collapse of the western part of the Roman Empire with its capital in
Rome, in combinationwith vastmigrationwaves of tribes and peoples from eastern
to western Europe, had caused enormous chaos in all aspects of the word.1 With the
disappearance of political, social and economic structures, any sense of coherent life
that we might call civilization had broken down. The network of long stretches of
brick roadsbuilt by theRomans throughoutEuropewas left indisarray, anda similar
fate befell the walls, schools, public baths and sewage systems of the cities. Reading
and writing became an obsolete skill, and those who persevered in it had to make
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use of hides, since papyrus was no longer available. Worse, all knowledge that had
once brought about the technical prowess of the Romans had gradually vanished,
together with their statecraft, arts, literature and science.
The chapter of what once was the Roman Empire was closed for the peoples of
western Europe who were now going through the lengthy and painful process of
reinventing and re-establishing themselves.Hence the nameMiddle Ages, as the pe-
riod between the Roman and Renaissance eras is called. Only the south-eastern part
of the European continent was rescued from this collapse; here, the Byzantine Em-
pire had succeeded the eastern Roman Empire. The Byzantines continued to build
and expand a prosperous empire that comprised what is now called the Balkans,
Turkey, the Middle East, North Africa and southern Italy.
An issueof debate is the extent towhich theMuslimconquests in the late seventh
and early eighth centuries were to be blamed for the Western European decline.
Some historians have argued that theMuslims’ occupation of the lands south of the
Mediterranean and their ensuing maritime blockade of the entire Mediterranean
deprived Europe of the chance to import vital goods and consequently cut off the
main artery of the European economy.2 This thesis has been contested, however,
mainly because Europe’s decline had already set in at a much earlier date than the
Muslim conquests in the seventh century. Several historians even take the contrary
position, arguing that the Muslim conquests had actually contributed to the later
social, economic and technological revival of Western Europe rather than having
caused its earlier decline.3
If any factor played a role in the European economic deterioration, then it was
not Islam but Christianity. The Church strongly disapproved of wealth, preaching
a return to poverty and ascetic life as the ultimate virtue. At a time when abbeys,
churches and monasteries were perhaps the last institutions with capital to spend,
the Catholic Church had forbidden all clergy from lending money at interest or
trading as professional merchants as early as 325ce (Council of Nicae). The Church
put a ban on usury, which was decreed a crime by worldly leaders like Charlemagne
in the late eight century. Consequently, Western Europe for several centuries “was
deprived of its financiers, bankers, greatmerchants, and contractors; in other words,
specialists in production and exchange”.4 The strict enforcement of Christian rules
regarding usury, capital and wealth was a reason for the continuation, if not the
cause, of an early medieval European economy that was in a complete shambles:
the use of money had become nearly obsolete and was largely replaced by a barter
economy, investment was almost nil due to the strict enforcement of the usury ban;
and consequently the development of a financial and economic infrastructure was
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non-existent. This situation was to change only around 1000ce, as we will see in the
next chapter.
In this early era, two European powers played a key role in the interactions with the
newMuslim neighbour. The first was the Byzantine Empire, the eastern part of the
former Roman Empire that had started a new life while the western part slumped
and collapsed. The Byzantine Empire grew powerful in terms of territory as well
as politics, military might and culture. It even managed to retain its power and
civilization after the ArabMuslims had usurpedmost of its territories in theMiddle
East and North Africa.
The second empire that played an important role in this epoch was that of the
Carolingian Franks, with their power base in France. This empire arose from the Eu-
ropean debris of theWestern Roman Empire, andwas of an entirely different nature
from the Byzantine Empire because itwas, in thewords of onehistorian, “religiously
intolerant, intellectually impoverished, socially calcified, and economically primi-
tive”.5 Its pinnacle of success and power was the reign of Charlemagne who ruled
from768until 814, andwhohadpledgedhis allegiance to theRomanpapacy as cham-
pion of Christianity. He unified large parts of Europe under the Frankish-Christian
banner, but his military campaigns were fought with increasing religious fanati-
cism, aimed at the conversion of the conquered tribes by force of the sword and
exercising vengeful ferocity against those who resisted or who reverted to their hea-
then ways. Even nations that were already Christian fell under the Frankish sword
with the allegation that they were not true Christians.6 All this was done with the
blessing of the Pope and with the help of missionary priests who accompanied the
Frankish armies.7
The Carolingians and Byzantines did not see eye to eye, and there was serious
rivalry and even hostility between the two powers. Themost conspicuous difference
between themwas their interpretation of Christianity: the Carolingians in the west
followed the Christianity that was Latin in language and rite, with its papal seat in
Rome, while the Byzantines in the east followed the Christianity of Constantinople
that was Greek in language and rite. Both sides therefore claimed superiority over
all Christendom and made a point of not recognizing the supreme leaders of the
rival church. Given the close relationship between clerical and worldly power, the
claim to power over the Christian flock was not a mere theological issue, but a
matter of power and therefore a continual bone of contention. This antagonismwas
aggravated by considerations of a more material nature. The richness and opulence
of the Byzantine Empire, and in particular its capital Constantinople, was a thorn
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in the side of the impoverished and primitive Western European. The Byzantines
also did not miss an opportunity to express their contempt for the intellectual and
technological backwardness of the Europeans. This streak of enmity that divided
Europe must be kept in mind when we take a closer look at the interactions with
the new adversary: Islam.
2. The Islamic Empire
In the periodwhen Europewas still in decline, theMuslims, by contrast, established
a thriving empire which they had built with dazzling speed, not only in territorial
terms, but also culturally, economically and politically. The relative security within
their vast empire brought about a Pax Islamica that stimulated an ever-increasing
cultural and economic prosperity, culminating inwhat becameknownas the golden
age that lasted until the end of the tenth century ce.8
After the brief reign of the so-called ‘Rightly guided caliphs’, the Islamic empire
was ruled from 661 to 750 by the Umayyad dynasty from its capital Damascus, which
was then replaced by the Abbasid dynasty that moved the capital eastwards, to
Baghdad. By then, the empire stretched fromMorocco and the Iberian Peninsula to
present-day Afghanistan and Central Asia. With the moving of the capital eastward
to Baghdad in 762ce, the focus of the empire gravitated towards Asia, with China
and India as themain sources of commerce andknowledge. TheMediterraneanbasin
remained of onlymarginal importance, being located on thewestern outskirts of the
empire.
Commerce in particular benefited from the security of the Pax Islamica across the
vastness of the empire. Trade could now be conducted along routes that stretched
from East Asia to West Africa and were dotted with caravanserais, the walled edi-
fices that combined hostel and trade centre. These same routes facilitated the flow
of knowledge and technology across the empire.9 This was particularly important
for agriculture, one of the backbones of the prosperity of the inhabitants of the Is-
lamic Empire. Crops that didwell in semi-arid areas of India andMesopotamiawere
transplanted to other regions in the empire with similar climates and, in combina-
tion with new agricultural techniques, allowing for an increase in harvests.10
One of themain features of this golden agewas the patronage of arts and sciences
by the caliphate court. At the heart of this patronage was the collection of scholarly
and scientific tracts from all over the empire for study by scholars in Baghdad. A
multitude of Greek, Persian and Sanskrit scholarly manuscripts was collected and
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translated into Arabic, becoming an immense source of knowledge on a range of
sciences. The Arab Muslim scholars assigned to study these tracts in turn furthered
the theories and sciences they became acquainted with.11 This scholarly enterprise,
which had already started in the eight century when the new Abbasid caliphate
had moved its seat to Baghdad, soon became institutionalized in the famous and
prestigious ‘House of Wisdom’, an academic research centre avant la lettre.
With the exception of the Iberian Peninsula, the Islamic empire did not seem to
care much about Europe at that time: Europe had very little to offer, and in terms
of commerce and knowledge the Muslims mostly turned eastwards, toward India
and China. The little trade that existed between Europe and the Islamic Empire was
mostly a one-way affair based on European demand for goods from the Islamic Em-
pire, and hardly the other way round.Moreover, theMuslims did not venture out to
trade across the Mediterranean; they would take their caravans as far as the Byzan-
tine Empire while Constantinople dominated trade further into the Mediterranean
basin. Knowledgewasnot yet in demandby theEuropeans – that became a commod-
ity only after the tenth century, as we will see in the next chapter.
II. Physical Islam
1. The Realm of Interaction
Now that we have outlined the division of powers and territories in the period
between 700 and 1000, we come to the main question: how did the people of the
two sides interact, and what was the role of religion in this interaction? As we have
already seen, virtual interactionwas very limited: Europeanshadno interest in Islam
as a religion or civilization, or in its technologies or knowledge. What little we know
of the images that Europeans held of Muslims and Islam will be discussed at the
end of this chapter. Interaction wasmostly of a physical nature, which was of course
dominated by battles and raids, but also by diplomacy, trade and,most importantly,
by the coexistence of these peoples in three territories: Constantinople, the Iberian
Peninsula and Sicily. The situations of these three regions were quite different, and
therefore merit separate introductions before we will take a closer look at their
inhabitants.
Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire
When the Arab Muslim warriors rode out into the Middle East for the first time in
634ce, the Byzantine Empire’s territories encompassed present-day Sicily, southern
Italy, the Balkans, Greece, Turkey, theMiddle East andNorth Africa, and as such had
been spared most of the wars and migrations of the European peoples that had rav-
aged and disrupted the European mainland in the previous centuries. Before the
Muslims, the only real threat had come from the east, from the Huns in Central
Asia and the rival empire of the Sassanids in Persia, but the Byzantines were able
to repel them. However, by the time the Arab Muslim armies emerged in the sev-
enth century the Byzantine Empire was too weakened to put up sufficient military
resistance. The Arab Muslim armies swiftly took the larger Byzantine cities in the
Middle East, like Jerusalem in 637ce. The Muslims’ victories were aided not only
by the Byzantine inability to defend its territories, but also by the little resistance
put up by the Byzantine subjects themselves. In several cases, they even welcomed
the newMuslim conquerors, because their promise of religious freedomwas amuch
better alternative than the persecution they endured from Constantinople that ve-
hemently opposed their sectarian views of Christianity.12
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The Muslim conquest of Byzantine territory took place in several stages, spread
out over a period of seventy years. The Byzantine Empire lost most of its dominions
in theMiddle East andNorthAfrica, andwas leftwith its territories on the European
continent and with the region what nowadays is Turkey.13 The ArabMuslim armies
even laid siege to the city of Constantinople in 674ce, and again in 717ce. The
last siege of the city ended in a devastating defeat for the Muslim armies. From
that moment onwards, the two powers maintained their territorial positions with
continuous skirmishes and raids in the border areas.
The Byzantine loss of most of its territories to the Arab Muslims plunged the
remnant of the Byzantine Empire on the European continent into what some histo-
rians have called a ‘dark age’. Trade between the remainder of the Byzantine Empire
and the formerByzantine lands thatwerenowpart of the Islamic empire diminished
dramatically.14The centuries-old economic infrastructurewasutterly disruptednow
that large portions of the empire were lost. Being cut off from the granaries of Egypt
and North Africa was only one of the many problems that Byzantium faced. The
despair also showed culturally: “fewer authors wrote, fewer teachers taught, fewer
artists and artisans created, and fewer builders built.”15 The demoralizationwas fur-
ther reflected in arguments on God’s displeasure with the Byzantines, resulting in
disputes about religious doctrine.
Al-Andalus: The Emirate and Caliphate of Cordoba
TheMuslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula seems to have been driven by chance
rather than by strategy. The peninsula was invaded in 711ce, less than a century af-
ter the Muslim conquests had started, and almost at the same time as, on the other
side of theMediterranean, theMuslimswere being repulsed from their siege of Con-
stantinople. The army of twenty thousand warriors was led by general Tariq, who
left his name to the mountainous outcropping at the most southern point of the
peninsula (Gibraltar, from Gabal Tari’, ‘mountain of Tariq’). The peninsula at the
time was ruled by the Visigoths, one of the Germanic tribes that had moved from
eastern Europe during the migration period, and who had converted to Christian-
ity. Several scholars have questioned whether the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula
can be called a Muslim conquest, given that the bulk of the invaders were ethni-
cally Berbers who were brought under Arab dominion only several years earlier
and whose recent conversion to Islam was probably symbolic at best,16 but also be-
cause the local population did not conceive of the invaders from Morocco in re-
ligious terms as a threat to their own Christianity.17 Their resistance to the in-
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vaders was meagre, and the Visigoth kingdom collapsed when its king was killed
during the first battle. The easy walk-in by the Muslim army therefore hardly de-
serves the name of conquest, but was more a take-over, especially with many of
the inhabitants applauding the replacement of the Visigoths by a less oppressive
ruler.18
The Arab-Berber presence in Spain – which was known in Arabic as Andalus (de-
rived from ‘(V)andals’, the predecessors of the Visigoths) – gained momentum when
a prince of the Umayyad caliphate fled from Damascus after the establishment of
the new caliphate of the Abbasids in 750ce, and made it all the way to the Iberian
Peninsula where he was put on the throne as a ruler. The prince had a land to rule,
Andalus had its legitimate ruler, and together as the emirate (princedom) of Cordoba
they embarked on an adventure that turned out to be of historical proportions. Al-
though geographically and politically disconnected from the Islamic Empire with
its capital in far-away Baghdad, the emirate was an indissoluble part of Islamic civi-
lization.
The presence of Arab-Islamic rule in Andalus was to continue for almost eight
centuries, from 711 to 1492ce. The presence of a Muslim population was to last
longer, as we will see in the third chapter. Already in the ninth century its economic
and agricultural progress made Andalus “at least four centuries more advanced that
Western Christendom.”19 The tenth century witnessed a true golden age, spurred
on and influenced by the economic, cultural, scientific and social achievements that
took place in the entire Islamic Empire. The emirate became a caliphate from 929 to
1031ce, and the capital of Cordobawas by then the largest city of the European conti-
nent,with approximately 100,000 inhabitants, to bematchedonlybyConstantinople
in the east.20 In addition to all this prosperity, the caliphate also initiated what be-
came known as a green revolution by introducing new irrigation techniques and
new crops such as rice, sugar-cane, cotton, oranges, lemons, bananas, spinach, ar-
tichokes and aubergines.21
The emirate – later caliphate – and its Frankish neighbours on the other side of
the Pyreneesmade regular raids and incursions into each other’s territories. Another
small neighbour within the Iberian Peninsula, however, was to prove the proverbial
nail in the coffin of the Muslim reign in the peninsula. The Arab-Muslim conquest
had not covered the entire peninsula, and in the north several small Christian king-
doms remained. The seat of power of theMuslim realmwas way down in the south,
first in Cordoba and later in Granada, and its rulers had little interest in the north.
Just as in the case of Byzantium and the Islamic Empire, the frontier between the
Christian north and Muslim south was a fluid affair, a zone for mutual raids and
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trade rather than a fixed and impregnable line. This more or less stable situation
would continue for several centuries, but changed dramatically to the disadvantage
of the emirate in the eleventh century, as we will see in the next chapter.
Sicily
The other part of geographical Europe where Muslims were to live together with
Christians was Sicily. This island in the middle of the Mediterranean had been oc-
cupied or colonized by the main powers that had dominated the Mediterranean in
thepast: the Phoenicians fromthe Levant, Carthaginians fromNorthAfrica, Romans
from Italy and the Byzantines from Asia Minor.
At the time of the Arab-Muslim conquests, Sicily was under Byzantine rule,
with a population that was predominantly Christian and mostly Greek- or Latin-
speaking. Due to the maritime dominance at the time of the Byzantines, Sicily re-
mained untouched by the early Arab aggression that went over land. Only when the
Arabs had firmly established themselves in Tunisia (called Ifriqiya or ‘Africa’ in Ara-
bic) did they cast hungry eyes at the island that on clear days could be seen on the
horizon. From the Tunisian coasts the Arab Muslims engaged in pirate raids across
the sea into Sicily and beyond, to the coastal areas of southern France and western
Italy.
Starting in 827ce, more than a century after the Arab-Muslim conquest of the
Iberian Peninsula and almost two centuries after the first Arab-Muslim conquests
from Mecca had started, Tunisian piracy turned to conquest: in the following years
cities in Sicilywere takenand, after initial plundering, Arab-BerberMuslimcolonists
fromNorth Africa moved in to settle there. In the following century, Muslim domi-
nation never encompassed the entire island, because of recurrent uprisings from the
native (Christian) population. It is therefore impossible to suggest a date fromwhen
one can speak of ‘Islamic Sicily’.22
The political heart of Muslim power was located in the city of Palermo, which
became a thriving centre of Arab-Islamic culture and gave Arab Sicily the name ‘the
little sister of al-Andalus’. The many religious jurists and scholars, grammarians,
scientists and poets of great repute quickly earned Sicily intellectual and academic
fame.23 Like Andalus, Sicily also benefited from the agricultural innovations im-
ported from North Africa, creating a second green revolution. Muslim domination
of Sicily remained for over a century and a half, until it was ended in the late tenth
century by the Normans.
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2. Living with the Unbeliever
Both Islam and Christianity are monotheistic religions with a claim to universality.
However, the urgency of spreading the word has manifested itself quite differently
in the earlyMuslimandEuropeanworlds: EuropeanChristian conquerors, and espe-
cially Charlemagne, waged an aggressive policy of forced conversions, whileMuslim
conquerorsdidnot. Also, given the chronological emergenceof Judaism,Christianity
and Islam, there was quite a difference between the two religions in their recog-
nition of the other two religions: Islam recognizes Judaism and Christianity as its
precursors, but Christianity recognizes neither (not Judaism because its adherents
had betrayed Jesus, and not Islam because it was unknown at the time of emerg-
ing Christianity). Apart from these theological viewpoints, it is important to note
that the worlds encountered by Islam and Christianity in their early days were very
different: Christianity manifested itself in early medieval Europe, while Islam en-
countered thehighly sophisticated civilizations of theByzantines and Sassanides. All
thesedifferenceshad their effect on the coexistence ofMuslims andChristians. In the
period under discussion here, this coexistence at first took place predominantly un-
der Islamic rule, and only later – especially since the late tenth century – also under
Christian rule.
The Issue of Conversion
Ashas alreadybeenmentioned, conversion–whether voluntaryor forced– tookplace
in quite different ways under Christianity and Islam. In the European setting, early
Christianity had spread gradually and sporadically,mostly by the efforts ofmission-
aries. Conversion was not a personal choice for a new faith but rather the adoption
of a new set of forms of worship, and therefore often a communal rather than an in-
dividual affair.24 The conversion of a king would usually imply the conversion of his
entire people. Later, under the Carolingian kings, in particular Charlemagne, con-
quests were accompanied by forced conversion. This coercion to convert, whether by
missionary or forced means, was not exerted, however, on the Jews nor, later, on the
Muslimswho lived in Europe (except in Spain in the late fifteenth century, aswewill
discuss at length in the third chapter).
The situation in the Islamic realm was quite different from that of Christianity.
Whereas Christianity first spread gradually through missionary activities and then
was established by conquest, the Islamic situation was the reverse: first an empire
was established by conquest and then, gradually, Islam spread within that empire.
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Another distinct difference between the Christian and Islamic realms was that the
peoples subduedby theMuslimarmieswere not pagan tribal peoples, aswas the case
in Europe, but established religious communities and civilizations – mainly Jews,
Christians and Zoroastrians – that were much more advanced than the tribal Arab-
Muslims who subdued them. But the most striking feature of Muslim conquest
was that the conquering Muslim armies as a general rule did not impose on their
non-Muslim subjects a compulsory conversion to Islam, nor was there any Muslim
missionary activity among the non-believers.
Why did the conquering Muslim armies not convert all subjected peoples to
Islam? Various reasons have been advanced by historians to explain this curious –
from a Christian perspective, that is – position. First there is a theological answer:
Islam does not allow forced conversion, as it is explicitly prohibited by the Quran.25
Also, the Quran specificallymentions Jews and Christians as people to be recognized
as predecessors to Islam and who need to be respected in their faiths. The second
answer is of amilitary andpolitical nature: the small bands of Arab-Muslimwarriors
would not have been able to impose and maintain the forced conversion of the
entire population of such a vast conquered area. The third answer is related to ethnic
superiority: although Islam claims universality, the Muslims of the Arab Peninsula
who rode out to conquer the world were Arabs, and this first generation of Muslims
considered Islam to be exclusively meant for Arabs, and for a long time non-Arabs
could adopt Islam only if they were sponsored by an Arab.26 It took a revolt by
converted Persians to alter this ethnic exclusivity. The fourth answer that explains
the lack of conversion zeal among theMuslim conquerors is financial, and according
to most historians was probably the decisive reason not to convert the conquered
peoples to Islam: the non-Muslims of the Islamic empire had to pay a poll tax that
was not obligatory for Muslims. Conversion meant that the poll tax was no longer
obligatory, and massive conversion would therefore lead to a lack of income for the
Muslim conquerors who very much needed these taxes to build the empire and
finance new campaigns.27
TheMuslim reticence in converting the conquered unbelievers created the para-
doxical situation of an Islamic empire being ruled by a Muslim minority. This was
also the situation at first in Spain and Sicily. To call these powers and civilizations ‘Is-
lamic’ is therefore, correctly speaking, in reference to the religionandcultureof those
in power, and does not refer to themajority population. Nevertheless, conversion to
Islam by the native population, and the consequential change of an increasingMus-
lim population in the Islamic empire, eventually did take place, but was a gradual
process. The speed of this process differed according to region, but it definitely took
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a long time, sometimes centuries, before Muslims became a majority in the various
parts of the Islamic Empire.28
The reasons for conversion to Islam are generally assumed to bematerial, name-
sly to get rid of the special poll tax for non-Muslims and to gain access to positions
of authority and power, whichwere reserved forMuslims only. Another and perhaps
evenmore compelling reason to convert to Islamwas that in societies where religion
wasmore a communal identity than an individual faith, converting to the religionof
the rulerwas themeans to express one’s acceptance of thedominant order. In the case
of Al-Andalus, it has been argued that conversion by native Christians to Islam was
mainly prompted by their wish or need to fully participate in the culture and society
of al-Andalus which was, at least theoretically, restricted to Muslims.29 We will see
later, with the progress of the Islamic-Christian history in Europe, that this was
a recurring phenomenon among Christians under Muslim rule. Interestingly, the
reversewas hardly the case: very fewMuslims under Christian rulewould convert to
Christianity. But this situation – i.e., ofMuslims living under Christian rule –would
only take place much later, and we will leave that to the next chapter. In the period
under discussion here, that is between 700 and 1000ce, very fewMuslims in Europe
were subjects under Christian rule.
Religious Rule
We must start with a remark on terminology that is to be borne in mind when
reading this and the following chapters. When we speak of ‘rule’ this is not to be
understood as the rule of a majority over minorities. As we have just seen, suchma-
jority rule was not always the case: inmany instances theMuslim rulers constituted
theminority in the societywhere they lived. ‘Islam’ ruled, but theMuslims for a long
time constituted a minority in their own empire. This was to repeat itself under Is-
lamic rule in Spain and in theEuropeandomains of theOttomanEmpire. The correct
manner of describing the power arrangementwithin a realm is thereforemore often
to speak of ruler and subject instead of majority andminority.
Christian and Islamic rulers all claimed to have established God’s rule and to
uphold God’s law. But what did this say about the treatment of non-believers?
Should they be converted, or subjected to God’s rule as upheld by the rulers, or
be left to their own religious law? Here also we see another distinct difference be-
tween Christianity and Islam. Let us start with Christianity. From a theological
point of view, Christianity in the period between the seventh and eleventh centuries
considered all non-Christians to be pagans who had to be converted to Christian-
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ity, by force if need be. However, Christian rulers made an exception for Jews and
later, when Muslims became subject to Christian rule, also for them. This excep-
tion should not be construed as recognition, but was merely the result of circum-
stances. Given the very few non-Christians in early medieval Europe, at least in
those parts of Europe that were under Christian rule, no formal position was de-
veloped as regards such communities. The freedom of the Jews to practise their re-
ligion was limited to what the Christians believed to be the correct interpretation
of the Old Testament, the Pope being the ultimate judge of what constituted cor-
rect Jewish doctrine.30 This marginal toleration of the Jews, often combined with
forms of social discrimination (they were excluded from several occupations, for ex-
ample, and from membership of guilds), would turn quite ugly after the eleventh
century.
The only Christian realm in Europe where Muslim subjects lived under Chris-
tian rule during the period between 700 and 1000ce was the Byzantine capital Con-
stantinople. These Muslims were an amalgamation of different backgrounds and
origins. Most Muslims in Constantinople lived there on a temporary basis: mer-
chants and prisoners of war waiting to be ransomed. They probably inhabited the
Muslim quarter of Constantinople. Here also resided the ‘permanent’ Muslim resi-
dents: the Arabs, Persians and Kurds who had voluntarily offered their military ser-
vices – an Arab chronicler in 943ce mentioned 1,200 Arab cavalrymen in the Byzan-
tine army.31 This was not a typical Arab phenomenon: the opposite also happened,
with Christians crossing the Arab-Byzantine frontier and seeking refuge in or offer-
ing their services to Arab rulers. OtherMuslimpermanent residents inConstantino-
ple were prisoners of war who had accepted the offer of their Byzantine capturers to
merge into Byzantine society by settling on plots of land.32
In addition to the presence of Muslim sojourners and residents in Constantino-
ple, Arab chronicles speak of a mosque in Constantinople as early as the eighth cen-
tury. It is said that it was built by, or at the request of, general Maslama, after whom
the mosque was named. He had led the legendary expedition against Byzantium in
717ce, and the mosque as well as the prison built for the Muslim prisoners of war
was possibly part of his conditions for lifting the siege. The exact location of the
Maslama mosque, as it became known, has never been found, however: it was de-
stroyed around 1200 and, according to Arab chroniclers, rebuilt by the Byzantines in
1263, although this reconstruction could have been confused with the alleged con-
struction of another mosque at the time by the Byzantine emperor to please the
Mamluks who then ruled the Levant and who were in the process of mopping up
the last remnants of the Crusaders’ presence.33
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The situation as regards non-believers was quite different in the Muslim realm, in
terms both of Islamic law and the practice of Islamic rule. Islamic religious doc-
trine formally recognizes the so-called religions ‘of the book’, that is Judaism and
Christianity, and this recognition was extended to Zoroastrianism and in practice
also toHinduism, creating in theMuslim realmmulti-religious societieswith Islam
as dominating religion. Islamic law developed a legal status for these non-Muslim
communities as ‘protectedpeople’ (dhimmi),which formallymeant that they enjoyed
full religious freedom and legal autonomy in religious affairs within their religious
community in exchange for a poll tax and recognition of theMuslims’ sovereignty.
Of course theory and practice were not always in concordance. Legally, the sta-
tus of the dhimmis provided both advantages and disadvantages.34 An important ad-
vantage was that non-Muslims were allowed religious freedom and autonomy in
religious affairs, including religious family law, which they were allowed to apply
within their community. Religious freedom meant that these non-Muslims were
exempted from several rules of Islamic law that were considered applicable only to
Muslims. These exemptions were the rules of marriage and divorce (some Muslim
scholars included inheritance and custody lawaswell), the consumptionof and trade
in pork and alcohol and, according to a majority of Muslim scholars, the rules of Is-
lamic penal law as specifically determined by theQuran. These ruleswould officially
not apply to non-Muslims.
The disadvantage of Islamic law, on the other hand, was that it granted non-
Muslims a second-class status: non-Muslims were not allowed to take on a position
of authority (for that would grant a non-Muslim authority over a Muslim), had to
pay a separate poll tax, and were subjected to all kinds of rules devaluating the le-
gal status of a non-Muslim to half of that of a Muslim, and discriminatory rules
intended to emphasize the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, like the
prohibition on wearing certain types of cloth or riding certain animals.
As said, legal theory was not always the same as social practice. The situation of
non-Muslim subjects could be better but alsoworse than their legal status. First and
foremost, dhimmi status was usually granted only to cities that surrendered: resis-
tance often led to pillaging the town and its inhabitants being sold into slavery (this
was not typical of Muslim conquests but the general code of war at that time, as we
will see later). But evenwhen the pact of dhimmitude had been established with non-
Muslim communities, practice could differ from the letter of the law. For instance,
Jews and Christians held high positions at the Islamic courts of Baghdad, Palermo
andCordoba in the tenth century, a statuswhichwas formallynot allowedby Islamic
law. In other instances, non-Muslims were worse off than their official status, for
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instance when, contrary to Islamic law, they were subjected to discriminatory rules
or even incidental persecution.
Tolerance and Social Tensions
The rules and practices of Islam as regards non-Muslim minorities as described
above are largely reflected in the two European territories where Muslim rule was
established in the early middle ages: the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily. When the
splendour ofmilitary glory and the excitement of bootyhadworn off, the two realms
were seen by theMuslim conquerors as dominionswhere theywould settle and rule.
There was no agenda of conversion: the native inhabitants were allowed to continue
their ways as long as they recognized the new rulers and paid the special poll tax.
This situation has prompted observers to describe it in terms of tolerance.35 Some
nuance is required here, however. Insofar as historians can gain insight into the ev-
eryday life of those times, it has been shown that these Muslims and non-Muslims
lived separate lives, perhaps only meeting in the market place or, in the case of con-
flict, in law courts.36 Toleration in this respect does not mean a pluralistic commu-
nity, but a pragmatic live and let live, basedmainly on indifference and segregation.
This could be different at the palace courts, the centres of power where enlightened
rulers would allow non-Muslim intellectuals and artists to participate in govern-
ment, science, arts and intellectual debates. These people would produce the writ-
ings that are preserved in history, and therefore these episodes are best known,while
outside the palaces the treatment of commoners could be much worse.
For instance, during the period of Muslim rule in Sicily, the initial treatment of
the native Christian population – including shipping them off into slavery toNorth
Africa – apparently was such that they had little reason to welcome the new rulers,
and there are various accounts of native Christians rising in revolt or migrating to
Italy.37 With many Christian communities, however, the Muslims concluded the
so-called dhimmi pacts that granted them religious freedom and a certain degree
of autonomy in exchange for their allegiance and payment of a poll tax. But the
combination of depopulation by migrating Christians, repopulation by Muslim
settlers from North Africa, and the remaining Christians’ gradual conversion to
Islam caused the Sicilian population to become aMuslimmajority.38
While the conquest of Sicily was part of, or the result of plunder raids that had
been taking place for decades, the conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula were much
more indulgent with the native population. Muslim rule as established in Andalus
in the centuries to come even gained a reputation for its religious tolerance. Given
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the circumstances of the time and the comparisonwith Europe of that time, this ad-
miration is definitely justified. But one must keep in mind that Islam, however tol-
erant of other religions, remained the authoritative code of morality and behaviour.
Islam was to be recognized as the dominating religion, and to be respected as such.
Blasphemy and insults to Islam were not acceptable, nor apostasy from Islam. The
reverse, on the other hand, was not considered an affront to public order: although
apostasy from Christianity or Judaism was also forbidden by these religions, it was
allowed by Islam as it meant conversion to Islam. And since Islam had supremacy,
that was to be the rule.
This situation was challenged in the ninth century by the so-called martyrs of
Cordoba.39 In the period between 851 and 859ce, a succession of, in total, forty-eight
Christians were decapitated for publicly denouncing the prophet Muhammad and
disparaging Islam. Most of these ‘martyrs’ – that is the title that Christian posterity
gave them–were asceticmonks, but among themwere also descendants frommixed
Christian-Muslimmarriages. The latter case proved particular serious, because even
though these people considered themselves Christian, according to Islamic law they
were Muslim since they were the offspring of a marriage between a Muslim man
and a Christian woman, and their children consequently follow the religion of the
father.* In these particular cases, however, the children persisted publicly in the
religion of theirmother andwere therefore, from the Islamic point of view,Muslims
guilty of the capital crime of apostasy from Islam. For these people there was little
mercy. The monks, on the other hand, who publicly denounced Mohammed as a
false prophet were treated leniently at first, being arrested and then sent away with
a warning or a beating. Only when they persisted in returning to the public squares
declaring the vileness of Islam and its prophet did the Muslim rulers apply the
capital punishment.
Several reasons have been advanced for this curious trend of deliberately seeking
martyrdom:was it thedefiance ofMuslimrule, a reaction toprovocationbyMuslims
or, in the case of Christians with Muslim fathers, the challenge of parental author-
ity? Any of these reasons seem plausible, but none of them explain why these events
took place in this particularmoment. A compelling reason is that this period of time
witnessed the shifting balance in society in favour of Arab Muslim culture, which
created unrest among the Christian population and led to the public denunciation
* That is also the reason that the opposite – a marriage between a Muslim woman and a Jewish or
Christian man – is not allowed under Islamic law because that would make the children follow their
father’s Judaism or Christianity.
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of that culture.40 InparticularnativeChristianswhowere adoptingvarious aspects of
the increasingly dominating culture of theArab-BerberMuslim rulers,were a source
of discontent among their fellow native Christians.41 While theMuslims in Andalus
were initially a tinyminority among aChristianmajority, their number is estimated
to have risen to 20–30 per cent by 850ce, the period of themartyrs of Cordoba.42 This
percentage was to rise to 50 per cent in the next century, indicating a steady increase
in conversions as well as influx of settlers fromNorth Africa. This development had
two consequences. On the one hand, there are recorded incidents of Muslims who
abused their status of dominance by publicly defying Christians. On the other hand,
it brought many Christians under Muslim rule to accommodate to Muslim dom-
inance, among others by switching to speaking Arabic (hence their name mozarabs,
whichmeans ‘thosewho are Arabized’). These developments incited someChristians
to defend their religion, culture andway of life frombeing appropriated by the dom-
inatingMuslim culture.
The resulting stand-off by the martyrs of Cordoba can therefore be interpreted
as a criticism not only of Muslims but also of fellow-Christians who were accused
of giving up their Christian identity. The Muslim authorities responded with in-
creasing severity towards the martyrs, but also towards the Christian community
in general by enforcing a separate dress code and closing palace functions to Chris-
tians – rules thatwere alreadypart of Islamic lawbut apparentlyhadnotbeen strictly
applied before. The Christian community also respondedwith criticism of these acts
of martyrdom, probably because they feared that their social and legal position in
Andalus was put at risk.
This argument – avoiding criticism of Islam or Islamic rule in order not to
jeopardize the delicate social position of the Christian community under Islamic
rule – recurred a century later, with the visit of a delegation from King Otto I to the
court inCordoba in 954ce.43At that time, caliphAbdar-Rahman III of Andalus (ruled
912–961ce) and King Otto, the first Holy Roman Emperor (ruled 936–973ce) were
the twomostmighty rulers in Europe, and on several occasions they had exchanged
delegates to negotiate certain issues. During Abd ar-Rahman’s rule Andalus enjoyed
thegolden age forwhich it is renown.Themartyrs ofCordobawere an incident of the
past and non-Muslims were restored to favour, for they were again allowed to hold
highpositions at court. Thiswas shownby thedelegationofKingOttobeing received
first by the caliph’s personal physician, who was a Jew, and then by the bishop
of Cordoba. The bishop, however, was sneered at by the head of Otto’s delegation,
abbot John of Gorze, for being too submissive to the rule of a religion inferior to
Christianity. The abbot’s disdain for the bishop only increased with the bishop’s
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rising panic about the abbot’s resolve publicly to denounce Islam once the caliph
had received his delegation. This never came to pass, however, probably because the
bishopmade sure the delegation was sent back home without meeting the caliph.
3. Other Relations and Contacts
The general picture of relations between European Christians and Arab Muslims in
the period between the eighth and eleventh centuries is that both sides mostly kept
to themselves and met only on the battlefield. Indeed, the political, economic and
cultural developments within the two realms took place in relative isolation from
each other. However, the image of two isolated warring blocks that are predomi-
nantly characterized by their religious identity does not do justice to the complexity
of everyday life, for there existed an intricate interaction of warfare and raids alter-
nating with diplomacy and trade.
An important aspect we must keep in mind when viewing this period is that
these two realms were not stable and singular unities: borders were fluid and under
constant threat, and even within each of the realms there was the continuous peril
of disintegration into political and warring factions, with warlords on both sides of
theMediterranean carving out their private fiefdoms. To preserve their power, lords
on both sides would occasionally turn to each other for military assistance against a
common foe. In themeantime, hostilities did not hinder commerce between the two
sides, albeit on a very limited scale. Here wewill pay closer attention to the nature of
the belligerency, trade and diplomacy between the two realms in this period.
Wars and Raids
The armed conflicts that characterized relations between European Christians and
Arab Muslims in this period were of two kinds: wars of conquest and raids. In the
wars of conquest the Arab Muslims had the upper hand. Granted, the Carolingians
in Europe also undertook wars of conquest, but these were directed northwards and
eastwards rather than southwards, and therefore did not lead tomilitary confronta-
tions with Arab Muslims. So if we are to look at wars of conquest wherein Arabs
and Europeans met on the battlefield, the Arabs were in almost all instances the ag-
gressor, and we see hardly any organized European campaigns to fight the Muslim
invaders or, once the Muslims had settled in European territory, to evict them. Eu-
rope simply lacked the centralizedpower to initiate suchorganizeddefence. The only
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exception was the Byzantine Empire, but its defence was futile against the agile and
fast-moving Arab Muslim warrior bands. The other European power, the Carolin-
gians, was established after the Muslim conquests were more or less complete, and
even then it undertookhardly any action against the Saracens, despitewhat the Song
of Roland or other European legends may have us believe.
Apart fromtheArab-MuslimandCarolingianwarswaged for thepurpose of con-
quest,most wars in these timeswere actually raids aimed primarily at raising slaves,
booty and tribute fromborder areas that served as “hunting grounds”.44The purpose
of these military confrontations was the maintenance of the border areas, resulting
in the re-taking of the strips of land usurped by the opponent and the plunder of
his lands. This feature of armed conflict was omnipresent, including in the fron-
tier areas that divided the Muslim and Christian realms. Every year, Baghdad and
Constantinople would dispatch an army to the frontier they shared, not as forces of
conquest but to plunder the lands of the other and to defend their own land against
the raiding enemy. InBaghdad the raids on theMuslim-Byzantine border took on al-
most ritualistic forms as they were scheduled bi-annually by court officials.45 These
raids took place in the frontier zone in present-day Turkey, but were extended to
Byzantine dominions in Greece and Italy once the Muslims learned to build ships
and sail them, extending the conflict zone into theMediterraneanwith repeated acts
of piracy against the European coasts.46 Sicily was one of the Mediterranean islands
that fell victim to these raids before it was turned from ‘hunting ground’ intoMus-
lim territory.
The raiders and pirates did not always pick the infidel as victim: the Muslims
in Crete became notorious for piracy against Muslims and Christians alike, just as
the Christian Slavs who raided up and down the Adriatic and the Venetians were
not too scrupulous in their religious selection of an occasional prey to piracy.47When
the raiding of one side became too regular, it prompted counter measures from the
other side, and sometimes such punitive actions resulted in conquest. For instance,
it has been suggested that the Arab occupation of Italian ports was brought about by
Italian piracy against Arab shipping.48
The other Muslim-Christian zone of confrontation was between the Western
Europeans – the Carolingians, but also Frankish, German and Italian rulers and
warlords residing along the western Mediterranean coastline – and the ‘Saracens’
and ‘Moors’ in Andalus andNorth Africa. According to European collectivememory,
the advance of the Muslims across the Pyrenees was stopped at Poitiers in southern
France, as we will discuss in more detail below. But for centuries, the Pyrenees and
the French Mediterranean coast were the zone of mutual raiding between Arabs
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and Europeans. Attacks in this zone were initiated not only by the craving for spoils,
but also upon request of local rulers who used the enemy to fight another adversary.
An illustrative example is the three Moorish governors of Barcelona, Zaragoza and
Huesca who in 777–778ce sent a delegation across the Pyrenees to France, offering
Charlemagne parts of northern Spain in exchange for a guarantee of autonomy for
their respective small governorates.49 The reason for this overture was that the three
governors felt their autonomous rule threatenedby the growingpower of their over-
lord, the caliphate in Cordoba. Charlemagne was most willing to be of assistance,
not only for strategic reasons but also because it fitted into his worldview of spread-
ing Christianity by conquest. His army marched into Spain that same year but the
campaign ended in a humiliating failure because noMuslim cities were conquered.
Moreover, upon his retreat to France in 778ce, Charlemagne’s baggage train was at-
tacked by Basques when crossing the Pyrenees. Themilitary embarrassment seemed
completebutwasglossedover in the chronicles of that time, and three centuries later
even transformed into a victory ofmythical proportions in the SongofRoland. In this
song the (Christian) Basques are replaced by the Saracens, and count Roland repre-
sents the archetypeof thegallantChristianknight sufferingmartyrdomwhile fight-
ing the overwhelming forces of Islam.50 The Song can be considered the European
ur-text for embedding the Islamic threat “deep in the memory banks of the West.”51
Another example of combined raiding, conquest and military alliances is pro-
vided by the Arab presence in the late ninth and early tenth centuries along what
is nowadays called the Cote d’Azur, the French and Italian coasts of the Mediterra-
nean.52 Already this area had suffered from Arab piracy, mostly initiated from the
North African coast, with the sacking of Rome in 846ce being only one of themany
raids. But around 890ce the Arabs established a land base in southern France by
building a fortress near what is now Saint-Tropez. For a period of eighty years they
raided from this stronghold the westernMediterranean seas but also the hinterland
as far as south-eastern France and southern Switzerland. There, in the high Alps, the
Arab raiders assaulted themany pilgrims on their way to Rome. Finally, the regional
lord Hugo mounted a full-scale expedition against the Arab fortress with the help
of the Byzantine fleet. Hugo was quite successful, but just when he was about to de-
liver the final blow, he unexpectedly entered into an accord with the Arabs in 941ce,
granting them the Alpine passes as well as the territories already occupied by them.
The reason for this sudden change of heart is speculative butmost probably dictated
by pragmatism: the Arabs in the Alps could act as a buffer against Hugo’s French
andGerman adversaries further northwho felt threatened byHugo’s successes. And,
in addition, Hugo did not want to jeopardize the good relations he had just estab-
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lished with the caliph of Cordoba by entering into a peace accord that also allowed
for free commercewith Andalus. The raids by the Arabs in southern France therefore
continued, this time legitimized by their accord with Hugo. Their forces were regu-
larly suppliedwith Christian deserters from the surrounding lords – a phenomenon
that was to remain quite common well into the eighteenth century, with Christian
sailors and pirates joining the ranks of the Muslim Barbary corsairs (of whom we
will come to speak inmore detail in chapter three). The Arab presence on the French
coast was ended in 973ce by King Otto (the samewho had sent the abovementioned
embassy to the court of the Cordoban caliphate), who was eager to re-establish free
passage across the Alps for pilgrims on their way to Rome, and in exchange receive
papal blessing as a true Christian king.
ReligiousWar?
Were the conquests andwars conductedbyArabs andBerbers (or Saracens andMoors,
as Europeans called them) in this early stage of Muslim-Christian history religious
in nature? In other words, are we to speak of conquerors who happened to be adher-
ents to Islam, or can we point at Islam as the instigator for Muslims to undertake
their conquests? This question is not easy to answer. First there is the problem of
the notion of war itself. Are we to consider centuries of raids, skirmishes and wars of
conquest as separate acts of belligerency conducted for differentmotives by different
people, or are they all to be amassed in a single-purposed and continuous endeavour
by Islamic military forces to conquer as much as they could whenever they could?
The latter is implied by maps one can find nowadays on the Internet with all Mus-
lim conquests and incursions shown in images set consecutively so that one sees
centuries of warfare passing by within seconds.53 On the other hand, Muslims and
Christians were not very different in their belligerency and their lust for spoils and
conquest: it was an integral part of the life of any warlord, prince, caliph or emperor;
his reason for existing and the means to prolong that existence. Admittedly, how-
ever, the Muslims did a much better job of this than the Europeans during the last
three centuries of the first millennium.
We must also take into consideration that, as a general rule, wars were not
to be conducted within one’s own realm, against one’s brothers; wars were to be
waged against others. This Otherness could be based on ethnicity, tribal affiliations,
political allegiances or, as was increasingly the case in the era we are discussing here,
religious affiliation. One was not to fight one’s co-religionist, and therefore war was
allowed only against the non-believer, not necessarily because the enemy was an
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unbeliever, but because his unbelief justified the hostilities against him. This kind
of reasoning and rhetoric was shared byMuslims and Christians alike.
Such justification of war has also been suggested as an explanation for the swift
and ever-expanding conquests of the Muslims in the seventh century. According to
this argument, the root of Muslim belligerency must be sought in the culture of
Arabs in the Arab Peninsula of conducting tribal feuds and organized plunder (ghaz-
zas) of each other’s encampments and caravans. However, Islam prohibited fighting
and plundering amongMuslims, so that the pent-up energy of the warriors was di-
rected outwards, into lands where there was no Islam and where, in consequence,
conquest and plunder were allowed.54 This would also explain the continuous war-
fare of the Muslims, because with every territory they added to the Islamic empire
they forfeited the right to continue fighting within that new territory and had to
venture further for war and spoils.
If we follow this line of reasoning, then Islamic scripture did not provide Mus-
lims with their marching orders, but rather provided them with a powerful new
identity that gave themstrength and an enormous self-confidence, prompting them
to go to the end of the world (indeed, it is told that theMuslim general who spurred
his warriors westward across North Africa, when reaching the Atlantic drove his
horse into the sea and then is said to have called: “O Lord, if the sea did not stop me,
I would go through the lands like Alexander the Great”55).
We will never know the exact motivations of these early Muslim warriors, how-
ever, because the history of early Muslim conquests was not recorded by the victors
themselves but by Arab chroniclers decades or even centuries later. It is very possible
that these chroniclers would retrospectively imbue the conquests with a religious
purpose and justification. But this lack of precise information has fuelled specula-
tion among modern historians. Some of them see mostly plunder and conquest in
the earlyArabMuslimwars, andvery little religionorholy fervour (whichwould jus-
tify calling them ‘Arab’ wars).56Other historians, however, stress religious zeal as the
most important motivator for Arab Muslim belligerency. Some take this argument
further by invoking unsubstantiated images of fearlessMuslimwarriors craving for
death in order to reach paradise,making them“themost terrifying of enemies, eager
for death, like the kamikaze pilots during World War II”.57 Some of these historians
find the evidence for such religiously motivated wars in Islamic holy scripture, an
approach that has become very popular since 9/11, yielding dozens of books and ar-
ticles on Islam’s alleged call for religious (holy) war.58 Other modern scholars argue
that the notion of jihad is not to be understood as incessant warfare to expand the
abode of Islam, nor as a duty on Muslims to engage in perpetual war against the
physical islam | 57
infidel; they point out that, after the initial Muslim conquests, jihadwas defined by
most canonical sources as a defensive war to be undertakenwhen the world of Islam
was under threat.59
Rather than trying to read the early Muslim mind by means of scripture or
chronicles, it may perhaps be more telling to see what the early Muslim conquerors
did. For instance, while the wars of conquest may have been waged in the name of
Islam, conversion of the conquered peoples was not the aim, as we have seen above.
The non-Muslim enemywas given the choicewhether to fight or to surrender under
two conditions: to pay a poll tax and to be subjugated to Muslim rule. This might
serve as an argument that the Muslim wars were ordinary conquests rather than
religious wars. Indeed, the Arab sources widely cite not conversion to Islam as a
reason for fighting, but pride in being Arab and a tribesman.60 On the other hand,
while theMuslimsdidnot spread Islambymeans of forced conversion, theydid force
Islamic rules on their non-Muslim subjects. This is not typical of Islam, however: in
the era we are discussing (and long afterwards, as we will see), Christian rulers also
forced religiously inspired laws onto their subjects. Butwas this in itself the purpose
of the wars of conquest conducted by Muslims and Christians in these times? The
Arab and Carolingian wars seem to confirm that to be the case, although it is very
possible that this aim came second to the primary goal of martial prowess, conquest
and plunder. If there was indeed something like a religious war, it is not typical
for Islam or Muslims, but a typical phenomenon of that time: religion determined
who belonged to Us and Them, and was the prime inspiration and explanation for
everything in life, including war.
The Battle of Poitiers
Weneed to pay attention to one specific battle that is verymuchpresent in European
collective memory because, according to many European historians, it was decisive
in terms of theMuslimpresence in Europe. In 732ce, twenty years after theMuslims
had conquered the Iberian Peninsula, they suffered a defeat at the battle near the
French town of Poitiers. This battle has gained mythical fame in Europe as the
moment that the Muslim advance into Europe was finally halted and, according
to some historians, was decisive for Europe’s history:61 “[i]t decided that Christians,
and not Moslems, should be the ruling power in Europe.”62 The famous eighteenth
century historian Edward Gibbon paints a futuristic picture if events had turned
out differently at Poitiers: “[a] victorious line of march had been prolonged above a
thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition
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of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the
Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is notmore impassable than theNile or Euphrates,
and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of
the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Quran would now be taught in the
schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the
sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.”63
Modern historians differ on the impact of this battle, however. Since historical
evidence is hard to come by, it is difficult to establish the true intentions of the
Muslims at the time. But one thing is clear: the Moorish raid into France was not
a continuation of the invasion and conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, which had al-
ready taken place twenty years earlier.We do know that since then both theMuslims
south of the Pyrenees and the Franks north of this mountain range had conducted
raids into each other’s territory. These raids were not aimed at conquest, but spoils
and plunder. Was this then aMuslim raid that went wrong and ended in disaster?64
Themilitary historianHugh Kennedy, however, argues that one should not dismiss
the notion of a Muslim invasion of Europe on the ground that it was ‘only’ a raid-
ing party: “[a]s the people of Central Asia were finding out at exactly the same time,
Arab raids could be a prelude tomore lasting conquest.”65 This battle could therefore
indeed be considered a turning point, says Kennedy, not because a Muslim invasion
army was stopped, but because it ended the routine of Muslim plunder raids into
France. Kennedy’s argument is not entirely correct, however, because the Moorish
plunder raids from Spain did continue for another sixty years, althoughmainly con-
fined to the area around Narbonne, east of the Pyrenees, the last one taking place
in 793ce.66 In addition, as we have seen above, Poitiers did not end the Arab pres-
ence in the French region, because less than a century later the Arabs established a
stronghold near Saint Tropez from where they dominated a large area for another
eighty years.
Another approach to the battle of Poitiers is that it may not in fact have been
of decisive importance but was deliberately given this mythical status by the rulers
of that time, the Carolingian Franks, for the benefit of their own public image as
saviours of Europe.67 The victorious Frankish king Charles Martel, the founder of
the Carolingian dynasty that was to conquer and rule large parts of Europe, created
amystique of himself as “leader of a special tribe, [that] had saved Christian civiliza-
tion, which couldmean nothing less than that he and theymust be vessels through
which God worked His wonders.”68 The mythologization of the Franks’ victory in
this battle would explain why another battle several years earlier has not received a
similar prominent place in Europe’s collective memory. The one-year-long siege of
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Constantinople in717cewas a truebattle,withahugeMuslimarmyamassed to con-
quer the city and thereby gain access to the European hinterland. If it had succeeded,
the largeMuslim army that – unlike the raiding party at Poitiers –was equipped and
sent for the explicit purpose of conquest would definitely have continued its way
into Europe. The scant attention paid by Arab chroniclers to the battle of Poitiers as
opposed to their avid attention to the Muslim defeat at Constantinople a few years
earlier would argue in favour of this interpretation of Muslim intentions. But from
the Frankish point of view, this threat against Constantinople was primarily aimed
at the Byzantines, their arch-enemy, and therefore not relevant to receiving atten-
tion (centuries later we will see a similar French indifference towards the Ottoman
siege of Vienna in 1683). To establish their credentials as the defenders of Europe, the
Carolingians embarked on a successful ‘spin’ avant-la-lettre of the battle at Poitiers.
Wewill probably never know the true intentions of the eighth-centuryMuslims
with regard to an accidental or deliberate conquest of Europe. It is noticeable, how-
ever, that ‘Poitiers’ is engrained in the European collective memory, and has shown
itself again as a throbbing nerve with the arrival of Muslim migrants in twenti-
eth century Europe. We will discuss this in more detail in the final chapter. But the
question that remains unanswered is: if the Muslims had conquered large parts of
Europe, what would that havemeant for Europeans and European civilization? The
image depicted by Gibbon is one confined to religion, assuming that themajority of
Europeans would have converted to Islam. We have seen that, just like other areas
of Muslim conquest, such conversion would not be forced but be the choice of the
Europeans themselves. Another, rather provocative image is that Europe could have
shared the golden age of the Islamic empire there and then, rather than having to
wait for several centuries: “[w]e [Europeans]wouldhave gained 267 years…Wemight
have been spared the wars of religion”.69 In a similar vein, economic historian Gene
Heck argues that Poitiers may have saved Europe from “Islamic political subjuga-
tion”, but by consequence condemnedWestern Europe to its “economic subjugation
in the Dark Ages”.70
Diplomacy and Trade
In the previous paragraphs we saw several examples of Muslim Arabs and Christian
European rulers exchanging delegates. These ‘embassies’were of a temporary nature,
sent with a specific task of negotiating a military or commercial alliance, although
often they would stay at the court of the other party for longer periods of time,
sometimes even years.
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Extensive communications by exchange of letters took place between the Byzan-
tineEmperor and theCaliphs inBagdad,Cairo andCordoba, andEmirs in theMiddle
East, and these letters were mostly delivered by embassies.71 On both sides, the am-
bassadors received full diplomatic immunity. Arab delegates to Constantinoplewere
also allowed to make trips into the area surrounding the capital. The difference in
status betweenWestern European Christians and ArabMuslimswas reflected in the
court etiquette that granted Muslim ‘friends’ a seat at the imperial table that was
higher than that of ‘Frankish friends’.72 The same etiquette made sure that care was
takennot to serve the ‘Muslim friends’ food prohibited by Islam.73The preference for
Muslim rulers and delegates added to the Frankish antipathy towards the Byzan-
tines, whose lifestyle – which was very close to that of the Arabs! – was already a
source of Frankishmockery anddisgust: they envied theByzantine opulence and lav-
ish lifestyle, they frowned on the use of the fork and eating habits like garlic and leek
cooked in olive oil, and considered thedress code of robes instead of pants effeminate,
just like the wearing of silk instead of wool and the use of eunuchs in court proto-
col.74
Arab-Byzantine communications concerned a number of issues, such as the
ceasefire for the annual and sometimes bi-annual skirmishes at the border between
the two realms and payment for, and the release of prisoners of war on both sides.75
Sometimes the letters discussed issues of art and culture, and the caliph in Baghdad
would occasionally engage in religious polemics in order to convince the Emperor
of the primacy of Islam.76 Commerce was also a source of intense negotiation and
the signing of treaties, since the Byzantine Empire was an important supplier of
slaves and an important trading partner at the far western end of the silk route that
ran through Islamic territory. Muslim merchants would not venture into Europe,
but they would easily and in great numbers enter Constantinople.77 Trade was usu-
ally not direct, however, but operated through a chain of intermediaries in frontier
areas, where the inhabitants themselves were mostly bilingual and of mixed Arab-
Greek origin.78 From the Levantine coastal ports –mostly in the hands of the Islamic
Empire, except for a brief period in the second half of the tenth century when the
Byzantine Empire ruled these areas – goods were shipped to Europe by merchants
from Genoa, Venice and Pisa.
In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Byzantine and Islamic Empires were in
an almost permanent state of war, but commerce between the two realms flour-
ished as well. By the tenth century, almost three centuries after the Byzantine Em-
pire had lost vast parts of its realm to the Arab Muslim armies, the Byzantines had
re-established themselves within their confined empire as a commercial and mil-
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itary power in the region, thanks also to a collapsing power structure within the
Islamic empire. This shift in the power balance may explain the magnanimity of
Byzantine court protocol with its cordial reception formulas for ambassadors from
Baghdad and Cairo. These two cities were by the tenth century the capitals of two
rival Islamic realms: the old, but ever crumbling Islamic Empire under the caliph
in Baghdad, and the newly arisen Fatimid Empire in the Middle East and North
Africa. The Byzantine court cunningly played into the rivalry between these two
Muslim empires that competed for supremacy over the Muslim community. Asy-
lum was granted to Muslim notables seeking refuge in the Byzantine Empire to
escape legal or political persecution in their own lands, and sometimes asylum was
granted to an entire tribe that put itself under Byzantine command and suzerainty.79
The extensive and often cordial relations between the Byzantine and Arab-
Muslim rulers did not mean that there was mutual understanding or friendship.
On the contrary, the abundant literature of those times shows that there was an
overriding mutual disdain, even hate, “an instinctive hate and a profound con-
tempt”.80
Similarly to the Byzantine situation in eastern Europe, the Carolingians in
Francemaintained a relationshipwith Cordoba that combined trade andwar.While
there were regular skirmishes and raids in the frontier areas, trade did indeed take
place between the two realms, although on a limited scale and with Carolingian ex-
ports limited toweaponry, timber and,most prominently, slaves,whowere exported
through the Iberian peninsula and then further eastwards into the Islamic empire.81
Slaverywas perhaps themain trading commodity between Europe and theMus-
limworld.82 It was an established practice throughout theMediterranean basin, and
slaves were the main form of booty in raids, whether by Christian or Muslim pi-
rates on the Mediterranean coasts, by the Moors in France, the Franks in northern
Europe, or the Byzantines in the Black Sea region.83 Since the Muslim side of the
Mediterranean was prospering economically, as opposed to the European side, the
Muslims had a much higher demand for slaves, and the slave trade undertaken by
Franks, Venetians, Jews and Byzantines was mostly directed towards North Africa.84
The role of Jewish slave traders operating from the Rhone region gave rise to accusa-
tions of Jews stealing Christian children and selling them off into slavery, one of the
stories that, together with the story of Jews eating Christian children, would soon
lead to the violent reactions against Jews in Western Europe during the First Cru-
sade.85
Enslaving people is typically something that was done in enemy territory, and
as a result slavery was conducive to forcedmigration of people.86 For instance, in the
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ninth century during the Golden Age of Andalus, the caliphate of Cordoba imported
nearly 14,000 white slaves from the Balkans whom they called Saqaliba (‘Slavs’), who
were to occupy sensitive positions in the army and government. They adopted the
religion, language and customs of their masters and upheld the caliphal culture
as intermediaries between the rulers and their subjects.87 This situation was quite
exceptional, however. Most slaves worked as domestic servants in households or as
labourers on farms, while the less fortunatewere confined to hard labour inmines.88
The slave trade from Frankish to Muslim lands was not as voluminous as that
of the Byzantines. Nor did Carolingians have regular diplomatic contacts with their
Moorish neighbours like the Byzantines hadwith their Arab neighbours in theMid-
dleEast.Diplomatic envoyswere exchangedonan incidental basiswithCordoba, but
on several occasions also extendedas far asBaghdad.KingPepin ‘the Short’ reportedly
sent a sizeable delegation to the court of the Abbasid caliphMansour in Baghdad in
765ce, while an Abbasid delegation visited France three years later.89 The exchange
of delegations in the period 797–801ce between Charlemagne and caliph Haroun
al-Rashid is well known.90 These encounters-by-proxy between the two mythical
leaders of the great empires of the time have triggered the imagination ofmany, but
nothing is known of what was discussed or agreed, nor seem there to have been any
practical outcomes.91
In the case of the Franks, their choice to make overtures to Baghdad was aimed
not only atmaterial gains, but probablymore to establish strategic alliances against
mutual enemies honouring the motto ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’92 To
the Franks their main enemy was not the far-away Islamic Empire, but the nearby
Byzantine Empire. The Byzantines, in turn, hadmaintained a belligerent peacewith
Baghdad for over a century. But the hostile atmosphere between the Carolingian
and Byzantine empires was of a more religious nature, with Constantinople vying
with Rome for supremacy over Christianity. In the case of Frankish diplomatic over-
tures to theCordobanemirate, the situationwas similarbut reversed:hereBaghdad’s
bone of contention with Cordoba was its unwillingness to recognize the Baghdadi
caliphate, while the Carolingians were engaged in a semi-permanent state of bel-
ligerent peace with Cordoba. The Franks and the Arabs therefore had their own rea-
sons for reaching out to each other. Although the endeavour to establish alliances
came to nought, it does illustrate that the religious divide between Christian and
Islamic dominions was not strictly adhered to.
III. Virtual Islam
In addition to the physical contacts and interactions between Muslim Arabs and
Christian Europeans, such as war, trade, diplomacy and coexistence, there were also
what we have called the virtual encounters, that is the encounters of Europeans
with Muslims or Islam in an intellectual, cultural, mythological or otherwise non-
physical sense. In theperiodbetween the eighthand the eleventh centuries, however,
Europeans had little, if any, religious or intellectual interest in Muslims or their re-
ligion, andmaintained crude forms of imagery about them.*
Myths, Legends and Ignorance
This imagery must be considered in the light of the events of that time. Europe in
the late seventh and early eighth centuries was confronted with Islam, a religion
that no one had ever heard of, but that was militarily successful and expanding
with alarming speed. This confrontation was primarily felt and experienced in the
Byzantine Empire and the Iberian Peninsula, but news and images of it also found
their way to the European mainland. The European reaction was mostly one of
reconciliation, sometimes refutation and hardly any resistance.93
To start with the last: as we have seen, actual resistance against theMuslimswas
scant andmostlydefensive. Charlemagne, thedescendent of the victor of thebattle of
Poitiers, had donned themantle of the great defender and champion of Christendom
and is remembered by posterity for his battles against the Saracens in Spain through
the Song of Roland (which dates frommore than two centuries later). We have seen,
however, that these fights weremostly raids into Arab lands or the repelling of raids
by Arabs, and that Charlemagne did not mind an alliance with some Saracen Arabs
against others. But with the feverish excitement of the First Crusade more than
* In the Islamic empire under the Abbasids, on the other hand, it was not uncommon for courts to
organize theological debates between representatives of various religions (obviously with the aim of
proving the superiority of Islam): see, e.g., Munʾim A. Sirry, ‘Early Muslim–Christian dialogue: a closer
look at major themes of the theological encounter,’ Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 2005 (Vol. 16,
No. 4), pp. 361–376; Jacques Waardenburg, Muslims and Others. Relations in Context, Berlin/New York:
Walter de Gruyter, 2003, p. 110 ff.
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two centuries later, Charlemagne would feature in popular imagination as having
risen from the dead to lead this crusade against the infidel Saracens once again.94
Part of this legend was that Charlemagne’s army intoMoorish Spain in 777–778ce –
retroactively proclaimed the first crusade against theMuslim infidel – hadmarched
victoriously behind the oriflamme, the three-pointed red banner with golden flames
that according to legend was brought by Charlemagne to the Holy Land to wait for
the knight who would wield it in the final victory against the Saracen.
But this eleventh and twelfth century European mythology was ante-dated. At
the time of theMuslim conquests, themedieval European Christian interpreted the
Islamic victories mostly in religious terms, as a tribulation brought by God upon
His faithful or, worse, as the coming of the Antichrist that was going to deliver the
last blow to Christendom.95 The Arab-Muslim conquests were not interpreted as
military failures on the European side, but as a lack of faith that was to be punished
by infidel victories – implying that infidel barbarians could never win on their own
accord, but their victory was merely an instrument of God to punish Christians for
neglecting their faith. The Other was used not in its own right, but as a function in
the existence and self-image of the European. Later, long after theMuslim conquests
had taken place, the image and the concept of the ‘SaracenOther’were used to justify
and glorify the violence of the European warrior class, reinforcing the ideology of
Christian knighthood.96Yet another view of these eventswas that the new victorious
religion of Islamwas apparently better than Christianity, and since Christianity was
on the losing side, Islam had to be reconciled with or even converted to. This last
and radical conclusion, however, was not drawn by earlymedieval Christianswithin
Europe, but only by Christians under Muslim rule.97
Whatever reactionmedieval European Christians had to Islam, they had no urge
or curiosity whatsoever to understand this new religion. According to Norman
Daniel, who has written one of the authoritative studies on medieval imagery and
studies of Islam, this was only natural in the circumstances where the Christian
Church exercised pressure on its flock not to engage in any interaction or commu-
nication, whether commercial or otherwise, with Muslims. “The way was nowhere
open to an ordinary Christian to know Islam better”98 – assuming, of course, that
these ordinary Christians in early medieval Europe wanted to know anything about
Islam.
For lackofknowledge,medievalEuropegave Islam“aplace in the three traditions
of European thought and sentiment, those of Biblical history, apocalyptical vision,
and popular imagination.”99 The net result was negative, combining feelings of fear,
mistrust and downright hatred.100 Saracens were considered pagan idolaters who
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worshipped combinations of several deities, mostly listed as Apollo, Jupiter, Lucifer
(also known as Mahound, a convenient wordplay on Mohammed or Mahomet as
he was known in medieval Europe), and an unknown deity called Tervagent. The
European study of the Islamic sources would have to wait for another four hundred






I. Setting the Stage
The turn of the millennium was also a turning of tables: the Islamic Empire was fragmenting
with alarming speed, and with the fading of its unity gradually lost its political, cultural and
military splendour, while Europe reached a stage of religious-cultural homogeneity and gained
economic and military momentum. Indeed, the eleventh century was the period when Western
European Christian civilization started to take shape and Latin Christendom expanded its
ecclesiastic andworldly power as far as Spain and the Baltic. The Eastern European civilization
of the Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, through the eleventh until the sixteenth centuries
underwent a steady decline, ending finally in 1453 when the Ottomans took Constantinople.
The turn of themillenniumwas a time of relative peace for Europe: the periods of terrifying
and devastating raids by the Vikings in the west, Arabs in the south and Huns in the east
were past; the Magyars who had ravaged the interior of Europe had settled in present-day
Hungary and converted to Christianity. European societal order took shape in the three-tier
structure of knights andnobility, citizens andmerchants, and clergy.This era of relative security
on the continent put the knights out of work, but gave ample opportunity for citizens and
traders to prosper. At the same time, Europe experienced an increasing religiosity that wewould
nowadays call fundamentalism. One of the most important events of this epoch, the Crusades,
was an almost logic consequence of all these developments, as we will discuss in further detail
below.
Compared with the previous period, a distinct shift took place in the form and nature of
warfare. While wars in the earlier periods were aimed primarily at raising slaves, booty and
tribute fromborder areas,with the turn of themillenniumonwardswarswere aimedat conquest
and the permanent appropriation of territory.1 This transformation in the goals of warfare
coincidedwith the religious fervour of those times, so that conquests quickly acquired thequality
of ‘holy wars’ and the conquered subjects were perceived in terms of their religion and treated
accordingly.
1. Economic Revival
Historians offer different reasons for the millennium change in Europe. Was it the
influence of the Arab-Islamic civilization that finally seeped through, or was it the
technological innovations of European origin, especially in agriculture, or was it
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the upwardmobility of the Europeanmiddle class that stimulated commerce?2 The
last was definitely an important factor, for by the millennial year Mediterranean
Europe had experienced a trade revival, especially in southern Italy, followed in
the next centuries by a “great period of commercial and industrial expansion” that
gradually included all of Europe.3 This was the beginning of an economic reversal
of fortunes of the Islamic Empire which in the previous centuries had been the
highly economically developed and commercially advanced trading partner of the
underdeveloped and industrially less sophisticated Western Europeans.4 From this
period onwards, Western Europe expanded its exports with dazzling speed, both in
volume and in the variety of commodities traded.
Economic historians argue that the important impetus for the European eco-
nomic revival was the interplay of the fracturing of the Islamic empire, on the one
hand, and the Crusades intoMuslim lands, on the other, resulting in the adoption of
advancedMuslim businessmodels. This interplay of factors contributed to – or even
caused – the economic boom of Europe that started with the eleventh century.5 This
argument is expounded as follows. First, the fragmentation of the Islamic Empire
created new commercial opportunities for the Europeans. While the Islamic Em-
pire was officially still one, ruled by a caliph from Baghdad, the facts on the ground
were different: in Egypt, the Shiʾite Fatimids had established a counter-caliphate in
909ce with Cairo as its capital, followed by the caliphate of Cordoba in 929, and the
Middle East was divided into independent and competing fiefdoms of generals and
warlords (emirates). Internal competition and wars disrupted the trade within the
Muslim realm that had once enjoyed the security of the Pax Islamica. Long-distance
trade became impossible, and theMuslimpowers bordering theMediterranean that
hadpreviously relied on trade fromAsia now turned to closer-by Europe for supplies.
This meant more business for the Italian commercial city-states that had already
monopolizedMediterranean trade.
The increase in trade across theMediterranean coincided with the second factor,
the Crusades. These military adventures were unprecedented (that is, for European
standards of that time) long-distance enterprises into enemy territory, and main-
taining and financing the far-stretched supply line posed a challenge. Until then,
Europeans had had no experience with long distance trade and investment. Italian
commercial enterprises, however, in their contacts with Muslims had come across
new business tools andmodels that exactly fitted that purpose. Indeed, theMuslims
had vast experience with long distance trade and their religion did not pose any im-
pediments to entrepreneurship (contrary to Christian doctrine), aswewill discuss in
more detail below.6The ensuingbusiness institutions thatwere adopted and further
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developed by Italian businessmenwere to revolutionizemainland Christian Europe
that was still enveloped in the throes of feudalistic economic stagnation.
2. Religious Revival
With the turn of the millennium, Europe experienced an increase in religious zeal.
Christianity was an integral part of the European’s identity and world vision, shap-
ing what became known as Christian civilization7 and determining Europeans’
hopes and fears, the patterns of daily life, and views on business and war.8 Outsiders
likeVikings,Magyars or Saracenswerepagans atbest, or tools ofGod’spunishmentat
worst.9 Themillennium brought an extra dimension to this religious outlook, caus-
ingmuch anxiety among Europeans: was this the end of times, was the Antichrist to
appear in the wake of the Riders of the Apocalypse?
The transition into the nextmillennium turned out not to be catastrophic, how-
ever, which perhaps contributed to the growing optimism and self-consciousness of
the medieval European. This disposition also showed in religious matters, for the
layman increasingly set out his own terms for a religious life. He was enticed to do
so, no doubt, by the not so religious examples set by some of the clergy. But it was
not only the commoner who took the daring steps of religious self-assertion; kings
also engaged in power gameswith the papacy to justify the divine ordinance of their
rule.10
The Church in Rome saw these developments as a threat to its sovereignty, and
quickly took action. Pope Gregory VII (Pope from 1073 until 1085ce) implemented
radical Church reforms and re-affirmed papal authority over the worldly rulers.11
The Church also re-affirmed its authority in determining orthodoxy by branding all
deviant Christian movements and sects as heretical. This confrontational attitude
was effectuated in 1215ce when the Church, during the Fourth Lateran Council,
ordered the secular authorities to exterminate the heretic. The ensuing Inquisition,
a quasi-independent ecclesiastical court, took an active role in persecuting alleged
heretics and apostates, andwould in the following centuries issue tens of thousands
of death sentences that were mostly carried out by burning at the stake.12 European
society verily became a ‘persecuting society’.13
The self-assertionofEuropeanChristendomwasdefinitelyRoman-Latin in char-
acter, which led to a continued confrontation with the Orthodox Church of the
Byzantine Empire. The two churches excommunicated each other in the eleventh
century, creating a fissure in the political European landscape and forcing the
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worldly rulers to choose between the Roman and Greek rites. This emphasized not
only a political Latin-Greek divide in Europe, but also a strong identification onboth
sides with their respective rites as well as their culture and politics.14
Finally, the turn of the century also brought change to monasticism. Monaster-
ies were spread all over Europe, and in addition to their original spiritual function as
places of asceticism andworship they had also become centres of wealth and knowl-
edge. In the Middle Ages, the Church owned vast areas of land that encompassed an
estimated one-third of European territory. The clergy’sworldly power brought them
out of their isolation and propelled them into the world of commerce, politics and
theological discourse. Themonastery of Cluny, for instance, was important in devel-
oping the concept of a just war, whichwas to serve the cause of the coming crusades.
And it was one of Cluny’s abbots who undertook the first translation of the Quran
into Latin, as we will see below.
3. The Crusades
The First Crusade was the product of the combination of religious zeal, commercial
industry and the pent-up ‘chivalry’ energies of eleventh century Europe.15 Many
more crusades were to follow, but the first was the most successful: starting in
1096ce, it succeeded against all odds in conquering Jerusalem four years later, in
1099ce. The citywas to remain inChristianhands for a century, and its loss in 1187ce
prompted several other crusades to recapture it, but none of these was successful
(except for a brief tenure in 1229–1244, when Emperor Fredrick II, as leader of the
Sixth Crusade, managed through negotiations with the Muslims to obtain control
of Jerusalem for a period of fifteen years).
The reasons and enthusiasm for the First Crusade are still a matter of debate
amonghistorians.16Themere argument of recapturing theHoly Land and the city of
Jerusalemdoes not suffice to explain this suddenpassion, because these lands had al-
ready beenunder Islamic rule for over four centurieswithout any European clamour
for reconquest. For the same reason (the long time span between the Muslim con-
quests in the Levant and the European crusade) it is inadequate to speak of the cru-
sades as “counter attacks”.17 The reasons for the First Crusade are to be sought not in
Muslim actions, but in European circumstances of that time. Three factors are sug-
gested to have played major roles in the success of the call for a crusade. First, there
was the Church that wanted to strengthen its papal authority and power. To call
knights as well as commoners to a holy war gave the Church not only the power to
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command armies, but also to determine what was sacred. Of course, this could
only work with Europeans who were genuinely devout, and the fear of one’s soul
and salvation has been suggested as a second, powerful factor in this “profound
spiritual era”.18 Finally, the call for a crusade tapped into the early medieval violent
and martial energies that needed new challenges now that the European borders
were being secured and internal conflicts had subsided. These pent-up energieswere
givendirection (East), purpose (holywar) andblessing (the promise of the absolution
of all sins).
In order for theChurch to champion thesewars, an adjustmentwasneeded to the
basically pacifist Christian doctrine. The concept of a just war was already known in
Christian theology, and it had become commonplace for the clergy to bless weapons
or even to participate in wars of conversion, as conducted by Charlemagne. The Car-
olingian kings were also the ones who championed the notion of a Christian empire
(imperium Christianum) that was to be inhabited exclusively by Christians (populus
Christianus). Fighting an enemy therefore by defaultmeant fighting non-Christians.
These practices and acceptance of violence and warfare by Christian doctrine gradu-
ally developed into the concepts of holy war and sacred violence.19
The First Crusade of 1096ce ended in the taking of Jerusalem in 1099, but it was
again lost to the Muslims less than a century later, in 1187ce. After that, eight more
crusades were undertaken in the Middle East to recapture the city. While these cru-
sades dominate European imagination,manymore crusadeswere conductedwithin
Europe. By this time, most military actions against pagans, heretics or infidels re-
ceived papal blessing and hence merited the name crusade. Some of these crusades
resulted in the acquisition of land, particularly in Scandinavia and the Baltic region;
others were primarily aimed at the eradication of hereticmovements, as in southern
France, Germany, Denmark and Bohemia. Crusades against Muslims on the Euro-
pean continent were few. The best known of these crusades was the Reconquista in
the Iberian Peninsula. The Christian kingdoms in the north of Spain had already
been engaged in a tug-of-war with the southernMoorish states, but in conjunction
with the religious frenzy of the First Crusade this belligerent peace turned into a
full-blown crusade. Later, in the fourteenth century, crusades were also launched
against the Muslim Ottomans in the Balkans, the Muslim Tartars near Lithuania,
and against Muslim pirates operating from northern Africa, but the success rate of
those crusades was very low.
II. Physical Islam
The period discussed in this chapter witnessed the expansion of Christian rule into
territories that were previously under Muslim rule: Spain, Sicily, the Levant. By
the twelfth century more Muslims lived under Christian rule than ever before.
In the three following centuries, however, the political and demographical map
changed radically. On the one hand, in the west the Arabs were evicted from Sicily
in 1250ce and the remnant of Moorish rule in Spain was brought to a final end
with the fall of the emirate of Granada in 1492ce. On the other hand, in the east
Christian Franks were ousted from the Levant during the thirteenth century, and
the Byzantine Empire came to its demise with the fall of Constantinople in 1453ce.
By the end of the fifteenth century, the Muslim ‘threat’ to Europe that traditionally
came from theWest (‘Moors’) had shifted to the East (‘Turks’).
Before we take a closer look at the relations between theMuslims and Christians
who inhabited these southern territories, let us first briefly review each of them
separately. Three of these territorieswe already know – Spain, Sicily and Byzantium–
but the frontier zonewas expandedwith twomore territories during this period: the
Latin Kingdoms and Tataristan.
1. The Realm of Interaction
Al-Andalus: Reconquista and Convivencia
At the turn of themillennium, theMoorswere still rulingmost of the Iberian Penin-
sula, although the golden age of the Cordoba caliphate had by now come to an end,
and its realm became fragmented into fiefdoms of feuding warlords. In the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, two Berber dynasties from Morocco, the Almoravids and
the Almohads, both with intolerant fundamentalist traits quite unlike those of the
Cordovan rulers, incorporated Al-Andalus into their Moroccan realms.
During this period of internal strife (known as the Taʾifa-wars), theMoorish and
Christian rulers fought each other, or among themselves, sometimes even joining
forces against others. The legendary El Cid, who has become one of the mythical
knights of Christendom fighting the Saracens, was in fact a successful warlord who
fought for the highest bidder, including theMoors. In the Christian north, however,
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the belligerency of the kings and knights became infusedwith religious zeal, gradu-
ally transforming their wars for spoils into a crusade aimed at conquest. The north-
ern kings, who preferred to call themselves ‘Catholic kings’, were successful in this
endeavour and pushed the front line between the Christian north and the Moorish
south rapidly southwards. In 1085ce, the city of Toledo in central Spain was taken
by the Catholic kings, and by 1250ce theMoorish empirewas reduced to the emirate
of Granada on the coastal strip in the south of Spain. There the northern conquest
came to a halt. A relative peace was maintained between the two sides for the next
two and a half centuries, during which the emirate of Granada reached new epochs
of splendour before it finally succumbed to the Catholic King Ferdinand in 1492ce.
When we speak of ‘Moorish Spain’ we must bear in mind that there are two
stories: that of its population, and that of its rulers. While the division between
Moorish and Christian rule was quite clear-cut, the population throughout the
Peninsula was an ethnic, religious and linguistic mixture. Religiously, there were
Muslims, Christians and Jews. Ethnically, theMuslimswere Arab or Berber or, in the
case of converts, of native origin. In the case of Christians,mostwere of native origin,
often maintaining religious rites and laws dating from Visigoth times, but many
in the north were also Frankish immigrants who had crossed the Pyrenees into the
Peninsula. Christianswhohad lived for generationsunderMoorish rule had adapted
their ways and customs to those of theirMuslim environment and rulers, as we saw
in the previous chapter, adopting Arabic as their (second) language. For that reason
theywere known asmozarabs (‘Arabized ones’), which became the name for a distinct
ethnic identity. The languages spoken in the peninsula were those of the religions –
Arabic, Hebrew and Latin – but also Frankish and the local Romance languages (of
which Ladino and Aljamiawere the Romance dialects used by the Jews andMuslims,
respectively).
The literature yields various estimates of the total population of Spain and its
number of Muslims. The tax registers are one of the few documents that modern
historians can rely on, although colonization by the victors, emigration or expul-
sion of the population, and conversion all contribute to the complexity of the cal-
culations. Harvey, after discussing the various calculations and figures provided by
others, indicates a considerable decrease in the Muslim population in the period of
1000–1500ce.20 In the early eleventh century, that is in the aftermathof thegoldenpe-
riod of the Cordoba Caliphate, Muslims constituted the majority in the peninsula –
some argue even 75 per cent21 – with the estimated number of Muslims set by some
as high as 5.6 million.22 By the fourteenth century these figures had dropped dra-
matically: the whole peninsula had a population of approximately 6 million souls,
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of whom only an estimated 1 million were Muslim.23 The decrease in the number of
Muslims is attributed to the armed conflicts of the extended civilwar and theRecon-
quista, and the discrimination and riots by the Christian population against them,
resulting in theMuslimsmigrating to northern Africa.
Keeping these shifting numbers in mind, we now turn to the impact of chang-
ing rulers. With the conquest of Moorish land by the Catholic kings, the Christian
mozarabs inhabitants formally lost their centuries-old status as non-Muslim dhim-
mis. Interestingly, the cultural and religious customs of themozarab Christians were
so different from their Christian brethren in the north that their treatment as a
minority was often continued under Christian rule. And the native Muslim pop-
ulation of the newly conquered territories now became subjects of Christian rule,
acquiring an inferior status known as mudéjar which was the mirror-image of the
dhimmi.
The period we are discussing now – from the eleventh to the end of the fifteenth
century – is mostly described as convivencia, that is the harmonious coexistence of
Muslims, Jews and Christians under Christian rule prior to the first expulsion of
religious minorities (the Jews) in 1492ce. Modern historians have disputed this
notion of a ‘golden age’ of religious tolerance, pointing to the numerous forms and
instances of discrimination and persecution of theseminorities; we will discuss this
in more detail later in this chapter. What is of importance to us now is to realize
that during this period two mirror situations co-existed: Muslims under Christian
rule (mudéjars) in the north and Christians under Muslim rule (mozarabs) in the
south. Nevertheless, historians usually pay more attention to the convivencia and
the position of the mudéjars, firstly because Christian rule dominated the largest
territorial part of the Iberian Peninsula in this period, but also because there ismore
documentation and thereforemore knowledge available on themudéjars than on the
mozarabs.
Sharing the religion of the ruler was of course a major advantage, and definitely
had a positive impact on one’s living conditions, as wewill see below. But the Iberian
Peninsula never was ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ in the sense of religious homogene-
ity. Never, that is, until 1527ce, when Islam was officially banned from the entire
peninsula. The choice between conversion and emigration had already been given to
Spanish Jews in 1492ce, and then again to the Spanish Muslims during the period
between 1499 and 1527ce. The reasons for this grand project of religious cleansing
were a mixture of religious intolerance by Christian ecclesiastic rule, deteriorating
living conditions, and issues of security, as we will further discuss below in para-
graph 2.
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Sicily: Expulsion ofMuslims
The only other case of massive expulsion of Muslims from Christian lands compa-
rable to that of Andalus in 1499–1527 had already taken place in Sicily, two and a
half centuries earlier, in 1250ce. This was a rather sudden end to a community that
was part of a society renowned for its tolerance and intellectual and cultural splen-
dour – first under Arab Muslim rule, and then under the Normans who conquered
Sicily during the period from 1060 to 1090ce. These Normans had come a long way:
they were the descendants of the Vikings who had established themselves in Nor-
mandy (France), and who had ventured forth to Italy fromwhere they had launched
their invasion of Sicily. They were known as devout Christians, and their conquest
was backed, if not instigated, by Romewhich for both religious and security reasons
wanted to get rid of this Arabmenace on its doorstep.
The Normans were not religious zealots, however, and established what became
known as the Arab-Norman civilization which embraced social as well as cultural
diversity, employing the intellectual and artistic backgrounds of the Greek, Phoeni-
cian, Italian, Arab and Norman inhabitants of the island. As in Spain, the Christian
rulers continued thedhimmi status, butnowapplied it to those communities thatdid
not belong to the Christian Norman class: legal autonomywas granted toMuslims,
Jews and Greeks, and Muslim magistrates were appointed by the Norman kings.24
King Roger II (1095–1154ce) was the epitome of this tolerant and civilized culture, a
philosopher-soldier and patron of the arts who spoke several languages (including
Arabic) and assembled scholars and artists at his court, including Muslims. More
than a century after the Norman conquest, the Norman kingdom of Sicily became
part of the Holy Roman Empire through marriage and again produced a ruler who
was renowned for his enlightened spirit: Frederick II (1194–1250ce) was king of Sicily
and Holy Roman Emperor, an Arabophile known as the ‘Wonder of the World’ (stu-
pormundi) because of his vast knowledge andwide erudition. Remarkably, it was this
same ruler who decreed the expulsion of theMuslims from Sicily in 1250.
How had it come to this dramatic episode? What had happened to the utopian
society of cultural diversity and social tolerance? As wementioned earlier in the case
of the Iberian Peninsula, the issue of tolerance and diversity was not as clear-cut
as the modern observer might think it to be. The artistic and cultural splendour,
as well as the tolerant attitude towards Muslims, were restricted to the enlight-
ened Norman court and the so-called ‘palace saracens’ who resided there. This is
the ‘Golden Age’ of twelfth and thirteenth century Sicily that has been recorded
and transmitted through history. But this situation stood in stark contrast to the
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oppression and bound servitude of the Muslim population in the countryside in
this period.25 The situation must have been really bad if we look at the numbers of
Muslims who emigrated: of the estimated 250,000 Muslims on Sicily in 1090ce, ap-
proximately 25,000 were left in 1250ce.26 Their deplorable state caused them to rise
up against their rulers in several revolts, which in turn justified the drastic ultimum
remedium of deportation of the entire Muslim population to the Italian mainland
in 1250ce.
Byzantium: The Loss of an Empire
If we move further east, we come to the region with the longest experience of in-
teraction with the Muslim world, the Byzantine Empire. At the turn of the millen-
nium, almost four centuries after the loss of most of their territory to the Muslims,
the Byzantines had reasserted themselves as an economic, military and diplomatic
power to be reckoned with. No one would have predicted at the time the utter ruin
that would befall this empire and its great capital city. But several developments,
some of which had been emerging for decades or even centuries, would prove detri-
mental to the Byzantine Empire.
The balance of economic power in the region shifted considerably with the cru-
sades and the establishment of the crusaders’ kingdoms along the eastern Mediter-
ranean coast. The crusades stimulated Mediterranean trade between Europeans
(mainly Venetians and Genoese) and Byzantines as well as the various Islamic em-
pires, and this became serious competition for the longstanding Byzantine-Arab
trade.27 Although the Byzantines, Franks and Italians shared a European and Chris-
tian identity, they were entangled in continuous and often fierce competition for
political, religious and economic power. The Venetians in particular were crafty in
maintaining their commercial interests with the Franks and Byzantines as well as
theMuslims in Egypt.28
The lack of Christian unity or solidarity between the Latin and Orthodox
Churchesmanifested itselfwith themilitary confrontations between theByzantines
and the crusaders. The age-old antagonism between the Western Latin and East-
ern Orthodox Europeans had already resulted in mutual excommunication in the
eleventh century, but erupted when the crusaders of the Fourth Crusade, shipped
by the Venetians to the Holy Land, changed course and landed at Constantinople
where they laid siege to the city. When they took the city in 1204ce, they ran-
sacked it with a vengeance, and then installed Roman Catholic rule that lasted until
1261ce.
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If this was not bad enough, new and aggressive powers arose in the east. In the
early thirteenth century, theMongols camewestwards from the steppes of northern
China with a speed reminiscent of the Arab-Muslim warrior bands six centuries
earlier. The difference was that the Mongols were utterly destructive, destroying
everything on their path. In 1258ce, they took the capital of the Islamic empire,
Baghdad, and razed it to the ground. The Byzantine Empire, located in what is now
western Turkey, would have been overrun by the Mongols if they had not been
stopped from reaching the Mediterranean by the Mamluks who, from their capital
Cairo, successfully defended their Middle Eastern domains against theMongols.
However, in the wake of the destruction wrought by the Mongols a new power
entered the stage: Turkish tribes from Central Asia united under their progenitor
Osman, and would become known in the centuries to follow as the Osmans or Ot-
tomans. By piecemeal conquest they carved out a territory for themselves, even by-
passing the impregnable city of Constantinople and venturing into the Byzantine
territories on theEuropean continent.During the fourteenth century, theOttomans
conquered most of Byzantine territory and beyond, including present day Greece,
Bulgaria and Serbia. It was as two communicating vessels: what was won by Chris-
tians in the west was lost in the east (or, vice versa: what was lost by Muslims in the
west was won in the east). By the late fourteenth century the Byzantine territories
were taken by the Ottomans and Constantinople was left isolated, a grand capital
without a territory, until it fell to the Ottomans in 1453ce.
Latin Kingdoms: A Short-Lived Dream
Strictly speaking, the Latin kingdoms established by the crusaders next to theMedi-
terraneanandBlack Seas arenot on theEuropean continent and therefore outside the
scope of our story about Islam in Europe.However, their presencewas so interwoven
with the European homelands and had such an impact on European imagination –
even now, more than nine centuries later – that they need to be incorporated into
our narrative of Islam in Europe.
As was the case with the Catholic kings in Spain, the Frankish and German
Crusaders encountered a population of mixed religion and ethnicity that had been
there for centuries. The Levant was the cradle of the Jewish and Christian faiths, and
each community had produced numerous sects, speaking and writing in a variety
of Semitic languages. The Byzantine Empire had imposed Orthodoxy as the state re-
ligion and Greek as the administrative and ecclesiastic language, and the Muslim
Arabs did the same with Islam and Arabic. The large Christian and Jewish com-
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munities in Muslim ruled lands had adopted the Arabic language, reserving their
specific languages for liturgical matters. In their capacity as dhimmis they enjoyed
religious freedom, but were ultimately subjected to Muslim rule. They had little in
common with the Crusaders, not even their religion because most Arab Christians
wereOrthodox. And theCrusaders acted in suchbrutalways that therewasno reason
whatsoever for Arab Christians to see them as liberators.
The Christian-European enclave in the Islamic empire lasted two centuries in
total: the first kingdom was created in 1096ce, with the First Crusade, and the last
Frankish stronghold of Acre was taken by theMuslims in 1297ce. Jerusalem had al-
ready been lost (or re-taken, depending on one’s point of view) in 1087ce, less than a
century after it had been taken by the Crusaders. During this period, however, suc-
cessive Muslim armies had been gradually taking Frankish cities and fortresses. On
the historical scale of events, therefore, the relatively short time span of the Frankish
presence would appear as a mere link in the long chain of the region’s history. But
while the impact of the Latin kingdoms on the regionmayhave beenmarginal, their
effect on the European homeland was to be of great importance, reverberating well
into the twenty-first century. But this effect was mostly on European imagination
and collective memory, andmuch less in terms of a material impact.
Tataristan and Lipka-Tatars
Finally, to complete our round of European territory where Muslims ruled or lived,
wemust turn east, to the long frontier area that is nowthe steppes ofUkraine andBe-
larus, east of Hungary, Romania and Poland. In the period between 1236 and 1240ce
a Turkish-Mongol tribal federation known as the Tatars split off from the Mon-
gol GoldenHorde that had swept through Asia and turned northwards, conquering
the western part of what is now Russia. Shortly after entering these territories they
adopted Islam.
After their conquests and plunder raids, the Muslim Tatars established a steppe
empire of which not much is known, mostly because little of this history is docu-
mented or, if it was, has not been preserved.29 Also, they are a people that has raised
little interest among Western scholars, although the few Tatar, Polish and Russian
scholars in this field are gradually also publishing in English.30More is known of the
so-called Lipka (‘Lithuanian’) Tatars, the Tatarmercenaries who in 1397 had been in-
vited to settle in theGrandDuchyof Lithuania, in theBaltics. Lithuaniahad formally
adoptedChristianity tenyears earlier, andwas successful in themilitary expansionof
its realm. To fight as well as protect these new territories, they called upon theMus-
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limTatarswhowere roaming the steppes. The Lithuanian rulers encouraged themto
settle in the Lithuanian realm, among others by allowing them tomaintain their Is-
lamic faith, to intermarry with the indigenous population and to raise the offspring
of such unions in the faith of the father.31 The Tatars accepted and would become a
societywithin a society thatwas to last to this day. It apparently alsoworked outwell
in the early stage of their settlement in Lithuania, because during the next hundred
odd years internal strife among theMongols in the Black Sea area would often result
in Tatar tribes splitting off and seeking – and receiving – refuge in the Lithuanian
Duchy.
It is unclear why this coexistence worked so well, as opposed to similar mixed
societies in other frontier states. For the Lithuanians (and later Poles) the answer
might be sought in the fact that no actionwas ever undertaken to convert the Tatars,
as the neighbouring Orthodox Russians forcefully did with their Muslim Cossacks
or the Catholic Spaniards with their Muslim mudéjars after 1499ce. For the Tatars
the answer perhaps lies in the fact that they were for a long time a proud martial
people, and in that capacity fulfilled a specific and indispensable role in Lithuanian
(and later also Polish) society.
But they were more than mercenaries; they were also inhabitants of the Duchy
of Lithuania. As such they proved to be staunch allies, in particular in the battles
that the Duchy fought with the German Teutonic Knights who conducted crusades
against what they considered pagan Lithuanians (which was peculiar given the fact
that the Lithuanians were Christians, but they were probably considered not Chris-
tian enough in Teutonic eyes, or refused to submit to Teutonic rule). The Tatars
demonstrated their loyalty to the Duchy of Lithuania time and time again by pro-
tecting their new homeland with their lives. In 1410ce, when the Duchy defeated
the Knights, an estimated 30,000 Tatars are said to have taken part in that decisive
battle.32 Ever afterwards, the Tatars had their separate units in the Polish army and
were often raised to the ranks of the nobility for their deeds.33
2. Living with the Unbeliever: Muslims under Christian Rule
All these geographical changes on the politicalmap of Europe’s frontier areas created
social challenges and tensions among the population of those areas. Robert Bartlett
convincingly argues that the active expansion of Christendom in this period was a
form of colonization, because a minority occupation force conquered and entered
a new territory where they came to dominate the native majority population that
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was alien in language, culture, social structure and, often, religion.34 There was a
distinct difference, however, between the northern and southern European frontier
areas in the exercise of this minority rule. This difference can be attributed mainly
to the factor of religion. In the entire northern zone of Europe, which stretched
from England to the Baltics, Christian missionaries had been active as early as in
the eighth century in converting the pagan population. Later, with incursions by
Christian neighbouring kings and crusader orders, this population was forcibly
Christianized either because they were not yet converted or because they were but
then allegedly had relapsed in their heathen ways.
In the Mediterranean frontier zone, on the other hand, there had been no mis-
sionary activity and the confrontation with and subjection to Christian rule came
suddenly, and always bymilitary defeat. In these regions, forced conversion was not
an aim or option at the time of conquest, although religion was a determining fac-
tor in distinguishing between the ruler and his subjects. This situation meant that
Christian Europeans had to deal with a fourth category of people: in addition to the
Christians themselves, heretics (Christians who had strayed from the true teachings
of Christianity as determined by the Church and who had to be returned to the true
faith, by force if need be, or else had to be burned in order to cleanse the world from
contamination by their pollutedways), and pagans (people whowere said to have no
religion andhad to be forcibly converted toChristianity), therewere theMuslimand
Jewish unbelievers under Christian rule who were allowed to maintain their faith.
While active campaigns of conversion were waged against the pagans on the north-
ern borders of Europe, such was not the case against theMuslims and Jews.
In the south, the conquered Muslim peoples of Spain, Sicily and the Latin King-
doms were allowed to keep their Islamic faith and modes of coexistence were em-
ployed. Conversion to Christianity was almost nil, and no conversion policies were
employed by the Christian rulers.35 Nevertheless, the lack of a clear status for Mus-
lims and Jews – unlike under Islam, which had developed the religious notion of
‘people of the book’ and the legal status of the dhimmi – had resulted in Europe in
a mixture of tolerance and discrimination, as we saw in the previous chapter. How
different the treatment of heretics and unbelievers could be was exemplified by the
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (1215–1250) who spoke fluent Arabic and was fond
of Arabic culture, but who with all his tolerance towards his Arab-Muslim subjects
was one of the first secular emperors in Christianity to codify the burning of Chris-
tian heretics.36
The distinction between heretic and unbeliever that had worked out in favour
of the latter changed with the increase in religious zeal and crusading spirit. This
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volatile cocktail was first unleashed against the Jews. Themasses thatmarchedwith
the First Crusade in 1096ce went on the rampage against Jews in several European
cities. Persecution and pogroms continued to take place, and in the course of the
twelfth to fifteenth centuries Jews were even expelled from most European coun-
tries. These exile orderswere often revoked, although sometimesonly after centuries.
But by then many Jews stayed in the safe havens to which they had migrated: the
Dutch Republic, Poland and Lithuania, the caliphate of Cordoba, and the North
African states ofMorocco andTunisia, Egypt and, by the end of the fifteenth century,
particularly the Ottoman Empire (the cities of Thessalonica and Alexandria, for in-
stance, were known for their large Jewish communities). From these new homes the
Jews would maintain important positions in the international commerce between
theMuslim and Christian realms.
Conquering the Lands of the Infidel
The period between the eleventh and late fifteenth centuries witnessed a territo-
rial expansion of Christian rule causing Muslim domination in these regions to
recede. The territories with religiously mixed societies under Muslim rule within
Europe shrank considerably, and remained in only two regions. The first is Mus-
lim Spain which in the course of two centuries was reduced to the small territory
of the Granada emirate; apart from the fact that Muslim Spain experienced a period
of religious intolerance under the Almoravid and Almohad rulers in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, there are notmany details to be added towhat has already been
told in the previous chapter. The second territory with religiously mixed societies
underMuslim rulewithinEurope is theOttomandomains in south-easternEurope,
whichwewill discuss at length in the next chapter. In what follows wewill focus on
the newly arisen situation of Muslims under Christian rule.
In doing so, we need to make a distinction between the newly conquered ter-
ritories in Catholic Spain, Norman Sicily and the Latin kingdoms of the Levant, on
the one hand, and the Byzantine Empire on the other. The Byzantine Empire is the
only part of Europe where Christian rule over Muslims was not established by con-
quest; the Empire already existed before Islam, and small numbers of Muslims had
migrated into its realm, in particular into Constantinople. In the course of centuries
the Byzantines had developed a delicate balance with their Muslim subjects, as well
as with their Muslim neighbours.
From this perspective the Byzantine Empire was the eminence grise of the Euro-
peanChristian realms thathadMuslimsubjects. Thiswas a position thatwas at least
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recognized by theMuslim rulers in theMediterranean region, and they had granted
the Byzantine Empire the role of protector of the Christians underMuslim rule.37 In
that function Byzantine officials were allowed to visit Christian communities in the
Muslim realm. This unique position was not shared by the other Christian rulers of
that time. And the Byzantines indeed took great interest inChristian life in theMus-
limworld (which, after all, used to be part of the Byzantine Empire), as shown in the
Byzantine presence recorded in Cairo and Alexandria as early as the twelfth century:
someweremerchants, others appear to bemere rich sojourners who resided in these
cities for short periods, visiting churches, Christian slaves and local Christian com-
munities.38
In those parts of Europe where Christians through conquest had become rulers
over Muslim and Jewish subjects, they often lacked standard policies for these peo-
ple. These were devised on the spot by means of treaties, terms of surrender, or laws
that had been applied to Jews in the Christian rulers’ homelands.39 In general, the
Muslim subjects were allowed to keep their Muslim faith, andmodes of coexistence
were employed. With the exception of Spain and Russia in the late fifteenth cen-
tury, Christian rulers did not employ policies of forced conversion. Instead, they
found different ways to regulate the religious and ethnic plurality within their
realms.
This situation of regulating coexistence arose only after the conquestswere com-
pleted, however. Before that moment, lands had to be conquered and cities to be
taken. Interestingly, just like the Muslim conquerors in previous centuries, the
Christian victors resorted to similar ways of treating conquered populations: a city’s
population that resisted so that the city had to be taken by assault was usually
slaughtered or enslaved, while its surrender mostly resulted in either its exile or
its subjection to Christian rule.40 Subjectionmeant that treaties were concluded be-
tween the victor and the population of the surrendering city, often allowing the
inhabitants to keep their properties and their religious customs in exchange for
tribute and recognition of the victor as their new overlord. Inmost instances the re-
ligious buildings and institutions remained intact, although often themain church
or mosque was transformed into the holy site of the victor’s religion. An exception
to this general pattern of behaviour was the Crusaders, in particular those partici-
pating in the First Crusade. Their massacres of the local population were unusually
ferocious, “probably because most Crusaders – unlike many Spaniards – had never
before encountered Muslims, or because of the frenzy inherent in holy warfare”.41
Also unique was the Crusaders’ decision to forbid ‘infidels’ – Muslims and Jews – to
reside in Jerusalem.
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Once the devastation and horrors of war had passed, the conqueror had to rule
the newly appropriated territories and peoples. As said, in general there was no
forced conversion or expulsion of the local population in the new lands under Chris-
tian rule. This is not to say that there was universal tolerance in these areas. The
treatment of non-Christian subjects varied in time and place, and the same di-
versity can be seen in their living conditions: sometimes these subjects suffered
oppression, sometimes they enjoyed peaceful andmutually beneficial relationswith
their Christian neighbours, and sometimes Muslim and Christian peasants had
more in common with each other than with their Christian overlords.42 Moreover,
even if the ruling religion allowed for a subject religion to exist and to be practised –
which to modern standards often seems to be the main criterion for viewing this
period as tolerant – intolerances of a social and legal nature gradually increased.
Christian rule over religiously mixed communities in the European southern
frontier areas usually started off in ways reminiscent of the Islamic dhimmitude, but
gradually became less tolerant. In an admittedly simple manner we can character-
ize Christian rule as evolving in three fluid phases during the period between the
eleventh and the end of the fifteenth centuries: tolerant segregation, strict discrim-
ination and finally forced assimilation.43
From Tolerant Segregation to Forced Assimilation
The first phase of ‘tolerant segregation’ allowed for the different populations to keep
their separate ways, whereby the Christian community enjoyed a favoured position
as regards the other communities thathad to endure various formsof legal and social
discrimination. This practice was, intentionally or not, a continuation of the dhimmi
practice established previously by the Muslim rulers in these areas. In the case of
Spain, for instance, Christian rule was almost identical to Islamic rule in its regu-
lation of the position of the non-believer: in exchange for fealty to their Christian
rulers and payment of a poll tax, Muslims (known as mudéjars) were granted ‘pro-
tection’, that is relative autonomy with regard to their religious affairs and family
laws, but their social-legal position was less than that of a Christian (for instance,
their evidence in court was worth less than that of a Christian, sexual relations with
Christians were punishable by death, they were not to wear certain styles or colours
of clothes).44 In addition, conversion by the mudéjar to Christianity was welcomed,
but the opposite, conversion by a Christian to Islam, was deemed apostasy and pun-
ishable by death.45 Tolerance in this respect should not be interpreted in terms of
acceptance or equality; it merely meant that different religions and their practices
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were allowed, including the autonomy for the religious communities to regulate
such practices.
An illustration of such tolerance was the charter of King Alphonso VI after the
capture of Toledo in 1085ce, which was later to be copied in other charters for
Moorish cities that had surrendered. This charter granted inmatters of religious and
family law autonomy, with its own laws and magistrates, to Muslims and Jews, as
well as to three (!) different groups of Christians: mozarabs, Castilians, and Franks,
each community speaking its own language. Mosques and synagogues were to be
maintained, and the non-Catholic Christians were allowed to preserve their own
rituals.46 This charter is often presented as the ultimate example of the celebrated
tolerance ofCatholic rule in Spain. This isundeniably the case, but the charter should
not be taken to represent all places in Spain, and definitely not the entire period of
the convivencia, as Catholic rule over Muslims and Jews during this period became
known. As we have seen before, laws do not always reflect the realities of life, nor can
they always dictate the realities.
On the one hand, as late as the fifteenth century, there were many cultural
cross-overs between the religious communities, which showed mainly in cultural
appearances like dress, food and dancing style. There are also recordings of friendly
interactions, like attendance at each other’s religious ceremonies and festivities, and
apprenticeship in other communities.47 On the other hand, segregation seemed to
be the norm: there were many differences in lifestyle and language between the
religious communities that mostly lived in separate quarters, and their religious
leaders often instructed themnot tomingle with the other communities.48 Also, the
attitudes expressed byMuslims andChristians about each otherwere definitely hos-
tile,49 and there is plenty of evidence that suggests that Muslims under Christian
rule suffered discrimination.50 And even in the most tolerant of times, when mem-
bers of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities interacted as drinking and
gambling companions, business associates, military buddies, visitors to each other’s
celebrations, the absolute red line between the religious communities was that of
sexual relations: the protection of a community’s integrity was formulated in terms
of prohibiting the community’s women from sexual relations with male members
of other religious communities.51
The second phase of coexistence, which we suggested calling ‘strict discrimina-
tion’, can be characterized as a strict upholding of the segregation between religious
communities. Allowing for exceptions to discriminatory rules, which was the hall-
mark of tolerance practised earlier, was replaced by strict adherence to the rules. This
phase started in the thirteenth century and gradually developed into a trend of op-
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pression:whereunder the terms of surrender in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
the minorities could maintain their property and mosques, as well as autonomy in
most legal and religious matters, these privileges were gradually granted less often
or even revoked.52
The Catholic Church was instrumental in the enforcement of this segregation.
The Church had two aims: conversion of the non-Christians and preventing the
faithful from ‘contamination’ by interaction with their infidel co-citizens.53 In the
Latin Kingdoms, dress codes that had been institutionalized a century earlier were
now enforced.54 In Spain,where theReconquista had brought large numbers ofMus-
lims under Christian rule, the clergy continuously complained about the religious
freedoms granted to those Muslim subjects by the Christian rulers. This, in turn,
incited the Christian lower classes to violence, riots and disturbances against Mus-
lims.55
But the Church also developed its own, restrictive legislation vis-à-vis the infidel
under Christian rule. At the Third Lateran Council of 1179ce, for instance, Muslims
and Jews were prohibited from testifying against Christians or otherwise holding
offices that would put them in a position of authority over a Christian, and Jews and
Muslims were prohibited from keeping Christian servants or slaves (Canon 26). The
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215ce took the separation between the communities a
step further by ordering ‘Jews and Saracens’ to wear clothes that would distinguish
them clearly from Christians in order to prevent confusion of identity that, in turn,
might lead to the possibility of prohibited sexual intercourse between members of
those religions (Canon 68).56 In the case of Jews, this led to the requirement to wear
a distinctive badge, but it is not clear whether this requirement was also made for
Muslims.57
It should be noted that, however repulsive thesemeasuresmay seem to themod-
ern observer, they were quite common in both theMuslim and Christian polities of
that era. Religious rule in both cases may have tolerated the non-believer, but al-
ways on the premise that one’s own religion ruled supreme, that one’s faithful could
not be put in a position of subjugation vis-à-vis the others, and that there was not
toomuch interminglingbetweenbelievers andnon-believers. Tolerance at that time
was therefore interpreted as allowing the unbeliever to go his ownway, according to
his own rules, in the isolation of his own community, but separated from the com-
munity that shared the religion of those in power.
What may have prompted the strict enforcement of segregation rules, as Powel
argues, was that tolerance as practised in the first phase failed to maintain the in-
tended segregation, putting the Christian community at risk of being contaminated
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by non-Christian elements.58 The Church took it upon itself to re-erect the social
boundaries and to keep them firmly in place.59 The actions by the Church can partly
be explainedby the epochofChristian zeal combinedwith theChurch’s need for self-
assertion as a power in everyday life. But, on the other hand, social tensions among
the religious communities seem to have been real, calling for intervention by the
rulers.60 This led to the next phase: of complete and enforced assimilation: instead of
strict separation and emphasis of the distinctions between the communities: every-
one now had to conform to one single religious, cultural and political polity.
This trendof assimilationwas a gradual process, aswas clearest inCatholic Spain:
first came the denial of judicial privileges, then restrictions on religious freedom,
finally followed by the choice for Muslims between expulsion or forced conversion
in 1499ce in Granada and afterwards in all of Spain. And even those Muslims who
chose conversion – the so-called Moriscos – were continuously pressed to conform
to the dominant culture: they were not allowed to speak Arabic, to wear Moorish
dress or the veil, or to use Moorish names. It is not surprising, then, that on several
occasions they arose in protest and revolts which, in turn, confirmed the fears of the
Christian community and its rulers that these minorities were not to be trusted,
let alone to be allowed to pursue their own religious, societal and cultural ways.
We will discuss the predicament of the Spanish Moriscos in more detail in the next
chapter.
3. Social Tensions
In the Mediterranean frontier areas that were under Christian rule the practice of
religious and ethnic plurality (first phase) was gradually replaced by a single polity
of a definite Christian character (second and third phase). This development coin-
cided with a growing tendency towards racial and religious discrimination, result-
ing in intensifying hostility towards non-Christian subjects. The historian Bartlett
attributes these sentiments of religious exclusivitymixedwith ethnic superiority to
an increasing emphasis on the “natural hatred” that already existed between eth-
nic and religious communities.61 The medievalist Powel, on the other hand, finds
the cause of these tensions not in the natural disposition of people but in the cir-
cumstances of their social environment, calling theMediterranean frontier societies
“societies in stress, sometimes in agony”.62 The factors contributing to this ‘agony’,
Powell argues, were of a social and economic nature, but also caused by demographic
changes, in particular the immigration of Christian colonists into the newly con-
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quered territories, creating pressure on the Muslims who had remained and who
were reduced to an inferior legal status.63
Powel points out that themeasures taken to curb contacts betweenMuslims and
Christians were not necessarily anti-Muslim, but were primarily meant to protect
the Christian community and faith. This community, living outside the Christian
polity, was now exposed to ideas by, and to social (and perhaps even sexual) interac-
tionwithMuslims, and thatwas the kind of contamination that had to be prevented
in order to preserve theChristian identity.64 In timeswhen the rise of heresy posed an
internal threat for the church, the intermingling of Christians and non-Christians
in frontier territories was perceived as an additional, external threat. The solution
for heresy was one of severe persecution. The solution for the negative influence –
whether real or perceived – caused by interaction with non-Christian subjects was
less clear and depended on local authorities.
However, the obsession with religious ‘contamination’ seems more a whim of
medieval imagination than related to reality, because the various communities al-
ready lived quite segregated lives. We argued earlier that one can hardly speak of
toleration in those times, given the fact that communities lived in such isolation
from each other: toleration would then equal ignorance, indifference and neglect of
one another.65This situation of factual segregation continuedwell into the sixteenth
century.66 For this reason Powel dismisses the term convivencia – the term denoting
the tolerant ‘living together’ under the Catholic kings of Spain – as a misnomer.67
The interactions that medieval Christians were worried about from a religious
perspective, therefore, hadnot somuch todowith social or intellectual interactions –
which were negligible – but were often of a more legal nature. For instance, under
Muslim rule, marriage between a Muslim man and a Christian or Jewish woman
was allowed, and their offspring would by birth be Muslim.68 When these societies
passed under Christian rule, the dominating perspective became Christian, which
disagreed with the situation that Christianmothers had to live in an Islamic family
environment and were not allowed to raise their children in the Christian faith.
However, since the family was designated as ‘Muslim’ and Christian rule allowed
Muslims to maintain their ways, this situation was allowed to continue.
Another legal issue of mixed relations that led to religious ‘contamination’ was
in theworkplace. Slaves, servants and functionariesusually didnot share the religion
of their masters or superiors. Hierarchy was based on religious categories, with the
religion of those in power always on top.UnderMuslim rule, for instance, Christians
could have their own local authorities or judges, but these were not allowed to
rule overMuslims asmasters, judges or functionaries. Consequently, the Christian’s
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testimony against theMuslimwas considered of a lesser value or even invalid or only
under strict conditions, and a Christian man was not allowed to marry a Muslim
woman. The same applied, vice versa, to Muslims under Christian rule.
Problems arose when one religious rule was replaced by another. UnderMuslim
rule, many Muslims employed Christian slaves, servants and functionaries. The
coming of Christian rule demanded a reversed situation: the Muslims could not
keep their Christian slaves and servants, their Christian neighbours would finally
go to court over the contested plot of land because their testimony was no longer
considered inferior to aMuslim’s, and the children of aMuslim father and Christian
mother could openly express their Christianity without fear of being persecuted as
apostates. However, reality dictated that this new legal situation could not be put
into practice immediately. Christian slaves and servant remainedwith theirMuslim
masters, but this situation was illegal under the new rule and had to be altered, as
we will see below when we discuss slavery. Also, Muslim functionaries remained in
court, but not in a position that was superior to Christian colleagues.
These forms of ‘contamination’ in work and family life could perhaps be con-
tained, but became complex and unruly in the case of conversion.
4. Conversion
Both Christianity and Islam share the basic rule that conversion from another reli-
gion to one’s own is applauded, while conversion to another religion is tantamount
to the crime of apostasy. In consequence, the religion in power determinedwhatwas
conversion andwhat apostasy: underMuslim rule all conversions to Islamwerewel-
comed, while Christian subjects lacked the power to resist such acts of apostasy, just
as under Christian rule all conversions to Christianity were hailed while Muslims
could only look on in horror at such acts of apostasy. One can imagine what distor-
tion in religious worldview was caused by a change of religious rule: the apostates
under the previous rule became the newly welcomed converts under the next rule,
while the converts became the new apostates.
In this religious-political sensitivity lies the explanation for the causes that led to
the brutal choice given to the Granada Muslims in 1499ce between conversion and
banishment.69 Seven years earlier, in 1492ce, with the fall of Granada, the Catholic
king had granted themost tolerant terms of surrender to the Granadians. However,
the newly installed bishop of Granada took offence at the presence of Muslims in
the city who had converted from Christianity to Islam – some only years ago, other
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generations ago – and who retained their Islamic faith even after Christian rule had
been imposed in the city. According to the bishop, these Muslims were originally
Christians and they therefore had to be invited – by force, if necessary – to return
to the true faith. This was against the terms of Granada’s surrender that expressly
granted freedomof religion for all thosewhowereMuslims at the time of surrender.
The bishop nevertheless persevered in his zealous actions and the king, although
in disagreement, did not dare to interfere lest it would cost him his credentials as
upholder of the Catholic faith. The bishop’s meddling caused unrest among the
GranadianMuslims, leading to full-blown uprisings that, in turn, brought the king
to the drastic measure of 1499ce.70 By then, the tide could not be turned, and the
choice between forced conversions and expulsion was also offered to the Muslims
in Castile in 1502, Navarre in 1512, and Aragon between 1520 and 1526ce: by 1527ce,
Islam had officially ceased to exist in Spain.
The other massive expulsion of Muslims which comes to mind was two and a
half centuries earlier, in Sicily in 1250ce. Here the reason for taking such a drastic
measure was similar to that of the Spanish kings: the Muslims had repeatedly risen
in revolt against the authority and since the uprisings could not be quelled militar-
ily, expulsion (or in the case of Spain: forced conversion) was the alternative solution.
That is where the similarity ends, however. The reasons for the uprisings were quite
different: in Sicily, the uprisings were a reaction to social-economical oppression,
while in Spain the oppression and discrimination of Muslims was predominantly
of a religious nature. Also, the means of expulsion were different: the Sicilian Mus-
lims were deported with all their families and belongings and resettled in Lucera
in southern Italy,71 while the Spanish Muslims were given the choice between con-
version to Catholicism and leaving the country – the latter often under impossible
conditions such as payment of a departure fee, abandonment of homes and proper-
ties, and sometimes even leaving one’s children behind.
In the lands with Muslim populations under Christian rule, few instances are
known of voluntary conversion by Muslims to Christianity. This is a striking con-
trast with themassive scale of voluntary conversion among the pagans in the north-
ern frontier zone of Europe, and also with the – much less massive, but still sig-
nificant – voluntary conversion of Christian subjects under Muslim rule to Islam
(whether for reasons of faith or of expediency). The utter lack of success in convert-
ing Muslims to Christianity then and in all the centuries to come has been a major
source of frustration for missionaries. Reasons can only be speculated upon, but it
has been argued that the main difference between the northern European pagans
who converted to Islam and the southern European Christians who converted to Is-
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lam, on theonehand, andMuslims, on theotherhand,was that the latterweremuch
more embedded in awell-developed and highly sophisticated civilization and theol-
ogy that had shaped an identity that was not to be shaken or altered easily.72
Therewas one exception to thisMuslimunwillingness to convert:Muslim slaves
in Christian ruled landswere prone to convert to Christianity, for that would release
them from slavery (as was reconfirmed by papal decree of 1237ce). Such conversions
were of course very undesirable froman economic point of view. Although theChris-
tian church and the Christian rulers formally welcomed conversion to Christianity,
this particular case raised a lot of resistance in Spain and the Latin Kingdoms where
slavery was a major source of labour.73 In both realms, Christian masters – ecclesi-
astical as well as worldly – were concerned about the loss of human capital, and the
rule was not applied in full everywhere. In Catalonia, for instance, laws made it far
easier for a Muslim slave owned by a Jew, rather than by a Christian, to become free
upon conversion.74
While conversion toChristianitywas hardly a factor of demographic significance
in these frontier areas under Christian rule,migration definitelywas. Themigration
was of two kinds that were mutually reinforcing: Muslims would move out, and
Christianswouldmove in. In Sicily, for instance, theMuslimpopulation by 1090ce –
when Norman rule was definitely established – was approximately 250,000, but had
dwindledby 1250ce, the year that theywere beingdeported to Italy, to 25,000.75 In the
Latin Kingdoms, the Franks lived mostly in towns where the Muslim populations
were either killed or driven into exile, while the countryside was predominantly
inhabited by the native people since there were no Frankish settlers to colonize
the lands.76 In Catholic Spain, many Muslims stayed on as mudéjars under Christian
rule if they were allowed under the terms of surrender to keep their lands and
property; but when the convert-or-emigrate decrees became effective, the majority
chose conversion, although an unknown number migrated to North Africa and
the Ottoman Empire.77 In the following chapter we will see that, although there
were officially no longer any Muslims in Spain, those Muslims who had opted for
conversion to Christianity were still suspected – and often with reason – of being
crypto-Muslims, which made them apostates or heretics in the eyes of the Church
and the Inquisition.
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5. Other Relations and Contacts
Commerce and Trade
We have seen that warfare in the period between 1000 and 1500ce had changed in
character compared to the previous centuries, aiming at conquest rather than spoils
and tribute, and often being inspired by religious zeal. What had not changed, how-
ever, was that war, in addition to creating havoc and destruction, also created ample
business opportunities. The Crusades were no exception. On the contrary: they are
considered by many scholars to have been the driving force behind the economic
resurrection of Europe. The grand scale of the Crusades – sending large numbers
of men and supplies thousands of miles away into enemy territory – demanded in-
novative thinking on logistics, maintaining supply lines, foraging, and long term
investments. The First Crusademetmost of these challenges on theway: the crusad-
ing army more or less haphazardly organized itself while moving through Europe
towards Saracen lands, and mostly provided for its needs on the way, leaving in its
wake a trail of devastation and ruin.Nowonder thatmanyEuropean cities kept their
gates shut, only bringing out food in the hope that this armed and fanatical rubble
wouldmove on.
This became different once the Crusaders had settled in the Latin Kingdoms and
later, when new crusades were being organized. The overland route had proven to
be too dangerous, and supplies andmenwere now shipped over sea. The only people
capable of doing sowere the Italian sailors and traders from the city-states of Venice,
Genoa and Pisa. The Mediterranean shipping trade was entirely in their hands. The
Crusades created immense business opportunities that the Italian merchants took
on with enthusiasm and great commercial cunning. Soon, these city states were
booming: warehouses were stocked to the roof and had to be expanded, shipyards
were working round the clock, bankers and investors devised new financial models
to accommodate the newly developing international enterprises. In this case, rela-
tions with the Muslim lands proved essential. Prior to the millennium, European
commercial and financial institutions were almost non-existent. One of the reasons
was the Church’s adverse view of commercial enterprise, as shown in the strict pro-
hibition of interest in canonical law.78 Moneylenders in this period therefore were
depending on Jewish financers and an occasional ecclesiastical lender who was will-
ing to bend Christian rules. Islam’s rules on commerce as well as Muslim economic
experiencewere instrumental in Europe’s revolutionary transformation to a vibrant
economy.
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The influence of Islam in this respect was not only the Islamic Empire’s four
centuries of experience with long-distance commerce but also Islam’s theological
approval thereof. The fact that Islam’s prophet Mohammed was by profession an
experienced merchant definitely contributed to the religious endorsement of cap-
italistic venture in the Islamic Empire. Getting rich is not a problem in Islamic eyes,
but the ways one goes about it may be. Islam allows for business, as long as one does
not unjustly enrich oneself, or misuse one’s position to the detriment of others, and
does not engage in speculative or other risky forms of business. As long as one ad-
hered to these rules thatwere enshrined in religious doctrine, onewas free to become
awealthy businessman – and the economic boomof the early Islamic empire showed
that many did so.
In addition to theological justifications for commerce, Islamic law also provided
the legal instruments that facilitated commerce without violating the tenets of
Islamic religious doctrine. These were the practices Italian investors turned to in
order to cope with the challenge of investing in a huge enterprise like the Crusades.
From theirMuslim counterparts they copied financial instruments and institutions
thatnot onlymade the Italians the first bankers inEurope, but also propelledEurope
into an economic and commercial renaissance. The most important problem faced
by the Italian investors was how to get the funds safely to their lenders hundreds
or thousands of miles away, and vice versa. The Arab Muslims, experienced in long
distance trade, had developed for this purpose the shakk (‘cheque’) and hawala (‘aval’
or the guarantee of a bill) as ameans to avoid carrying cash during the long journeys
of the trade caravans. Similarly, the newly established Italian banks would issue
‘cheques’ to kings and rulers to be cashed in partner banks at the location in Europe
where armies and supplies had to be raised, or even in the Middle East where they
were deployed.79
More fundamental, perhaps, was the European transformation from a barter
economy into a monetary economy. The Islamic empire already had a well-functio-
ning monetary economy and its currency remained dominant in determining the
monetary standard in theMediterranean. The newly emerging commercial interac-
tion between the two worlds, in particular in the Latin Kingdoms, arguably played
a material role in the reappearance of a monetary economy in Europe: ‘not only in
creating a need for a new coinage to support commerce, but by concurrently under-
mining theMuslim coinage then in circulation.’80This undermining ofMuslim cur-
rency started with European counterfeiting of Muslim currency, resulting in coins
like those found in the Latin Kingdombearing both Arabic inscriptions and a Chris-
tian cross.81 Mediterranean alternatives that were introduced proved more lasting:
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the first gold coin since the Carolingian monarchs was minted by the Sicilian King
Roger in 1151ce and was known as the ducat, followed by the florin minted in Flo-
rence.
Not everyonewaspleasedwith these commercial and economic transformations.
TheByzantineEmpirehad traditionallydominated tradebetween itsMuslimneigh-
bours and the Italian city-states. Very little trade was conducted directly between
the Italians and the ArabMuslims. With the Crusades, however, the volume of trade
between the Latin and the Arab-Muslim parts of the Mediterranean increased ex-
plosively, shifting the trade monopoly in the region from Byzantium to the Italian
city-states.82 In the resulting competition, Byzantium proved a master in playing
out the city states against each other, by granting the merchants of one Italian city
certain commercial privileges and the right of residence in Constantinople, while
denying it to the other, and vice versa.83At the same time, both the Byzantine Empire
and the Italian city-states concluded commercial treaties with the Fatimid, Syrian
and Andalusian rulers.84 The Italians were exclusively focused on trade, and the Arab
rulers assigned to Venice, Genoa and Pisa each its own caravanserai or fondacos ( funduq
inArabic), buildings that combined lodging andwarehouse.85TheByzantines, on the
other hand, already had long-standing diplomatic relations with Muslim rulers, in
which commercial activities were included.
Even thoughMuslim demand for European commodities increased, the trading
initiative remained one-sided: Byzantine and Italian merchants went to the Mus-
lims’ lands, not the otherway round. This had already been the case in the preceding
centuries, which at the timewas understandable because therewas noneed forMus-
lims to come to Europe for it had little to offer to them. But now this pattern of
European commercial initiative was to persist in the centuries to come.
Slavery
While the presence of Muslim population in Europe decreased considerably in the
course of fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there was one commercial commodity
that enlargedMuslim presence in Europe: slavery. Slaves were primarily used in the
Mediterranean basin, and less so on the continent itself. Slavery took place on both
sides of theMediterranean basin, and several cities in Italy (Genoa, Naples, Palermo)
and France (Marseilles,Montpellier) were important slavemarketswhere bothMus-
limandChristian slaveswere traded.86The slavesusedbyEuropeanswere sometimes
black Africans,87 butmostlyMuslims fromNorth Africa whowere enslaved through
raids and in wars. They were put to work as domestic servants, as galley rowers and
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on plantations andmines in Spain and Italy, in particular in the Venetian colonies of
Crete and Cyprus.88
Since the millennium, most wars had been increasingly fought along religious
fault lines, and a captive was almost axiomatically a slave of his religious enemy.89
This, in turn, gave rise to anewcommercial enterprise, that of raiding for thepurpose
of selling the captives for ransom. This practice was not new, but while in previous
times the ransom was reserved for the rich nobles, it became customary in Euro-
pean lands to ransom as many Christians as possible, and Christian organizations
were established that made it their goal to ransom Christian captives.90 To this end,
town councils in the frontier zones of Spain made use of those Christian and Mus-
lim merchants who maintained the flow of trade across the frontier, and officials
were appointed in charge of arranging the ransoms, while from the twelfth century
onwards the Church rallied the faithful to pay alms for these ransom sums.91 This
development in turn incited theMuslim corsairs to increase their raids on Christian
coasts and ships, because the Europeanwillingness and infrastructure to ransom the
captives made it a profitable venture.
III. Virtual Islam
Before the turn of themillennium, the EuropeanChristian perception of the Saracen
orMoorwas that of a victorious and fearsomewarrior, not unlike the Viking,Hun or
Maygar. In the period between 1000 and 1500ce, Saracens orMoorswere increasingly
perceived as non-Christian, albeit not as the pagan peoples in the north who were
easily converted by missionaries or by force, but as a people that was self-assured in
their religion and civilization. The impossibility of Christian Europe to assimilate
them into the religion, culture and language of the Christian commonwealth, as
was done with all the other pagan peoples, and the refusal on the Arab Muslim
side to do so created a divide between the two. This divide was similar to that
between the realmsof theLatinCatholicWesternEuropeans and theGreekOrthodox
Byzantines in eastern Europe. There, too, religion, culture, prosperity and language
were a source of differentiation.However, theByzantinesnever acquired theposition
of the European Other, which became reserved for the Muslims. This can be partly
explained by the fact that the Byzantines did not conduct raids or wars of conquest
into Europe, as Arab Muslims had done. Another explanation may be the different
views that the Western European held of the two: the Byzantines were regarded
with animosity towards their heretical religion and loathing of their lifestyle, while
the Arab Muslims were viewed with fear and awe of their power, combined with a
disdain for their infidel religion.
After themillennium, Islamgradually became embedded in the European imag-
ination as a source of knowledge, but also as the European Other. The Crusades
played an important role in this respect, because even though they were of little his-
torical ormilitary consequence, they contributed to an increasing sense of solidarity
and cohesiveness of European Christendom. This self-image was reinforced by be-
ing pitted against what European Christendom was not: the Muslim. This gave rise
to an interest in the Muslim’s religion, but the resulting study primarily aimed at
maintaining the self-image of the European Christian. Islam served not as a matter
of study in its own right, but as the photo negative of the European Christian. Even
the physical interaction with Muslims and their religion that was brought about
by the Crusades, both in Spain and the Latin Kingdoms, did not improve European
knowledge about Islam. In European texts of that period the image of theMuslim as
polytheist idolater remained dominant, as we will see below.92
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1. The Study and Legends of Islam
With the twelfth century the European-Christian view of the religion of the Moors
and Saracens altered, and Islam gradually “began to be treated seriously”,93 result-
ing in a considerable volume of literature on Islam by the end of the thirteenth
century that had become quite widespread throughout Europe in the fourteenth
century. The person known for the first European attempt to understand Islam by
its own sourceswas Peter the Venerable, abbot of the famousmonastery of Cluny.He
commissioned Robert Ketton to translate the Quran and in 1143ce, more than five
hundred years after the Muslim conquest of the Byzantine Empire, and more than
four hundred years after theMuslim conquest of Spain, the first Latin translation of
theQuranwas produced, quickly followed by a biography of the prophet (whichwas
not based on the official Islamic biography, but on an obscure Arabic source). In the
following centuries more translations of the Quran would be published, but Robert
Ketton’s translation remained the ‘standard version’ of the translated Quran until
the eighteenth century.94
Peter the Venerable wrote a commentary on Islam, based on these translations.95
His point of departure was – not unlike the present day’s – the Islamic texts and
how he read them, and not how theMuslim theologians read them. The textual and
historical factswere therefore often correct, but the conclusions onwhat the tenets of
Islamwere supposed to be did not always concur with what Islamic doctrine stated.
This is not so surprising: the mind-set of the medieval Christian, even one with
as good intentions as the abbot of Cluny, was dominated by Christianity, and this
would remain for many centuries the viewpoint when studying the Quran.
While the new study of Islam elevated this religion from its former status of
an abject form of paganism to the belief system of a powerful infidel nation, it was
not to be recognized as a religion in its own right. Christianity remained the frame
of reference, and the many Christian elements of Islam, as well as Mohammed’s
acquaintancewith Jews and several Christians, were reason enough to conclude that
Islam was a heretical offshoot of the true faith. Islam was listed as one of the great
Christian heresies, together with Nestorianism and Arianism.96
The Christian theologians were primarily focused on the Muslim prophet Mo-
hammed. They regarded him as a renegade Christian missionary who had started
his own sect, and consequently blamed him for corrupting the Christian message
of which he was supposedly well aware, and for deliberately teaching falsehood and
heresies, leading the poor Arab desert dwellers astray with tricks and magic. Pop-
ular legends also abounded with the theme of the impostor posing as a prophet.97
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One of these stories was that Mohammed put a pea in his ear that was picked out
of there by a trained pigeon – his way of tricking his audience into believing that
he communicated directly with God. It is an interesting combination of Islamic and
Christian elements: Islam holds that God conveyed His message to Mohammed by
meansof themessenger angelGabriel,while thepigeonas a symbol of theHoly Spirit
is typical for Christianity. A similar story is that of a trained bull showing up while
Mohammedwas addressing the crowd, holding abook on its horns, representing the
Quran sent to God’s prophet.
The image of the false prophet also brought Mohammed a place in Dante’s
Divine Comedy (1321), where he was positioned in Hell as a ‘schismatic’ on the ninth
level in the eight circle (‘fraud’). Mohammed shared this place with his cousin and
son-in-law Ali. Other Muslims were much better of: Saladin was not in Hell nor in
Heaven, but in Limbo,where virtuousnon-Christians andunbaptized infants ended
up, together with the philosophers Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd).
Other medieval European stories about Mohammed have more mundane
themes. The story of Mohammed drinking with his good friend, the monk Sergius,
was famous (again a mixture of Islamic and Christian elements: according to the Is-
lamicbiographyofMohammedhehadmet amonknamedBihaiduringhis travels as
a merchant into Syria, while Christian folklore holds that an apostate priest named
Sergius had run off to Arabia to spread falsehood). When the two companions fell
asleep in a drunken stupor a soldier passed by who killed the sleeping monk and
placed his sword in Mohammed’s hands. When he awoke and the soldier told him
that he had killed his companion in his sleep, Mohammed foreswore wine for the
rest of his life. The Islamic prohibition of alcohol and pork greatly intrigued theme-
dieval European, and recur in many stories, possibly because they represented the
elementary food supply for the average European (we should keep inmind that beer
and wine in many medieval European cities replaced water that was often too pol-
luted to drink).
Medieval Europeans were particularly fascinated by several aspects of Islam that
still capture the imagination and indignation of the modernWesterner: the violent
nature of Islam, the sexual licentiousness of Muslims and Islam’s Paradise, and the
position of the Muslim woman.98 To the Christian European, for whom marriage
meant an indissoluble and monogamous bond, the Islamic notions of bigamy and
divorce were shocking, and contributed to the notion of the ever lustful Muslim
man.Theoppressionof theMuslimwomanwas explainedby the fact that shedidnot
enjoy the same rights as her husband – an argument that may sound odd given the
social position of women in European medieval life, but made sense from a formal
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legal perspective: the medieval Christian woman indeed had exactly the same op-
tions as the man, namely a monogamousmarriage, and no divorce.
2. Polemics
The scholarswho hadmade the first serious attempt to come to an understanding of
this Islamwere limited inmeans aswell as in aims. The limitedmeanswere reflected
in the lack of Arabic sources that were available to them, and the European scholars’
knowledge of the Arabic language and specific Islamic theological terminology was
questionable. An exception was the Dominican monk Riccoldo da Monte di Croce
(1243–1320ce), who spent a decade studying Arabic in Bagdad and then devoted the
remaining years of his life in Florence studying Islam.99 His work, however, fitted in
with the limited aim shared by all scholars of that time: their intention was not to
understand Islam itself, but to refute it.
Medieval European scholars did soby engaging inpolemics anddisputations, us-
ing newly developed methods of logic based on theological and rational arguments
to ‘prove’ that the faith of the Muslim infidel was wrong.100 The result was a large
production of polemics pointing at the contradictions within the Quran, and the
contradictions between the (alleged) behaviour of Muslims and what the Quran or-
dained, and at the contradictions between the tenets of Islam and Christianity. The
contradictions themselves were already sufficient proof that Islam was false, since
Christianity was held to represent the truth. For instance, the fact that Islam recog-
nized Jesus Christ as a prophet was not a reason for rapprochement between the two
religions but, to the contrary, it constituted ‘proof ’ that Islam was false because it
refused to recognize Christ as the son of God.
The ostensible purpose of these polemics was to convince the Muslim of his
wrong beliefs and, since Islam was considered a heresy of Christianity, to make him
return to the fold of the true religion by means of reasoning. However, the aim
of convincing the Muslim of his errors was mostly an academic exercise, because
Christian theologians never even met a Muslim, let alone engaged the Muslim in
a polemic debate. These polemic tracts were mostly written in European lands far
away from societies whereMuslims lived. The polemics were therefore not intended
for Muslims but for a Christian readership as a scholarly proof of the rightfulness
and truth of Christianity.
By the eleventh century, Christian Europeans considered the Muslim a person
who, once shown thewrongfulness of his beliefs, would repent and embrace the true
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faith. This reveals a new view of the Muslim: the assumption that he would be sus-
ceptible to reasoning implied that in the eyes of themedieval theologian he was not
a pagan barbarian but a human being gifted with reason. Abbot Peter the Venerable
describes this effort as follows: “[b]ut I do not attack you, as some of us often do, by
arms, but by words, not by force, but by reason; not in hatred, but in love”.101 This
celebration of rationality was illustrated by stories of theological debates at faraway
Muslim courts between Muslims, Christians and Jews that were – of course – won
by the Christians. These stories were fictional but based on historical fact, for such
encounters had indeed taken place, mainly at the invitation of Muslim rulers who
occasionally invited representatives of the three monotheistic faiths to theological
debates at court (no doubt to prove the truth of Islam).William of Rubruck’s partici-
pation in the disputation at theMongol court of Möngke Khan in 1254ce involving
Muslims and Buddhists was famous.102 In his Itinerarium Rubruck describes how he
outsmarted the Buddhists by asking themwhether all their gods [sic] were omnipo-
tent, to which they had to answer that no god was. The Muslims did not contradict
the Christians but also did not convert: “[w]e concede that your law is true and that
the Gospel is true: we have nowish to dispute with you”. According to Rubruck’s de-
scription, the debate ended with loud singing by the Christians and the Muslims,
and copious drinking by all.
Another polemic disputation that acquired mythical status is that before the
khan of the Khazars, a people near the Black Sea. The khan thought it time for him
and his people to adopt a proper religion, and invited a rabbi, priest and imam to
convince him of what was the best of religions. In the aftermath of this polemic
battle, all three faiths claimedvictory (although correspondence in the tenth century
between the Andalusian foreign secretary and the khan of the Khazars indicates that
Judaism emerged triumphant).103
Given the presumption of the truth of Christianity and the rationality of man-
kind, medieval Europeans therefore had high hopes for the Mongols. They were
the new great power in Asia and the Near East, and by the thirteenth century had
conquered most of the Islamic empire. They were pagans, but among them were
Nestorians, a Christian sect that was persecuted as heretic by the Byzantine Em-
pire and hadmoved eastwardswhere it settled in Central Asia. TherewereNestorian
priests among the Mongols, and quite a few Mongol rulers had married Nestorian
women. TheMongol commander who conquered Damascus in 1260cewas a Nesto-
rian Christian, who rode into the city flanked by two other Christian princes, one
Armenian and one a Frankish Crusader. Even though European Christianity con-
demned theNestorians as a Christian sect, themarital and clerical presence of Chris-
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tianity among theMongols raised European hopes for their conversion to Christian-
ity, and severalmissionary delegates had visited theMongol courts for that purpose.
Great therefore was the shock in Europe when the Mongols rulers – and, conse-
quently, their people, including the Tatar tribes – in the course of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries converted to Islam. So great was the disappointment among
Christian Europeans that from that moment on they abandoned the idea of Mus-
lims’ rationality. From the fourteenth century onwards the use of force and coercion
waspermitted to bringMuslims to the right path, “as itwas permittedwith children
or animals”.104
Still, missionary orders like the Dominicans and Franciscans kept going into
Muslim lands to convince the infidel by rational means of his erroneous ways. They
did so sometimes on their own initiative, butmostly as emissaries sent by European
kings or the Vatican to courts of Muslim (mainly Mongol) rulers.105 The number of
missionarieswas very limited,however, and their success rate in convertingMuslims
was nil. An offshoot of medieval Christian missionary activity in Muslim lands was
the missionaries who actively sought martyrdom by going into Muslim lands and
publicly denouncing Islam and proclaiming the falseness of its prophet.106 We saw
such behaviour taking place several centuries earlier, with the so-called ‘martyrs of
Cordoba’ in the period between 850 and 860ce. In the thirteenth century therewas a
renewedpursuit ofmartyrdomat the infidel’s hand,with preachers going intoMus-
lim lands as far as Tatary to denounce the supposed wicked and false ways of Islam
and its prophet. The responseby theMuslimrulerswas similar to that of their prede-
cessors four centuries earlier: bewildered amusement turning into irritation when
the missionaries persisted, even after they had been admonished or banned, and of-
ten endingwith thedeathpenalty –hence fulfilling themartyrdomthemissionaries
had craved for. These acts of martyrdom gained great prestige in Europe.
The most prestigious act of self-righteous defiance was that by Francis of Assisi
who in 1219ce, during the Fifth Crusade in Egypt, crossed enemy lines and was ad-
mitted to the tent of Egyptian sultan Al-Kamil where he was apparently allowed to
speak to the sultan for a while before he was escorted back to the Crusaders’ camp.107
We will never know whether Francis of Assisi was intent on martyrdom or on the
conversion of the great sultan, and whether he was disappointed in obtaining nei-
ther of these goals. It is an interesting twist of Europeanhistory, however, that in the
twentieth century this bold action ofmission and zealous crusadingwas turned into
a symbol of ‘dialogue’with Islam: somehowthe imagewas retained throughall these
centuries of one of Christianity’s famous saints engaging with the leader of Muslim
faithful in civilized conversation with the purpose of understanding each other.108
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3. Culture and Technology
Theeleventh centurywas themomentwhenEuropeansbecameawareof, and started
to take an interest in, the knowledge possessed by theMuslim Arabs on a wide array
of subjects ranging from agricultural, financial and architectural techniques to the
sciences of philosophy, mathematics, astrology, chemistry, medicine, and the like.
Muchof this knowledgewaspassedon intoEuropebymeans of the translationof the
Arabic works into Latin, an activity that took place predominantly in Toledo in the
eleventh century, after its capture in 1085ce. (The image of Baghdad’s House ofWis-
dom comes to mind, but the translation activities in Toledo were not as organized
and on a much smaller scale.) Techniques, on the other hand, were often copied by
repeating what one had seen, and this took place in most areas where Muslims and
Christians interacted. Themechanisms of financing are one example.
There has always been a modest interest among modern Western scholars in
these transmissions of knowledge and in the Arab influences onmedieval European
scientific, artistic and intellectual developments. But after 9/11 the publications on
this topic becameprolific.109Apparently therewas anurge todisprove the clashof civ-
ilization theory by demonstrating the strong links between the European-Christian
and Arab-Islamic civilizations. The question then arises, however, whether a link or
similarity between European and Arab thinking or techniquesmay bring us to con-
clude that these elements of the European-Christian civilizationwere influenced by
or even directly taken from Arab-Islamic civilization. Since the Arabs had come up
with many insights, discoveries and inventions long before the Europeans did, it
would be fair to say that the Europeanswere influenced by, or even had copied, what
the Arabs had produced earlier. But this conclusion has its critics.
First, there is the problem of qualifying the influence itself: does a mere simi-
larity between practices in different times and places justify the suggestion that the
latter is influenced by the first? Or can it be that people thought of the same thing
independently of each other? Was the emergence of educational colleges in Euro-
pean cities like Paris and Bologna directly influenced by those in theMuslimworld,
as some scholars have argued,110 orwas this a coincidental parallel development?Has
Islamic law influencedEuropean law?111And is there a causal connectionbetween the
first use of rib-vaulting in Italian and English churches and the capture of Toledo in
1085ce, where Europeans could now come to see these techniques for themselves, or
was it coincidental?112 The same ambiguity with regard to the source applies to the
guitar and the lute: while the word lute is etymologically derived from the Arabic
al-ʿud, similar stringed instruments can be found in most cultures of the time.113 In
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such cases it is hard to discernwhohad original intellectual ownership. On the other
hand, research has demonstrated that Copernicus, in his calculations that demon-
strated that the sun and not the earth was the centre of the planetary system, made
use of models already developed by Arab and Persianmathematicians.114
Also, is the availability of Latin translations of Arabic books on a large number
of scientific topics in itself proof that they actually influenced European thinking
and practices? In some instances we know this to have been the case. Arab Muslim
philosophers like Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina have become part of the European canon
of philosophy, knownunder their Latinizednames of, respectively, Averroes andAvi-
cenna.115Averroes, who applied the philosophical thinking of Aristotle to theological
questions, was amajor source of inspiration to Thomas Aquinaswho referred to him
merely as ‘the Philosopher’.116 Being an admirer of Averroes was also reason for be-
ing expelled from more religiously orthodox European universities – not because
Averroeswas aMuslim,whichwasnot generally known, but because his Aristotelian
ideas were considered too radical at the time.
The discussions on who influenced whom andwhowas first are notmere schol-
arly debates: they touch on the very essence of European identity, namely on the
question whether Europe has invented itself, or whether European civilization is
indebted to the Arabs for escaping from the Middle Ages and entering the Renais-
sance. Is it thanks to the Arabs that Europeans conceived of the concept of a library,
hospital or university, that Copernicus discovered the workings of the solar system,
that Thomas Aquinas introduced logic into theological thinking, that sailors can
navigate with a compass and that new forms of irrigation and agriculture were de-
veloped? Or have Europeansmade these discoveries on their own,merely assisted by
Greek philosophers and Indianmathematicians whose works the Arabs passed on to
them? It is one thing to represent ‘Islam’ as a ‘carrier civilization’ that had “little of
[its] own to offer” but merely reproduced knowledge of Greek, Indian and Chinese
origin that was of great use to Europeans.117 But it is quite another matter to argue
that the Islamic civilization has actually been at the cradle of pre-modern Europe
and that it kick-started Europe into its Renaissance118 and perhaps even introduced
Europe to the notion of humanism119 or modern science.120
I would argue that these debates on ‘ownership’ of knowledge presuppose an ex-
change of knowledge between civilizations as if these were closed boxes, and deny
that science and knowledge are not owned by people, but used, developed and passed
on from generation to generation by those who are capable of handling such knowl-
edge. The legacy of the Arabs is not only the translation into Arabic of original works
from the Greeks, Indians and Chinese, but also their elaboration of those works that
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brought them to the next stages of innovation and scholarship. Science and knowl-
edge was thus passed on and further developed by those who had the ability to do
so: first the Chinese and Indians, then the Greeks, then the Arabs, followed by the
Europeans. Each period and community of scholars can be proud of its own achieve-
ments, but these are to be seen as a phase in a long history of scientific and scholarly
development. However, the sensitivity of these debates illustrates how the percep-
tion of the Arab-Muslim Other provides an obstacle to such considerations: many
Europeans prefer to hold on to the self-image of Europe that raised itself as a Baron
von Munchhausen from the Middle Ages, without any help or influence from the






I. Setting the Stage
By the late fifteenth century, the Muslim presence in Europe shifted from the western to the
eastern Mediterranean. In the west, Spain had officially eradicated Islam from its Catholic
territory and society by 1527ce, and during the following century also expelled the remaining
Muslims who were coerced to convert to Christianity, the so-called Moriscos. This expulsion of
the entireMuslim population had already been accomplished in Sicily, several centuries earlier.
In the east, on the other hand, it was the Christian presence in the form of the Byzantine Empire
and Crusader states that had come to an end, and was replaced by the new Muslim power of
the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Islam entered Europe in the Balkans by means of Muslim
sovereignty, conversion to Islam, andMuslim colonists.
Perhaps the main characteristic of this period was the religious, political and national
divisions that were cutting through the European continent in continuous shifting alliances.
The Catholic Church’s domination over the entire continentwas challenged by theReformation
and powerful kings. The Ottoman Empire, the onlyMuslim power that was physically present
on the European continent, was to become an intricate part of these divisions and power plays.
1. Europe: Reformation and National Self-Assertion
In the period under discussion in this chapter, the notion of Christian Europe as “a
single commonwealth anda single body”1was an ideal claimedbymanybutpursued
by few. Nations had become aware of their own and unique identity, and asserted
themselves accordingly. Even religion became ‘nationalized’ as shown in themaxim
cuius region eius religio (to each region its own religion): European countries identified
themselves eitherwith Catholicism orwith various forms of ‘Protestantism’ like the
Anglican, Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist, Hussite, Presbyterian or other denomi-
nations. At the same time, the overall endeavour of each king was to emerge as the
championof theChristian realm:Francis I of Francebore the title ‘themostChristian
of Kings’, Charles V of the Habsburg Empire in central Europe was called the ‘Holy
Roman Emperor’, and Henry VIII of England used the title ‘Defender of the Faith.’
The religious andpolitical squabbles thatdominatedEurope in the sixteenthand
seventeenth centuries rendered the image of a perpetual conflict of Christianitywith
theMuslim infidelmostly imaginary, although it remained appealing. The repeated
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calls for crusades that used to be so inflammatory in previous centuries now went
unheeded or led to naught.National and petty concerns outweighed common inter-
ests, evenwhen these were religious. The Italian political thinkerMachiavelli, when
exhorting against the “barbarians”,meant not theOttomans, but Spain and France.2
The Reformation created a religious north-south divide, with the Catholic south
being caught between the hammer of Protestantism in the north-west and the
anvil of Islam in the south-east. But there was also a political west-east divide,
with the powerful Holy Roman Empire being squeezed between France in the west
and the Ottoman Empire in the south-east. Within this political-religious matrix
there was a continuous shifting of alliances between nations that all served one
purpose only: preserving one’s interests. If one of the European states acquired a
power much greater than that of the other states, then those states would set aside
any differences they might have and join forces against the other. In this intense
and continuous struggle the Ottoman Empire might still be branded as the infidel
Other, but actually was one of the competing European states – and a very powerful
one, for that matter.
2. Rise of the Ottoman Empire
The late fifteenth century witnessed the emergence of the Ottoman Empire as the
sole heir to the Byzantine Empire and later also to the Islamic empires of theMiddle
East. Its emergence had been gradual, dating back to the fourteenth century when
a Turkish tribe moved from Central Asia into Anatolia where it had established
its power base. They soon became known as the Osmans or Ottomans, after the
progenitor of their tribe.
Long before the fall of Constantinople in 1453ce, the Ottoman forces had al-
ready conquered most of the Byzantine Empire which included large parts of the
Balkans and Anatolia (present-day western Turkey). The Ottomans’ first foothold in
the European continent dates from 1352ce, when they came to the call of the Ge-
noese colony of Galata, opposite Constantinople, in one of their military struggles
against the Venetians andByzantines. TheOttomansmoved their capital to this new
stronghold in Edirne, on the most eastern tip of the European continent, and from
there gradually took over the adjacent territories in the Balkan hinterlands, taking
advantage of internal struggles among the local warlords. On several occasions the
Ottoman incursions were welcomed by the local population who hoped to be liber-
ated from these hated overlords.3
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The expansion of the Ottoman Empire usually followed the same pattern: first
alliances were established with local rulers, then this relationship turned into vas-
salagewith the rulers pledging allegiance and paying tribute to theOttoman sultan,
and in a later stage these territorieswere often annexed into the empire as provinces.4
This was not a calculated strategy, but mostly prompted by the financial logic of
conquest: the war machine had to be paid with the spoils of new conquests, and
the income from new lands was highest if they were annexed because then the Ot-
tomans could allot plots of land to their military commanders (the so-called timar
lands).5
The capture of Constantinople in 1453ce brought twelve centuries of Byzantine
Empire to an end. This historical event was not without symbolic significance: for
the Ottomans it meant the final usurpation of the Byzantine legacy to which they
claimed to be the only heirs; for the Greeks it was the final demise of the Eastern
Roman Empire; for the Russians it meant that the rightful seat of Orthodoxy was
transferred to Moscow; and for the Western Europeans it signified that Western
Christendom had now become the trustee of ancient Greek culture which, by that
time, was conceived as the cradle of European culture.6
After 1453ce, the Ottomans chose Constantinople – now renamed Istanbul* –
as their new capital, where the Sultan established his court known as the ‘High
Porte’ (from the Ottoman ‘High Gate’ or entrance to the court). A century later, the
Ottoman Empire was at the zenith of its power and its realm reached as far west as
Tunisia, as far east as Iraq and as far north as Hungary (basically the territory of the
ByzantineEmpire at theheight of its power seven centuries earlier). The army aswell
as the administrationof the empirewas efficiently structured, securing a continuous
flow of revenue that, together with the economic revival within the realm,made the
empire’s wealth and power the envy as well as concern of all European countries of
that time.Moreover,Ottomanpowerwasnot established just on land, but also at sea.
Thanks to their large fleet of galleys the Ottomans dominated the Mediterranean,
making Italy, France and Spain vulnerable to possible attacks fromthe sea.7 Invasions
of these lands by sea did not come to pass, but the anxiety caused by Ottoman raids
on their coasts was to have far-reaching consequences, as we will see later.
* ‘Istanbul’ was the combination of Greek ‘stin-poli’ (‘in the city’) and Ottoman-Turkish ‘Islambol’
(Ottoman for ‘aboundingwith Islam’). TheOttomans referred tobothConstantinople (‘Konstaniniyye’)
and Istanbul, which became the official name of the city only in 1930. (Caroline Finkel,Osman’s Dream.
The History of the Ottoman Empire, New York, Basic Books, 2005, p. 57.)
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The period thatwewill discuss in this chapter roughlymatches the golden age of the
Ottoman Empire. The two landmark events, at least from a European perspective,
during this period are the fall of Constantinople in 1453ce and the second siege of
Vienna in 1683ce which became the first major defeat of the hitherto invincible
Ottoman army. After this period, the economic, social, political andmilitary decline
set in that led to dismemberment and final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in
1914ce, of which we will speak in the next chapter.
In what follows, we limit our discussion to the European provinces of the Ot-
toman Empire (called ‘Rumeli’ by the Ottomans). These provinces were central to
the Empire, because they provided the largest portion of state revenues,8 and most
state dignitaries and the military elite came from this region. At the height of the
Ottoman power, halfway through the sixteenth century, themost northerly bound-
aries of its European provinces ran across Romania (‘Transylvania’), Hungary and
Slovenia to the Adriatic Sea. The city-state of Dubrovnik (or Ragusia, in present-day
Croatia) was allowed to maintain its independence,9 as were most Venetian colonies
along the Balkan coast, to serve as the economic link between the Ottoman Empire
andWestern Europe.
The Ottoman Empire had several European neighbours that we will briefly in-
troduce here in order to obtain some background to the developments and events
that we are to discuss later. The city-state of Venice was at the centre of a network
of merchant colonies dotted along the Adriatic, Greek and Byzantine coastline. So
powerful was this small state that the Ottomans at first left most of these colonies
untouched. Only later were these commercial bases gradually usurped by the Ot-
tomans, culminating in their conquest of Cyprus in 1571ce, which had been under
Venetian rule during the previous century. From the Venetian perspective, the Ot-
tomansmerely replaced the Byzantines as the Venetians’ most powerful partner and
rival in the region.10 The Republic of Venice played an intricate and dangerous game
of diplomacy that continuously sought a balance between France, the Habsburgs
and the Ottomans, playing one power off against another.
The other and most lasting adversary of the Ottoman Empire was the Holy Ro-
man Empire of the Habsburg dynasty, which straddled what is now Germany, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia and northern Italy. While Venice was a
power without territory, aimed only at commercial gain, the Habsburgs formed a
power very similar to the Ottomans, with distinct territorial and universal claims.
Indeed, both laid claim to be the rightful heir to the Byzantine Empire, the Habs-
burgs from a religious perspective and the Ottomans from a territorial and cultural
perspective.11These two power blockswere permanently in conflict, the border terri-
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tories of Transylvania andHungary serving as themain bones of contention. Rather
than assisting the Habsburgs in their plight, other European powers often took
advantage of the Habsburg military preoccupation with the Ottomans. The most
prominent example is France, as we will discuss at length below. The others were
the German Protestants who, when engaged in the devastating civil war within the
Catholic Habsburg Empire (known as the Thirty Years War: 1618–1648ce), took ad-
vantage of Ottoman pressure on the Habsburg borders to consolidate and expand
their position.12
Of theOttomanneighbours, the Venetians andHabsburgs posedmost problems
for the Porte in Istanbul. There were two other immediate European neighbours
of the Empire, but they were initially much less of a threat to the Ottomans. The
firstwas the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth, an enormous empire established in
1569ce and encompassing what is now Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine.
During the two hundred years of its existence it was one of largest and most popu-
lous countries inEurope.Theparts of its territory thatbordered theOttomanEmpire
were predominantly populated by nomadic tribes and ruled by several sedentary
khanats,most ofwhichwereMuslimwithwhomtheOttomansmaintained friendly
relations. Relations between theCommonwealth and theOttomanEmpirewere cor-
dial, prospering fromprofitable trade in slaves and furs, andwith a regular exchange
of emissaries.13 Themain source of continuous antagonism between the two powers
was the Commonwealth’s use of the unruly and nomadic Cossacks as a mercenary
defence force that regularly made incursions into Ottoman territories.
Cordial relations also existed between the Ottoman Empire and its other neigh-
bour, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, which in 1498ce was granted the right to trade
freely in the Ottoman Empire. This balance was disrupted in 1547ce when Ivan, the
Duke of Muscovy, embarked on the building of an empire by crowning himself tsar
and subsequently annexing the Muslim khanates between Muscovy and the Ot-
toman Empire and forcing all their Muslim inhabitants to convert to the Russian
Orthodox faith.14 This was threatening to the Ottoman Empire, but more so was
the Russian claim of custodianship over the Orthodox population in the Ottoman
domains, which the Russian Empire was to use repeatedly in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as a justification for military interventions.
II. Physical Islam
1. Living with the Unbeliever
The European continent contained three states with mixed Muslim and non-
Muslim societies: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the east, the Ottoman
Empire in the south-east and Spain in the south-west. Of these three realms, theOt-
toman Empire was the only one with Islamic rule. Spain is an exceptional case, since
Islam had officially been eradicated from the Peninsula since 1527ce; however, the
Catholic rulers spent the following centurypersecuting theMuslimconvertswhoal-
legedly persisted in their Islamicways. Theways inwhich the religious communities
coexisted in these realms and how the ruler interacted with its subjects of another
faith were so different that they need to be discussed separately.
1.1. Lipka Tatars in the Christian Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
The eastern frontier zone of Europe consisted of the vast area between the Baltic
in the north and the Black Sea in the south. Nations on the western side of this
zone were, from north to south, Poland and Lithuania, the Holy Roman Empire of
the Habsburgs, and the Ottoman Empire. On the eastern side of this zone was the
Duchy of Moscovy, which from the sixteenth century onwards was to expand its
territories and become the Russian Empire. The vast steppe of the frontier zone itself
was dominated by two tribal nations: the Tatars and the Cossacks.15 The Cossacks
had embraced Christianity and their allegiance was primarily to the Russians. The
Tatars,16 on the other hand, were Muslim, so that the Tatars in the Crimea were
vassals of the Ottomans, while the Tatars in the north had entered into allegiance
with the (Christian) Duchy of Lithuania, as we saw in the previous chapter, and
since then had been known as the Lipka (‘Lithuanian’) Tatars. They were allowed
to maintain their cultural, linguistic and religious ways as Muslims and were even
allowed to intermarry with the indigenous population, a remarkable privilege for
those times, especially when this was accompanied by the right to raise the children
of suchmixedmarriages in the faith of the father, that is Islam.
The Tatars’ status as Muslim warriors loyal to the Duchy was continued when
theDuchymerged into the Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth in 1569ce. The num-
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ber of Tatars living in the Commonwealth during this period is subject to specula-
tion.Numbers ashighas 200,000 arementioned for the entireCommonwealth,while
in the sixteenth century the number of Tatars in the Lithuanian Duchy is estimated
at between 20,000 and 25,00017 and an estimated 100,000 are said tohavemigrated into
Poland at the time of the Commonwealth.18 With a total population of an estimated
11 million inhabitants in the late seventeenth century,19 the Tatars constituted be-
tween 1 and 2 per cent of the entire population.
As early as during the fifteenth century, the Lipka Tatars voluntarily and “with
startling rapidity” assimilated into their new living environment.20 By the mid-
sixteenth century the majority of the Tatars spoke only Byelorussian or Polish, and
while the rank and file of the Tatar soldiers took up trade and manual labour and
lived as communities in separate quarters of villages, the richermembers of the com-
munity lived among their Christian social equals.21 Compared to other Muslims in
European frontier realms, this process of assimilation is exceptional. The reason that
has been suggested for this voluntary and successful assimilation of the Lipka Tatars
is their geographical and linguistic isolation: they had no connection with main-
stream Islam or any Muslim country, and Polish or Byelorussian was not spoken in
theMuslimworld.22
Theonlypart of Tatar identity that didnot assimilatewas religion: theTatars lost
the culture, customsand languages theyhadbroughtwith theminearlier times, but
they remained Muslim throughout the centuries. They built mosques, albeit in an
architectural style similar to that of the local churches in the region, andmaintained
the Islamic rites of birth, circumcision, marriage, death and burial, all performed
by or in the presence of imams and qadis (learned men who also acted as judges).23
On the other hand, the Islamic rules of polygamy, veils for women, and the ban on
alcohol were not adhered to.24 Themixed identity of the Lipka Tatars is perhaps best
illustrated by their religious texts, which were in either Polish or Byelorussian but
written in Arabic script.25
The Ottomans had a keen interest in these Muslims. They made several diplo-
matic interventions during the early seventeenth century when the religious free-
doms of the Tatars were being restricted under a growing Catholicism in the Com-
monwealth. The rise of theOttomanEmpire combinedwith religious intolerance in
the Commonwealth culminated in the Tatar rebellion of 1672ce, with many Lipka
Tatars defecting to the Ottomans. What followed was quite remarkable, especially
for those times, because the Polish king and nobles quickly restored the ancient
privileges of the Tatars and invited the Tatars who had defected or migrated to the
Ottoman Empire to return to the Commonwealth. A special role in this process of
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rehabilitation was played by King Jan Sobieski, known as the liberator of Vienna in
1683ce, who on several occasions, when Polish forces were to meet Tatars serving in
theOttoman army, struck deals whereby the Tatars were allowed to return and even
to be awarded privileges they did not have before, like exemption from all taxes and
permission to settle on Crown estates. Many Tatars answered this call from the Pol-
ish king, but quite a few remained within the Ottoman realm. The reasons for this
Polish indulgence must be sought in the Tatars’ standing as a military caste, their
defection causing a serious destabilization of the Commonwealth’s military might.
1.2. Ottoman Europe
Settlement and Conversion
The census of 1520–1530ce conducted in the Ottoman Empire records slightly more
than 1 million households in the European provinces, of which 18.8 per cent were
Muslim.With Jews being a tinyminority (0.5 per cent), Christiansmade up the dom-
inantmajority of 80.7 per cent in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In
most areas, however, Christians numbered even more, because the Muslims were
concentrated mostly in towns. In the large towns, Muslims even constituted a ma-
jority, except in Christian-dominated cities like Athens, Nicopolis and Trikala, and
in Salonikiwhere the Jews constituted amajority of 54 per cent.26 IslamandOttoman
culture, therefore, were restricted to the urban centres, while the countryside re-
mained the domain of the indigenous inhabitants who were mostly Orthodox.27
Let us now take a closer look at the Muslims in the European provinces of the
OttomanEmpire. The census of 1520–1530ce indicated that one thirdwere estimated
to be settlers (most of whom lived in large cities), and the remaining two thirds
converts.28 Both settlement and conversion need further elaboration.
Resettlement was a well-known policy of the Ottomans, which they applied of-
tenbymeans of incentives, but sometimes also by force. This policy, knownas sürgün,
was used from the early Ottoman conquests of Balkan territory to repopulate newly
conquered areas, either as an outlet for overpopulation in Ottoman territories, but
mostly to fill the voids left by the indigenous non-Muslim population in European
territories that had fled the Ottoman advance.29 An interesting example in this re-
spect is Constantinople after its conquest in 1453. Sultan Mehmet II wanted to re-
build and repopulate the devastated and abandoned city in order tomake it the new
capital of the empire.30Although theOttomanEmpirewas distinctively Islamic, Sul-
tan Mehmet II wanted to restore the capital to its original grandeur, not least in
the economic sense, and therefore ordered its re-population with people of mixed
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religions and ethnicity. These new inhabitants were attracted by favourable taxes
and land prices and, if unwilling,whole communities (Muslims, Armenians, Greeks,
Jews and Latin Christians) were forcibly resettled into the city.31 While the popula-
tion of 150,000 inhabitants prior to 1453 had diminished to several thousand after the
city was taken by the Ottomans, the – mostly forced – resettlement policy of Sultan
Murad paid off: thirty years later, according to the 1478 census, Istanbul had 70.000
inhabitants, of whom 58 per cent was Muslim, 32 per cent Christian, and 10 per cent
Jewish.32 The city by then had probably enough prestige to attract new citizens, and
a century later, by 1600, it had an estimated population of over 250,000 inhabitants,
making it the largest capital in Europe – compare Paris (220,000 inhabitants), London
(200,000), Rome (105,000), Madrid (50,000), Vienna (50,000).33
The other segment of theMuslim population in the European provinces of the Em-
pire was indigenous people who had converted to Islam.We saw that in 1530ce they
made up two thirds of the Muslims in the provinces. Research indicates that con-
version to Islam was a gradual process,34 but that it quickened in the seventeenth
century (the Balkan ‘age of conversions’)35 and thenhalted in the eighteenth century.
No census was conducted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but modern
historians mostly refer to an estimated 20 per cent of Muslims in the Balkans, al-
though it has also been argued that the total Muslim population there had by the
late eighteenth century increased to 40 per cent.36 The percentage differed region by
region, with Albania and Bosnia being Muslim majority regions (although Bosnia
lost this majority position in the nineteenth century).37
Who, then,were these converts, andwhatmade themconvert to Islam?Extensive
research has been conducted on this issue.38 The Ottomans, upon their conquests
of non-Muslim peoples, like their Arab predecessors in the seventh century, did
not force or otherwise require conversion to Islam. The reasons were the same as
with the Arab conquerors, namely an amalgamof theological,military and financial
motivations, of which the last seems to have dominated: the non-Muslim subjects
had to pay a mandatory poll tax (cizye in Ottoman) as required under Islamic law,
which was a source of income to the Ottoman state. It has been calculated that in
1528ce the poll tax from the European provinces made up 8 per cent of the total
revenue of the Empire.39
A combination of three motives may explain conversion to Islam in the Balkans.
First and foremost, conversion exempted the new Muslims from paying the poll
tax compulsory for all non-Muslims. Also, the worldly and military successes of Is-
lam seemed a sign of God’s favour and, conversely, of the spiritual and institutional
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weakness of Christianity in this part of Europe.40 Belonging to Islam was therefore
belonging to the new order of power, whichwas amotivation not unlike the conver-
sions that took place in the centuries after the first conquests of the Muslim Arabs.
In the case of the Ottoman Europe, however, an additional role was played by the
Islamic ascetic and mystical or dervish orders that were very active in establishing
lodges in newly occupied areas andwhose sufi Islamdisseminated by travelling holy
men (babas)was close to the local folk religionof theBalkans.41 In addition, they oper-
ated as guilds, bringingmaterial benefits and fraternization in addition to spiritual
bonding.42
Conversion was not exclusively directed towards Islam, however. Among the
many Christian dominations and sects there were those who chose to convert not
to Islam but to Orthodox Christianity. The reason may have been expediency in the
particular context of Ottoman rule: the Orthodox Church enjoyedmore exemptions
from taxes and more allowances on church building than other non-Muslim reli-
gions, and the location of the seat of its Patriarch in Istanbul facilitated quick access
to the sources of power if the interests of the community needed empirical favour.43
A major exception to the voluntarism of conversion to Islam was the typical
Ottoman practice of boy levy (dev̧sirme): sons of non-Muslim peasants were rounded
up as a government levy and taken to Istanbul where they were raised as Muslims
and trained to fill the ranks of the Janissary military elite corps or the government
apparatus. This levy focused specifically on Christian boys in the Balkans44 and was
imposed irregularly for approximately two centuries between the fifteenth and late
seventeenth centuries, resulting in an estimated total of 200,000 boys being taken
from their homes.45
The practice of recruiting slave soldiers and slave government functionaries was
not new, as it already existed under the Romans, Arabs and Seljuks. We saw it in the
caliphate of Cordoba (the Saqaliba, or Slavs) and at the time when the Ottomans in-
stituted the dev̧sirme, Egypt was ruled by the Mamluks (‘slaves’), the military caste
recruited from slaves imported from the Black Sea region. But what made the case
of the Ottoman dev̧sirme exceptional was its enslavement of boys by means of a levy
among its subjects, and their obligatory conversion to Islam. The system of dev̧sirme
served the purpose of creating a military and governmental elite with absolute loy-
alty to the Ottoman rulers and their religion. It was taken so far that a significant
portion of the military and state apparatus of the Ottoman Empire had become
staffed with cadres recruited through the boy levy. The elite corps of the Janissary,
which was the backbone of the Ottoman army, was entirely made up of men who
were recruited through dev̧sirme. Many of the boys recruited through the youth levy
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rose to high status, as is exemplified by the famous Ottoman vizir KöprülüMehmet
(from Albania), who was appointed grand vizier in 1656ce, and whose family mem-
bers and protégés would dominate Ottoman politics for the next half century. The
dev̧sirme therefore resulted in thepeculiar situation that theOttomanEmpire for two
centuries was ruled by people who were staunch Ottoman Muslims but of Balkan
Slav-Christian origin.46 As a result, Turkish elites resented the domination of Ot-
toman political life by people of Balkan origin, not for ethical considerations but
because they felt threatened in their own positions of power.47
Although the boy levy was dreaded bymany, the prospects of a better life would
in some cases prompt Christian Balkan families to insist on having their boys taken
to Istanbul.48 The advantage was not only to the boys themselves; often they would
not forget their origins and return favours to the land of their birth land and their
families. Famous examples in this respect are the grand viziers Ibrahim Pasha and
Mehmed Süküllü, who under the dev̧sirme had been taken away as boys, were raised
and trained in Istanbul, had risen to the highest echelons of power at the Porte, and
in that position had lavishly spent on bridges and buildings in their Christian birth
towns in Bosnia.49 However, the boy levy was overall perceived as a humiliating and
arbitrary act of the ruling class against its non-Muslim subjects which may have
contributed to the gradually evolving resentment against Ottoman rule that was to
explode in the nineteenth century.50
Religious Rule
While the Ottomans did not force their non-Muslim subjects to convert to Islam
(except in the case of the boy levy) they did establish a form of government that we
might call Islamic rule. This manifested itself in terms of political-legal constructs
as well as a general identity.
The most renowned Ottoman political-legal construct vis-à-vis non-Muslim
subjects was the millet system, which was a continuation of the dhimmi status de-
scribed in the first chapter: the non-Muslim communities enjoyed relative auton-
omy in handling their religious affairs, with their own courts applying their reli-
gious laws, in exchange for a second-class social and legal position and the obligation
to pay a poll tax.51 While maintaining the dhimmi status of relative freedom of reli-
gion on the one hand, and second-class citizenship on the other, the millet system
was a set of arrangements developed over time that made the non-Muslim commu-
nities part of the state apparatus by creating ties between the community leadership
and the sultanate.52 It was one of the strategies for managing an Islamic empire
whose non-Muslim subjects might have been considered a minority from a politi-
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cal and legal point of view, but who de facto constituted the religiousmajority under
Ottoman rule. For the Ottomans, allowing for religious freedom and the internal
self-regulation of the communities was therefore a matter not only of Islamic law,
but also of political expediency, because they did not want to antagonize their non-
Muslim subjects, not least because they provided a substantial portion of the state
revenues through the poll tax.53
During their conquests in the Balkans, theOttomans hadmade dhimmi arrange-
ments with the non-Muslim communities they conquered. These arrangements
were often tailor-made to the needs of each community or region.With the conquest
of Constantinople in 1453ce, however, the Byzantine Empire came to its final end
and the Ottomans were now formally in charge of the three non-Muslim commu-
nities in their realm: the Orthodox, who had a Church institution and a Patriarch
as communal leader with a seat in Constantinople; the Jews, who had no institu-
tional organization but had chief rabbis as communal leaders; the Armenians, who
livedmostly in Anatolia andwho had their spiritual capital and demographic centre
outsideOttoman territory.54Ottoman rulewas definitely to the advantage of theOr-
thodox patriarchate: under the Byzantine political structure the Emperor was head
of the Church, but under Ottoman rule this position was delegated to the Patri-
arch. The power that theOrthodoxChurch exerted over theOrthodox inhabitants of
south-eastern Europe not only continued under Ottoman rule, but was augmented
and institutionalized by the Ottomans.
The arrangements that Ottoman conquerors had concluded with local com-
munities in the two centuries prior to the fall of Constantinople remained intact,
but communication with Ottoman authorities gradually became more centralized,
transforming into an arrangement that later became known under the name of the
millet system. This transformation was initiated on both sides: the communities
needed access to the central authorities to defend and safeguard their interests,while
the Ottomans needed direct contact with those communities through a representa-
tive body in order to communicate their desires or orders. A hierarchical structure
developed,whereby the three religious communities, whichwere ethnically and lin-
guistically pluriform, were subdivided into many local administrative units that
were often mono-ethnic or mono-linguistic.55 In the next chapter we will see that
this was one of the factors that contributed to a development of nationalist senti-
ments.
The other manifestation of Islamic rule in the Ottoman Empire was the Ottoman-
Islamic identity. The Ottoman rulers identified their state strongly with Islam, and
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the conqueror of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmet II, was the first to claim the
additional title of caliph: ‘sultan’ denotes worldly power over a territory, while ‘ca-
liph’ denotes authority over all Muslims, including those beyond the caliph’s terri-
torial power.
The Islamic identity further showed in the physical dominance of mosques over
churches. Christians were allowed to maintain their churches, but their bell towers
had to be removed or lowered, and restoration of churches was prohibited without
the sultan’s approval.56And rather thanbuildingnewmosques, theOttomanswould
commonly convert one ormore of the largest churches of a newly conquered city into
mosques.57 The Haga Sophia in Constantinople, one of six churches converted after
the city’s fall in 1453ce, is an interesting example. It retained its name, pronounced
in Ottoman as Ayasofia and its transformation into a mosque was effected by the
replacementof the altar, crosses andbells by thepulpit, prayerniche and the addition
of minarets. Frescos and mosaics with representations of Christianity were at first
kept, even those in plain view of themain prayer hall, like the paintings in themain
dome. The paintings most visible to the public were painted over 150 years later,
around 1600, during a period of intolerance towards figurative representation, while
those not visible from the main prayer space were painted over only in the early
eighteenth century.58
Quite contested – because contrary to Islamic doctrine – was the sale of monas-
teries and churches in the European provinces to fund the costly campaign against
Cyprus in 1571ce. This was reminiscent of Henry VIII’s dismantling of Catholic
monasteries and churches and sale of their properties thirty years earlier, but while
the English king’s ultimate aimwas to get absolute control over theCatholic Church
in England, the Ottoman’s additional motive was not to subjugate the Orthodox
church but to downsize the substantial land holdings of the Orthodox Church and
mainstream themwith that of the Ottoman state.59
Islamic identity was also expressed in the legal and social superiority ofMuslims
over non-Muslims. Christian and Jewish commonerswere on a daily basis reminded
of their inferior status as non-Muslims; they had to wear brightly coloured cloth-
ing, were not allowed to carry arms, or to ride horses or camels (or, if they were
allowed to do so, had to dismount when encountering a Muslim riding a horse),
and could be chastised or fined for not showing enough respect for Muslims “and
for an almost endless number of other ‘breaches of etiquette’ ”.60 In cities, Christians
and Jewswould keep off the streets during Ramadan, and stay away from Janissaries
whomightmolest themwith impunity: “Constantinople was a dangerous place for
non-Muslimsuntil the nineteenth century.”61These discriminatory regulations and
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treatments did not necessarily apply to Christians and Jews in high positions. But
all Christians and Jews, regardless of their social and economic position, were con-
fronted with the poll tax, with inferior status in court in cases against Muslims,
and the prohibition onmarryingMuslimwomen. Christianswere oftennot allowed
high church towers, or to ring their bells, or to have their churches repaired.
No wonder, then, that non-Muslims did not identify with the Ottoman Em-
pire. But neither did many of the Muslim Ottomans. While the Ottoman Empire
identified itself with Islam, its subjects did not share a sense of national belonging.
Compared to, for instance, the Roman Empire, where loyalty and belonging to the
empirewere expressed by the notion of citizenshipwhich in turnwas defined as a set
of rights and duties, the Ottoman Empire was a conglomerate of fiefdoms intended
to serve the emperor, its subjects identifying mostly with their religious or ethnic
communities. The term ‘Ottoman’ designated a member of the ruling class, while
the remaining population was referred to as ‘flock’ (reʾaya) irrespective of its faith or
ethnicity.62This population, on the other hand,would refer to itself exclusively in re-
ligious and ethnic terms. Therewere ‘Muslims fromCrete’, ‘Saloniki Jews’, ‘Catholics
from Dubrovnik’, and until the late nineteenth century, the Orthodox Christians,
whether Greeks or Slavs, referred to themselves as Romans (‘Romaioi’ or ‘Rum’) or
simply as Christians.63
The combination of this societal order and its religious-legal frameworkbrought
about a complex and delicate social infrastructure. It was, for instance, possible for
a Christian or Jew to have a high position at court (although much less so than a
Muslim, and certainly not the highest positions64), which would make him socially
superior to Muslim commoners.65 But in general, this system contributed to an
institutionalized form of religious discrimination. Nevertheless, compared to the
practices inEurope of that time, theOttomanEmpirewas relatively tolerant towards
its non-Muslim communities, attracting not only the admiration of Protestants in
northern Europe, as wewill see later, but also a substantialmigration of Jews fleeing
Spanish intolerance in the period between 1492 and 1527ce, as well as religious
refugees from Europe, like the Huguenots, Anglicans, Quakers, Anabaptists.66 The
number of Spanish Jews was substantial, and they received a warm welcome; most
of them were directed towards Saloniki (present-day Thessaloniki) where they soon
constituted the majority of its population.67
Sowhile theOttomanEmpirewas religiously tolerant in the sense that it allowed
for different religious communities within its realm, it was definitely intolerant to-
wards any defiance of, or sign of dominance towards, the Islamic order. This order, as
we have seen, included certain discriminatory rules. But apart from that, Ottoman
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society was a religiously pluralist society. An interesting aspect of this coexistence
was that there appeared to have been little religious segregation in terms of resi-
dence or profession: the three religionswere represented in all trades andprofessions
and exclusively Christian, Jewish or Muslim neighbourhoods were rare. “This ur-
ban topography suggests that employment and economic level may have been even
more important than religion in Ottoman subjects’ personal identity.”68 The non-
Muslims were also known to ‘shop’ between their own religious courts and the Ot-
toman sharia courts toget the ruling that suited their interests best, even though this
infuriated their community leaders who imposed bans trying to stop this practice.69
Nevertheless, the relative tolerance in the Ottoman Empire towards its non-
Muslim subjects had its fluctuations. The early seventeenth century, for instance,
witnessed a period of Islamic puritanism, missionary zeal and intolerance (possibly
becauseof the Islamicmillenniumin theyear 1591ce). The intolerancemanifested it-
self towardsMuslims aswell as non-Muslims.70Muslims faced an increase in charges
of heresy, especially relating to allegations of shiʾite sympathies (so-called Kizilbas),
which can partly be explained by the emergence of the neighbouring shiʾite Safavid
Empire in present-day Iran. The non-Muslims, on the other hand, were subjected
to a strict application of existing discriminatory regulations that until then had
been relatively dormant. There was a sudden wave of churches being converted into
mosques, and their figurative frescos and mosaics were covered up (including those
depictions in church-turned-mosques that had been tolerated for decades). Envy of
non-Muslims’ wealth – in particular Jews, who were prosperous traders, tax farm-
ers and bankers – and suspicion of their close links with foreignmerchants led to an
increase in discrimination and intolerance. The Jews of Istanbul, for instance, were
blamed in 1660ce for the fire that devastated much of Istanbul, leading to their ex-
propriation and banishment.
This period of intolerance was not helpful in cementing a relationship of trust
between the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects in the following times
that proved to be testing to the Empire.71 Neither was the increasing regulation and
bureaucratization of all aspects of life during the sixteenth century, which merely
over-emphasized the social distinctions and dhimmi status of non-Muslims. And if
therewas any reason to be loyal to authority, then themillet system ensured that this
loyalty was directed towards the communities themselves, rather than to the Ot-
toman rulers who were not interested in their non-Muslim subjects as long as they
kept their place. So when by the eighteenth century the Ottoman state began to face
social andeconomichardship, therewas little solidarity among its subjectswhose co-
operationwas needed to overcome these problems, as wewill see in the next chapter.
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1.3. Moriscos in Catholic Spain
We have seen that the Ottoman Empire identified itself strongly with Islam but felt
no need to impose this on its non-Muslim subjects, just as the Polish-Lithuanian
state strongly identified with Catholicism but felt no need to impose that on its
Muslim subjects. Catholic Spain, by contrast, since the late fifteenth century had
pursued a policy of imposing its Catholic identity on all its inhabitants, even to the
extent that everyone had to be Catholic. While Spain was unique in the scale of this
task, the relentlessness in its urge to religiously cleanse its lands of all non-believers
was typical of many European countries of that time, with Jews being expelled from
France, England, Germany, Italy; Huguenots massacred and expelled from France;
Catholics being persecuted in England, and Protestants and Catholics plunging into
the terrors of the Thirty Years War of religion in eastern Europe. While wemay now
look back with horror at the plight of Muslims in Spain, the Catholic Spaniards
themselves had no doubts about their actions: “[o]n the contrary, they possessed a
profound conviction that they were carrying out a pious duty.”72
Let us go back to where we left off in the previous chapter. By the end of the fif-
teenth century, the Reconquista in Spain was complete in territorial terms – the last
Moorish stronghold of Granada was taken in 1492ce – but then this struggle con-
tinued in human terms. In 1492, the Jews in Spain were given the choice between
emigration and conversion to Catholicism. A similar fate befell the Muslims, al-
though in a much more protracted way, over the period between 1499 and 1527ce.
By 1527, therewere officially nomoreMuslims in Spain. TheMuslimswho had opted
for conversion to Christianity were called ‘newChristians’ to distinguish them from
the indigenous ‘old’ Christians, but became known asMoriscos (although themany
among themwho had converted without conviction kept referring to themselves as
Muslims and maintained their faith in secret73). Around 1600ce, a century after the
conversions had taken place, an estimated 275,000–330,000 Moriscos lived in Spain,
mostly concentrated in the eastern regions of Granada, Valencia and Aragon; that is
2.5 to 3.5 per cent of an estimated total population of 8 to 9 million.74
The forced conversion did not automatically lead to the desired religious unity,
because the Moriscos were suspected – often correctly so – of secretly maintaining
their Islamic faith. Nor did the conversion lead to the desired aim of assimilation,
becausemost of theMoriscosmaintained their customs, different clothing and Ara-
bic language. Even more so were Moriscos perceived as racially different from the
‘old’ Christians, who claimed descent from the Germanic (Visi)Goths as opposed to
the allegedly semitic Arab descent of the Moriscos. Even if such differences actually
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existed – which seems unlikely after eight centuries of coexistence,75 but could have
been the case because Christians andMuslims always lived quite segregated lives – it
seems very unlikely that it showed in physical appearance: if it had not been for dif-
ference indress or the circumcisedmales, theMoriscos of the sixteenth century could
not be distinguished from the old Christians.76However, these differences do not ex-
plain why, in the period between 1499 and 1604ce theMoriscos were persecuted and
finally expelled. Four other reasons have been put forward that seemmore plausible:
the psychological state of mind of the Reconquista, religious fervour, demographic
fears, and security dangers.77
Regarding the psychological state ofmind, it has been suggested that Spain,with
a long-fought Reconquista war coming abruptly to a halt, was in need of another
enemy to channel its aggressive energies.78 “It appears that in this age the Spaniards
had a permanent need of an enemy, real or imagined, to confront as a nation.”79 This
enemy was first found in the Jews, then the Muslims, followed by the Moriscos and
from 1556ce onwards the Protestants (‘Lutherans’).
The second reason to explain the persecutionwas religious zeal and the desire for
a new and unified Spain that was entirely and exclusively Catholic, not only in name
but also in devotion. As mentioned, this was not an ideal typical for Spain at that
time, but the Spanish clergy were pursuing such religious unity with an aggressive
missionary policy. Theywere assisted therein by the special and enthusiastic support
of the papacy in Rome. Spain was one of the few countries in Europe where the
Catholic Church gained unmitigated influence. The main instrument for doing so
was the Inquisition, founded in Spain by papal bull in 1478ce. This court operated
independently of the secular courts, persecuting Christians for any infraction of
Catholicdoctrine. In the caseof Spain, itsmainvictimswereProtestants and conversos,
that is Jews andMuslims who had voluntarily or forcibly converted to Christianity.
The Moriscos appeared on the Inquisition’s radar only in the late sixteenth cen-
tury, nearly a century after the establishment of the Inquisition in Spain. In fact, the
Moriscos of Granada had managed to buy off the Inquisition’s scrutiny of Moriscos
for a period of forty years, but when this period came to an end in 1560ce, the In-
quisition renewed its interest inMoriscos and started its trials and executions. Some
Moriscos were sincere Christians, while others kept practising their Islamic faith in
secret, but in both cases they maintained a distinct Moorish culture that set them
apart from other Spaniards. But even the Moriscos willing to embrace Christianity
experienced the problem of knowing little or nothing about Christianity, and in-
stances are known of Moriscos pleading in vain with the authorities to be taught
Christian doctrines.80 The Inquisition had little consideration for these specific cir-
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cumstances and the court would often base its verdict on circumstantial evidence
that the accusedwere secretly practising Islamic rituals. These alleged ‘Islamic’ prac-
tices could takemany different forms: the failure to observe holidays or to go tomass
or confession; the use of Arab names in addition to the Christian names given at
baptism; the refusal to have representations of saints in their homes; the refusal to
drinkwine or eat pork; the habit of regularly washing (an indication that onemight
prepare for Islamic prayer).81 And if the evidence was insufficient, confessions were
extracted bymeans of torture.82 The Inquisition was to unleash a reign of terror that
was to remain in Spain for three hundred years.
The third reason that Moriscos were eyed with anxious suspicion was the size
of an unassimilated community that was perceived as not authentically Hispanic.83
The Catholic Spaniards felt in danger of being demographically outnumbered by
the Moriscos, who were said to have great reproductive powers. This anxiety was
compounded by the fact that a decrease in the growth of the Spanish populationwas
caused by the Catholic tradition of that time of sending daughters to monasteries
and having at least one of the sons become a member of the clergy.84 These fears,
which were also mentioned in official reports,85 did not correspond to the facts,
however, because the Moriscos were not only a relatively small community (we
mentioned 2.5–3.5 per cent) but also a community long in decline.86
In addition to the fear of the Moriscos as an internal enemy, there was the even
greater fear ofMoriscos acting as a fifth column for external enemies.One enemywas
the corsairs from North Africa who repeatedly raided the coasts of Spain. Although
the corsairs abducted both Christians and Moriscos as slaves, the Moriscos were
accused of inviting the corsairs to conduct these raids so that they could be rescued
from their Spanish bondage.87This accusationwas not entirely unfounded, however,
because it was known that some of the Muslims who had been expelled from Spain
between 1499 and 1527cehad joined the ranks of these corsairs.88Agreater threatwas
posed by theOttoman Empire which had obtained footholds inNorth Africa during
the sixteenth century and whose fleet ruled the Mediterranean. The encroaching
Ottoman power fuelled fears in Spain that it might invade the Peninsula, and the
Moriscoswere suspected ofwelcomingor even inviting suchOttoman invasion. This
suspicion was not groundless, because Moriscos circulated prophecies of imminent
assistance by the Ottomans.89 And for his part, the Ottoman governor of Algeria had
supported the Morisco revolt of 1570ce with weapons and ammunition, and the
Ottoman sultan as well as his vizier had written letters of support to the Moriscos,
the sultan suggesting that they join forces with the Dutch rebellion against Spanish
rule.90The latterwas tobecomeSpain’s third enemyafter theBarbary corsairs and the
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Ottoman Empire: the Dutch Republic had risen in revolt against Spanish suzerainty
in 1566ce, followed by England entering the conflict on the side of the Dutch.While
this conflict took place far away from Spain, it was feared that not only theMoriscos
but also the few Lutherans in Spain might act as agents, possibly assisted by French
Huguenots.91
Although the four concerns about Moriscos – their racial difference and con-
sequent lack of assimilation, undermining Christian unity by secretly remaining
Muslim, posing a demographic threat, and acting as a fifth column – are each of
a different nature; together they convinced the Spaniards more and more that the
Moriscos were a serious threat to Spanish unity and security. These concerns were
compounded by a growing number of state reports in Spain warning of imminent
danger from all sides.92 Together they made for an atmosphere of panic and a siege
mentality, and a fear of an internal fifth column. Consequently, most Lutherans
and Moriscos who were executed during the second half of the sixteenth century
had been accused of conspiracies and plots.93 The kings of Spain who ruled during
the Morisco-period – Ferdinand II (1479–1516), Charles V (1516–1554) and Phillip II
(1554–1598) – attempted to pursue a policy of moderation, but were under contin-
ual pressure from the papacy in Rome and the Inquisition and clergy in Spain that
produced a relentless barrage of accusations and complaints against Moriscos.94 In
several instances,measureswere taken to assimilate theMoriscos by force. In 1524ce,
an edict prohibited the Arabic language, traditional Morisco clothing, amulets and
jewels, and the practice of circumcision, ritual slaughtering and Islamic marriage –
measures that were paraphrased by historian Green as: “these foreigners within the
national bodywould have to learn to speak like ‘us’, behave like ‘us’, and become like
‘us’.”95
The edict was bought off by the Morisco community with a great amount of
money, but did not fail to antagonize other Moriscos who rose up in revolt in 1526.
This, in turn, led to the proclamation of a new edict in 1567ce that reiterated the
prohibitions of the edict of 1524ce but went further by calling for the destruction of
all public baths (which were suspected of being used for the ritual washing before
Islamic prayer), and the requirement for Moriscos to leave their front doors open,
women to unveil and the prohibition on dancing the traditional zambra or singing.
This time there was no opportunity to have the edict rescinded in exchange for
money, and again the Moriscos rose in a savage revolt that was put down with even
more brutality.96
The culmination of events ultimately led to the final and desperate measure in
1609ce of expelling allMoriscos from Spain, a project that was undertaken in phases
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that lasted until 1614ce. The majority of Moriscos left in 1609ce, after being given
three days’ notice to sell their goods, of which a set portion was already allotted to
their feudal lords as compensation for the loss of their workforce. In total an esti-
mated 275,000–330,000 Moriscos were deported from Spain,97 most leaving for North
Africa where they received a hostile reception as suspected renegade Christians, and
often suffered misery and poverty.
The total elimination of ‘new Christians’ – converted Jews and Muslims – was a
horrific catastrophe for the victims themselves, but also caused a significant disrup-
tion of Spanish society. The process leading up to the final expulsions had created an
atmosphere of intense suspicion and fear, in which family squabbles and disputes
with neighbours could end dramatically with accusations beingmade to the Inqui-
sition. But the disappearance of the two communities was particularly detrimental
to the social-economic fabric of Spanish society. In the case of theMoriscos, their sud-
den departure had left entire villages depopulated, agricultural lands and irrigation
derelict, and Christian landlords without labourers.98
2. Other Relations and Contacts
We now move from coexistence to other forms of interaction. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, these were both belligerent, like wars and raids, as well as
cooperative, such as an increasing diplomacy and trade.Most of this interaction took
place betweenOttomanandEuropean states, andhad as a conspicuous characteristic
that it was mostly one-sided: wars were mostly initiated by the Ottomans in their
continual urge for conquest, while the cooperative interactions – trade, diplomacy,
alliances – were mostly initiated by Europeans. The Europeans were too weak to
engage in war with the powerful Ottomans (and were too tangled up in their own
conflicts), while the Ottomans had very little need for the Europeans in terms of
commerce or diplomacy (a position they were forced to reconsider in the eighteenth
century, as we will see in the next chapter). The exception to this one-sidedness was
raiding and piracy, which were undertaken by bothMuslims and Christians.
Thequestion thatwill continuouslyhover over the followingparagraphs is:what
is the role of religion inall this?Wehave seen in thepreviousparagraphs that religion
was the main measuring stick by which societies were organized and ruled. In the
next paragraphs we will see that religion is much less of a determining factor in
other forms of interaction between Muslims and Christians. Two exceptions stand
out, however. One is European states acting as protectors of religious minorities
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in the Ottoman Empire. The other is religion as the main indicator for selecting
victims in raiding: pirates and raiders in the frontier areas of eastern Europe and
the Mediterranean targeted the ‘infidel’, just as only the infidel could be taken into
slavery. As we will see, this worked both ways, Muslims and Christians alike.
2.1. Wars and Raids
HolyWars Revisited?
Manyarmedconfrontations tookplace in sixteenthand seventeenth centuryEurope,
between Christian states as well as between Christian andMuslim states. The ques-
tion that concerns us here is to what extent thewars between Christian andMuslim
nations weremotivated by religion. The Ottomans often named theirmilitary cam-
paigns ‘jihad’ and the Holy Roman Emperor, in particular Charles V, was glorified
for his ‘crusades’ against the Turks.
By the sixteenth century, however, the numerous calls on the Christian side for
a crusade or some form of ‘holy’ alliance against the Turkmore often than not led to
nothing, indicating that religious fervour did not rank highly on the list of motives
for war. This does notmean that religion itself had lost its importance in general, or
in visualizing ‘the Turk’. The concept of holy war in Europe retained a “lingering
popular legitimacy”99 but was generally overridden by economic motivations and
political rivalries.
Nevertheless, the notion of holy war maintained its appeal in frontier areas:
the Barbary corsairs of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli sailed with the patronage of the
Ottoman sultan under the banner of jihad; the Catholic Uskoks from Croatia raided
the northern Adriatic with the patronage of the Habsburgs and occasionally Rome
under the banner of holy crusade; the Knights of St John, after their eviction from
the Holy Land and later from Rhodes continued their holy war from the island
of Malta; the Cossack bands raided the steppes of Ukraine and the Crimea, often
with the Christian patronage of Polish-Lithuania or Muscovy princes.100 It remains
disputed to what extent their call for holy war was out of genuine conviction or
merely justified their raids againstmerchants, soldiers and villagers of the opposing
faith. We will speak of this more below.
Let us now take a closer look at the Ottoman intentions in terms of warfare, be-
cause their alleged desire to conquer all of Europe as amatter of religious duty is still
a prevailing notion in modern European thought. Was Ottoman expansion moti-
vated by jihad or holy war, or was it a warfare state aimed at expansion and riches?
The Ottomans referred to their wars primarily as ghazza, and after the seventeenth
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centurymore as jihad. Both termsare commonly translated intoEnglishas ‘holywar’
without doing justice to the clear distinction between the two andwhat theymeant
in practice.101 To appreciate this distinction we need to consider the chronological
developments of Ottoman warfare.
During their early conquests in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ot-
tomans did not uphold any anti-Christian sentiments or ideology: “[t]he pervasive
notion of permanent and irreconcilable division between theMuslim and Christian
worlds at this time is a fiction”.102 Indeed, in this early period Christians made up
a large part of the Ottoman army, in particular as part of the light and irregular
cavalry that raided the frontier.103 Rather than pursuing holy war, the Ottoman was
a “predatory confederacy” comprising Muslim and Christian warriors alike, whose
goal was booty, plunder and slaves, no matter the rhetoric used by their rulers.104
Historians have made the same observation with regard to the Ottomanmilitary of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: whereas they were perhaps motivated by
religious zeal to fight the infidel, the main incentive to fight was “a well-calculated
system of bonuses and promotions”.105 It therefore seems fit to translate ghazza as
raiding aimed at conquest and booty.106
This does not mean that the ideology of holy war or jihad was not used – on
the contrary, it was the term commonly used to announce a new war campaign.
Moreover, this term was mostly reserved for wars against the Christian lands of the
Balkans andByzantineEmpire, andnot forwars againstMuslim lands in the east and
south.107 This would suggest that jihad does indeed refer to war against the infidel
and, more so, that it was not used in its canonical definition as a defensive war.108
Before we draw our conclusions, however, we need to reflect on this particular form
of Ottoman jihad in the light of the following observations.
First, Ottoman warfare was an annually recurring affair, almost ritualized with
military campaigns starting every spring in order for the army to be back in time
before winter. The need for this continuous war served several purposes, includ-
ing booty as major source of state income, the acquisition of land to keep the mil-
itary caste satisfied, and the need to keep the military occupied. Especially after
the conquest of Constantinople we may attribute the Ottoman Empire with an
“imperialist mentality, i.e. conquest for its own sake.”109 These conquests were not
restricted to Christian lands: a larger part of the Ottoman territories comprised
Muslim-dominated lands (Middle East, Gulf region, North Africa).
Second, there is the matter of Ottoman legitimization of its warfare. This is the
part where religion comes into play. War against the infidel, or jihad, was by defini-
tion a legitimate reason to go into battle, regardless of the actual reasons. And if jihad
physical islam | 131
was not declared, then a sultan would request the opinion of his religious scholars
(a so-called fatwa) to legitimize war on other grounds. This Islamic justification was
meant to make the war official, but was not necessarily the real reason for war.110
Religious-military propaganda should not be taken at face value.111
A third consideration is thatmuchof our informationon theOttoman conquests
and themotivations therefore is based on what Ottoman chroniclers have recorded.
Since they were writing in a time, and often in the service of, an imperial state that
identified itself increasingly as distinctively Islamic (especially in the seventeenth
century), wemust take into account the possibility of political-religious correctness
on their part. For instance, these chroniclers have omitted from their writings the
many alliances with Byzantine and Christian rulers in early Ottoman times (includ-
ing those bymarriage), and they increasingly identified the battlegrounds in Europe
as ‘Christian’ states.112
Based on these considerations we might conclude that the Ottoman conquests
andmilitary campaignswere not necessarily religiouslymotivated, but that religion
played a role in their justification. How sincere that role was depended on the time,
the personality of the sultan and on specific circumstances. When the Ottomans
wagedwar against non-Muslims – who, in the geographic situation of the Ottoman
Empire, were by default Europeans, since all other border areas where they engaged
inmilitary campaigns were inhabited byMuslims – they used the term ‘jihad’. This
notion did not mean a ‘holy war’ targeting non-Muslims for the reason that they
were infidels, but merely indicated a war campaign for reasons of conquest against
people who happened to be non-Muslims.
Vienna 1683
In the European collective memory, the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and again
in 1683ce are the symbol of Ottoman expansionism in Europe, as Poitiers was the
symbol of Arab-Muslim expansionism into Europe in the early eighth century. This
historical event is still fresh, as shown in the remark of the EU commissioner Frits
Bolkestein in 2004 that if Turkeywere tobe admitted to theEuropeanUnion “the lib-
eration of Vienna in 1683would have been in vain.”113Given itsmythical proportions,
the siege and battle of Vienna deserves closer scrutiny as to its historical circum-
stances and, in particular, the Ottoman intentions.
Startingwith the latter, how far did theOttomanswant to go in their expansion-
ism?Did theywant to conquer Europe if they had the chance? The answer to this can
only be based on circumstantial evidence. We have seen that Ottoman belligerency
was of a permanent nature, causing its Empire to expand continuously. There is no
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reason or evidence to assume that the Ottoman Empire had specific aspirations to
bring Christian Europe under ‘Islamic’ rule. Europe merely happened to be encap-
sulated into the ever-widening circle of Ottoman territorial gain. But that in itself
meant that Europe’s fears of this expansionist power were very well justified. These
fears were further fuelled by the pervasive and persistent legend of the Turks be-
ing driven by a prophesy promising them the ‘Red Apple’, which was interpreted
by Europeans to mean Rome which, in turn, symbolized the Christian common-
wealth.114
Vienna, being the capital of the Holy Roman Empire, definitely was a great prize
for any Ottoman general. But Vienna was also at the limits of Ottoman military
reach. This has to dowith thepractical considerations of theweather (awar couldnot
be sustained during the rainy autumn and cold winter seasons), the ever increasing
distance to the front (amarch ofmore than amonthwould severely shorten the time
for actual battle), as well as the structure of the Ottoman military (the main body
of cavalrymen or sipahi needed to return annually to their estates in the homeland
to run their affairs and collect taxes).115 The first siege of Vienna in 1529ce appears
to have been primarily to settle the Ottoman-Habsburg dispute over Hungary, the
frontier zone between the two empires.116 The siege of 1683ce, more than a century
and a half later, is said to have been motivated by the complex court politics in
Istanbul demanding a spectacular victory.117
The exact reasons andmotivations for the famous Ottoman attack on Vienna in
1683ce are therefore speculative at best. What we do know is that Europe showed
little unity in this perilous situation. The European powers were so divided among
themselves that the possibility of rallying them to come to the Habsburgs’ rescue
was “infinitesimal.”118 This was illustrated in particular by the silence and indolence
on thepart ofHabsburg’s arch-enemyFrance,whichhada secret agreementwith the
Ottomans and did not seem to care much if Vienna was taken. When the Ottomans
were repulsed, an English pamphlet commemorating theOttoman defeat and laud-
ing the ‘Illustrious Heroes’ cynically mentioned that victory was one “without the
help of the Most Christian monarch [i.e., the king of France] and against the Most
Antichristian Monarch [i.e., the Ottoman sultan].” The relief force that ultimately
came to the rescue was confined to those who knew they would be next if the Hab-
sburgs fell: the princes from southern Germany and the Poles under King John III
Sobieski (who was handsomely rewarded by the Pope).119 They succeeded in dislodg-
ing the Ottoman siege, and Europe sighed with relief.
Looking back at this historical event as a ‘European’ effort to repel the Ottomans
is therefore a retroactive mythification of events, just as the battle of Poitiers had
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been given a spin to accommodate the interests of the Carolingians. Similarly, the
notion that Europe in 1683ce was saved from Ottoman or Islamic rule is not jus-
tified by the facts and events of the time: while the Ottomans were unmistakably
expanding their territory by means of conquest it seems unlikely that their taking
of Vienna would have given them the stepping stone for the further conquest of all
of Europe since Vienna was at the furthest edge of Ottoman military reach, just as
Persia was in the east.
Raiding and Piracy
For centuries, the inhabitants of European frontier states and coastal areas lived
with the threat of being raided, their goods and livestock being taken, their homes
burnt, and the people themselves dragged off to be sold into slavery. The attackers
could act on their own or as some state’s proxy bandits hired to menace the realm
of an enemy. Of the states engaging in such acts of raiding during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans were particularly known – probably because
they were in more need of slaves than the Europeans – although many European
states also hired pirates or raiding tribes, some even gaining national fame (the
English pirate Sir Francis Drake and the Dutch pirate Piet Hein are still celebrated
as national heroes).
We have already seen above that the eastern border of Europe was suffering
from raids from the Muslim Tatar and Christian Cossack tribes. In the Mediter-
ranean basin the main menace was the corsairs who pounced on their prey from
small harbours. These corsairs were Muslim as well as Christian, but in the Euro-
pean collectivememory these corsairs are commonly identifiedwith theBarbary cor-
sairs who operated from the North African coast. In addition to attackingmerchant
ships, which was the main line of business of these corsairs, they would occasion-
ally raid European coasts, sometimes as far as England and Iceland, dragging entire
populations of villages off into slavery in Northern Africa.120 These raiders inflicted
widespread fear in Europe, just like theHuns andVikings had done centuries earlier,
which explains why they are still remembered in Europe.
The daring of these raids so far away from their home base can be explained by
the European origins of several of themost notorious corsairs. The Englishman John
Ward, and the Dutchmen Dirk de Veenboer, Symen Danzeker (‘Simon the Dancer’)
and Jan Janszoonwere pirates who, after piracy services rendered to their own states,
had become wanted criminals, and who sought and found new employment with
the Barbary pirates – after having settled the practical matter of converting to Islam.
The most notorious among these renegade pirates was the Dutchman Jan Janszoon
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fromHaarlemwho became known as ReisMurad, admiral of the pirates’ fleet of Sale
on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. He was the one who raided villages in Iceland in
1627ce. Other famous corsairs were the Barbarossa brothers who established their
base in Algiers in 1514ce. So well known were the navigating skills of one of the
brothers, Hayder Barbarossa, that the Ottoman sultan employed him as admiral of
the Ottoman fleet. It was under the command of Barbarossa that the Ottoman navy
gained dominance in the Mediterranean. But Barbarossa did not lose his pirate’s
plumage: he used that same fleet to pursue his old trade of raiding and piracy along
the coasts of the enemies of the Ottoman Empire.121
The Berber corsairs were not the only pirates who made the Mediterranean seas
and coasts unsafe. There were plenty of ‘Christian’ corsairs, such as the Uskoks in
the Adriatic and Ionian Sea, the Knights of St John who operated from Malta, and
various freelance pirates under English, French or Spanish flags. Such was their
menace that it has been argued that ‘Christian’ piracy was worse in its impact than
‘Muslim’ piracy.122
A conspicuous aspect of these raiders and pirates was that they selected their vic-
tims on the basis of religion (hence our reference to themas ‘Muslim’ and ‘Christian’
pirates). The Muslim Barbary corsairs targeted the ships and coasts of Christian na-
tions, andMuslimslaves foundduring these raidswouldmostlybe set free.Christian
pirates did the same in reverse, targeting only Muslim prey. The Christian Cossacks
preferred to raid Muslim communities on the Black Sea coast as well as the booty-
laden Tatars returning from their own raids,123 while the Muslim Tatars from the
Black Sea preferred to raid the Russian territories.124
But not every corsair was precise in the religious definition of his prey. The
Uskoks used a strict Catholic definition when identifying their targets, which al-
lowed them to rob not only the Muslim Turk, but also Ottoman Jews and even
Orthodox Christians whom the Uskok Catholic considered heretics.125 The Uskoks
also raided (Catholic) Venetianmerchant ships because they often shippedOttoman
cargo, as well as the (Catholic) republic of Dubrovnik and the (Catholic) Venetian
domains along the Adriatic coast because, according to Uskok opinion, they had
compromised themselves by entering into treatieswith theOttomanEmpire.126 Sim-
ilarly, the Knights of St John in Malta at first attacked only Ottoman and Barbary
vessels, but later also Christian ships under the pretext that theymight be shipping
infidel goods, or that theywere not true Christians but schismatics like Orthodox or
Maronites.127
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2.2. Alliances
The overall characteristic of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was political
scheming in order to find allies but also to abandon them as soon as they ceased
to serve one’s interests. This manoeuvring was accompanied by diplomatic envoys
sent between the various powers (permanent embassies were to be established only
in the eighteenth century).128 The motto ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ was
widely applied, andMuslim-Christian boundaries were not sacrosanct, resulting in
complex political scheming and diplomatic traffic. Themyth of Christian unity was
continuously upheld in speech, but very rarely in practice. There was no European
bloc, nor a Christian commonwealth, versus the infidel Turk; on the contrary, the
OttomanEmpirewas one of themanyplayers in the great game of power and chang-
ing alliances in Europe.129 England and the Dutch Republic sought alliances with
the sultans of Morocco as well as with the Ottoman Empire against their enemy
Spain; Sweden needed Ottoman assistance against the Russians; France wanted the
Ottomans as an ally against the Habsburgs; the Hungarian protestant princes were
willing to become Ottoman vassals in exchange for an Ottoman attack on the Hab-
sburg Empire. Later, in the eighteenth century, it was the turn of the Habsburgs to
enter into an alliance with the Ottomans against their common enemy, the Russian
Empire. Twoof these exampleswill be elaboratedbelow to illustrate themechanisms
of these processes: the relations between France and the Ottoman Empire, and be-
tween the Dutch Republic and theMoroccan sultanate.
France and the Ottomans
One of the most enduring rivalries in the period under discussion here was that be-
tweenFrance and theHolyRomanEmpire ruledby theHabsburgdynasty. Thekings
both vied for dominance in the European political arena, using all means includ-
ing religion. The King of France, for instance, donned the epithet ‘Most Christian
King’ in order to compete with the Habsburg emperor’s official title of Holy Ro-
man Emperor. But when the Habsburg emperor Charles V got the upper hand in
this struggle for power, King Francis I of France made a move that astounded Euro-
pean Christendom: he entered into an alliance with the Ottomans. This alliance had
a very profitable commercial dimension but was effectively also a military alliance
directed against the Holy Roman Empire. Secret negotiations had started in 1526ce,
a year after the French had suffered a major defeat against the Habsburgs, and ten
years later a treatywas concluded between France and theOttomanEmpire thatwas
to last for two and a half centuries.130
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The Franco-Ottoman alliance had its ups and downs, corresponding with the
state of the relationship between France and the Holy Roman Empire, King Fran-
cis I being the ultimate Machiavellian: whenever relations with Charles V turned
sour, he would revert to the Ottomans, and vice versa. Themost controversial use of
that alliance was the joint French-Ottoman military attacks against Habsburg ter-
ritories. In 1528ce, the French attacked the Habsburg Empire in the west, while the
Ottomans marched in from the south and laid the first siege to Vienna in 1529ce.
In 1534ce, upon the request of King Francis I, the Ottoman navy sailed out against
Habsburgpositions in theAdriatic, laying southern Italy towaste and carrying thou-
sands of people off into slavery.131This joint French-Ottomanmilitary campaignwas
repeated ten years later, in 1534–1544ce, on a much larger scale. The Ottoman fleet
of 110 ships commanded by the illustrious Barbarossa and again accompanied by the
Frenchambassador, sailed fromConstantinople toFrance, on itswaypillagingall the
coastal areas thatwerenot indicated to be allies of Francis I (who, for all practical pur-
poses, identified his enemy Rome and the papal territories as such allies).132 The fleet
moored inMarseilles, where the Ottoman admiral and his entourage received a fes-
tive welcome. It then sailed out again, this time together with French navy forces, to
attackNice. To overcome logistical problems that arose thatwinter, Francis I allowed
the Ottoman fleet to spend the winter in the port city of Toulon, which was evacu-
ated for that purpose and placed in the hands of Barbarossa and an estimated thirty
thousand Ottoman troups. For several months, the city was Ottoman, with its own
mosque (the cathedralwas temporarily converted for that purpose) and slavemarket
where they could sell the people they had enslaved during their pillaging raids (such
as the entire population of Lipari, an island north of Sicily). But then, with the com-
ing of a new year, the tables had turned: Francis I had now entered into a peace treaty
withCharles V, and theOttoman fleet returned toConstantinople in 1545ce, but not
until it had forcibly released all the Muslim galley slaves from the French fleet. The
Franco-Ottoman alliance ebbed to a low point but was soon to be activated again:
the French supplied material support for the Ottoman military campaigns against
the Hungarians (1543–1544ce) and the Safavid Persians (1547ce). Francis’ successor,
Henry II, also availed himself of the alliance, and the French and Ottomans staged
joint naval raids on Italian coasts during the period 1551–1559ce, wherein the French
captured Corsica and the Ottomans the Balearic Islands.
Themilitary part of the alliance then became dormant for over a century,mainly
because France and theHabsburgs had entered into a peace treaty. Ottoman-French
commerce, on the other hand, the conditions of which were stipulated in the treaty,
flourished. In the late seventeenth century, however, when relations between the
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French and Habsburgs soured again, King Louis XIV thought it opportune to en-
courage the Ottomans on several occasions to initiate military campaigns against
the Habsburg southern flanks. Indeed, as we have seen, when the Ottomans once
more laid siege to Vienna, the French did not intervene and it was the Polish forces
that came to the rescue. Five years after the Ottoman siege of Vienna had been re-
pulsed, and the Habsburg army was still successfully pushing the Ottomans back,
the French king Louis XIV attacked the Habsburg Empire, thereby relieving –
whether intentionally or not is unclear – the Ottomans from Habsburg military
pressure.
The Dutch Republic and theMoroccan Sultan
The reason that the Dutch Republic and Morocco got acquainted was their mutual
enemy, Spain.133 In the sixteenth century, Spain was entangled in a protracted re-
bellion in the Low Countries in which the Dutch Republic of the Seven Provinces
declared independence from their Spanish sovereign in 1588ce. When in 1604ce the
Dutch captured a Spanish ship at theNorth Seawith Turkish andNorth African gal-
ley slaves on board – for which the Dutch had no practical use, because they had no
galleys norwere they engaged in the slave trade at that time – they decided tomake a
gesture of goodwill to the sultan ofMorocco by returning the slaves to him. In doing
so, they hoped to nudge the sultan intomore belligerency towards Spain. The sultan,
in need of European weaponry, responded positively.
In the ensuing diplomatic and commercial relations between the Dutch Re-
public and the Moroccan sultanate, Moriscos and Jews, both originally from Spain,
became the most important middlemen, although The Hague also enjoyed the un-
usual sight of Arab-Berber envoys dispatched from the Moroccan court.134 Negotia-
tions resulted in a Dutch-Moroccan treaty in 1610ce inwhich theDutch committed
themselves to the delivery of weapons and warships to the sultan, in exchange for
a safe conduct from corsairs for Dutch trade vessels in the Mediterranean and the
promise that no Dutch slaves would be traded inMorocco. The Dutch, being Protes-
tant and fervently anti-Catholic at the time, were not deterred by the papal ban on
anywargoods to “Saracens, Turks andother enemies of theChristians” thathadbeen
in place since 1179ce and was again renewed in the early 1450s.135 Military alliances
were not included in this ban, but were probably not foreseen at the time as being
absurd and unimaginable.
From the Dutch perspective, a military alliance with the Moroccan sultan was
not undesirable, but at the time of the treaty not considered possible since theDutch
Republic had by then entered into a truce with Spain. No objections existed against
138 | divided europe (1500–1700ce)
the sale of weapons, however, and several canons arrived safely in Morocco where
they can still be admired, but of the three warships that were built for the sultan,
two were sunk by the Spanish on their way to Morocco and the third returned to
Holland in haste. Morocco actually had nothing to offer to the Dutch Republic, but
eagerly imported Dutch cloth and weapons, a trade that continued until 1659ce.
The Moroccan-Dutch relationship ended with the English capture of Gibraltar in
1704ce; from then on, trade withMorocco became an exclusively English affair.
2.3. Trade
Commerce between Europe and the Ottoman Empire was a one-way affair, prompt-
ed by a lack of Ottoman need for European commodities (except for slaves, as wewill
see below): compared to the total volume of tradewithin theOttoman Empire, trade
with Europe was a relatively marginal part of the Ottoman economy.136 It was the
Europeans who came to Ottoman lands to trade, not the other way round. The few
Ottomanmerchants that ventured into European ports weremostly Ottoman Jews,
Greeks and Armenians.137 This lack of interest on the Ottoman side was caused not
only by economicmotivations, but also by a fear of travelling into a Europe that was
considered so intolerant towards non-believers that Ottomans thought they risked
their lives if they were to venture there.138 Venice was the only European city that
tried to accommodate Ottoman traders by building a fondaco (from the Arabic fun-
duq – that is a trading house that also functioned as a hostel), just as they themselves
had been accommodated with funduqs in Syria and Egypt: Ottomanmerchants now
only had to sail into Venice, unload their goods straight from the canal into the fon-
daco, spend the night there if needed, and then leave, without having to venture into
the city or having to get in touch with any Venetian.139
Insofar as the Ottoman merchants wanted to trade with Europe, they did so
either through Ottoman Jewish, Greek and Armenian intermediaries, or through
the city-states of Venice and Ragusa (present-day Dubrovnik at the Croatian coast),
both of which had trading posts dotted along the Ottoman shores of the Adriatic
and Aegean Seas. Most of these Venetian colonies were taken during the Ottoman-
Venetia wars of 1570–1573ce (resulting in the Ottoman conquest of Venice’s most
important outpost, Cyprus), but the city-state ofRagusamaintained its autonomous
status within the Ottoman realm.140
Fromthe sixteenth century onwards, the European states engaged indirect trade
with the Ottoman Empire, a development that heralded the gradual decline of the
traditional commercial dominance of the Italian mercantile city-states. Their posi-
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tionwas now taken over by western Europeanmerchants and trading houses. These
commercial activities were often secured by bilateral treaties at the state level, start-
ing with France in 1569ce,141 followed by England (1580ce), and the Netherlands
(1612ce) as a reward for having fought the Spaniards.142 In the Dutch and English
cases, these agreements were entered into by trading companies that had first se-
cured trading monopolies from their own governments and subsequently from the
Porte; the lack of any state interference in their commercial activities provided them
withmore acumen and agility than their counterparts in other countries.143
These trade agreements, known as ‘capitulations’, allowed both parties all kinds
of commercial privileges, including free trade, tax exemptions, and the like. The
Europeanparties to these capitulations profitedmost from these agreements. France
in particular saw an increase in the volume of itsMediterranean trade, and became a
dominant commercial power when Venetian trade was brought to a near standstill
after its loss of Cyprus and subsequent submission to Ottoman power in 1571ce.144
The capitulations alsoprovided for consular assistance onOttoman territory, and the
European powers soon established consulates in one or more of the main Ottoman
mercantile cities, such as Istanbul, Smyrna (Izmir), Aleppo, Sidon, Alexandria and
Cairo. The capitulations also allowed forOttoman consulates inEuropean states, but
the Porte did not see the need to capitalize on this possibility.
With the increase in volume of European trade with the Ottoman Empire, the
foreign mercantile community within the Empire also expanded and, in conse-
quence, increased the importance of the consul. With the regular extension of the
capitulations – usually every five years – , the immunities of the consul and his staff
were often augmented, even granting the consulate judicial powers in commercial
matters. The development from occasional and individual permissions to trade in
the tenth and eleventh centuries to the commercial treaties between states in the
sixteenth century gradually resulted in the establishment of veritable European en-
claves in Ottoman cities in the subsequent two centuries, as we will see in the next
chapter.
2.4. Slavery
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries several European countries engaged in
the slave trade between Africa and the Americas, but slavery became less practised in
Europe except for a limiteduse as oarsmen innavygalleys or forhard labour inmines
and agriculture in countries along theMediterranean coast.145 While the presence of
Muslim slaves in Europe became less in comparison to the previous centuries, and
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theWestern European states reserved the practice of slavery tomost of their colonies,
the practice of slavery increased in Muslim states in the Mediterranean basin, in
particular the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary states on the North African coast
in what is nowadays Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
This affected Europe sincemany of these slaveswere Europeans captured in raids
on European coasts or ships. The numbers of slaves in those times are of course hard
to assess, but according to estimates a total of 1–1.25 million European Christians
had been enslaved by the Barbary corsairs between 1530 and 1780ce.146 Some of these
slaveswereused tomakemoneybymeansof ransom,manywere sold to theOttoman
Empire, and the remainder were put to work tomaintain the corsairs’ harbours and
fortresses or to build the immense palace of themegalomaniac sultanMoulay Ismail
(1672–1727ce) of Morocco.147
In Ottoman society, slaves were used for hard labour in mines and agriculture,
but more so in domestic service and in economic and military domains.148 By the
seventeenth century, theOttomanadministrationwas entirely in thehands of slaves
who were considered much more obedient and trustworthy to the sultan than the
freeborn Turkish upper class, especially if they had converted to Islam.149 Slaves were
often allowed to earn their own income so that they would be capable of ransoming
themselves, and Islam encouraged the manumission of slaves as an act of pious
charity; the result, however, was a “constant erosion of the slave population” in
Ottoman society that, in consequence, kept the demand for slaves high.150 The need
for new supplies of slaves also remained high because most slaves accepted the
religion of their masters, and subsequently had to be set free.
Slavery inNorth Africa differed from that in Europe and the Ottoman Empire.151
Slaves were primarily a source of income through the payment of ransom. This
practice was reserved first for rich captives, but with the enormous rise of captives
brought in by corsairs by the end of the seventeenth century, governments of Euro-
pean states started to send envoys to negotiate the ransom of larger groups of their
countrymen. The rising number of slaves, combined with the work of charitable or-
ganizations working for the ransoming of Christian fellow men in captivity,152 and
the publication of narratives of ransomed and escaped slaves,153 contributed to an in-
creasing interest of the European public in the plight of Christian slaves in North
Africa.
Already in the previous centuries slavery had become divided by religion: Chris-
tians would only use non-Christian slaves, and Muslims only non-Muslim slaves.
On both sides, Christian andMuslim slaves had three ways to regain their freedom:
ransom by their fellow countrymen, manumission by a friendly master or conver-
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sion to the religion of their master. The last was controversial, however, since losing
a slave constituted a loss of income to the master.154 In the case of the Barbary city-
states, conversion combined with the joining of the ranks of corsairs was a way to
escape slavery. The fact that so many did so was a source of scandal and unbelief in
Europe, where it was widely believed that such conversionmust have been the work
of tireless efforts by theMuslim slavemasters to turn their captives away from their
Christian faith.155 All those who converted to Islam and managed to escape or be
ransomed, however, recounted that they converted not because of pressure by their
masters to do so, but to escape the harsh conditions of slavery (although they often
remained slaves after conversion).156
After the Barbary corsair states had been routed in the early nineteenth century,
the practice of slavery continued in the Ottoman Empire until 1918.
III. Virtual Islam
1. The Image of the ‘Turk’
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans generally distinguished
between Islam, which was an object of disdain and fear, and the ‘Turk’ who was an
object of fascination.On the onehand,Ottoman victorieswere seen as a typicalman-
ifestation of Islam as a violent and aggressive religion, symbolized by the cruelties
perpetrated especially by the elite corps of the Janissaries, and one had to pray for the
undoing of this Islam.157On the other hand, the prominent presence of theOttoman
Empire on the European continent in the seventeenth century generated great pop-
ular interest in the ‘Turk’ and his customs and religion. Descriptions of Ottoman
society were published as early as the late fifteenth century.158 By the seventeenth
century, however, an increasing stream of travel accounts, diaries and pamphlets
with first-hand experiences and observations about Ottoman society appeared in
Europe where “the Turks were filling the minds of nobles and peasants, seamen
and intellectuals.”159 The authors were quite diverse: pilgrims travelling through
the Ottoman realm on their way to Jerusalem, slaves who were liberated or had es-
caped, religious refugees fromEuropewhohad found refuge in theOttomanEmpire,
physicians hired by the Ottoman elite, European merchants and diplomats.160 The
merchants and diplomats also brought artists in their wake, so that pictorial images
were added to the scriptural ones. These stories, in turn, greatly influenced plays,
literature, folktales and apocalyptic literature of this period.161 And they all reached
a wide audience thanks to the newly functioning printing press.
This stream of information, combined with the newmindset of impending En-
lightenment that invited the Europeans to exercise self-reflection and self-criticism,
gradually transformed the image of the Turk as well as Islam. The Turk inherited
fromprevious centuries the image of the negative or exclusionary Other, such as the
fierce Saracen, the conquering Turk or the licentious Muslim, but also acquired the
image of the positive Other, such as the tolerant Turk or the ally against a common
enemy. The Turk was viewed negatively as someone exercising arbitrary power and
unbridled lust and who disliked alcohol, but also positively as a person of honesty,
sobriety, religious tolerance, with an administration of “swift, expeditious, inexpen-
sive” justice.162
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The European curiosity about the Turk stood in stark contrast to the near in-
difference of the Ottoman towards the European Christian. Apart from the keen
awareness of thePorteof the religious struggles in sixteenthcenturyEuropeofwhich
the Sultan tried to make political use,163 Ottoman interest in European customs or
affairs was almost non-existent until the nineteenth century.
2. Dealing with the ‘Turk’
While there was popular interest among Europeans in the Turk out of sheer curios-
ity and fascination, the European Christian states had great interest in the Ottoman
Empire for pragmatic reasons like political alliances and commercial treaties. From
1500ce onwards, the Ottoman Empire became a power like any other European
power. Still, the ‘Turk’ remained an outsider, regardless of howmuch the European
Christian nations were engaged in internal bloody wars – especially the devastating
religious Thirty Years War (1618–1648ce) – and regardless of all the diplomatic and
commercial overtures these nations made towards the Ottoman Empire. The Eu-
ropean nations might be practising a considerable degree of Realpolitik as regards
the Ottoman Empire, but in their diplomatic exchanges among each other – even
with their bitter arch enemies – they maintained the jargon of a united Christian
commonwealth, admitting that their diplomacy with the infidel Turk was actually
inappropriate.164
The outsider’s position of the Ottomans in the international European setting
became particularly apparent with the Reformation and the religious conflicts and
wars that followed in Europe. The debates on how to respond to the encroach-
ing Ottoman military onslaught focused mainly on the infidel character of the
Ottomans, so that arguments were of a theological nature. The Catholics gener-
ally called for a general crusade against the Ottomans (the crusade being the term
for any war against non-Christians, not unlike the jihad as called for by the Ot-
tomans when fighting non-Muslims). The Protestants, on the other hand, were
willing to lend their support only to a defensive war. There were of course prag-
matic reasons for this position (the Roman Church was suspected of calling for a
crusade merely to reassert its authority), as well as political reasons (holding back
support might press the Catholic rulers to give in to Protestant demands).165 But
the Protestants also raised various objections of a theological nature against par-
ticipating in fighting the Ottomans. For one, the Protestants held a different con-
cept of the notion of a just war. Such war could only be waged by secular offi-
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cials and rulers in defence of the people and the land entrusted to them, not as
an extension of their religious convictions. From this perspective, fighting the Ot-
tomans might be justified, but not as a crusade.166 Another argument was that the
Turk might be fought as an aggressor, but not for the mere fact of being a Mus-
lim, since all people, regardless of their religious differences, belonged to the same
‘spiritual church’ (geistliche kirche) from where they, ideally, should reach the true
faith of Christianity; the Turk was therefore a ‘potential brother’ and not an in-
fidel enemy. Finally, there were Protestants who saw the Ottoman onslaught as a
punishment from God that had to be suffered as penitence; the more radical el-
ements among the Protestants went even further and saw the conquests by the
Ottomans either as the fulfilment of the Apocalypse and the coming of Judgment
Day, or as a means of converting the Muslims once they had occupied all of Eu-
rope.167
Not all Protestants were so reluctant to withstand the Turk. There were also
voices calling for Christian unity against the Turkish peril. Especially in England,
authors and clergy called upon the Anglican faithful to stand shoulder to shoul-
der with the Catholics to withstand the Turkish onslaught.168 But regardless of what
argument was favoured, none of these arguments would have been made if the Ot-
tomanEmpire had been a Christian nation. The role that religion played in ordering
societies by creating the dichotomy of us versus them and insider versus outsider
also applied to the international arena: the ‘Turk’ was marked as an outsider by the
mere fact of not being a Christian, and all additional stories and descriptions of the
‘Turk’ merely emphasized this difference. Even though so much more knowledge
was available onOttoman society and customs, the ‘Turk’ was set to follow the same
fate as the Saracen andMuslim of being the European Other.
3. Islam: ‘Better Turkish than Papish’
Knowledge of the religious tenets of Islam further increased in the seventeenth cen-
tury with the establishment at various European universities of chairs dedicated to
the study of Arabic and Islam. However, the attitude towards this religion remained
polemic: it needed to be studied properly, but only with the purpose of proving it
wrong and wicked. Arabic was not considered the key to a civilization, but the lan-
guage needed to read Islamic scripture. While this was the situation in academic
circles, the case of Islam was also taken up by religious intellectuals in the disputes
between Catholicism and Protestantism.
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Protestants in general looked favourably on the Ottoman relative tolerance to-
wards their non-Muslim subjects as opposed to the Protestants’ treatment at the
hands of the Catholics. It did not go unnoticed that many religious refugees from
Catholic Europe found shelter in the Ottoman Empire, like the Jews from Spain,
Huguenots from France and some Anglicans and Quakers from England. From this
observation stemmed the revolutionary slogan ‘better Turkish than Papish’ (Liever
Turks dan paaps, meaning: better Muslim than Catholic) used by the Dutch (Calvin-
ist) opposition against Spanish (Catholic) rule. But this battle cry had little to dowith
Islamitself, as oneof the first professors ofArabic at LeidenUniversity expounded ina
lengthy lecture presented in 1648ce: Islam itselfwas an evil heresy, but if ever offered
the choice between Turkish and Catholic rule, a Protestant would prefer the first
since the Turk allowed Protestants religious freedom, whereas the Catholic Church
did not.169
Protestants detected quite some similarities with ‘the Turk’ and his religion.
Were they not also against icons, clerical hierarchy, celibacy, alcohol and swearing
and excessive religious architecture?170 Indeed, the successes of the Ottoman army,
as opposed to those of European armies, were explained by the prohibition of alco-
hol and the strict discipline in Ottoman ranks. The Ottomans were aware of these
sentiments in northern Europe, and used them to their own political advantage, as
shown in the letter from sultan Suleyman addressed to the ‘Lutheran princes in the
Low Countries’ shortly after 1552ce, offering them military help against the Pope
and theHolyRomanEmperor, andwriting thathe sawthemas standing close tohim
since theydidnotworship idols, believed inoneGodand fought against thePope and
Emperor.171Notmuch later, in 1574ce, sultanMurad IIIwrote anopen letter in a sim-
ilar vein to the ‘Members of the Lutheran sect in Flanders and Spain,’ which is worth
quoting: “[a]s you, for your part, do not worship idols, you have banished the idols
and portraits and bells from churches, and declared your faith by stating that God
Almighty is one andHoly Jesus is His Prophet and Servant, and now, with heart and
soul, are seeking and desirous of the true faith; but the faithless one they call Papa
[Pope – MB] does not recognize his Creator as One, ascribing divinity to Holy Jesus
(upon him be peace!), and worshiping idols and pictures which he has made with
his own hands, thus casting doubt upon the oneness of God and instigating how
many servants to that path of error.”172Of course, this religious overture to theDutch
merely served the Ottoman goal of forging alliances with these European countries
against the common enemy, Spain.
Not all Protestants went so far as to prefer the Ottomans over Catholics. And
those who did definitely did not go as far as the sultans to equate Islam with their
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protestant versionsofChristianity. Islamremained to themanaberrationor evil, and
itwasmore commonamongProtestants to equate IslamwithCatholicism, declaring
themequallybad. For instance, awall painting in theGothemchurchon the Swedish
island ofGotlanddepicts St Christopher carrying Jesus as a child safely across thewa-
ter with, on either side, the Pope andMuhammad (with distinct Ottoman features)
drowning, symbolizing their heresy and unbelief.173 This imagery was also voiced by
Martin Luther in whose Christian cosmology the Turks represented ‘the Devil’ who
had come as ‘the scourge of God’ to punish the Christians for their sins, whereas the
Pope and his clergy represented the ‘Anti-Christ’ because of their burning and perse-
cution of “the innocent, the pious, the orthodox.”174 Still, he thought the Pope worse
than the Turk, because the latter was at least tolerant towards other faiths.175
But even such a staunch theologian as Luther was influenced by the political
realities of his time. In 1518ce he wrote in his Explanation of the Ninety-five Theses
that the Turk should not be fought since he represented God’s punishment for
the sins of European Christians, and this punishment should not be resisted but
endured as a purification of these sins: “to fight against the Turk is the same thing
as resisting God, who visits our sin upon us with this rod”. But several years later, in
1529ce,when theOttomanswerebesiegingVienna for the first time, Luther strongly
favoured fighting the Turk, albeit on “two fronts”: one by penance and prayer, for in
fighting “servants of the Devil” one first needs to beat the Devil before one can beat
his servants; the other front was by war. This war against the Turk, however, should
be a secular, not a holy war, because it was to be fought on the prince’s command in
his capacity as defender of his land andas protector of “ourbody and earthly life”, and
not in his capacity as protector of the Church.176 But whatever Luther’s thoughts on
the role of ‘the Turk’, he had no sympathywhatsoever for Islam as a religion because,
he said, it taught violence, deceit and disregard for marriage, denied Christ as a son
of God, and had a prophet who hadwritten “a foul and shameful book” full of lies.177
One might argue that equating Islam with Catholicism in terms of its evilness
effectively elevated Islam from the shadowy world of heathendom to the level of a
despised, but nevertheless Christian religion like Catholicism. This is twenty-first
century logic, however, because the recognition of a plurality of equally valid re-
ligions was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not part of the European
mind-set. Only very few ventured actually to compare Islam and Christianity on an
equal footing as religions. The French jurist and political philosopher Jean Bodin178
(1530–1596ce) in his Colloquiumheptaplomeres (‘Colloquiumof the Seven about Secrets
of the Sublime’) described a fictional discussion among a philosopher of natural law,
aCalvinist, aMuslim, aRomanCatholic, a Lutheran, a Jew, and a sceptic, endingwith
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a call for mutual tolerance. Similarly, Guillaume Postel in his Republique des Turcs
(1560ce) argued that Muslims, Jews and Christians held many beliefs in common.
Later, Jean de Savigny in hisDiscours sur les choses torques (1606ce) would go even fur-
ther by stating that Turks are “for themost part, half-Christians and possibly closer
to true Christianity thanmany amongus”.179What is interesting here is not somuch
the favourable attitude towards Islam, but the fact that Islam was seen as a religion
comparable to that of Christianity, which was a break with the centuries-old theo-
logical position that held Christianity as the only religious truth, condemning all
other claims to similar truths as falsehoods and paganisms. This development was






I. Setting the Stage
The period between 1700 and 1950 witnessed the demise of theOttoman Empire and the formal
ending of this last Muslim stronghold in Europe in 1923. Communities of Muslims continued
to live in the former Ottoman provinces in Europe and beyond, however. The same European
powers that had actively engaged in bringing the Ottoman Empire down had also expanded
their own territories beyond Europe, and through these colonial projects acquired new subjects,
many of whom were Muslims. So while the European continent for the first time was devoid
of Muslim rulers and the Muslim population in Europe had reached an all-time low through
migration and killings during the second half of the nineteenth century, European powers ruled
foreign lands with vastMuslim populations.
Europeanmilitary, economic and political prowess, together with the successes of European
imperialism all added up to a position of superiority and condescension vis-à-vis Islam and
Muslims. At the same time, two new concepts gained popularity that were to prove a powerful
source of dissent and even revolt among the Muslim communities both inside and outside Eu-
rope: nationalism andminorities. In the case of theOttomanEmpire, they played an important
role in inciting non-Muslim communities to rebel against their Muslim overlords. The result-
ing break-up of the centuries-oldOttoman social, political and legal structures that were based
on religion was to be very violent and brutal, and the volatile combination of ethnic, national
and religious identities made the conflicts all the more complex.
1. Colonialism and Imperialism
The eighteenth centurywas theheyday of European colonialism: Spain, France, Eng-
land, and theDutchRepublic established chains of trading posts on the shores of the
American, Asian and African continents. Colonialism evolved during the nineteenth
century into imperialism when the European countries also imposed their rule on
these territories and their hinterlands and, as a final step, incorporated these realms
into their sovereign domains. Consequently, the stateswith the largestMuslimpop-
ulations in the world were not the Ottoman Empire or Iran, but the Netherlands
(which ruled the Indonesian archipelago) and Great Britain (which ruled what are
now India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The nineteenth century witnessed the com-
bination of exploration of unknown territories (for profit, but often also as part of
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genuine scientific interest) and frantic competition among the imperialist states to
expand their empires with these territories outside Europe.
Muslim lands and peoples were completely overtaken by this European hunger
for conquest and knowledge. The three great Muslim empires at the time were
the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and Middle East, the Safavids in Iran and the
Moghuls in what is now Pakistan and northern India. They could not withstand
themilitary prowess of the Europeans – in particular the British, Dutch, French and
Russians – and had to succumb, as the smaller Muslim sultanates and emirates in
other parts of the world had already done. Resistance to the European powers was
scanty andunity amongMuslims almost entirely lacking. Even theOttoman sultan,
who was officially the caliph and hence the sole spiritual leader of all Muslims, did
not function as a rallying point of resistance to European imperialism, nor did he act
as such – perhaps because the Ottoman Empire was itself an imperialist power.
Between 1700 and 1950ce Europeans did not speak of the Islamic world or Mus-
lims, as is common nowadays, but mostly referred to the generic terms ‘Orient’ and
‘Mohammedans’. The term Near Orient was often reserved for the region stretch-
ing fromMorocco to Iran, while the ‘Far Orient’ referred exclusively to the region of
East Asia. This terminology reflects the worldview of the nineteenth century Euro-
pean of a division between the civilized ChristianWest and the exotic but backward
East. By the early twentieth century nearly all territories in the Orient inhabited by
Muslimswere either subjected to European rule ormade part of an alliance that was
dominated by the European partner.
Interestingly, the imperial endeavours of the European nations did not radiate
outward, but rather from the outside inward. The first colonies were in far away
places, and the territories close to Europe became of interest only at a later stage.
By the time Napoleon made the first inroad of European imperialism into the Arab
Mediterranean region by invading Egypt in 1798ce, the Dutch had already estab-
lished themselves in Indonesia and the British in India. Napoleon’s military action
has attained mythological properties in European history, but from a military and
imperialistic point of view it was an utter disaster (Napoleon eventually abandoned
his disease-ridden army in Egypt to return to France and embark on the conquest of
Europe). It took another century before France and England acquired an imperial-
istic taste for North Africa and the Middle East: France because it considered North
Africa part of its backyard and realized that it was one of the last territories left to
secure during the late nineteenth century colonial scramble for land; England be-
cause theMiddle East – especially after the opening of the SuezCanal in 1869ce –was
considered important in protecting its lifeline to British India. Oil, whichwas found
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at the time in Iran and in the Caspian Sea, became of importance only in the early
twentieth century, especially when the British navy in 1910ce switched from coal
to oil (the Arab Gulf oilfields were discovered in the late 1930s and became of geo-
strategic importance after the SecondWorld War).
The period under discussion here, from 1700 to 1950, sets our topic of ‘Islam in
Europe’ in a peculiar light, because almost all territories in the world inhabited by
Muslims became part of European colonial domains. But, apart from the Ottoman
Empire, none of these territories were located in Europe. And Europeans in this
period encountered more Muslims than in the previous centuries, and Islam was
never studied as much now as in the preceding epochs, but Islam and Muslims
had never been so far removed from the European continent as in this period. With
the gradual loss by the Ottoman Empire of its domains in the Balkans, the early
twentieth century was the first period in European history since the advent of Islam
in which no Muslim power had a foothold on that continent, and so few Muslims
resided there. By the early twentieth century, Muslims and Islam were therefore no
longer an issue of proximate danger, or of neighbourly relations, but had become the
exclusive domain of colonial and foreign politics.
2. The Demise of the Ottoman Empire
The demise of the Ottoman Empire set in with the turn of the eighteenth century,
and was reflected in a collapse of its military power, economic prosperity and social
order.
Militarily, the Empire never recovered from its defeat at the walls of Vienna in
1683ce, and it was the Empire’s luck that the Habsburgs did not press their ad-
vantage to the full but settled for peace. The resulting Ottoman-Habsburg treaty of
Karlowitz in 1699cemarked a turning point. From then on, any battle fought by the
Ottomans – mostly against the Habsburg Empire and tsarist Russia – would cause
themonly to lose territory, and other Europeanpowers like Prussia, France andGreat
Britainquicklymoved in to share the spoils and to tip thebalance in their favour. The
Ottomans tried to recover, but the eradication of the insubordinate Janissaries in
1826ce and a modernizing overhaul of its army in the late nineteenth century with
the help of German and French instructors, came too late and was of little avail. The
shortcomings of themilitary showed not only in the loss of territory, but also in the
inability to maintain internal order. The uprisings of the nineteenth century in the
Balkans couldnotbe stemmed, resulting in an internal fragmentationof theEmpire.
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The economic situationwas alsoworsening in this period, for a variety of reasons.
First and foremost, the Empire had no industries and was not a trading nation, but
relied almost entirely on its domestic agriculture. For its import and export it de-
pended on its Armenian, Greek and Jewish inhabitants, but even they hardlymoved
outside the Ottoman realm. The transport of goods from and into the Empire was
therefore dominated by Europeanmerchants who became increasingly intrusive, as
we will see below. The Ottoman lack of interest in (and even disdain for) trade also
made the Empire literally miss the boat in a rapidly developing global economy. By
the early nineteenth century, the Empire was debt-ridden and engulfed in a major
financial crisis. Its solutions were short-sighted and insufficient to solve the prob-
lems the Empire was facing: the issuance of promissory notes to raise cash added to
inflation, and taking out foreign loans to pay off debts increased both the national
debt and dependence on foreign powers.
And finally, the social order collapsed. This is perhaps the most complicated
development of this period because a number of factors interacted. One was the
breakdownof themillet system. This special religious systemof theOttomanEmpire
that had successfully existed for centuries had become dysfunctional. Another factor
was the declining fealty of Ottoman landlords and governors in the provinces to
the rulers in the far-away Porte. These two factors merged with the new sentiment
of the nineteenth century, namely nationalism, and this proved a volatile cocktail
that created series of uprisings by Ottoman subjects. And to complicate matters,
Russia, Austria, France, England and other foreign powers exploited these uprisings
to pursue their own interests vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire.
Thesemilitary, economic and social developments had their impact on the pres-
ence of Muslims and Muslim rule in the south-eastern part of the European conti-
nent, which became known as the Balkans. Ottoman rule rapidly receded from this
region, its European provinces becoming independent or acquired by the Austro-
Hungarianmonarchy. Thewars andmany insurgencies in the Balkan region during
the nineteenth century led to an unprecedented flow of migrants, settlers, refugees
and forced expulsions of communities of all nationalities, ethnicities and religions,
causing a dramatic shift in population composition in the Balkans. In 1923ce, the
territory of the Ottoman Empire on continental Europe was reduced to the furthest
south-eastern tip of the continent, round the city of Edirne.
The Ottoman Empire finally left the European stage with one last and dramatic
action: it entered the First World War by choosing to side with the German axis.
The choice would prove disastrous, but was not illogical at the time. The Allied
axis of Great Britain, France and Russia represented everything that the Ottomans
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had come to resent as European imperialism in the past century. The Prussian and
German empires, on the other hand, were much admired by the Ottomans for their
organizational andmilitary skills (and probably also for the manner in which these
empires defied the Ottoman arch-enemy, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy). In its
modernization efforts during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had
maintained close relations with them, and Prussian military advisors had come to
restructure and train the Ottoman army according to the newest techniques.
TheGermandefeat in 1918ce signalled the final destruction of theOttomanEm-
pire by the victors in the Versailles talks of 1919–1920. The remnants of the Ottoman
Empire in the Middle East were parcelled out among the French and English, and
discussion was under way on what to do with the Ottoman rump state in Anatolia
(present day Turkey). The Greeks, however, were not willing to wait for the outcome
of these protracted negotiations and decided to put their idea of a Greater Greece
(known as the Megali Idea) into practice: Greek forces invaded the western Turkish
shores in 1919 and moved inland to repossess those areas that were ostensibly part
of the historical Greek heritage. They were finally repelled in 1922ce by the Turk-
ish nationalist army under Ataturk. In 1923ce, the Ottoman Empire officially ended
andwas replaced by the Republic of Turkey. A year later, the last remnant of this last
Islamic Empire was cleared away with the abolition of the caliphate.
II. Physical Islam
1. Living with the Unbeliever
Estimates of the population of the Ottoman provinces in Europe during the eigh-
teenth century are not available, but at the outset of the nineteenth century these
provinces held the major part of the population of the entire Empire with about
10 million people, of whom approximately one third were Muslim and two thirds
non-Muslim.1 With the increasing territorial losses during the nineteenth century,
compoundedby the relocationofMuslimrefugees into the shrinkingOttomanterri-
tory, thenumber ofMuslims inEurope rapidlydeclined, but the percentageofMuslims
in the remaining Ottoman provinces gradually rose to 48 per cent by the end of the
century.2
These estimates, however, give only an impression of the population composi-
tion within the entire Ottoman Empire. We, on the other hand, are interested in
the Empire’s provinces in Europe. These figures are hard to come by, but one esti-
mate is that the Muslim population in the Balkans had reduced from 2.3 million in
1911ce to an estimated 1million in 1923ce, predominantly living in Bosnia, Bulgaria
and Albania (the last being the only Muslim-majority country in the region and in
the whole of Europe, for that matter).3 The one place that during these decades of
religious and ethnic turmoil remained a place of continuedMuslim-Christian coex-
istence was Istanbul: during the entire nineteenth century its population remained,
on average, half Muslim and half non-Muslim, and only by 1914ce was the number
of non-Muslims slightly reduced.4
What was it, then, that caused this sudden and violent break-up of the Ottoman
society that had lived in relative harmony for centuries? As mentioned, the causes
were a combination of loss of power by the Porte, economic crises and changes, a
dysfunctional millet system, declining fealty of local lords, emerging nationalism
and the increasing influence of foreign powers.Wewill discuss these factors inmore
detail below.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the social order of Ottoman society con-
sisted of a legal and political classification of the population based on religion (the
millet system), while an informal classification existed on the basis of one’s social-
economic situation. We have also seen that the Muslims primarily inhabited the
urban areas of the European provinces of the Empire. Muslims and non-Muslims
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often lived separately, but not segregated. The often held view of “Ottoman subjects
living in sharply divided,mutually impenetrable, religious communities calledmil-
lets … is incorrect.”5
But with the beginning of the eighteenth century we can discern the develop-
ments thatwere later identified as factors contributing to the fracturing of the social
order. One of these developments was the emergence of a political autonomy in the
provinces. Muslim landlords started to act more independently, their loyalty shift-
ing from the Porte in Istanbul to their own lands in the remote places of the Empire.6
These landlords were of two kinds: descendants of officials who were appointed by
the Porte and over time had become rooted in the area, and families of local nota-
bles whose status and power had been recognized by the Ottoman Porte, as was the
case in Bosnia. Both kinds of local rulerswere usuallyMuslimby religion, but not al-
ways Turkishby ethnicity. By the end of the eighteenth century, the central state had
started to re-establish its power over these local elites and to claim its right to collect
taxes directly from them, but after strong opposition had to settle for a compromise:
the local notables recognized the political supremacy of the Porte but retained sub-
stantial power and wealth.7
The local, mostly Christian, population in the European provinces was also
changing during this period, showing signs of a gradually emerging civil society.
Themiddle class, in particularmerchants and craftsmen, organized themselves into
guilds. Empowerment of these guilds and organizations came from an unexpected
source: the Janissaries. The boy levy had been abolished in 1703ce and the ban on
soldiers marrying had not been enforced for a while, so that this elite infantry had
become hereditary. Moreover, the lack of annual campaigns meant that the Janis-
saries found other sources of income. Since their garrisons were in the towns, they
became part of urban economic life, either as mafia-style chieftains or as members
of the business community. They maintained their position of political power, en-
abling themtomake andunmake rulers. In that capacity theybecame thenewurban
elite that acted as the voice and the sword of the local population, often defending
it against local rulers.8 The power of the Janissaries became such, however, that in
1826ce the sultan thought it necessary to have them annihilated. One of the re-
sults of the removal of the Janissaries from Ottoman society was that with them
also disappeared the larger part of theMuslimmerchant elite that hadmonopolized
commerce, resulting in a new phase of economic liberalism from which the emerg-
ing non-Muslim business elite in particular profited.9
The non-Muslim merchant class was by then already profiting from economic
change that created new wealth and possibilities and this, in turn, spurred on the
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non-Muslims’ social mobility that was increasingly defined by wealth rather than
social origins. This merchant class expanded its already existing commercial con-
tacts with European countries, importing not only Western commercial interests
but also Western ideas of liberty, equality and political representation.10 These ideas
were received with apprehension by the Muslims, however, since they were consid-
ered a threat to the traditional social order wherein non-Muslims were supposed to
know their place. The response was similar to those of earlier times: a barrage of old
regulations on behavioural and dress codes was being re-invoked to restore the old
order, including the prohibition on non-Muslim merchants wearing fur or yellow
shoes.11Thesewere local initiatives: when the sultan in 1799ce issued a liberal decree
permitting Christians to carry arms, including the yatagan, the long, curved tradi-
tional Turkish knife, theMuslim population protested; in particular the Janisarries,
who had always exhibited brutal behaviour towards local peasants, were now faced
with thepossibility of armedopposition fromChristianpeasants. Surprisingly, these
peasants received support from theirMuslim landlordswho resented the Janissaries’
ruthlessness as undermining the landlords’ authority as well as their estates’ in-
come. Rather than caving in tomounting opposition among theMuslimpopulation
of the Empire against the rules abolishing the discrimination of non-Muslims, the
sultan pressed ahead with his equality programme. In 1829ce, the sultan overnight
abolished all laws on dress codes, but also prohibited all turbans and robes of hon-
our worn by Muslims and imposed a uniform – the fez and frock coat – for all state
officials. In doing so, the sultan reversed a centuries-old practice of using clothing
regulations to create or maintain social differences, and replaced it with visual uni-
formity.12
We will discuss the effects of this revolutionary move by the sultan against the
wishes ofmost of hisMuslim subjects inmore detail below, butmust now continue
with our discussion of the factors that were at the root of the disintegration of the
OttomanEmpire. In addition to themilitary, social and economic factorsmentioned
above, therewas also the novel phenomenon of the local population of the European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire increasingly asserting itself in terms of religious
and ethnic identity. This may sound self-evident in a society that was already struc-
tured on thebasis ofmilletsdividingOttoman society into the four religious commu-
nities ofMuslims, Orthodox, Jews and Armenians. Two of these communities, how-
ever, theMuslimand theOrthodox, started to fracture fromwithin along ethnic and
linguistic fault lines. This situationdemands a closer look into these ethnic, religious
and linguistic differences to understand the complexity of the conflicts that were to
erupt in the nineteenth century between – and within! – the privileged minority of
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Muslims and the second-class majority of non-Muslims, who were predominantly
Orthodox Christians.13
The Muslim millet included several ethnic and linguistic communities like
Turks, who originated from Anatolia, and those who identified themselves as in-
digenous Muslims from the European provinces, such as Albanians, Bosniaks and
Pomaks (Bulgarian speakers), but also small minorities of Muslim Greeks and even
Muslim Jews (who identified ethnically as Jews but religiously as Muslims). Many
of the Greeks on Crete were Muslims, for instance, as was a distinct group of Jews
in Saloniki.14 As such they belonged to the Muslim millet, although it depended on
the local contextwhether their religious affiliationwasmoredetermining than their
ethnic, or vice versa. By the same token, many Albanians, Bosnians and Bulgarians
belonged to one of the Christianmillets, in particular the Orthodox. Wemust there-
fore realize that religion and ethnicity were not always conflated.
Ethnic and linguistic commonalities often provided sources of cohesion that
were as strong as, if not stronger than, religious commonalities, since most ethnic
communities maintained and increasingly cherished their own specificities.15 The
Greeks, for instance, were a seafaring nation, dominating Ottoman trade as private
entrepreneurs and comprising most of the Ottoman merchant and military navy
personnel. Many tradesmen knew several languages, and as a community they were
probably also the best-educated of Ottoman subjects, with Greek schools and books
proliferating across the Ottoman Empire. The Serbs, on the other hand, weremostly
peasants and relatively poor, but cherished a strongly celebrated cultural heritage.
Other prominent communities in theOttoman Balkanswere those of the Albanians
and Jews. Most Albanians were Muslim, and since they had been the main target of
the boy levymany Albanians were part of the Ottoman establishment. Themajority
of Jews in the Empire were descendants of the Sephardim who had fled fifteenth-
century Spain. They spoke their own language, Ladino, and remained aloof from the
othermillets. Many were deported to remote areas in the Empire to stimulate the lo-
cal economy. A true ‘Jewish’ town was Saloniki (later Thessaloniki) where the Jews
had for centuries constituted a majority, and formed the centre of an economic hub
dominated by Jewish trade in the region.16
We are, therefore, looking at communities that were not clearly divided into
Muslims and non-Muslims, since these communities themselves were fractured
into ethnic and linguistic communities. To add to this complex situation, we must
now introduce the foreigners and the role they played in the Ottoman Empire.
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2. The Combustible Mix of Capitulations, Millets and Nationalism
In its contacts with non-Muslims, the Ottoman Empire made use of two different
systems: the so-called capitulations to dealwith foreigners, on the one hand, and the
millets to deal with non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, on the other hand. To a modern
observer, the two systems may seem entirely different. With regard to the capitula-
tions, their subject-matter was foreign nationals, their goal was to grant privileges
connected to commerce and the contracting parties were the Ottoman and foreign
states. Themillet system, on the other hand, had theOttomannational as its subject;
its goal was to establish a social-legal status and the contracting parties were the Ot-
toman state and its indigenous communities. More importantly, the determining
factor identifying the parties in the case of the capitulations was nationality, while
in themillet system it was religion.
From an Ottoman perspective, however, the two systems were merely two sides
of the same coin. Both provided institutional means for dealing with non-Muslims,
as they were adaptations of the system developed by Islamic law: the dhimmi status
for non-Muslims residing within the realm of Islam (which allowed religious free-
dom and a restricted form of autonomy, but a second-class legal and social status)
and the so-called mustaʾmin status for non-Muslim outsiders who were visiting the
realm of Islam (granting them temporary entry and a status of relative immunity).
In both systems the non-Muslim was assumed to belong to another community or
‘nation’, whether this was indigenous (the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire
were referred to as ‘Rum’ or Romans, derived from the Eastern Roman empire) or
foreign (Western Europeans were often referred to as ‘Franks’).
From this perspective, it was not uncommon for foreign states to intervene
on behalf of religious communities in other states. Already in the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Ottomans had made diplomatic interventions in Russia and the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth to protest – sometimes successfully – against alleged
ill treatment of the Muslim minorities in these realms. Conversely, French diplo-
mats would do the same on behalf of the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, and
Russians on behalf of the Russian Orthodox. Intervention by a state on behalf of
the religious communities was perhaps not appreciated by the state where these
communities resided, but it was not interpreted as an infringement of national
sovereignty. Communities with a religion different from that of the state were con-
ceived as a foreign body by that state; and while their political allegiance was to be
with their sovereign, itwas considerednatural that their religious allegiance lay else-
where.
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Herewe see adistinctdifferencebetween theOttomanandEuropeanapproaches:
whereas theOttomanEmpirewas strict in its condition of political allegiance but ac-
commodated a religious allegiance out of state, the European countries conflated the
two and deemed any religion other than the state religion a potential source of dis-
loyaltyor treason.TheEuropeanpositionhad led todevastating religiouswars aimed
at creating religious homogeneity. Since religious cleansing could not be achieved
in full, the European states ultimately settled for modalities of religious tolerance
(which, as we saw in the Introduction, is a pragmatic rather than principled toler-
ance).
In the religiously pluralist Ottoman Empire the state, as a matter of Islamic
law, had entrusted itself with the protection of its indigenous non-Muslim subjects.
Protection in this respect meant that these non-Muslims should be able to practise
their faith. But since the religious leadership of some of these religious communities
was located outside the Ottoman realm, the Porte allowed these subjects also to be
‘protected’ by foreign powers. Such protection was often confirmed in treaties, such
as the treaty of 1637ce that recognized France as the sole protector of Catholics in the
Ottoman realm, and the treaty of 1774ce that recognized Russia as the sole protector
of Orthodox Christians in the Empire.
While the Ottoman Empire might consider its dealings with its non-Muslim
subjects and non-Muslim foreigners to follow a certain logic that, to the Empire’s
mind, had created a fair and just system that had lasted for centuries, the two
communities developed their own dynamics. The millet and capitulations systems
served theirpurposes independentlyof eachother, butby the late eighteenth century
they becamemore andmore intertwined and turned out to be one of the nails in the
Ottoman Empire’s coffin.
Capitulations as a Political Tool
The capitulations developed from mere commercial privileges like tax exemptions
anddiplomatic status for the local consul andhis assistant to a fully fledged legal im-
munity for an ever-increasing community of foreigners that included their families
and local staff. That such large communities could reside within Ottoman territory
with legal impunity, as if they were living in a bubble, was increasingly considered
a violation of Ottoman sovereignty.17 This issue became prominent when themillets
became involved by means of the so-called dragomans. The dragoman (‘translator’)
was anOttoman local hired by the foreign consulate as an intermediary between the
commercial outpost and the Ottoman merchants and authorities.18 The dragoman
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was mostly recruited from one of the Christian millets, mainly because the mercan-
tile families in thesemillets could provide a commercial network within and outside
the Empire, but also because a Christian was considered more trustworthy to the
European employer than aMuslim.
Under the capitulations that were re-negotiated during the nineteenth century,
the immunity granted to foreigners was expanded to their dragomans. They could
now also claim immunity from theOttoman legal system in a number of situations.
This privilege (the so-called beraʾt, or exemption) became a source of criticism among
the Ottomans, because it had the effect of granting foreign nationality to an Ot-
toman subject. Evenworsewas that beraʾtswerehanded out as if theywere passports,
and themselves became objects of trade.19
From the Ottoman perspective foreigners were increasingly abusing their priv-
ileges under the capitulation agreements, and expanding them at the expense of
Ottoman sovereignty. But why, then, would the Ottomans extend these privileges
in the first place? In answering this question wemust realize that capitulations had
been granted since the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire was at the
height of its power, and had been re-negotiated with every extension since then.
In the early stages of the capitulations, the Ottomans were not so concerned with
the commercial incursions of foreignmerchants because the goal of the Porte was to
establish political rather than commercial contacts. Also, in the Islamic legal termi-
nology of the capitulations, the Ottomans viewed themerchants asmustaʾminswho,
if they were to reside in Ottoman territory for longer than one (ormore) year, would
come under Ottoman jurisdiction as dhimmis.20 But practice was different and that
had to do mostly with a shift in power in the late seventeenth century: since then,
the Ottoman Empire had lost its military edge and was increasingly dependent on
financial arrangements with Europeans through trade and loans. This gave Euro-
peans the leverage to re-negotiate the capitulations to their own advantage. And so
they did, to the full.
The drawing of the Ottoman millets into a foreign sphere of influence cannot
be exclusively blamed on European strategies in this respect. The Ottomans them-
selves also contributed to this development. For instance, they considered their non-
Muslim subjects more as foreigners than as nationals – it is telling in this respect
that the Ottoman millets in the nineteenth century came under the Ottoman Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, just like foreigners.21 This was partly a result of the millet
system, which had created a parallel infrastructure with the state representing the
Muslim millet while all non-Muslim millets, although residing under the ultimate
sovereignty of the state, retained a degree of autonomy.
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The elements of the millet system that had obtained so much praise in the past
from Europeans – relative religious freedom, autonomy, no interference from the
state – were now becoming a source of criticism from the same Europeans because
they lacked equal rights and complete freedom of religion. When the Porte tried to
remedy this by abolishing the millet system and instituting Ottoman citizenship
in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was already too late: the centuries-old
division between a state by and for Muslims, on the one hand, and its non-Muslim
subjects who only needed to pay tax and know their place but were otherwise to
manage their own affairs, on the other hand, was not to be repaired by a single
constitutional reform.
Nationalism
The notion of nationalism, that became so popular throughout Europe and beyond
in the nineteenth century, provided the growing social and economic unrest in the
Europeanprovinces of theOttomanEmpirewith adirection. Itmustbe remembered
that much of the social and economic unrest was at first internal and not intended
to discredit or challenge the authority of the Porte. On the contrary: the Porte was
often implored by the Christian communities to step in and solve their social and
economic conflicts with Muslim landlords, local authorities or the Janissaries. But
the complexmixture of events, sentiments and situations was channelled into a na-
tionalistic idiom, leading to national revolts and a gradual break-up of the Ottoman
Empire. We will discuss these revolts inmore detail below in the paragraph on wars
and insurgencies.
Nationalism was not embraced exclusively by the non-Muslim subjects of the
Ottoman Empire. Muslims also became infected by the bug of nationalism. In the
latter case we need to distinguish between Muslims who were living within the
Ottoman Empire and those who used to be Ottoman subjects but came under non-
Muslim rule when the lands where they lived were conquered from the Ottoman
Empire. The Bosnian Muslims (‘Bosniaks’) are a typical example. The formation
of the Bosnian Muslim identity was unlike that of other nationalist revivals in
the Balkans. Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Albanians had their own histories and
folklore that they could refer to, and their nationalist revival was preceded – if
not prompted – by large-scale social and economic changes. Moreover, the Ortho-
dox and Catholic populations could rely on the centuries-old organizational in-
frastructure of their churches. The Muslims in Bosnia had none of these and so,
when the Ottoman rule of which they had been part for four centuries was re-
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placed by that of the Austro-Hungarian double monarchy in 1878ce, they were at
a loss. The disappearance of Istanbul as a point of authoritative orientation and
the lack of will to refocus on Vienna forced the Bosniaks for the first time to de-
velop their own, separate identity.22 They did so by primarily focusing on religion,
Islam. Austria facilitated this by allowing religious freedom for Muslims: they re-
tained their own religious institutions, such as courts, schools and mosques, and
were autonomous in their religious affairs (an inversed dhimmi situation that we
have seen repeatedly being applied by Christian European powers in the past). One
exceptionwas conversion: the case of a BosnianMuslimwoman converting to Chris-
tianity caused a confrontation between Bosnian local authorities arresting her for
apostasy and Austrian authorities releasing her with the argument that shewas free
to choose her religion.23 These confrontations over conversion continued in Bosnia
even after a settlement was reached with the Austrian Conversion Ordinance of
1891ce.
We must realize that the Muslims in Bosnia did not view their predicament
as eternal: they considered themselves Ottoman subjects under Austrian occupa-
tion, which was expected to be temporary. This situation changed, however, with
the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908ce. The new Austrian province of Bosnia-
Hercegovinawasgranted autonomy, and its constitutionof 1910cementioned Serbs,
Croats andMuslims as native peoples. These three communitieswere also politically
organized, for each had its representative political party in the Bosnian parliament.
Whereas Bosniaks had been lords and authorities under Ottoman rule, they were
now a constitutionally recognized minority in an autonomous province under the
Austro-Hungarian double monarchy
With regard to theMuslimswithin the Ottoman Empire nationalism came late.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals in Istanbul and
other urban centres of the Empire were very much engaging in new and exciting
concepts like westernization, secularism, and centralization.24 Nationalism – that is,
Turkish nationalism – joined the ranks only by the end of the nineteenth century.
Until that time, the elites and especially the Porte itself tried very hard to introduce
the modern ideas of secularism and equality in order to unite all subjects of the
Empire. But the legal, economic and political reforms initiated by the Porte, known
as the Tanzimat, were too late or not rigorous enough to stem the tide of religious,
ethnic and national fragmentation of the Empire.
physical islam | 165
Reforms (Tanzimat)
We have already seen that the sultan was willing to introduce forms of equality
among his subjects when in 1829ce he abolished all laws on dress codes for non-
Muslims and prohibited all turbans and robes of honour being worn by Muslims.
This decree turned out to be a prelude to the more radical reforms of 1839ce and,
when confrontedwith a general refusal by localMuslim landlords to implement the
decree, a repetition of the reforms by the decree of 1856ce. The reforms concerned a
number of issues, but those that are of interest to us here are the ones related to the
non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. These were primarily aimed at estab-
lishing equal citizenship. The decrees abolished the separate (dhimmi) status of the
non-Muslimand the special poll tax tobepaidby everynon-Muslim, and introduced
the concept ofOttomancitizenship. Consequently, non-Muslimswere allowed to as-
sumepositions in theOttomangovernment.However, non-Muslimswere not eager
to enter themilitary, neither were they readily admitted to the foreignministry, but
their presence “becamemost pronounced” in the civil bureaucracy.25
The reforms were met with a lot of opposition from the Muslim subjects of
the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of equality between Muslims and non-
Muslims was perceived bymany as disruptive to the social fabric of society that had
been in place for centuries. There was strong opposition and even vandalism against
churches that were newly built in Ottoman provinces like Bosnia after building
restrictions were lifted by the Tanzimat reforms.26 But the opposition was also mo-
tivated by practical considerations: the abolition of the poll tax caused a serious loss
of income for the tax-farmers who lived off collecting the tax. It was themain reason
for the uprising of Bosnian Muslim landlords in 1830ce. Many of these tax farmers
therefore quickly devised ways to impose other forms of tax that replaced the abro-
gated poll tax, which in turn caused opposition from their non-Muslim tax-payers
who appealed to the Porte for help.
Not onlyMuslimswere dismayedby these reforms;manynon-Muslims opposed
them as well, for various reasons. The non-Muslims who worked closely with for-
eign consulates, or who had obtained a beraʾt, correctly assumed that the institution
of Ottoman citizenship wasmeant to bring them back under Ottoman suzerainty.27
Others who cherished theirmillet autonomy feared that their courts would be taken
away from them, just as the millet authorities were anxious that they would lose
power over their communities.28 These fears were unfounded, however, because the
Tanzimat abolished the dhimmi position and its poll tax, but not themillet system it-
self. The communitiesmaintained their infrastructure and the right to live in accor-
166 | powerfull europe (1700–1950ce)
dance with their own family laws to be applied by their ownmillet courts. Moreover,
and quite paradoxically, the Empire not only maintained the structure of the mil-
let system, but by 1914ce had increased the number ofmillets from three (Orthodox,
Jewish, Armenian) to thirteen: Greek-Orthodox, Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean
Catholic, Syrian Jacobites, Armenian Gregorians, Armenian Catholics, Protestants,
Melkites, Jews, Bulgarian Catholics, Maronites, Nestorians.
The millet system as an institution that for centuries had functioned as the go-
between between the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim communities was now
formally replacedby the institution of citizenship that positioned the individual in a
direct relation with the state, withoutmillet intermediary.29 But themillet remained
intact as the rallying point for communal interests of the individuals, for had not
themillet over the centuries preserved the community’s culture, heritage, language,
religion and laws? And since the Ottoman state was increasingly incapable or un-
willing to safeguard these communal interests and differences, allmilletsmade sure
that they were under the protection of one of the great powers, France for Catholics,
Great Britain for the Protestants and Russia for the Orthodox.
But, as we saw above, religious identities rapidly fractured along ethnic and
linguistic fault lines. The Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, Bulgars – to name
but a few – re-discovered their cultural identity and their own language and felt
empowered by their economic freedom to assert that identity.30 This development
took a dangerous turn when these communities became dissatisfied with the fact
that they had no territory of their own – that they were ‘nations’ without ‘states’.
The fulfilment of this need resulted in atrocious episodes of ethnic and religious
cleansing, which we will discuss in more detail below.
The process of identity and loyalty did not endwith the establishment of nation-
states, however. Once the ethnic-linguistic communities had broken away from
their larger religious communities to establish their own states, it was religion that
appeared to determine national loyalty. For instance, the Bulgarian-speaking Mus-
lims (Pomaks) would feel more allegiance to Turkey than Bulgaria, Greek-speaking
Muslim Turks from Crete felt little affiliation with the Greeks on the mainland
and preferred to settle in Turkey, while the Turkish-speakingOrthodox Greeks were
loyal to the newly established state of Greece.31 And since none of the new states
with Orthodox communities was prepared to acknowledge the Orthodox Church
as a supra-nationalist religious authority, they all established their own Orthodox
state churches: Serbia (1832), Greece (1833), Bulgaria (1860), Rumania (1885) and Alba-
nia (1929). An exception was Catholic-majority Croatia which remained loyal to the
Church in Rome.
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3. Wars and Insurgencies
The loss of territory in its European provinces through wars and insurgencies was a
major blow to the Ottoman Empire, more so than the loss of its dominions in the
Middle East, because the European provinces had always constituted the heartland
of the Ottoman Empire. The wars and insurgencies that were waged upon and
within the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were many and present a kaleidoscopic image of events.
At the risk of simplifying two centuries of armed struggle, we will first distinguish
between inter-state conflicts on the one hand and domestic armed conflicts, on the
other, and then continue by discussing the role of religion in these conflicts.
Inter-State Conflicts
The inter-state conflicts can be divided into two categories. On the one hand there
were the conflicts between theOttomanEmpire and its direct neighbours, theHabs-
burgs (from 1804ce onwards known as the Austrian Empire, and from 1867 until
1918ce as the ‘Austro-HungarianDoubleMonarchy’) and theRussian tsarist empire.
On the other hand there were the conflicts with far-away countries like France and
Great Britain. The Ottomans fought several wars with the Austrians and Russians,
while the conflicts with Great Britain and France in the Balkan region were mostly
by proxy, with the two European powers occasionally siding with the local insur-
gencies and revolts in the Ottoman realm. They were instrumental, for instance, in
bringing the Greek revolt of 1821ce to its successful end in an independent Greek
state in 1830ce.
Ever since the Ottoman defeat at the walls of Vienna in 1683ce, Austria had
pushed theOttomansback andgradually conqueredparts ofneighbouringOttoman
territory: Hungary finally became part of the Austrian Empire which, in its pursuit
of theOttomans, took Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Russia alsowanted its share and,
with the justification of protecting its Orthodox co-religionists, engaged in several
wars with the Ottoman Empire, acquiring Moldavia and the territories north and
east of the Black Sea. Such was the Russian encroachment into Ottoman territory
that for once the French and British sided with the Ottomans against the Russian
advance in the Crimean War (1853–1856ce). The British nurse Florence Nightingale
became known during this war for her efforts to raise hygiene standards in English
lazars and Ottoman hospitals.
In terms of territorial appetite, however, France and Great Britain were more
interested in the Arab dominions of theOttomanEmpire,most ofwhichhad already
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acquired a semi-autonomous status. This region, comprisingNorth Africa, theMid-
dle East and the Arab Peninsula, was once the cradle of the great Roman, Byzantine
and Islamic civilizations, but by the sixteenth century it had lost its splendour and
prosperity, having slumped back into poverty and backwardness. Napoleon’s inva-
sionofEgypt in 1798cewas thereforemerely amilitary and romantic adventurewith
no political, economic or strategic gains. Perhaps the only impact of this adventure
was that it ended the two and a half centuries-old French-Ottoman military pact,
and triggered the European romantic and religious interest that became known as
Orientalism, of which we will speak below.
Imperial interest by European powers in this region came only a century after
Napoleon’s adventure: the western Ottoman domains, Algeria and Tunisia, were
taken by France in 1830 and 1881ce, respectively, while Egypt was occupied by Great
Britain in 1882ce. Great Britain’s interest in Egypt and several Gulf emirates was
purely strategic at first, for it was only meant to safeguard free passage to its impe-
rial domains in British India through the recently opened Suez canal. In 1911ce, Italy
invaded the Ottoman province of Libya. When the Ottoman Empire sided with the
German axis in the First WorldWar (1914–1918) and subsequently lost, its remaining
provinces in the Middle East and Gulf were divided between the British and French
powers: France gained Syria and Lebanon, while Great Britain took Jordan, Palestine
and Iraq.
Internal Conflicts
The Serbian revolt of 1804ce was the first in a series of insurgencies of non-Muslim
Ottoman subjects who identified themselves on national-religious grounds. This,
and subsequent rebellious acts were considered the ultimate disruption of the Ot-
toman social order in which non-Muslims were supposed to know and keep their
place, and the Ottoman response was extremely harsh, with punishments like im-
palement, stoning to death, rape and prisoners being roasted alive.32 The Ottomans
were not alone in so gruesomely restoring order: the Serbs who had participated in
the same revolt on theHabsburg side of the border facedmass executions, concentra-
tion camps and deportation of their elites by theHabsburgs. These atrocities were to
set the tone – on all sides – for the following revolts. TheGreekuprising (1821–1830ce)
was the next revolt of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects who identified themselves as
Greeks, that is a singular religious and ethnic nation united by language. Bosnians,
Bulgarians, Albanians, Macedonians and others followed suit and, mostly with the
aid of European powers, were able to obtain varying degrees of autonomy.
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In 1878ce, after the Ottoman defeat in its last war with Russia, the European
powers came together in the Berlin Congress to reach a final solution for the Balkans
by dividing the former Ottoman territories thus: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Mon-
tenegro and Serbia were granted independence; Albania, northern Greece andMace-
donia remained part of the Ottoman Empire; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia (including
Herzegovina) were incorporated into the Austro-Hungary doublemonarchy. But by
now the genie of national and religious sentiments was out of the bottle and could
not be pushed back in by granting independence and re-drawing national bound-
aries. The problem that remained after the division of territories in 1878ce was that
the peoples (‘nations’) and their territorial home (‘state’) did not always coincide, be-
cause lands were often still shared bymixed populations.
The Role of Religion in Internal and Inter-State Conflicts
The uprisings in the Ottoman European domains were not always non-Muslim
subjects rising against Islamic rule. Often other factors were involved. Many re-
volts by (mostly Christian) peasantry against their (mostly Muslim) overlords were
prompted by economic oppression, the Christian rebels often emphatically pro-
claiming their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and even imploring the Porte for
assistance against the local Muslim overlord. And when help was given, this could
then cause the local Muslim elite to rise against the Porte, as was the case with the
Bosniak revolt in 1850ce. Bosniaks were the ruling Muslim elite in Bosnia who by
religion and fealty owed allegiance to the Ottoman Porte, but who for centuries had
lived in Bosnia and spoke Serbo-Croat as opposed to Ottoman Turkish. When the
Ottoman Porte introduced the first set of Tanzimat in 1839ce that included the alle-
viation of fiscal hardship of the Christian subjects, the local Muslim elite protested
and refused to implement these regulations. Their disobediencewas answeredby the
Porte with military force, which in turn caused the Bosniak revolt. The indiscrimi-
nate punitive actions by the Ottomanmilitary against the local Bosnian population
that was both Christian and Muslim led to the devastation of Bosnia and left the
Christian peasantry inmoremisery than theywere already in and turned their orig-
inal loyalty towards the Porte into antipathy or hatred.33
While the causes of the many uprisings in the Ottoman Balkans were complex
and need to be considered in their local contexts, we may make the general obser-
vation that these uprisings were at first prompted by social and economic reasons –
poverty and oppression being the main causes – but increasingly became struggles
for autonomy and independence. This development was typical of all Europe at that
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time. In 1848ce, popular revolts swept through Europe like wildfire, either toppling
existing powers or forcing them tomake concessions formore political participation
by the populace. This development did not leave the Balkans untouched, and made
the ethnic, national, linguistic and religious patchwork even more complicated to
comprehendas revolts andwarsbrokeout amongpeoples that for centurieshad lived
in relative political and economic stability.
The Greeks may serve as an example. They had been living in the eastern part of
the Mediterranean for centuries and continued to do so as subjects of the Ottoman
Empire. Their commonalitywas therefore language and religion, not territory. Their
revolt against Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century was precipitated by the ac-
tions of the Friendly Society (Philiki Etairia), a Greek secret society established in
1814ce throughout the Empire, with the aim to ‘liberate the Motherland’ although
the geographical contours of this motherland were unclear.34 A flurry of incidents,
bolstered by the uprising of a local Ottoman lord against the Porte, culminated in
a nationwide Greek uprising that became known as their independence war (1821–
1830ce). Most parts of the Ottoman Empire with Greek communities experienced
eruptions of violence and massacres of the local population by both the Ottoman
military andGreek insurgents. It is hard tomake clear-cut divides between the sides
that were killing each other: in Crete and the Peloponnesian peninsula, for instance,
the majority of the population was Greek-speaking, but Greek minority communi-
ties were also Muslim, and that characteristic made them fall victim to the Greek
Orthodoxmobs.
Religion was therefore not a cause of these conflicts, but a factor with varying
importance. Religion was also an instrument used by the European powers, either
out of conviction or for political purposes. Wars and diplomatic meddling were at
first mostly territorial and power-related, but gradually became religious, in that
Europeanpowers asserted ecclesiastical sovereigntyoverOttomansubjects: Russians
over the Orthodox, English over Protestants, French over Catholics. We have seen
that such religious ‘protectorates’ by a foreign nation were not uncommon and that
they were regularly confirmed in treaties. For some European states this was out
of genuine concern for the plight of specific Christian communities with whom
intensive contactshadbeen established through the capitulations system.For others
it was just another way to get a foothold in the Empire.
The Empire at that same time was struggling with the role of Islam, which was
traditionally an intrinsic part of the Ottoman Empire. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, many Turkish intellectuals and state officials debated whether the solution to
the many problems of the Empire had to be found in less Islam, hence secularism,
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or more Islam. The state had opted for the first solution, but many of the secular
reforms imposed by the state were considered too radical and failed to have their in-
tended effect.With the continuing disintegration of the Empire andwith the threat,
whether perceived or real, from indigenous and foreign forces that identified them-
selves as Christian, Islam became the only remaining unifying and legitimizing fac-
tor.35 This reaction among the Ottoman elites coincided with – or was it prompted
by? – thenotion of so-called pan-Islam that becamepopular throughout theMuslim
world during that period.
It is in this light that the call for a jihad by the Ottoman sultan in 1914ce
against the European enemies of Germany stirred the anxiety of these European
allies; theywereworried that this callmightbe takenupby theMuslims inEuropean
colonies across the globe to rise up against their colonial powers. Moreover, it was
assumed that this holy warwas concocted by, or otherwise ‘made in’, Germany, with
which the Ottomans had sided in the First World War.36 With hindsight we may
say that too much was made of this call for jihad.37 Just as in previous centuries,
the Ottoman rulers often reserved the term ‘jihad’ for war against an enemy that
was non-Muslim. Between 1768 and 1922ce, six official Ottoman jihad declarations
were identified, in addition to numerous references that were made to jihad.38 The
call for jihad in 1914ce followed a similar procedure to these other jihads: the sultan
would ask the highest Muslim cleric, the sheyk-ul-islam for a legal opinion ( fatwa,
or ‘fetve’ in Ottoman) on the religious validity of the intended war, and would
then formally declare the war when an affirmative ruling was given. What was
of great concern to the Allied forces, however, was that the fatwa also implicitly
called upon all Muslims in the European colonies to rise in jihad.39 The Europeans
were anxious that the position of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, that is ruler of all
Muslims, might prompt the Muslims in European colonies to rise. The concern
among the colonial powers was unwarranted, however, because the Islamic call to
armswent completelyunanswered amongMuslimsworldwide. They ostensibly saw
the Ottoman involvement in the war as an exclusively Ottoman affair.
Religious-Ethnic Cleansing
In the previous section we saw that religion, whether Islam or Christianity, was
merely one of the factors contributing to the emerging sense of national identity
among the Ottoman subjects during the nineteenth century. From the 1870s on-
wards, however, the conflicts acquired nationalistic overtones in which religionwas
subsumed with nationality. The Ottoman state first tried to give in to the national-
172 | powerfull europe (1700–1950ce)
ist aspirations by granting the various communities autonomywithin theOttoman
realm.The expansionof thenumberofmilletswasoneof theways of doing this.How-
ever, one of the characteristics of the millet is that it is not defined territorially. And
this was precisely what the emerging religious-ethnic nationalism aspired to: the
communities wanted their own territory or state. In the mixed population of the
Balkan region where so many people for centuries hadmigrated, settled andmixed,
this seemed impossible. If one were to achieve that dream, drastic measures were
needed. And that is what happened from the second half of the nineteenth century
onwards.
What became known as the ‘process of nation-building’ in the Balkans started
with all parties using variousmethods to create a homogeneous national population
in a newly established state with its own territory. Ethnic and religious ‘homogene-
ity’ is the keyword in this endeavour, and there were no nice ways to reach that goal.
Massacres and expulsion were one way to achieve homogeneity, forced conversion
another. But they all achieved the same end: a religiously and ethnically cleansed
homeland. In 1914, the independent commission established by the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace that had investigated the causes and conduct of
the Balkan wars, stated: “The Turks were fleeing before the Christians, the Bulgari-
ans before the Greeks and the Turks, the Greeks and the Turks before the Bulgarians,
the Albanians before the Serbians. … The means employed by the Greek against the
Bulgarian, by the Turk against the Slav, by the Serbian against the Albanian, is no
longer extermination or emigration; it is an indirect method whichmust, however,
lead to the same end, that of conversion and assimilation.”40
The Commission also observed that the worst atrocities were not committed by
soldiers or the armed gangs known as bashi bazouk, but by the populations them-
selves, who were “mutually slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened
by mutual knowledge and the old hatred and resentments they cherished.”41 The
contemporary Europeans watched in horror, but tended to highlight the atrocities
committed by the Muslims. As an observer wrote in 1905, “When a Christian kills a
Muslim, it is a righteous act; when a Christian kills a Christian it is an error of judg-
mentbetternot talkedabout; it is onlywhenaMuslimkills aChristian thatwearrive
at a full-blown atrocity.”42
The cleansingdidnot pertain just to people: religiousmonuments andbuildings
were torn down and houses and entire villages were destroyed to eradicate traces of
another life or culture. The massive scale on which this took place was unique, but
not the destruction itself. A century earlier, Habsburg armies upon their conquest of
Hungary and Croatia burned down many mosques, Islamic buildings like tombs,
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bathhouses and schools, as well as the houses of Muslims: in Sarajevo alone, the
Habsburgs destroyed 60,000 houses and 160 mosques, and in Beograd left only one
of the 30 mosques intact.43
But even when the ultimate goal of a cleansed homeland was reached, its appeal
was still limited. The creation of independent Greece and Serbia did not prompt the
Greeks and Serbs whowere still residing in the Ottoman Empire tomigrate to these
new states: most remained subjects of the Sultan by choice, and some evenmigrated
out of these states back to the Empire to avoid the tax demands and poor economic
prospects of the newly established states. In the case of Greece, an estimated 800,000
inhabited the new kingdom, while 2 million Greeks remained Ottoman subjects.44
Several scholars have undertaken the task of attaching numbers to the people
massacred, deported, converted, fleeing or migrating.45 Suffice it here to say that
these numbers are all in the hundreds of thousands and sometimes even millions
for each ethnic or religious people, which merely illustrates the staggering scale of
events. Every person in the Balkans at one time or anotherwas affected byhorror and
atrocities.
Under these circumstances the situation of mixed populations within the states
and newly established autonomous areas became so untenable that countries opted
to exchange each other’s populations. Such organized exchanges of populationswere
proposed as early as 1826ce between Turks and Greeks in the Greek peninsula, and
in 1878ce between Turks and Bulgarians, but became common only in the twenti-
eth century.46 Themost notorious of these exchanges was between Turks and Greeks
in 1923ce. The situation was that the Greeks had invaded Turkey after the Ottoman
defeat in the First WorldWar, but were repulsed. Both parties then sat down in Lau-
sanne to negotiate a solution to their conflict. This was done in the tumultuous af-
termath of the war withmillions of Russian, Armenian, Turkish and Greek refugees
in need of repatriation, diplomats discussing ways to establish national homogene-
ity in the Balkan region in order to prevent future conflict, and American president
Wilson proclaiming that ‘nations’ – in its meaning as peoples – had the right to self-
determination. Perhaps these circumstances and considerationswere the reason that
the Lausanne treaty of 1923 was considered a diplomatic and practical success at the
time, although it would be unimaginable in a post-WorldWar II Europe. The treaty
decreed a huge population swap: all the ‘Turkish nationals of Greek-Orthodox re-
ligion’ in Turkey (except those in Istanbul) were to move to Greece, and all ‘Greek
nationals ofMuslim religion’ in Greece (except those in the province of Thrace) were
tomove to Turkey. An estimated 1.5millionGreekswere forced to leave Turkey (or, as
refugees from the Turko-Greek war, were not allowed to return), and an estimated
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half million Turks were forced to leave Greece. As a result the percentage of non-
Muslims in Turkey plummeted from roughly 20 per cent to less than 2 per cent.47
The nationalistic-historical idea of the need for people to be restored to their native
soil had complete disregard for the human misery of people being uprooted from a
landand societywhere theyhad lived forgenerations, sometimes formany centuries.
With this dramatic episode, Ottoman (Muslim) sovereignty over the south-
eastern parts of the European continent had formally ended (with the exception of
the region around Edirne) and the Ottoman Empire was subsumed by the secular
republic of Turkey. Between 1822 and 1922ce an estimated 5 million Muslims were
driven from their lands in the Ottoman Balkans and the Black Sea region, and an
estimated 5 million were killed during that period.48 However, an estimated 1 mil-
lion still remained in the Balkan region, especially in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania,
and in the eastern Greek province of Thrace. What also remained was the Islamic
infrastructure, insofar as it had not been destroyed in the wars, such as mosques,
religious courts, educational institutions and institutionalized leadership such as
imams, ʿulama andmuftis. Themillet systemwas somehow retained, albeit in amuch
more restricted form: as citizens the Muslims of the Balkan states enjoyed equal
rights like all nationals, but were allowed autonomy in religious matters, such as
religious education and family law. Even themillet structure was left intact: the cen-
tral governmentwould communicatewith the religious communities through their
representative bodies. We will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
4. Diplomatic Relations and Trade
After all this violence it seems a little peculiar to speak of diplomacy and trade. But
these, also, were important aspects of this period. The space in this chapter spent
on discussing the hostile encounters between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects
in the Ottoman Empire, and between Ottoman and European states, should not
be interpreted as being representative of all interaction that took place during this
period. The emergence of trade and diplomatic relations in this period, especially the
eighteenth century, was unprecedented in its scope and new developments.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the rise of modern states and the in-
crease in political and commercial trans-border activities required a new approach
to diplomacy. The personal envoys sent on behalf of the ruler did not suffice and
were replaced by diplomatic services that were an integrated part of the governmen-
tal administration. The European powers had established permanent embassies at
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the Porte as early as in the sixteenth century, starting with the French ambassador
who was sent in 1535ce upon conclusion of the French-Ottoman alliance. The Ot-
tomans, on the other hand, did not feel the need to reciprocate until the late 1790s
when they established permanent embassies in London (1793),49 Vienna (1794), Berlin
(1795) and Paris (1796). These embassies and the many reconnaissance envoys that
preceded them throughout the eighteenth century provided the Ottomans for the
first timewith the opportunity to come into contact with Europe, causing a “drastic
change in Ottoman perceptions of the West.”50
The lateOttomanentry intoEuropeandiplomacywasnotwithout reason. By the
eighteenth century the power balances in Europe had shifted and theOttomans had
lost theupperhand. Theywere bypassedbyEuropeanpowers thathadbecomemuch
stronger economically aswell asmilitarily. Politically, theOttomanEmpire nowhad
to rely on diplomacy and allies to secure its position. Militarily and economically, it
started to imitate thedevelopments and technologies thatweremodernizingEurope
and bringing it such power and prosperity. The turning point was the Habsburg-
Ottoman peace of 1699ce that ended the series of Ottoman defeats it had suffered
after being routed before the walls of Vienna, and allowed diplomatic and commer-
cial relations between the two realms to improve and increase.51 The Ottomans did
not rely entirely on the newly established relationswith the Austrians, however, and
also rekindled the dormant treatywith France by intensifying their commercial and
diplomatic relations with the newly established French Republic. One of the aims of
Ottoman diplomatic engagement with France, and later with Prussia, was to bring
in French and Prussianmilitary advisors to restructure the Ottoman army.52
But it was too late, and the Ottoman Empire was not to regain its previous
prowess. The European shift in power was permanent, as could also be seen in the
languages used in European diplomacy. French became the European language for
political affairs, Italian for commercial affairs, but very few diplomats had knowl-
edge of Ottoman politics, commerce or language. The apparent lack of need for this
knowledge is illustrative of the position of the Ottoman Empire and the relative in-
difference of Europe towards this state that they had once feared and admired.53 The
Habsburgs were the only ones who felt the need to know their neighbour, and in
1754ce established the Academy of Oriental Languages of Vienna with the explicit
purpose of training young diplomats in the language, customs and political and
commercial peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire.54
Just as theOttomans foundnoneed to establishpermanentdiplomatic contactswith
European powers at first, they did not venture into Europe to engage in commercial
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activities. It is unclear whether this was a continuation of a centuries-old lack of
interest byOttomanmerchants. But even if theOttomanmerchants themselves had
been interested, they might have been deterred by the lack of support from their
government in the Porte that made little effort to claim protection and privileges
on behalf of its Ottoman subjects in treaties with European powers.55 There were
also practical obstacles. In the Mediterranean sea trade of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries there was the permanent menace of Christian corsairs – who
outnumbered theMuslim corsairs, even in the eastern parts of the Mediterranean –
so that Ottoman trading houses had their trade carried by foreign, especially French
ships.56Tradeoverland into theEuropeanmainlandalsoused tobenooptionbecause
it had topass through theunsafe frontier zones between theOttomanandHabsburg
Empires.
This situationwas to change drastically once these frontier zoneswere taken and
secured by the Habsburgs between 1683 and 1699ce. The Habsburg-Ottoman treaty
of 1739ce, which included numerous privileges granted to Ottoman merchants,
spurred tens of thousands of them to resettle in the former frontier areas and set
up shop inHabsburg cities inHungary, but also as far away as Vienna, Lvov (western
Ukraine, near Poland) and Leipzig (eastern Germany).57 These Ottomans were never
Muslims, however, but Orthodox Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks andMacedonians (Jews and
Armenians tended to go to Italy).When three decades latermany of the trading priv-
ileges were revoked by the Habsburgs, most of these Ottoman merchants preferred
to be naturalized and stay.58
These Ottoman Christian mercantile initiatives into Europe were an exception,
however. In general it was European merchants who travelled into the Ottoman
Empire rather than the other way round. Under the protection of the capitulations,
Western European traders established themselves throughout theOttomanEmpire:
in its European domains there was a strongWestern European commercial presence
in the cities of Edirne, Saloniki and Istanbul, but more so in the city of Izmir (west
coast of Turkey), and in Syria and Egypt.59 In the eighteenth century, the Austrians
were second to the French as the main trading partners of the Ottoman Empire,
with the Dutch taking third place and the English fourth.60 An important part of
the Austrian trade was the transport of African slaves to the Ottoman Empire.61
From the European perspective, however, the importance of the Ottoman Em-
pire for European trade quickly lessened.WesternEuropeanpowers hadmuchgreat-
er economic interests in their colonies, andduring thenineteenth century the global
economy expanded so rapidly that by the end of that century the Ottoman economy
was reduced to that of any other ‘Third World’ country in the world at that time.62
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5. Muslim Sojourners: Students, Nationalists and Conscripts
We have seen that during the history of Islam in Europe few, if any, Muslims ven-
tured into Christian Europe, whether as merchants, travellers or diplomats. An ex-
ception is perhaps the many Muslim slaves, but that was limited to the Mediter-
ranean basin and against their will. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, however, this reluctance on the part of Muslims altered. Students and intel-
lectuals came to Europe from the Muslim lands that were colonized by European
powers, followed by nationalists and political activists (or sometimes the two quali-
ties of student and activistwere combined in one person). And finally, the largest but
mostly forgotten segment ofMuslims venturing into Europe by the early twentieth
century was the conscripts and auxiliary forces in the European wars.
Manyof theMuslim sojourners came as students to theuniversities of their colo-
nial overlords as part of training programmes to return and take positions as local
administrators: Muslims from Indonesia, British India and North Africa flocked to
the universities of Leiden, Oxford and Paris. Several of them travelled extensively in
Europe, thrilled by the new ideas they encountered and evenmore excited about the
prospect of putting those ideas to use in their native countries to modernize them
andperhaps even to gain their independence. These youngmenwere few innumber,
but their intellectual impact on their home countrieswas often significant. In effect,
wemight observe a reverse intellectual impact compared to several centuries earlier:
while Christian Europeans in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries made grateful
use of ArabMuslim intellectual achievements,Muslims from theArab andOttoman
world six to seven centuries later came to Europe to get a taste of the latest Western
intellectual fruits. They eagerly studied newly developed concepts like people’s rep-
resentation, rule of law, freedom and equality, and took home with them the ideas
of modern institutions like a parliament, constitution and division of powers.63
European ideas also had their impact on Muslims’ reformist thinking about
Islam. Two scholars from one the most influential centres of Islamic theology, the
Al-Azhar in Egypt, may serve as an example. Rifaʾa al-Tahtawi studied for five years
in Paris (1826–1831ce) and we know his impressions from the journal he kept.64 He
praises the sciences, cleanliness, efficiency of transportation and postal system he
witnesses in France, as well as the benefits of newspapers to educate the people,
and is enthralled by the rationalist approach to science, but is completely mystified
by those who through “extreme rationalist” reasoning come to atheism. Tahtawi’s
countrymanMuhammedAbduh, one of the great reformers of Islam, also spent four
years in Paris (1884–1888ce), but as an exile from the Britishwhohad occupied Egypt
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in 1882. Just like Tahtawi, Abduhwas impressed by thenotions of freedomof opinion
and rationalist thinking, and by the importance of education. He went so far as to
equate the European achievements with what Islam should stand for, as shown in
his succinct remark: “I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back
to the East and sawMuslims, but not Islam.”65
Later, in the inter-bellum period of the 1920s and 1930s, Europe became the des-
tiny for political adventurers and nationalist intellectuals fromMuslim lands. They
travelled throughout the continent, and met in Istanbul, Zurich, Berlin, London,
Paris, Vienna where they discussed politics and the future of their colonized home-
lands.66 Here, also, they were few in number, but quite influential in impact as they
functioned as lynchpins between Europe, where they tried to advocate their ideas of
Islamic nationalism and independence, and their home countries, where they intro-
duced the European ideas and ideologies of liberalism, socialism, nationalism and
fascism.
The pious among these Muslims were often the ones who established the first
Islamicmosques and study circles inWestern European countries. The governments
of the main European powers were not unwilling to accommodate them, but felt
the need more to make overtures towards their Muslim subjects abroad or – as was
the case in Germany – to the Ottomans, by establishing mosques in their European
capitals: London in 1904, Berlin in 1924 and Paris in 1922ce. Before that, however,
smaller mosques had been built to accommodate sailors (the 1860mosque in Cardiff
for Yemeni and Somali sailors) or soldiers (the 1887 mosque in Vienna for Muslim
military personnel in the Austrian army), and in Germany for Muslim prisoners of
war (Senegalese,Moroccans, Algerians, Indians, Tatars) taken during the FirstWorld
War.67 Compared to these initiatives it is quite conspicuous that the Netherlands,
as colonizer of Indonesia, until 1949 the European country with the largest colonial
Muslim population after Great Britain, did not build anymosque at all.68
Some of the Muslim nationalist sojourners in Europe established contacts with
the European powers that, in turn, wouldmake use of them to their own advantage.
Nazi Germany, in particular,made good use of them in its Arabic and Persian propa-
ganda broadcasts from Berlin during the 1930s aimed at inciting the peoples in the
colonies of the Allied powers.69 History would stigmatize these young nationalists
for holding Nazi sympathies, while from their perspective they were often merely
siding with one European power that was against other European powers that colo-
nized their home countries.70Perhaps themost famous – or shouldwe say infamous –
of these Muslim nationalists in this respect is Amin Hussain, Mufti of Jerusalem.
Palestinewas anEnglishMandate, and theMuftiwent toBerlin to seekhelp fromthe
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Germans. Whether he actually held Nazi sympathies – particularly the antisemitic
ideology – is still a matter of debate, but the picture of him sitting amicably with
Hitler is to many sufficient proof.71
Of a completely different nature was the presence of hundreds of thousands of
Muslim soldiers and armament industry labourers who were recruited to sustain
the English and French war efforts. In France, Muslims from Senegal and Morocco
were recruited into the army as early as the Crimean War in 1845ce, and later also
in the 1870 war against Germany. An estimated 200,000 Algerians were involved in
the First World War, and many stayed afterwards.72 About 80,000 Moroccan soldiers
had participated in the Spanish Civil War, while 73,000 fought in the Second World
War.73 Manywar cemeteries in France have separate sections where tombstones bear
the sickle moon to indicate the Islamic creed of the fallen. Most of these recruits
were from North Africa, but many also from Sub-Saharan Africa, India and Bosnia.
Although their loyalty was primarily with their colonialmaster, the defeats suffered
by these samemasters caused a breach in their image of invincibility.74
III. Virtual Islam
The European perception of Muslims (‘Turks’ or ‘Mohammedans’) and Islam un-
derwent a “drastic change” at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
from a period of respect and even admiration for the Islamic civilization and religion
to one of contempt.75 This switch in perspective was not limited to the Ottomans,
but also included India and China: the mysterious and fascinating Oriental became
the uncivilized non-European. The main cause of this transformation was Euro-
pean colonialism that introduced Europe to the wider Muslim world in Africa and
Asia and was accompanied by a strong sense of superiority over other cultures and
civilizations. While eighteenth century European historians thought of Islam as a
great albeit bygone civilization, the nineteenth century European merchants, trav-
ellers, administrators andmilitary in the colonies saw Islamas themain source of the
backwardness and poverty of theMuslim societies they encountered. The same per-
spective was taken on theOttomans: until the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman
Empirewas still a power to be reckonedwith culturally, politically and economically,
but in the nineteenth century it rapidly unravelled into social and economic turmoil
not unlike what Europeans witnessed in the many other Muslim societies in their
colonial dominions.
The Ottoman of the eighteenth century still represented the Other, but he was
‘one of us’, the strange but fascinating neighbour at the end of the street. Europeans
were perhaps a bit frightened but mainly fascinated about him, his customs, his
religion. But while this Ottoman was what we might call the ‘inclusive’ Other, the
Ottoman of the nineteenth century became the ‘exclusive’ Other who represented
everything that Europeans abhorred. And even if the Europeans for the sake of
political expediency allowed the Ottoman to be one of us, he definitely was not
anyone like us. By the end of the nineteenth century, when colonial Europe had
entrenched itself in most of the Muslim world, the notion of the exclusive Other,
who was so unlike the civilized and rational European, was extended to Islam and
theMuslim.
This transformation of perspective from the eighteenth into the nineteenth
century became clear in the contemporary studies of Islam, as well as in the two
successive trends of Turquerie and Orientalism, which we will discuss separately in
the following paragraphs.
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1. Eighteenth Century: Turquerie and Inclusive Othering
Turquerie
The sixteenth and seventeenth century fascination for the Turk as both the ‘scourge
of God’ and the mysterious Oriental developed into a fashion that became known
as Turquerie. Turquerie was the European fashion to imitate aspects of Ottoman
culture, ranging from decorative motifs to fashion and coffee.76 The first forms of
Turquerie were observed in Venice which had always been in close contact with
the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman influences could be seen in Venetian paintings and
fashion. In 1630ce, the first coffee housewas opened inVenice, a novelty in European
society, followed by coffee houses in Paris and London, and developing into a very
coffee house culture in eighteenth century Europe. It has been argued that the coffee
house wheremen (not women) could sit together and exchange ideas was one of the
characteristics of the eighteenth century that, together with newspapers and clubs,
created a public domain in which critical thoughts could be exchanged, thereby
laying the ground work for later democracies.77
Turquerie is said to have been introduced into France by the doings of the first
Ottoman ambassador to Paris, Muteferikka Suleyman Agha.78 When he was to sub-
mit his credentials to King Louis XIV (the ‘Sun King’) in 1669ce, he had been ordered
by the sultan not to show too much deference for a king who, from the Ottoman
point of view, was of much lower status than the sultan. The ambassador followed
this instruction so well – he appeared in a wool coat, refused to bow to the king and
apparently did not pay any attention to all the pomp and magnificence that was
brought out to impress the sultan’s envoy – that King Louis in his rage denied him
further access to Versailles. In his residence in Paris the ambassador subsequently
opened a salon in good Parisian custom, but did so in an Ottoman style with Turk-
ish coffee, tobacco andpipes, draperies and sofas. The salon became very popular, and
quite a few prominent Parisian ladies had their portraits painted while reclining on
couches in Turkish robes and hair styles.
Turquerie was not the only fashion at the time; it was part of a larger demand for
anythingexotic fromtheOrient.We therefore also see in this perioda similar interest
in the Far East (the so-called ‘Chinoiserie’). This longing for exoticism was a partic-
ular feature of the European bourgeoisie that by the late seventeenth century had
developed into a very rich and independent middle class that was willing to spend
money to show off its wealth and to have itself entertained. This sometimes took ex-
cessive forms, as was the case with so-called tulipomania inHolland.79 The tulip was
182 | powerfull europe (1700–1950ce)
imported from Istanbul by aDutch botanist to theDutchRepublicwhere itwas suc-
cessfully cultivated in many different varieties. During the prosperous seventeenth
century the tulip became a fashion among the richmerchants in Holland who were
willing to raise their bids on the onion-like bulbs speculating on the prospects of
what flower they might yield. This form of speculation reached grotesque heights
when payments amounted to more than a million euro – calculated in present day
currency – for a single bulb, causing the collapse of the market in 1637ce, taking
many amerchant’s wealth in its wake.
The Ottoman decorative style – or what was assumed to be so – found its way
throughout Europe in tiles, carpets, pottery and the like. These, as well as the Ot-
toman fashion,were often reproduced inpaintings, especially of Biblical scenes, such
as those of Rubens andRembrandt, but also in dresses like thoseworn by FransHals’
Girl with the Pearl Earring or by Rembrandt himself in one of his latest self-portraits.
Ottoman themes also featured in plays and operas, such as Molliere’s Le Bourgeois
Gentilhomme (1670) Rossini’s Il Turco in Italia (1814) and Mozart’s Die Entführung aus
dem Serail (1782). Several composers also used the typical Ottoman military march-
ing music in their compositions: Mozart’s Rondo alla Turca and Beethoven’s Turkish
March are the well known examples.80 Even European literature did not escape Tur-
querie. Goethe wrote twelve poetry collections inspired by Persian poets under the
title West-östlicher Divan (West-Eastern Diwan), and Victor Hugo wrote the poem Les
Djinns (which was later put to music by Fauré).
Studying Islam
The eighteenth century witnessed widespread interest in Islam as a civilization and
as a religion in its own right. The approach taken by European scholars was quite
different from that of their predecessors, however. Enlightenment demanded ratio-
nality and impartiality, and European explorers took to feverishly collecting all sorts
of information andmaterial from the new and exoticworlds in amanner thatwas to
be objective and factual. The examplewas set by the ‘army’ of scholars thatNapoleon
had taken with him to Egypt in 1796ce: they tookmeasurements of pharaonic tem-
ples and Islamic mosques, made detailed drawings of the dress people wore as well
as flora and fauna, and studied the wildlife and the customs of the people. The re-
sults were published in the voluminous Description de l’Egypte, a collection of ex-
ceptionally thorough and accurate studies published during the years 1809 to 1822.
The study is still a delight to peruse, and is astonishingly relevant to the modern
reader.
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This approach was also taken to the study of religion. The earlier view of Chris-
tianity as the only true religion, reducing all other beliefs to either paganism or
heresies, was replaced by a view of religious pluralism, with Christianity being one
among other religions. Althoughmany scholars would personally still deem Chris-
tianity to be the only and ultimate truth, they employed a secular philosophy in
their study of other religions. Consequently, Islam was elevated from its status as
an object of polemic discourse to a position of one of the world religions worthy of
study. Studies came out that tried to provide objective and accurate descriptions of
Islam’s religious rites and dogmas.81 Some of these studies were even sympathetic to
Islam, especially several biographies of Mohammed, possibly as a counterweight to
the malicious and derogatory descriptions of the prophet of Islam that were pub-
lished in previous centuries. The problem with all these studies, however, was that,
like their predecessors in previous centuries, they all relied, directly or indirectly, on
a limited number of sources in the Arab language. Only with colonial presence in
Muslim lands in the nineteenth century did European scholars gain access to the
source material needed for the study of Islam.
The newly acquired knowledge encouraged academic and political correctness in
terminology. While it was still common to use an ethnic adjective like ‘Saracene’ or
‘Turkish’ in combinationwith theword ‘faith’ or sometimes even ‘religion,’ scholars
gradually started to refer to Islam (themedievalDominicanmonkRiccoldodaMonte
diCroce,mentioned in chapterTwo,whohad spend time learningArabic inBaghdad
was perhaps the first to use this term, but also one of the few who did so before
the nineteenth century).82 Nevertheless, even the most impartial academic did not
use the name that Muslims call themselves – ‘Muslim’, that is ‘he-who-submits’
(to God) – but referred to ‘Mohammedans’, following the Christian emphasis on
the position of Christ and naming his followers after him. Such perspective is an
insult – intended or not – to Muslims, however, for their religion emphasizes that
they worship God and not His prophet.
With all the shortcomings in the study of Islam and its prophet during the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this study was no longer set in the context
of Christian polemics. Neither were Muslims perceived as a hostile tribe but as
carriers of a great civilization that was retroactively recognized as one of the great
world civilizations. Prominent philosophers like Leibniz (1646–1716) and Voltaire
(1694–1778) were quite sympathetic towards Islam and its civilization; the historian
Edward Gibbon (1737–1794) devotes a large part of his Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire to it, and a scholar like the English historian Ockley (1678–1720) in hisHistory
of the Saracens even made the point of favouring the civilization of the Muslim East
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over that in the Christian Western world. In short, “the eighteenth century saw the
Muslim East through fraternal and understanding eyes.”83
2. Nineteenth Century: Orientalism and Exclusive Othering
Vision of the Turk andOrientalism
This perspective of admiration for a great Islamic civilization changed in the nine-
teenth century, however, and was replaced by a Western sense of superiority over
other cultures and civilizations. The Christian superiority of previous centuries,
supported by theological studies, was now succeeded by a civilizational superior-
ity supported by scientific study. The evolutionary theory of Darwin was applied by
academics to explain why Europeans had evolved to a social, economic, political and
cultural status that was deemed so much better and higher than that of all other
peoples in the world.84 One of the sciences that was fashionable at that time was
racial studies, which tried to determine the qualities of a race and, consequently, its
level on the ladder of civilization.85 Within these studies the question became perti-
nent whether the Ottomans or Turks could be considered ‘Europeans.’ The answer
wasmostly negative, for two reasons: Turkswere considered descendants fromAsian
tribes and were therefore, firstly, racially different and, secondly, invaders who had
colonized the Balkans.86 From this perspective, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
was nothingmore than the rightful final expulsion of an ‘Asian’ power fromEurope.
According to nineteenth century Europeans, it was the Asian character of the
Turk that made him prone to barbarism and brutality, and explained the atroci-
ties he allegedly committed during the Balkan wars.87 And it was the same character
that, according to the nineteenth century historian Marriot, explained the “clash”
between “the habits, ideas and preconceptions” of the West and East in south east-
ernEurope as an “immemorial antithesis” that had startedwith the contest between
Persians and Greeks, and in theMiddle Ages between “the forces of Islam and Chris-
tianity”, and that “reached its climax, for the time being, in the great battle of Tours
[Poitiers – MB] (732) and, again, with the battle of Vienna (1683).”88
The Ottomans did not hold similar views on their origins, however. On the con-
trary, not only did they have strong ties with Europe, but they also saw themselves
as part of Europe’s legacy.89 From a ideological perspective, they considered the Ot-
toman Empire as the heir to and substitute for the Byzantine Empire (which also
straddled the lands of south-eastern Europe and Asia Minor). From a pragmatic
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perspective, these were the areas that provided the main income of the Empire,
as well as most of its functionaries.90 These functionaries were mostly recruited
through the system of dev̧sirme or boy-levy, and of the forty-nine grand vizirs who
served theOttoman sultans between 1453 to 1632ce, only fivewere of Turkish origin:
eleven were Albanian, eleven Slav, six Greek, one Armenian, one Georgian, one Ital-
ian, and the rest were Christian-born of unknown nationality.91 And finally, from a
cultural and institutional perspective, the Ottomans since the fifteenth century had
“drifted closer to European standards”, and by the end of the seventeenth century
were “as integrated into Europe as [they] would ever be”.92 In short, the Turks and
their predecessors, the Ottomans, had for centuries were oriented westward rather
than eastward.
But even if, for whatever reasons, one might consider the Ottoman Empire de
facto part of Europe, in practice it was not accepted as such. European states, de-
spite their internal differences, defined themselves as a ‘Christian family of nations,’
a grandnarrative that in the nineteenth century had replaced its religious specificity
with the notion of a commonEuropean civilization and culture that rose high above
all the others in the world.93 The Ottoman Empire was not considered a member
of this family. This became manifest in its exclusion from the Congress of Vienna
in 1815ce, where the European countries re-arranged their political and geographi-
cal relations after the defeat of Napoleon. Only in 1856ce, after the Crimean War in
which European powers sided with the Ottomans against the Russians, did the vic-
tors decide that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire was vital
to the ‘Peace of Europe,’ and consequently allowed the Sublime Porte “to partici-
pate in the advantages of the Public Law and System of Europe.”94 In return, the
European powers demanded from the Ottomans reforms on property, justice and
rights of their Christian subjects, which the Porte granted by decree in that same
year. This status was codified at the Hague Conference in 1899ce, and again in
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923ce. Nevertheless, these treaties could not deny that
the Ottoman Empire, and its successor the secular Turkish Republic, in the eyes
of Europeans remained an outsider, as became apparent when Turkey applied for
membership of the European Union. Wewill come to speak of this in the next chap-
ter.
The idea of Turks as the exclusive Other – as opposed to the civilized European –
found its expression in the new trend of Orientalism. While Turquerie was an in-
nocent fashionwithout preconceptions or judgmental predispositions, Orientalism
definitely was not. Orientalism – not to be confused with the academic discipline, of
whichwe come to speak below –was the representation of the image that Europeans
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had of the Orient, and in particular the Arab Muslim world.95 This exotic world ap-
pealed to the rising trend of Romanticism.More prominently, however, Orientalism
was a European discourse based on stereotypes and prejudices, whereby the Orient
was a projection of theOtherwho embodied all the characteristics and qualities that
were considered the opposite of those held by Europeans. The many paintings in
the so-called Orientalist style show a whole range of these characteristics and qual-
ities: sensual ladies, often nude and reclining (as opposed to the self-composed and
virtuous European), malicious men at female slave auctions (as opposed to a Euro-
pean sense of gender equality), poverty and backwardness (as opposed to European
modernity and prosperity), fatalistic believers (as opposed to European Christianity
that inspires self-determination and self-development), and fanaticism (as opposed
to European self-restraint based on rationalism).
The ideological construct called Orientalism reflected Europe’s sense of cultural
hegemony and self-righteousness towards the rest of the world that served as a
justification for its colonial policies as a mission to bring civilization. This was
mainly a feature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Before that,
the arrows of Enlightened critics were mostly pointed at Europe itself, and Islam
was instrumental in that criticism: Islam’s relative religious tolerance and its lack
of a church structure that imposed religious doctrine were used as mirror for the
rigidity of European Christianity of that time. By the nineteenth century, however,
the Enlightenment was identified with the European mind-set, and was carried
along with imperialist adventure into the world. The European vision of Islam
acquired new impulses, the images of the well-structured, highly organized and
relatively prosperous Ottoman Empire being replaced by the poor and backward
societies of Africa and Asia. The critique of Islam that was commonly framed in
religious polemicswas now reformulated into thenewly found secularizednarrative
framed in the Enlightenment philosophy: Islamic societies were portrayed as closed,
rigid and lacking the freedom and the rational thought that would otherwise have
brought them progress and prosperity.96
Studying Islam
By the nineteenth century, colonies were not mere sources of profitable trade or
extortion, but had become vast lands ruled by colonial European powers. Many of
the European colonieswereMuslimmajority countries. TheDutch in Indonesia, the
British in India and Egypt, and the French in North Africa were for the first time in
theirhistory confrontedwithMuslimsubjects, Islamic institutions like the religious
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scholarly clergy (ʿulama) and Islamic courts, religious culture and traditions. Ruling
these countries meant that Europeans had to have knowledge of them, and the
existing European academic discipline of Arabic (a philological study that focused
primarily on the study of Islamic theological texts) was geared in that direction and
became known as Orientalism (a term that encapsulated all of Asia, including China
and Japan, and was therefore not restricted to theMuslimworld).97
Orientalist academics of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are not
to be compared with modern scholars of Islamic or Middle Eastern studies. The
Orientalist academics had a background of philology and philosophy. They were
often not interested in the daily and contemporary situation of Muslim people,
culture, religion and societies, but in disclosing the textual legacies of these cultures,
and in theories that situated Islam in larger conceptual frameworks like history of
religions or the anthropology of races or the genealogy of civilizations. With the
exception of a few, these academics did not feel the need to be in physical contact
with the peoples or societies they were studying, but devoted their time to the study
of the legacy of their cultures and civilizations as documented in texts.
On the other hand, the policymakers of colonial rule in the European capitals, as
well as the diplomats, merchants, travellers, military, administrators living within
the colonies had a great interest in factual information about these places and peo-
ples: agriculture, economics, politics, legal systems and customary law, social and
cultural characteristics of the societies and peoples. These are what we would nowa-
days call the academicdisciplines of anthropology, sociology, economics andpolitical
science – disciplines that were non-existent in the nineteenth century, or at best in
their infancy. In thenineteenth century, thegathering andanalysis of this kindof in-
formation, whether academically sound or not, wasmostly instigated for pragmatic
reasons, for it was to serve the purposes of colonial rule.98
The distinction made here between a philological ivory tower approach and a
pragmatic policy-oriented approach does not mean that research undertaken by ei-
ther was academically unsound or biased. On the contrary, quite a few scholars ap-
plied a rigid positivistic discipline in their scholarly activities andwere the founders
of the encyclopaedias and vast library collections that were to serve as the sources for
future research (including researchundertakenbymodern scholars coming fromthe
Muslimworld to study in theWest). Also, among theEuropean travellers and explor-
ers in theMuslimworldwere several scholarswhowere often recruited by their gov-
ernments. The English archaeologist and Arabist T.E. Lawrence (1888–1935ce) is the
most famous, andhe shared his dismay aboutwhat he considered European betrayal
of theArabs (theywerenotgiven the landspromised to themby theEnglish in return
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for their revolt against the Ottoman Turk in World War I) with the French scholar
LouisMassignon (1882–1962ce)whohad conducted research inMorocco, Algeria and
Iraq. Another example is the Dutch scholar Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936ce), who
was renowned forhis research inMecca, and acted as an advisor to theDutchmilitary
command that was in charge of putting down the rebellious Muslim people of the
Indonesian province Aceh.
When it came to Islam, the European of the nineteenth century had two ap-
proaches. On the one hand, there was a pragmatic approach employed by the colo-
nial rulers who used their knowledge of Islamic clergy and Islamic law to facilitate
their colonial administration. For instance, the French and English allowed the local
sharia courts to continue their work and maintain their authority, but only inso-
far as they contributed to the general order of colonial rule.99 On the other hand,
Islam was often conceived as one, if not the main cause for the backwardness of
the Muslim countries at that time. This idea was based on several theories that we
briefly introduced above and that had become common knowledge for the average
nineteenth century European. According to these theories, not only race but also re-
ligion was an intrinsic part of each civilization, and each civilization was unique in
its own right and developed at its own pace. From this reasoning sprang the idea
that European civilization of that time was attributed to Christianity, and that by
consequence Islam was to be blamed for the deplorable state of Muslim societies.
Why this was the case at this particular juncture (nine centuries earlier the situa-
tion between theMuslim andChristianworldswas reversed) was themain question
that putmany European academics towork. Somewould argue that Islamic civiliza-
tion had had its time, with the golden age of economic and intellectual prosperity in
the tenth century, to be only briefly resuscitated by the Ottoman Empire in the six-
teenth century. Others merely declared Christianity to be a religion of progress and
Islam a religion of stagnation. And then there were those who shared the conclu-
sion of many Muslim reformists that Islamic doctrine had become stagnant in the
course of time and had to be revived if it was to cope with the demands of modern
times.100
Regardless of the validity of the reasons put forward to explain the difference
between the Western and Eastern worlds, the primal focus of attention was Islam.
In consequence, the people living in these societies were regarded as homo Islamicus,
a person who is shaped and guided by no other factors than his religion of Islam.
This concept conflated racial and religious qualities, defining Islam as the only iden-
tity to the exclusion of all other identities. In this mindset, the position of women
was attributed to Islam rather than to tradition or culture, revolts were the result of
virtual islam | 189
Islamic fanaticism rather than political or economic factors, and anti-imperialism
was a characteristic of pan-Islam rather than local social-political opposition.101 The
view of Islam as the single factor andmotivation of Muslim lives remained a persis-







I. Setting the Stage
We now come to the last period of Islam in Europe, which has a relatively short timespan
compared to the previous periods. But then this period is the start of newdevelopments that have
not yet ended. It is also a period characterized by several developments that have no precedent
in Europe’s history with Islam.
The first development is that after two devastating world wars Europe managed truly to
unify itself, at least more so than in previous centuries. This unity was different from those of
preceding centuries because itwas based on economic cooperation andpolitical-legal values like
individual freedoms, rule of law and democracy.
The second development was the secularization of the European public domain. By this we
mean the decreasing relevance of religion as personal piety or as a factor of societal importance.
The authority of the churches and their clergy dwindled and Christian-Democratic political
parties were religious only in name.
The third development was unique mainly to the western parts of Europe, and that is the
settlement of large numbers of Muslims within European societies and, in consequence, Islam
becoming a feature of the new Europe. The Muslim communities in Europe, and particularly
the migrant communities in Western Europe, combined national, ethnic, religious and local
identities which were disturbing to many in Europe since they challenged the strong sense
of a single national identity. The challenge became a security threat when Muslim youth
radicalized and some even committed terrorist attacks on European targets.
The fourth development that is significant to these times was globalization and transna-
tionalism. Political and economic structures, but also cultural and religious identities, had
become interwoven on a global scale. People identified and connected with causes and commu-
nities thatwere not only local but spread over theworld. In the case ofMuslims inEurope, one of
themanifestations of this developmentwas the notion of a single global community of believers
(umma) that transcended local and national identities.
1. A New Europe
Why refer to Europe as ‘struggling’ if it managed to pull itself from the ashes of two
world wars with such vigour and determination, and even established a European
union?Notwithstanding themanyachievements of this period,wemayobserve that
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Europe is still going through a process of transformation. This transformation is
multifaceted.On ahistorical – andperhaps psychological – level, Europehad to come
to termswith the fact that it was not theworld power it had been for centuries. After
the 1950s and 1960s, when European colonies gained their independence, Europe lost
most of its political power to the United States (and, until the 1980s, to the Soviet
Union) and as of recent times seems to lose its economic power to Asian, South
American and perhaps even African rising economies.
On the other hand, on an internal level, Europe was, and still is, in a process of
political and economic unification.Whereas clerical or cultural unity of the past cen-
turies was often more imagined than real, Europe since the 1950s has managed to
create a trueunity, first economically, then legally, andgradually alsopolitically. This
unification is a complex process with its crises and criticisms. However, while many
may criticize the degree of integration of European states into the Union, or the role
of the European Commission and European Court of Human Rights, few question
the existence of these institutions. In that respect, many Europeans still share the
notion of a European unity, regardless of the form it will ultimately take. Relevant
to the topic of Islam, aswewill see below, is the fact that this unitywas also expressed
in political-legal values, such as individual freedoms, democracy and the rule of law.
Many of these valueswere enshrined in the EuropeanConvention onHumanRights
of 1953, which applies to all member states of the Council of Europe which, in addi-
tion to all states in Europe, also includes states like Russia, Georgia, Azerbijan and
Turkey.
Another important aspect of the transformationofEurope is religion. In the 1950s
and 1960s, the authority of the clergy as well as that of religion itself reached an all-
time lowworldwide, a trend thatwas known as secularization. But the idea that reli-
gionhad recededwith the rise ofmodernity – the so-called secularization thesis –was
challenged by the re-emergence of religion, both as personal piety and as a societal
force, from the 1970s onwards. Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism
and new forms of religion have again become important to many. The one region
where this resurgence of religion was relatively limited was Europe. Here, secular-
ization remained dominant in the public domain: religion was considered a private
affair and public manifestations thereof – whether in politics, public celebrations,
state functions, social behaviour or public morality – were limited. Secularization as
describedhere is a cultural process rather than a political or legal one: religiousman-
ifestations were not prohibited (on the contrary, they were ensured by the freedom
of religion), butmerely ‘not done’, either because they had lost their meaning or be-
cause they were frowned upon as relics from times when they had merely caused
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conflict. Secularism, on the other hand, is a political-legal institution to separate state
and clerical powers that had been established since the nineteenth century and re-
mained unaltered inmost European countries.
If we take these characteristics of the new Europe – unification as an economic
power, unity in political-legal values, and secularization – it is surprising that dur-
ing the first decade of the twenty-first century the presence of ‘Islam’ in Europe
was experienced as a serious challenge to this very same unity. Some authors even
warned that Europe might be on the brink of destruction.1 This feeling of anxi-
ety, more than anything else, warrants the characterization of a ‘struggling’ Eu-
rope – because if a relatively small group of Muslims can pose such a threat to
the values and integrity of Europe, then surely something must be amiss with
the stability and foundation of those values. On the other hand, we must bear
in mind that the warnings against the ‘Islamic threat’ to Europe came predomi-
nantly from American authors. This is significant because, from the perspective of
many of these American observers, Europe’s main problem is its lack of religios-
ity combined with too much liberalism and political generosity (as opposed to the
United States which, according to these authors, is more religious, patriotic and
security-minded). These characteristics of Europe, American authors argue, allow
the new religion of Islam to make quick and successful incursions into European
life.
I agree with the American authors’ observation that Europe is being challenged,
but disagree with their diagnosis. Europe has reached a stage in its history where
the political, legal and social balance of creed, coexistence and conflict have entered a
new constellation. Also, the presence ofMuslims and Islam is inmany respects a new
challenge for Europe. But, as I will argue in this chapter, it is not the existence of the
newEuropean constellation that is challenged, but the presumptions that uphold it.
If there is a conflict between ‘Europe’ and ‘Islam’, it is notwith theEuropeanpolitical
and legal values onwhich the constellation of the new Europe is based, but with the
cultural values that are presumed to be its underpinnings.
2. Islam in the New Europe
From the previous chapters we know that the physical presence of Muslims in the
geographical area of Europe is not new. Muslims ruled as empires in the Iberian
Peninsula for nearly 800 years, in Greece for 500 years, in the Balkans for 300 years,
and in Sicily for 100 years. As subjects under non-Muslim rule, Muslims stayed on
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even longer: they lived in Spain for 900 years, in Sicily for 400 years, and still live in
Lithuania and Poland after more than 600 years, and in most Balkan countries after
more than 500 years.
However, when we come to speak of Islam in Europe from 1950 onwards, a dis-
tinction needs to be made between Western and Eastern Europe with regard to the
presence ofMuslims. Since the late sixteenth century very fewMuslims have resided
in the European region west of the Warsaw-Vienna-Trieste line (a region that, for
lack of a better term, I will refer to as ‘Western Europe’). The arrival of large numbers
of Muslimmigrants in these lands from the 1970s was therefore a development that
confronted the native Western Europeans with a situation that is a historical nov-
elty. The presence of large numbers ofMuslims and the visibility of Islam–mosques,
women with headscarves, bearded men in jalabas, halal restaurants – was not only
sudden, but also new for Western Europeans.2
The novel situation turned into a confrontation in two ways. On the one hand,
the discussion arose to what extent these migrant Muslims needed to be social-
economically or culturally part of Western European societies. The debate wavered
between the need for those Muslims to adapt (‘integration’), on the one hand, and
society’s obligation to accommodate differences (‘multiculturalism’), on the other
hand. The other confrontation was the radicalization of Muslim youth, with some
of them resorting to violence. Europe was shaken up in bewilderment and terror
by the bombings by Muslim extremists in New York (2001), followed by attacks on
European cities: Madrid (2004), Amsterdam (2004), London (2005), Glasgow (2007),
Toulouse (2012), Brussels (2014) and the occasional news that similar attacks had been
thwarted in several European countries. These attacks not only prompted fear of Is-
lam in the European mind, but also justified the idea that Muslims could not and
did notwant to be part ofWestern societies, especially when it became apparent that
many of the perpetrators were youngmenwho had been educated inWestern Euro-
pean societies and done relatively well there.
The situation in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, is quite different from that
in Western Europe (and we must remind ourselves that this geographical distinc-
tion is made for the purpose of this discussion only). First and foremost, Muslims
and their Islamic cultural, institutional and architectural heritage have existed here
for centuries. In addition, the Eastern European countries with established Mus-
lim communities have been under a communist regime for over four decades –
with the exception of Austria3 and Greece. During that period, Islamic life was in-
corporated into the state system but was quite limited by virtue of the doctrinal
secularism – sometimes amounting to state-sponsored atheism – of the commu-
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nist regime. These regimes were dismantled in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989. In Yugoslavia, this process was accompanied by a devastating civil
war. Although the conflict was between (Orthodox) ‘Serbs’, (Catholic) ‘Croats’ and
(Bosnian) ‘Muslims’ – note the interesting different use of adjectives and nouns in
the reference to religion and ethnicity – the role of religion in this conflict still re-
mains unclear, as we will see below. In the new Balkan states that emerged from
the fall of the communist regimes and from the Yugoslavian civil war, Islam grad-
ually re-established itself as an institutionalized part of society and the state. In
addition, however – and here we may observe one of the few parallels with West-
ern Europe – orthodox and even radical forms of Islam emerged among the younger
generation.
3. Identity, Loyalty and Security
InWestern as well as Eastern Europe there is a tendency amongMuslims to empha-
size their religious identity, and since the 1990s they do so mainly in conservative
ways. This development is in parallel with – but mostly independent of – an emerg-
ing Islamisminmost of theMuslimworld.ManyaEuropean considers the emerging
‘Islam’, bothwithin and outside Europe, as a phenomenon that is alien to everything
that Europe stands for politically, socially, culturally and historically. The rise of this
phenomenon therefore becomes a challenge at best and a threat at worst when these
worlds inside and outside Europe become connected.4
Scholars have called this connectedness ‘transnational Islam’, a notion that in
this book’s terminology has both a physical and a virtual dimension. Physically,
Muslimsmigrate andmove across borders, whether asmigrants or political refugees
into Europe (including several radical Muslims who acquired asylum in Europe be-
cause they faced torture or the death penalty in their homelands) or as students
outside Europe (many European Muslims study Islam in Turkey, Pakistan and the
Middle East). In doing so theymaintain economic, social and religious ties that cross
national borders.5 The virtual dimension is that pious Muslims keep Islam as their
main frameof reference and identity, irrespective of national or cultural boundaries.6
In doing so they identify with a global Muslim community (umma) rather than a
homeland or national culture.7Transnational Islam, in brief, can be defined in terms
of an ideological sense of belonging to a – real or imaginary – world-wide commu-
nity of Muslims (the umma),8 as well as through its ethnic and national diaspora
networks, migrant organizations, educational and cultural links, the Internet and
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satellite television, etcetera. This transnational Islam is a development that is typi-
cal among the generationMuslims born since the late 1980s.9
Transnational Islam does not mean that European Muslims represent a unified
or single community – on the contrary, they have multiple and shifting identities,
resulting in varying loyalties:10 Pakistanis in Englandmay identify with England as
well as with Pakistan, and for their religionmay refer to the local imam in Birming-
ham, or to the Muslim customs of Lahore or Peshawar, or to any Muslim cleric on
the Internet whom they deem authoritative. This English-Pakistani Muslim may
feel loyal to England, butmay cheer on the Pakistani cricket team, and he or shemay
feel affronted by English discourse on Islam but also by the Islamic fundamental-
ist tendencies in Pakistan.11 Indeed, the loyalty of many Muslims to the umma does
not exclude a similar national loyalty, for they show considerable commitment to
and pride in their European country of settlement.12 However, the consciousness of
belonging to a global religious community definitely contributes to a sense ofMus-
lim uniqueness,13 and according to some observers this may lead to isolation or even
radicalization.
These turbulent developments amongMuslim communities within Europe are
bewildering to many Europeans who are used to a single cultural identity and an
ensuing single national loyalty. To many the emerging Islamic identities in West-
ern and Eastern Europe are seen as alien and even threatening to ‘Europe’. The loy-
alty of Muslims is being questioned – is it with their new home country, or with
their country of origin, or with some imaginary Muslim community? – adding fuel
to the already heated debates on integration. Citizens with more than one iden-
tity or nationality are suspected of having loyalties across the confines of national
borders and therewith contribute to a fear of ‘the insider enemy’ or fifth column.14
The sensation of threat was enhanced by the terrorist attacks by European Mus-
lims, and the many reports of global networks of such extremists who were out
to fight ‘the West’ in a jihad that was to be conducted from outside Europe as
well as within. The combination of these factors has contributed to what has been
called the ‘securitization’ of Islam in Europe, meaning that Muslims and their re-
ligion were perceived as a security threat to ‘Europe’.15 The ‘in’ of ‘Islam in Europe’
thus acquired anothermeaningwhen Islam became a global and transnational phe-
nomenon.
II. Physical Islam
1. Living with the Unbeliever
CountingMuslims
How many Muslims are living in Europe at present? This may seem an innocent
statistical question, but has become for many – especially for those warning against
‘Islamization’ of Europe, or an impending ‘Eurabia’ – an issue of concern. Bernard
Lewis in 2004 warned that Europe would have “Muslim majorities by the end of
the twenty-first century,”16 and downplayed this ominous prediction several years
later with his statement that “in the foreseeable future” Muslims would constitute
“significantmajorities in at least some European cities or even countries.”17 Another
persistent ‘fact’ that circulates on the Internet is thatMuslimswill comprise “at least
20 per cent of Europe’s population by 2050”.18
Trying to answer the question about the number of Muslims in Europe is not
easy because it confronts us with two problems: quantifying Muslims and qualify-
ing what is a Muslim.19 Quantifying Muslims is problematic since most European
countries do not keep records of their population on the basis of their religious affili-
ation.Thismeans that all figures relating to religionarebasedonestimates andmust
therefore be taken broadly. Recalculations in Germany, for instance, conducted by
the government in 2009 raised the previously used estimates of 3.1–3.4 millionMus-
lims to 3.8–4.3 million, an increase of almost thirty per cent.20 On the other hand,
recalculations in the Netherlands in 2007 lowered the number of Muslims from
950.000 to 850.000, a decrease of more than 10 per cent.21
Another problem is the relative and absolute nature of these numbers and re-
lated percentages. For instance, the United Kingdom ranks third in all of Europe in
absolute numbers ofMuslims (after France and Germany), but takes sixteenth place
(after Belgium and Sweden) in percentage.22 Also, the picture can change dramati-
cally depending on the view one takes. For instance, the percentage of Muslims is
close to 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 6–8.5 per cent in France, but less than 4 per cent
in the entire European Union.23 Such differences apply in particular on a domestic
scale. While the overall percentage of Muslims in The Netherlands in 2010–2011 was
6 per cent, it was 28 per cent in the city of Amsterdam and 37 per cent in Rotterdam.24
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Similar demographic differences between cities and countryside can be observed in
most European countries.25
Taking all these caveats into consideration and using the available statistics, we
may use the following estimates. The number of Muslims in ‘Europe’ is estimated
to be 15–17 million (approximately 3 per cent) in Western Europe, 17–19 million (ap-
proximately 3.5–4 per cent) in the EuropeanUnion and 24–26million (approximately
4.5–5 per cent) in the entire European continent that borders on Russia, Belarus and
the Ukraine.
However, these quantitative data bring us to the problem of qualification: on
what basis do European statistics categorize people as Muslim – or, for that mat-
ter, a Catholic, Jew, or non-believer?26 Most official European estimates are based on
the assumption that people fromMuslim-majority countries areMuslim. How this
assumption may affect the statistical calculations was illustrated by the abovemen-
tioned 2007 recalculation of Muslims in the Netherlands, because it became clear
that many Iraqis and Syrians were not Muslim but Christian, and that many Irani-
ans and Alevite Turks did not consider themselves ‘Muslim’.27
Once we start to qualify what ‘Muslim’ means, the figures may alter drastically,
especially when people are being given the option to identify as Muslim – or not. In
Germany, for instance, recent studies have indicated that only 7.5 per cent of Turks
define themselves as “quite religious”,28 40 per cent of Iranians consider themselves
without religion, and more than 10 per cent declared themselves as Christians.29
In France, 59 per cent of the North Africans and Turks identified themselves as
“Muslim” and 20 per cent as “without religion”.30 In Sweden, only one third of
SwedishMuslims indicate they are “practising”.31 Similarly, Albania is said to be the
onlyEuropeancountrywithaMuslimmajoritypopulation (70per centMuslim), but
scholars have indicated that its population does not consist of a majority of Muslim
believers.32 The only exception, perhaps, is the TurkishMuslim community of Thrace
in eastern Greece that identifies strongly with Islam, partly because it remained
isolated from the secularization process in neighbouring Turkey, and partly because
it felt the need to reassert itself vis-à-vis the dominant Orthodox culture.33 Suffice it
to conclude that the term ‘Muslim’ is highly complex.
Muslim Identity
What, then, makes a person in Europe a ‘Muslim’? With the risk of oversimplifying,
we may resort to the following categories. First we can make a division between
cultural (or sociological) Muslims and religious (or devout) Muslims.34 The main
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characteristic of the cultural Muslims is that religious dogma has no influence on
their lives. They may be agnostic, indifferent or respectful, and many may observe
certain rituals orpractices suchas circumcision, religious feasts ormarriage. But they
do identify asMuslims, sometimes in amanner that is reminiscent of Jewswhomay
be non-religious or even atheist, but strongly identify as ‘Jew’.
The other category of Muslims are those for whom religion plays an impor-
tant part in their lives, whether as a strict scriptural doctrine or as spiritual guid-
ance. Among these ‘religious Muslims’ we may make a further division based on
generation: there is a veritable generation gap between the younger generation for
whom religiousness is mostly associated with higher knowledge of Islamic doc-
trine, and their parents for whom religion is mainly rituals for which they refer
to the interpretations of their local cleric.35 This new generation of what I suggest
calling ‘puritanMuslims’ (formerly also called ‘fundamentalist’, nowadays often re-
ferred to as ‘salafi’ in Western Europe and ‘Wahhabi’ in Eastern Europe) has an in-
terest in the study of religious texts and the critical questioning thereof, and try
to live their lives in accordance with the prescripts of these scriptures.36 As a re-
sult, these Muslims, who are often highly educated, are turning away from tradi-
tional sources of leadership and develop an interpretation of Islam that, to their
minds, reflects a ‘pure’ or ‘universal’ Islam.37 This does not necessarily lead to in-
terpretations that are very different from those of classical doctrine: often it is an
exercise of the re-appropriation of religion by the individual believer – he or she
had to reconfirm the doctrine for him- or herself rather than merely taking it for
granted.
One consequence of this focus on religious doctrine is that Islam becomes more
detached from ethnic or national identity, and is increasingly perceived as a personal
choice.38 In addition, these European Muslim puritans emphasize their religious-
universal commonalities rather than religious-ethnic differences, so that differences
among sects and juridical rites of Islam tend to diminish.39 But overall, Islam to the
puritanMuslimhas become away of life that encompasses all human activities,40 in-
cluding thosewhich are otherwise quite secular, such as sports and rapmusic, which
have become new forms of Islamic lifestyle.41
Why, then, this religious resurgence among younger Muslims in Europe? To
answer this question we must distinguish between developments in Western and
Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, Islam was already part of the identity of certain
communities, as we saw in the previous chapter, and this identity resurfaced after
the ending in the late 1980s of communist rule and the ensuing civil wars.42 In
Western Europe, on the other hand, the emergence of an Islamic identity happened
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in a context of migration. Scholars have pointed to the importance of both ethnic-
ity and religion as identity markers for migrants in general, and Muslim migrants
in Europe in particular.43 However, since the 1990s European Muslims have under-
gone a gradual shift in identity marker from ethnicity to religion. For instance, the
term ‘Muslim’ became common use only from the 1990s onwards in both Western
and Eastern Europe. Before then, ethnic and national labels were used: Pakistanis
and Moroccans, Berber and Kurds, Bosniaks and Pomaks. These names revealed the
national, ethnic and linguistic patchwork of ‘Muslims’ in Europe. Most Moroccans,
for instance, are Muslim but some are also Jewish, and most Arab-speaking Mo-
roccans live in France while most Berber-speaking Moroccans live in Belgium and
the Netherlands. The Bangladeshis and Pakistanis who live predominantly in the
United Kingdom aremostlyMuslim, but also Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Christian.
And among the Bosnians we find Serbs and Croats as well as Christians and Mus-
lims (the latter called ‘Bosniaks’). The linguistic and ethnic differences also explain
the differentiation betweenmosques on ethnic or national grounds – Albanian, Pak-
istani, Moroccan – each with its own religious doctrine, customs and organization.
The new generation is gradually breaking with this trend and identifying mosques
on religious grounds: liberal, conservative, salafi etcetera. Their choice of marriage
partner is also increasingly determined by religion rather than ethnicity or nation-
ality – a trend that is not uncommon inmigrant communities when their faith has
no tradition in the society of settlement.44
The emphasis on religion as an identity marker for the next generation of Mus-
lims of foreign origin in Western Europe – who are often born and raised there –
is not to mean that they are more religious per se. As indicated above, a religious
identity can be cultural as well as pious. Why, then, would people identify with a
religion if they were not religious? Here the notion of Othering offers an explana-
tion. Since the late 1990s, Western public discourse has vilified Islam for reasons that
sometimesmighthave been very justifiable, but the effectwas that youngpeople felt
pushed into a corner because they were given no alternative of identification other
than assimilation into the society of residence, while the other identity – the cul-
ture of the homeland of the parents – had lost its meaning to the generation born
and raised in theWest. As a reaction, they identified evenmorewith that same Islam
that was the source of criticism, whether out of defiance or for lack of an alterna-
tive. The main problem that Western society had with the Muslim Other, namely
their social-religious identity, became precisely the rallying point for these Mus-
lims.45
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Conversion
As in previous centuries, not all Muslims in Europe were migrants; some of them
were local converts. The number of native Western Europeans who have converted
to Islam in the period since 1950 is not known; in 2004 it was estimated to be nomore
than one per cent of theWestern EuropeanMuslimpopulation,46 but it appears to be
steadily rising, with recent estimates of almost 7 per cent in the United Kingdom47
and 2 to 6 per cent in France.48
While we have seen that in previous periods conversion to Islam took place
mainly to get access to the cultural and political polity of the Muslim ruler, such
considerations are not in play here. The literature on Western European converts
to Islam has come up with a number of other motives.49 One motive which has
always existed is conversion for the sake of marriage, either to enable a non-Muslim
man and Muslim woman to marry (Islam does not allow such marriage) or, the
opposite,whenanon-Muslimwomanwhomarried aMuslimman (which is allowed
under Islamic law) felt the need to join her husband in his faith. This relational
conversion has been overtaken, however, by a larger number of single adolescents
who convert to Islam for othermotives; some find in Islam the spirituality they seek,
others a reasoned structuring of life and society, and yet others because it grants
them the intimatemembership of a close community. An interesting aspect of these
conversions is that there seems to be a correlation between the rising criticism of
Islam and the increase in conversions to Islam.
The general response of the environment to such conversions is generally one
of puzzlement. Given the negative image that the larger European public opinion
has of Islam, conversion to that religion is tantamount to an irrational act.50 For
that reason the voluntarism of the conversion is often questioned, in particularwith
regard to female converts – given the alleged bad reputation of Islamwith regard to
the position of women, how can a Europeanwoman in her rightmind embrace such
a religion?51 An additional factor that contributes to the suspicion of themotives for
conversion is the fact that converts – not only those converting to Islam, but converts
in general – tend to be zealous in their new religion, and quite a few of the European
Muslim extremists involved in terrorist acts were Muslim converts, just as many of
these converts have travelled to countries like Chechnya and Syria to participate in
the local civil wars as a matter of jihad. No wonder that conversion to Islam is eyed
suspiciously by intelligence agencies as a potential security threat.52
In this respect we must make an addendum to the notion of conversion: much
wider spread than ‘ordinary’ conversion to Islambynon-Muslims is themany young
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Muslimswhohave ‘found’ their religious roots andbecome religious, often in a zeal-
ous or conservative manner. These conversions are similar to those of the so-called
‘born-again’ Christians in the United States, and are therefore often labelled with
the same term: ‘born-againMuslims.’53 The difference with their Christian counter-
parts is the motivation for the return to religion: in case of the born-again Muslim,
he has been described as “a Muslim who having adopted or absorbed many mod-
ern or foreign influencesmakes a show of discarding them in his search for personal
identity and cultural authenticity.”54But inboth cases of conversion the voluntarism
of the conversion is questioned and the cause of conversion is sought in factors out-
side the will of the person: for women this is usually said to be the oppressive role of
men (fathers, husbands, brothers), while for men it is said to be the indoctrinating
power of Islam itself or that of fanatical clergy. While these situations may very well
be the case, the resulting image is that Muslims, and in particular Muslim women,
are powerless, without will or agency.
So far we have discussed people turning to Islam. But the opposite also hap-
pens – strictly speaking this is also conversion, but from the perspective of Islam
it is considered the prohibited act of apostasy. Apostasy is considered forbidden by
most religions, but legally the act of apostasy is no longer a problem in Europe as
freedom of religion includes the freedom to abandon one’s religion, while cultur-
ally the act of apostasy is not frowned upon in Europe and in some social circles
evenwelcomed. This poses a predicament for EuropeanMuslims: themore religious
they have become, themore condemnable apostasy from Islam is to them, but at the
same time they live in an environment where the opposite sentiment dominates.
It has resulted in two conflicting situations. On the one hand, Muslims who want
to change religion or abandon Islam have come under enormous pressure and even
threats from their Muslim peers. On the other hand, there is the pressure from out-
side the Muslim community to modify or preferably give up one’s Islam as the only
way to integrate into European society.
Visibility of Islam
Speaking of ‘Islam’ in Europe implies, among others, that there is something recog-
nizable as such. The manifestation of Islam can be observed either by architectural
presence or byMuslims’ behaviour or a visibility that is – rightly orwrongly – identi-
fiable as Islamic. In thepolitical-legal constellationofmodernEurope, suchvisibility
or behaviour is generally not problematic as it pertains to personal liberty in gen-
eral and the freedom of religion in particular. Insofar as there is unease in European
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countries it is about Islam’s visible presence through mosques, religious dress and
behaviour.
In the case of mosques, Western Europe has witnessed an enormous increase in
prayer rooms and Islamic centres where the faithful gather for prayer, but gradu-
ally also the construction of so-called purpose-built mosques usually with the vis-
ible architectural signs of a dome and one or more minarets. The latter has been
considered by some scholars as a sign of final settlement and integration into Eu-
ropean societies (why else would Muslims invest in such expensive and permanent
projects?),55 but the European public generally perceives the purpose-built mosques
in Western Europe as ‘out of place’ or otherwise alien and therefore undesirable.56
Theuse of traditional (‘Oriental’) architecture is interpreted by critics as questioning
the norms and values of the host country or, as is the case with the minaret in par-
ticular, as a symbol of Muslim domination.57 The Swiss 2009 referendum outcome
prohibiting the building of minarets (not mosques) is quite telling in this respect,
because Switzerlandwas at that time a countrywith only fourminaret-bearingmos-
ques.58
Critics of the architectural representation of mosques are not limited to non-
Muslim Europeans. SomeMuslim European architects reject what they call ‘home-
sickmosques’ and have proposed futuristic glass mosques to emphasize their trans-
parency.59 Similarly, many Muslims in south-eastern European countries consider
theirOttoman-stylemosques symbols of traditional andpeaceful Islam, andare anx-
ious about the construction of many new ‘Arab’ style mosques funded by the Gulf
States that they perceive as the representation of a growing influence of so-called
‘Wahhabism’.60 InWestern Europe, on the other hand, it is these ‘Wahhabi’Muslims
(better known as salafi Muslims) who joined the chorus of mosque critics, arguing
that the typical mosque with dome and minaret is not Islamic at all, but represen-
tative of cultural additions to the originally simple structure of a walled and partly
roofed courtyard. This has given rise to a curious paradox: the simple brick and con-
crete mosque structures used by these puritan Muslims may look quite ‘integrated’
into the Western European architectural landscape, but some of them are under
the scrutiny of national intelligence services for potential radicalization tendencies
among the young salafi congregations,while the ostentatious ‘Oriental’mosques get
all the public attention and criticism because of their Otherness, but their congre-
gations are mostly traditional and otherwise pose no security risk in the eyes of the
intelligence services.61
Religious dress is yet another manifestation of religious visibility. The oppo-
sition to Islamic dress, and in particular the headscarf, has been particularly pas-
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sionate in Western Europe.62 Muslim women may consider it a symbol of identity
and piety, but to many native Europeans this is a symbol of growing conservative
Islam in general, and women’s oppression in particular. This view was shared by
the European Court of Human Rights which in two controversial rulings argued
that a headscarf had a negative impact on a secular environment, was a sign of
proselytization, and was in general a symbol of intolerance and gender inequality.63
While these debates took place in Western Europe, the headscarf and conservative
Islamic dress have also become fashionable in south-eastern European countries.
While the headscarf, or the turban and kaftan may be a normal sight in Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Eastern Greece or Bosnia, many Muslims as well as non-Muslims in
these countries considered the new conservative forms of religious dress contrary to
the traditional form of Islam.64 It is interesting to note, therefore, that the only two
Muslim-majority countries in Europe, Kosovo and Albania, have banned the head-
scarf from state institutions, including universities – a ban that is shared only by
France.
The visibility of Islam in Europe further shows in behaviour that Muslims may
consider typically Islamic. Suchbehaviour is predominantly related to religious ritu-
als, and sometimes these clashwith the practicalities and culture of the non-Muslim
environment, in particular inWesternEurope. Prayer and fasting, in particular, have
occasionally resulted in problematic situations, either at work or in the public do-
main. In particular Muslims who have taken or demanded space for their ritual
5-minute prayer have at times come into conflict with employers or colleagues who
argue that such behaviour pertains to the private domain and should therefore not
be allowed or accommodated at work. Dietary rules of halal food and the prohibition
of alcohol can also be problematic – the latter especially has become an impediment
for devout Muslims to socialize with colleagues or neighbours since, according to
European custom, social events usually involve alcoholic beverages, and often take
place at cafes or bars.
In addition to these known manifestations of Islam, new forms of behaviour
have arisen in Europe that Muslims have attributed to Islam and that have caused
conflicts within both Western and Eastern European societies. An example is the
physical separation of men and women, which is practised in particular by young
European Muslim puritans. The refusal by these Muslims to even have physical
contact with the opposite sex not only causes dismay in European societies, but is
also problematic in jobs where social interaction is considered vital,65 or in the case
ofmedical treatment.66Anexponent of this segregation is thewearing of the full-face
veil (also called burka or niqab). Reactions against such behaviour are vehement
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throughoutEurope: inWesternEuropebecause it is considered contrary toEuropean
values (of which we will come to speak below), and in Eastern Europe because it is
considered contrary to Islam.
2. Secular and Religious Rule
The ‘Muslims’ – as we will continue to call them – who came as migrants and
guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s, and later came on their own accord to find
work in Western Europe, were until the 1980s treated as labour migrants who were
bound to return. Later, many more economic and political refugees and migrants
flocked towards Europe, targeting in particular the Mediterranean countries as the
place of entry. Only when many of these labourers and refugees brought their fam-
ilies over – which they were entitled to as a right of family unification, as stipu-
lated by the European Convention on Human Rights – did it dawn on the West-
ern European societies and governments that a situation of permanence was taking
place.
European countries had quite different attitudes in their shift from a policy of
labour migration to one of incorporating large communities with foreign cultures
into their societies. France for a long time maintained the strict differentiation be-
tween citizens (that is, those with French nationality) and non-citizens; it took Ger-
many until 2000 to grant long-term citizens German nationality; the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom championed ‘multiculturalism’ which allowed for far-
reaching cultural and linguistic differences; and Greece maintained that Muslim-
minority rights were only for Greek Muslims who live in the province of Thrace
and not for the many Muslim migrants living in other parts of Greece.67 But by
the late 1990s most European countries felt a need to gear these approaches towards
a policy aimed at ‘integrating’ the many communities of foreign origin into their
new societies: in the case of France, for instance, allowances needed to be made for
cultural differences, while in the Netherlands and United Kingdom the policy of
multiculturalism had to be curbed in order to let people partake in the larger social-
economical and cultural structure of society.
The European – and particularly Western Europe – policies of ‘integration’ fo-
cused on two domains: social-economical and cultural. To stimulate people of for-
eign origin to take part in society in terms of education and jobs, for instance, pri-
mary importance was attached to the need for proficiency in the national language
of that society: first as an option, later as a condition. But with the second and third
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generations who were born and raised in Western European societies and who had
gone through the educational systems of those societies, the discussion on integra-
tion shifted to the domain of culture: public and political opinion demanded from
these young people that they adopt the norms, values and customs of the European
societies where they lived. This demand focused most prominently on Muslims.
Some advocates of this cultural integration argued that Muslims needed to adopt
European political and constitutional values (assuming that theMuslims did not do
so), while others went further by puttingmore emphasis on cultural and customary
values that Muslims needed to embrace (which many Muslims resisted since that
conflicted with their identity and was tantamount to assimilation).68
The issues of integration, acculturation and assimilation are typical for any mi-
grant community at any time inhistory.Our interesthere is thequestionwhat issues
of European ‘rule’were typical forMuslims and, therefore, Islam.Thismeans thatwe
need to take a closer look at policies and political-legal structures of European states
that related to religion in general and Islam in particular. The most significant of
these are secularism, freedom of religion and the impact of Islam-criticism.
European Secularism and Religious Freedom
We have distinguished before between ‘secularization’ as a process of decreasing
religiosity among people and ‘secularism’ as a system that governs the relation
between state and religion or religious institutions.69 Almost all European countries
adhere to more or less strict interpretations of secularism, meaning that the state
is (officially, at least) neutral towards religion and will not favour one religion over
another, nor deny the existence of certain religions. Not all countries will adhere
to this principle and profess their preference for a national religion, as is the case
in Greece, for instance. Within this framework of secularism, however, there are
quite a few differences among the Europe countries, by the use of which we may
distinguish between what I propose to call ‘active’ and ‘passive’ secularism. Active
secularism is a state’s policy to remove religion from the public domain as much
as possible so that the domain is religiously neutral. An example is France where
religious parties are not allowed in parliament and religious manifestations are
prohibited in all public institutions, includingpublic schools. Passive secularism, on
the other hand, merely demands the state’s neutrality in its dealings with religion,
but leaves everyone free to manifest their religious preferences in the public and
political domain. This is the case in most other European countries, albeit in many
different forms.
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Sowhile inmost European countries there is no separation between religion and
politics (think of the many Christian Democrat parties), there is often a distinction
between the state and the religious communities (or: ‘church’). The separation of
‘church and state’ is in Europe commonly explained as non-interference by the
state in matters of doctrine and organization of any religion. But here, also, there
are different national traditions that stem from historical developments. Generally
speaking, religious communities in Eastern European countries adhere to the legacy
of the Ottoman millet system because religious communities maintain a form of
autonomy as regards the state. In the case of the Muslims, their so-called ‘Muslim
Communities’ are formally recognized in most Eastern European countries, and
their spiritual leaders, ormuftis, hold office in countries from Lithuania, Poland and
Austria to Bulgaria and Greece. The state recognition of theseMuslim communities
implies that they are entitled to regulatematters likemosquemaintenance, religious
education, the appointment and payment of clerics. Inmost cases the representative
bodies of these communities receive funds from the state to fulfil these duties to the
community.70
In Western European countries, on the other hand, such a relationship is non-
existent, with a few exceptions (in Belgium, for instance, clerics of recognized reli-
gious communities with proper representation receive their salaries from the state).
Most states, however, maintain formal communication with most of the religious
communities, just like the south-eastern European states do. This was only the case
with established religious communities, however, like Protestants, Catholics, Jews,
and not with the new religions like Islam or Hinduism that had been brought in
by immigrants (not to speak of the many other new and exotic religions that flour-
ish among Europeans). WhenWestern European states wanted to establish a similar
form of communication with their Muslim communities in order to discuss issues
like integration, radicalization and terrorism, this turned out to be more difficult
than anticipated. The national, ethnic, linguistic, generational and even religious
differences among the Muslims were such that they did not manage – or were un-
willing – to unite in a single organization that represented all Muslims of a coun-
try. In desperation, European governments like France, Germany and the Nether-
lands broke with the tradition of secularism, that is non-interference in religious
affairs, and actively prompted their Muslim communities to organize themselves.
This resulted in the emergence of national Muslim bodies in these countries. How
representative they are of the entire Muslim national community in each coun-
try remains to be seen, because they mostly appear to represent the first genera-
tion.71
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The constituent principle of secularism is religious freedom, which had become
one of the most distinctive features of Europe in the period after the 1950s. The
European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that this freedom means not
only that the state should not interfere in matters of religion, but that it should
also actively guarantee that the faithful can freely practise their religion.72 This
has prompted some European states to change laws on burial and slaughter in
order to accommodate the religious needs of non-Christians, such as Jews, Muslims
and Hindus. In other instances, European states make sure that the faithful who
are hindered in the free practice of their religion due to their stay in government
facilities such as prisons, army barracks or public hospitals are provided with access
to clergy and prayer rooms and are given religious diets.73
Freedom of religion also means that religious communities are free to organize
themselves and to regulate their own affairs in accordance with their own wishes,
including their own religious laws. This will always, however, be under the scrutiny
of the national law of the land. Here we see the fine line between, on the one hand,
the principle of liberty, including the freedom of religion and, on the other hand,
certain rules that need to be followed by all citizens. With regard to Muslims a
point of friction in this respect is family law. Until the nineteenth century, religious
communities were free to regulate their own family affairs. By the early nineteenth
century, and particularly under Napoleon’s rule, family law had become a state
responsibility, resulting in the promulgation of national civil laws that applied
to all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs. Couples were free to celebrate
their religious unions according to their own traditions, but before the law only
civil marriage counted. This situation created a parallel legal structure of civil and
religious institutions that each adjudicate on the basis of their respective laws (but
with the civil law being dominant). In most European countries the Protestant,
Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish communities still maintain their own councils (also
called ‘religious courts’). In Eastern Europe, such councils also exist in the Muslim
Communities.74 At the time of writing, such Muslim advisory or judicial bodies
(‘Sharia councils’) did not exist in a formal manner in Western European countries,
except the United Kingdom.75 There are two reasons for this omission: one is that
Muslims cannot agree on a single set of Islamic rules, and the second is that the
establishment of such Islamic bodies proved to be highly controversial.76 We will
discuss this issue of ‘sharia courts’ in Europe inmore detail below.
In addition to the freedom to regulate the religious affairs of their communities,
Muslims also have the right to pursue religion in politics, just like Christians have
been doing in the past century. The only European countrywhere this is not allowed
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is France. However, initiatives to establish Muslim or Islamic parties on a national
or local (municipal) level are either non-existent or have met with little success.77
The representation of Muslims in political positions, like municipal councils, par-
liaments or government, is therefore often not on a religious ticket as ‘Muslim’, but
on a political ticket such as socialist, liberal and even Christian Democrat. Roma-
nia is the only European country where the constitution reserves one seat for every
national minority, includingMuslims, provided they are represented by a single or-
ganization.78
Romania is an exception, however, and its constitutional provision is based on
minority rights rather than religious rights. It is typical of modern Europe that
minority rights pertain to ethnic, national or linguistic minorities, but are not
extended to religiousminorities.79The reason for this omission is that the protection
of this category of people is supposed to be achieved by the constructs of secularism
and freedom of religion: states are not to interfere with the beliefs and internal
regulations of religious communities. The question then arises whether Muslims,
given their special position inEurope, shouldnevertheless demand specificminority
rights. Among Muslims it is a matter of debate whether they are to perceive and
organize themselves as a religious minority (as is argued by the prominent Muslim
cleric shaykh Qaradawi80) or as European citizens with a distinctive Islamic identity
(as is argued by the equally prominent Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan81). This
debate seems mostly theoretical, however, as the Muslim communities in Europe –
in particularWestern Europe – are quite differentiated and dispersed.Moreover, it is
not entirely clear from what kind of minority rights Muslims would benefit more
than they already do under the freedom of religion.82
Tolerance: A Clash of Fundamental Rights
The feeling among Muslims in Europe, and in particular Western Europe, is that
their Islamic identity is under a constant barrage of criticism and ridicule with im-
punity.83 The combination of hostility towards Islam and fear or dislike of Muslims
has become known as ‘Islamophobia’, which we will discuss in more detail below.
This trend has also been a cause of concern for European governments. For one, this
situation might cause young Muslims to radicalize since it emphasizes their alien-
ation from the European societies in which they live. But governments have also
been apprehensive that it might disrupt societal harmony and violate theMuslims’
freedom of religion. The question therefore arose whether tolerance should be en-
forced and, if so, how?84 This question was mostly phrased in terms of one of the
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fundamental rights embraced by the European states: equality and non-discrimina-
tion. Governments could – and they often did – take action in this field, especially in
the labour market, although it was not always successful.
But most public attention was geared to the other aspect of toleration: respect
and recognition. Regulating such basic forms of human behaviour and interaction
proved extremely difficult, however, due to another fundamental right: freedom of
opinion. Little could be done against the defamation and criticism of Islam since
these expressions pertained to the freedom of opinion and speech. Of course, this
freedom was not absolute, and insult, slander and hate speech are considered crim-
inal offences in most European jurisdictions. The issue here, however, is a principal
one: European laws protect people, not religions.85 From this point of view religions,
ideas, ideologies and all other abstractions remain subject to the freedomof opinion,
including criticism. But how far can one go in expressing one’s opinion with regard
to a religion in the knowledge that this will offend and hurt the faithful? The Eu-
ropean answer is: very far. The reason therefore is that the freedom of opinion and
expression is considered a corner stone of European democracies: only by continuous
critical debate can a democracy be sustained. This principle is enshrined in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights which says that the freedom of opinionmay be
limited only when that is “necessary in a democratic society”.86 The European Court
of Human Rights has interpreted this provision to mean that, in the interest of a
functioning democracy, freedom of expressionmust be allowed to the extent that it
may even “shock, disturb or offend”.87 In other words, the freedom of opinion and
expression is so important that it may override goodmanners or decency.
This explains the reluctance of European states to intervene in public and po-
litical discourses about Islam that were sometimes indeed shocking and offensive.
Criticizing or ridiculing religions, ideas or ideologies is not prohibited by law, even
if it is offensive to the adherents to those religions, ideas or ideologies. Only people
who are targeted are protected by the law. This distinction between protection of
people and their convictions shows in the difference between anti-Semitism and Is-
lamophobia. While in the case of anti-Semitism the criticism and abuse is directed
against Jews rather than Judaism, in Islamophopbia it is generally directed against
Islam rather than Muslims. Legally, this makes quite a difference, because persecu-
tionof those guilty of anti-Semitism is easier thanpersecuting thosewhodirect their
criticism, satire, abuse or hate speech against Islam.*
* The distinction between beliefs and believers is not always easy to make. In a case in the Netherlands
where a banner was hung out of a building with the text “Stop the cancer called Islam. We won’t
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In addition to the two fundamental rights – non-discrimination and freedom
of opinion – we need to add a third fundamental right to the equation: freedom of
religion. While Muslims in Europe may have to endure disproportional criticism of
their religion, they also experiencemore freedomof religion than theywouldhave in
most Muslim countries (this is perhaps more true in Western Europe than in East-
ern Europe, where the boards of the Muslim Communities keep a check on Islamic
doctrine). The freedom of religion in Europe allows Muslims to develop their own
interpretations of Islam, whether liberal or conservative. Many Muslim ‘puritans’
in Western Europe, in consequence, are critical of their countries of origin that, in
their opinion, are not ‘Islamic’ in a correct manner. Some of those countries would
not tolerate such views and enforce a state doctrine of Islam.Muslims in Europe, on
the other hand, enjoy the freedom of religion to live and manifest their religion in
ways they see fit. But while theymake use of that freedom, theymust also suffer the
consequences of another freedom that allows for criticism of that very same religion.
3. Wars and Terrorism
In the period under discussion here, Europe was confronted with twomajor violent
conflicts in which Islam allegedly played a role: the Yugoslavian civil wars and the
acts of terrorismbyMuslim extremists. In the followingwewill briefly discuss these
two conflicts with an emphasis on the question what role Muslims or Islam played
in them.
The YugoslavianWars
Yugoslavia, the kingdom of several Balkan nations since 1918ce, became a socialist
federal state of six republics under Marshall Tito after World War II. After Tito’s
death in 1980ce, the federal state of Yugoslavia began to unravel, and old grudges
and aspirations that had been suppressed in the previous decades emerged: Serbs in
Kosovo complained at the way they were treated by the Kosovan Albanians; Croatia
submit to Allah”, the Supreme Court ruled that the offensive remarks were directed towards Islam, not
Muslims, so that there was no criminal offence (Dutch Supreme Court: HR 10 maart 2009, LJN BF0655).
But in a similar case in the United Kingdom, however, concerning a banner with the text “Islam out of
Britain – Protect theBritish People”, theEnglish court ruled that the offencewas clearly directed against
Muslims (ECHR, Norwood vs UK, 16 Nov 2004).
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and Slovenia resented the fact that their income through tourismwas to be spent on
the poor regions elsewhere in the federacy; BosnianMuslimsdiscussed autonomyon
the basis of Islamic principles. In 1989 the newYugoslavian president,Milosevic, first
tried to revoke the autonomy of the federal nations but, realizing that he could not
accomplish that, switched to the notion of Greater Serbia. A break-up of Yugoslavia
would be allowed, he argued, as long as all territories where Serbs lived – including
those outside theborders of the republic of Serbia – remainedwithin aGreater Serbia.
When Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in 1991, Serbia claimed the Serb
territories in those lands and triggered a war that lasted from 1991 until 1995ce.
The main theatre of war was the territories in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina
where the three main populations, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim
Bosnians (‘Bosniaks’), had coexisted for centuries. The factions fought each other
but also formed alliances against each other. Muslims and Serbs teamed up against
Croats in Herzegovina, rival Muslim forces fought each other in north-west Bosnia,
Croats and Serbs fought against Muslims in central Bosnia. But the overall aim of
their respective armies and militias was to carve out a territory for each people (‘na-
tion’) to the exclusion of others who were forcibly removed. The Bosnian Muslims
were least successful in these ethnic-religious projects, and as a result constituted
the largest groupof refugees fromformerYugoslavia intoEurope. Finally, in 1995, the
Daytona peace accord settled the conflict by creating a complex government struc-
ture in a carved up Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1999, another war broke out between
Serbia and the autonomous state of Kosovo over the conflicts between the Ortho-
dox Serb andMuslim Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo. This conflict was settled with
military force by NATO.
The horrors of the resulting ethnic-religious cleansing were a brutal reminder
of those that had taken place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The need for a religious and ethnically pure state was apparently still there, and four
decades of strictly secular communist rule had not changed these aspirations. This
wasnot only the case inYugoslavia. InBulgaria, for instance, a policy ofBulgarianism
was adopted in the 1980s claiming that Bulgaria had always been a Christian state,
resulting in suppression of religious freedom and forced assimilation of theMuslim
communities to Slavic norms, including mandatory name change and a ban on
certain clothes and on any language other thanBulgarian.88This policy drove 370,000
Turkish Bulgarians to move to Turkey in 1985.89
The origins and developments of the Yugoslavian wars have been sketched here
in an admittedly simplisticmanner since theymerely serve as a general background
to describe the role and position of Muslims in this part of Europe, but also to raise
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the question that we for the purpose of this book are interested in: what was the role
of religion, and in particular Islam, in these conflicts? Many scholars and observers
have tried to analyse the causes of these wars and different opinions exist on the im-
portance of the role of religion therein. To Samuel Huntington, this conflict was an
example to prove his point that religion plays a major role in conflicts between civi-
lizations.90 Some have compared the Yugoslavian war with the conflicts in Lebanon
and Northern Ireland, in which “it is obvious that religion has not been a purely
passive onlooker of the war, but has been actively involved and engaged in it.”91 But
others argued that the main conflict was of an ethnic or nationalist nature and that
religionwas only an indirect aspect of that conflict92 or that religionhadbeen abused
for political purposes.93
Given the fact that religion was of little importance in the daily lives of most
Yugoslavians prior to 1990ce, a depiction of the conflict as a collision of religious
communities seems incorrect. However, the conflation of ethnicity and religion
into a national identity proved a volatile cocktail.94 And even if the secular elites
had little affiliation with the religious part of their identity, the religious rhetoric
that was being used greatly influenced the rank and file in the conflict.95 Religion
provided the different nationalisms with a religiously mystical aura: the Croation
and Serbian warriors carried Catholic and Orthodox crosses, respectively, and the
BosnianMuslimswoulduse thebattle cry “Allahu akbar”.96Andall sides felt theneed
to accompany their acts of ethnic cleansingwith thedestructionof religious artefacts
and buildings of their adversaries, as they were considered the main symbols of the
opponent’s identity.97
In the case of the Muslims, however, the conflation of religion and ethnicity
was not as conspicuous as it was with others. The Serbs could clearly identify with
Orthodoxy, and the Croats with Catholicism, but the ‘Muslims’ – as they became
known – identified with various ethnic and national identities: Bosnian, Albanian,
Bulgarian, Turkish. ‘Muslim nationalism’ therefore took on different forms: Islam
played a larger role to the Bosnian Muslims, while ethnicity was more important
to the (predominantlyMuslim) Albanians.98 Among the BosnianMuslims there had
since the late 1970s already been an Islamic revival or Islamic renaissance, and this
trend intensified during the war.99 The leader of the Bosnian Muslims during the
wars, Izetbegovic, was one of themain proponents of that trend, and he had written
extensively on the relationship between Islam and the state (writings which were
interpreted by some as a call for an independent and Islamic Bosnia).100
Religion, therefore, including Islam, was a powerful factor in the Yugoslavian
wars. However, it cannot be seen in isolation from other factors, such as ethnicity,
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nationalism, economics or politics. From this point of view one could indeed argue
that the wars in Yugoslavia were neither civil, ethnic nor religious wars – they
were all of them combined.101 Nevertheless, religion remained strongly connected
with nationalism, and the sentiment of a religious-ethnic ‘pure’ state has always
been strong since the nineteenth century, and possibly will remain so in the future,
although itmay be pursued by differentmeans. An example of such differentmeans
is the ‘Millennium Cross’ in Macedonia, a 66-metre high cross built between 2002
and 2008ce on amountain top overlooking the capital Skopje. The cross – the largest
in theworld –was funded by theMacedonianOrthodoxChurch and the government
to celebrate two thousand years of Christianity. In a country with a third of the
population being Muslim, it is not surprising that this construction is interpreted
as a symbol to emphasize the Christian identity of the state102 – just as Bulgaria had
done thirty years earlier.
Extremism and Terrorism
Theother formof violence that involved IslamandMuslims inEurope after 1950ce is
the attacks on civilians by Muslim extremists in the first decade of the twenty-first
century. These attacks had shaken Europe’s sense of confidence and safety and set
in motion an unprecedented security effort. The focus in trying to understand this
Muslim anger – “why do they hate us?” – was at first primarily pinpointing the re-
ligion of the perpetrators since that was how these people explained their actions.103
Other researchers, however, argued that the radicalization of Muslim youth in the
West was primarily rooted in external circumstances and that there were more rea-
sons for Muslim anger beside innate Islamic anger or militancy itself.104 It became
clear that there were specific grievances amongMuslim youth in Europe other than
a general hatred for the West and Western lifestyles. The source of their resentment
was not what the West is, but what the West does. The Western actions that caused
resentment among EuropeanMuslims were, on the one hand, Western military in-
terventions inMuslim-majority countries (or the lack of such intervention, as is the
case in the Syrian civil war that started in 2011) but more so, on the other hand, the
negative attitude of the European native population vis-à-vis the Muslims in Eu-
rope.
The fact that European governments could not – and often did not want to – act
because the defamations and criticisms of Islamwere considered part of the freedom
of expression merely added to the general feeling among Muslims in Europe that
theywere left unprotected frompublic scorn and abuse. The other development that
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causedgrievances amongmanyof theWesternEuropeanMuslimswas their position
at the lower end of the social-economical ladder.105 They experienced higher unem-
ployment rates, under-representation inhigher jobs andoffices, over-representation
in prison. Discrimination – whether real or perceived – was experienced not only in
education and employment, but also socially. Muslims in Europe, and in particular
in Western Europe, felt ‘under siege’.106
The combination of all these factors had led to feelings of alienation, exclusion
anddisenfranchisement amongEuropeanMuslims.Whether this sensationwas jus-
tified is not important – the perception was already enough to make it real.107 This
psychological factor is of critical importance in understanding the motives for ter-
rorist acts by EuropeanMuslims, even those whowere well educated and frommid-
dle class families.108 Their sense of not belonging and exclusion arguably drove these
youths into the ideology and acts of jihadi terrorism. Of course, these explanations
merely provide the general contours of what is conducive for Muslims to radical-
ize, because in the end it is the particular psychology and choices of each individual
Muslim that determines whether he or she will actually embark on that process.
The awareness of sources other than Islam feeding into Muslim anger brought
about a change in policy among Western European governments:109 in addition to
security and judicial measures, the key word for the counter strategy became ‘inte-
gration’. Radicalization of Muslim youth might be prevented, so ran the argument,
if they were made part of European society to the extent that they actually felt a
sense of belonging. The German intelligence service was most explicit in doing so
when it defined its new strategy in the catch phrase “successful integration equals
prevention of extremism and terrorism.”110 Hence a flurry of activities financed by
security services, like social programmes for school dropouts, intellectual empower-
mentof those consideredvulnerable to radical rhetoric, trainingof young cadres, and
social reinforcement of neighbourhoods. Such initiatives were taking place mainly
in countries like England, the Netherlands and Spain, and to a much lesser extent
in Germany and France.111 Often cooperation was sought with local mosques and Is-
lamic organizations. In some instances municipal councils approached imams and
scholars (in)directly inorder to influence Islamicdiscourse among theirMuslimcon-
stituencies.112
The fact that security agencies were actively engaging with domains that tradi-
tionally belonged to the civic and social realm also created confusion and suspicion
among Muslims. Questions were raised about money made available by the am-
ple funds of security agencies for social events or discussion seminars on issues like
civil responsibility. While such involvement usually takes place behind the scenes,
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it took on more explicit forms, as when the German intelligence service established
the ‘ConfidenceWorkingGroup’ with the purpose of engaging in dialoguewith rep-
resentatives ofMuslim organizations in Germany. As a youngDutchMoroccan once
said in a publicmeeting about integration in 2008, “Theymay talk about ourwelfare,
but that is only because we are a security concern.”113 This development has been
called the ‘securitization of Islam’, meaning that Islam is considered a national se-
curity issue and as such affects all kinds of laws, policies and measures relating to
immigration and integration.114
4. Europe and Its ‘Neighbourhood’
In the previous chapters we discussed numerous forms of diplomatic interactions
between European and Muslim sovereigns and states. Charlemagne sent envoys to
BaghdadandplottedwithMoorishgovernors against the caliph inCordoba,Western
European nations sent ambassadors to Istanbul to secure first economic and later
also political interests. This process continued in the twentieth century, but on
a different scale: it was not individual European states but the European Union
which identified a Mediterranean and North African (MENA) ‘neighbourhood’ that
it wanted to remain as stable as possible. At the same time, the European Unionwas
involved in a seemingly endless negotiation with Turkey about its membership of
the European Union.
Exporting Stability?
It was in the European interest to create a stable environment at its borders for a
number of reasons: wars or unrest had to be prevented from infecting the European
Union zone, economic refugees fromAsia and Africa had to be stopped from illegally
entering, and the European Union was to benefit from trade with its neighbours.
A set of political and economic measures was developed to create stable ‘neighbour-
hoods’ in the former communist eastern European countries and in the Mediter-
ranean and North African region.
In November 1995ce, on the date exactly 900 years after Pope Urban II called
for the first Crusade, a new phase of relations was heralded by the historic partner-
ship between the 15 EU members states and 12 states from North Africa (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia), the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian
Authority, Israel), as well as Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.115 One of these measures
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was the so-called ‘Association’ agreements with individual countries in which eco-
nomic advantages were promised in exchange for good governance. This so-called
‘Europe-MediterraneanPartnership’was lopsided:while theNorthAfricanandMid-
dle Eastern countries had considerable economic interests in cooperation with the
EU, the European side was predominantly concerned with the ‘3 Ds’: the lack of
democracy, the explosive demography, and the lagging development in these coun-
tries.
Islam played a very limited role in these interactions and contacts.116 This is re-
markable, given its role in social and political developments on both sides of the
Mediterranean. Its absence is understandable from the European perspective, how-
ever, given the fact that the EU has no competence over religious affairs117 and that
Islam had become a highly sensitive issue that better remained untouched.118 Even
the formally established EU-Arab dialogue that was officially “to encourage under-
standing between cultures and exchanges between civil societies”119 was of little use
in this respect, because it gradually dissolved into a differentiation of policies and bi-
lateral contacts between individual European and Arab states.120 Nevertheless, prac-
tices and initiatives were developed on an informal level that foster dialogue ‘with
Islam’ within the framework of intercultural and interfaith dialogue of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership.121
Still, Islam, and in particular political Islam as it manifested itself in the Middle
East and later also in Turkey, was a source of concern for Europe, firstly because the
volatile mix of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and migration was considered a
threat to Europe’s security,122 but also because of the anxiety about the direction in
which the trend of political Islam was to go: would it develop into a political tradi-
tion similar to that of the ChristianDemocrats in Europe, or into a theocratic regime
which might be hostile to Europe just like Iran’s Khomeini had proclaimed Amer-
ica as the ‘great Satan’? Even though Europe advocated democracy as the primary
system of good governance, it was veryweary of whatmight be called theHitler syn-
drome: the possibility that the Islamists in Arab countries would participate in the
democratic process in order to gain access to power and subsequently dismantle the
democratic order and establish their own Islamic regime.
This concern made the European Union prefer to support undemocratic but
stable regimes rather than pushing for a potentially unstable democracy. It has been
argued that this position was detrimental to European credibility to those in the
Middle East and North Africa who genuinely advocated democracy, and was the
cause of the development of anti-Western sentiments. President George Bush was
one of the first to admit this in 2003, in a statement that otherwise received little
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attention: “[s]ixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack
of freedom in the Middle East did not make us safe … because in the long run,
stability can not be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East
remains a placewhere freedomdoes not flourish, itwill remain a place of stagnation,
resentment, and violence ready for export.”123
This recognition prompted American and European endeavours to promote de-
mocracy and freedom in the Middle Eastern region. In the eyes of many Muslims,
thatpolicy failedmiserablywith theviolence that erupted in Iraq after theAmerican-
British invasion in 2003, and the Western refusal to recognize Hamas after its land-
slide victory in the 2004 Palestinian elections. In the Muslim world one points to
double standards at work in Western foreign policies when promoting democracy
for some while denying it to others.124 As we have seen, this bitterness is shared by
Western EuropeanMuslimswith regard to the foreign policies of their national gov-
ernments and the ensuing resentment among Muslims provided new recruiting
ground for Islamic extremism.125
The Arab Spring revolts of 2011 finally brought about the situation that had for
so long been dreaded by Europe: the toppling of dictators and the establishment
of forms of popular rule that was by many heralded as ‘democracy’. At the time of
writing the outcome of these new political constellations is still unknown as only
few appear to havemaintained some kind of stability, while others have succumbed
to the feared situation of chaos and violence. In Turkey, on the other hand, the Is-
lamist AK Parti has had a huge majority since 2002, and has managed to implement
a religiously motivated policy within the strict secular system of Turkey although
opposition to the alleged autocratic rule of the AK Parti is growing. The eastern and
southern Mediterranean region, therefore, has produced a distinctive Islamic polit-
ical and social voice that Europe will have to deal with. So far, the European attitude
has been one of acceptance and cautious involvement in the political processes in
these countries.
Importing Extremism?
In the aftermath of 9/11, Europe felt threatened by ‘Islam’ from two sides: the (some-
times violently) anti-Western sentiments in the Muslim world, as well as the rising
orthodoxy amongMuslimswithin Europe, on the one hand, and the radicalism and
terrorism among some of them, on the other hand. The connection between the
Muslims inside and outside Europe became one of the main concerns of the Euro-
pean security agencies. However, severing any link between the two was an impos-
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sible task in a world dominated by globalism and transnationalism where Europe’s
Muslim population had access to ideas, people and organizations abroad by means
of modern media.126 Insofar as Muslims from outside tried to influence their sisters
and brethren in Europe, such endeavors were not so much undertaken by govern-
ments of Muslim countries vis-à-vis their nationals in Europe,127 but much more
by foreign Muslim individuals and organizations. For instance, many mosques in
Western Europe recruited imams from abroad, mainly because they did not have
their own imamsand lacked the ability to train their imamswithinEurope, and such
recruitment was permitted as a matter of freedom of religion. The result of this ar-
rangement was that Western European Muslim communities remained dependent
on their countries of origin, and that they were often exposed to religious leaders
who had little knowledge of the European context.128
Another situation that yielded unexpected results was the asylum granted to
Muslim foreigners who were persecuted in their homeland for extremism and had
fled to Europe, and who could often not be extradited if torture or the death penalty
awaited them in their countries of origin. Suchwas the case, for instance,withmem-
bers of the Muslim Brothers who had found refuge in Europe.129 Many of them
were conservative and politically opinionated, initiating discussions among Euro-
peanMuslimyouth in support of Islamist oppositionmovements in theMiddle East
and of the various wars in Bosnia, Algeria, Chechnya and Afghanistan. They encour-
aged the viewpoint that EuropeanMuslim youths belong to the worldwideMuslim
community orumma, and that itwas their duty todefend this community, evenwith
violence if need be. This vision drew the conflicts from outside into Europe.Western
Europe became a target of Middle Eastern radical Islam with the spill-over of the
Algerian civil war into France in 1994. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the in-
volvement of European nations in the 2003war in Iraq further globalized the theatre
of operations into EuropeEurope.130
The main influence on European Muslims appears to come from foreign Mus-
lim organizations.131 Many of these organizations see it as their duty to educate and
inspire EuropeanMuslims in the ‘true’ spirit of Islam, not unlike the way Christian
missionary organizations go out to help and supportminority Christians inMuslim
lands. While these organizations are mostly concerned with the spiritual wellbe-
ing of Muslims in Europe, they sometimes also gear them towards an isolationist
position vis-à-vis their European environment, or even towards radicalism. In the
particular case of the Yugoslavian civil war of 1991–1995, the plight of the Bosnian
Muslims made a great impact on Middle Eastern Muslims, prompting not only an
influx of military volunteers during the war, but also after the war humanitarian
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support and strenuous efforts by Islamic organizations from Turkey, Saudi Arabia
and Iran to ‘re-Islamize’ the secularized Bosnian Muslims.132 While their impact at
first may have been small,133 we have seen that concerns have been expressed about
the increase in Middle Eastern-style mosques and garments, and Middle eastern-
style orthodox views on gender and non-Muslims.134
But not all Islamic-political sentiments were imported. The new generation of
European Muslims developed their own opinions and ideas. The Syrian civil war
that erupted in 2011 and the establishment of a ‘caliphate’ in northern Iraq by the
Islamic State organization (known as ‘IS’) in 2014 were illustrative for events that
took place abroad but greatly enticedMuslim youth in Europe. It showedhowmuch
European Muslims are engaged with the political turbulences in the Middle East,
and how these events reflect on their lives in Europe. All these foreign elements
contributed to the complexity of and growing concerns about Islam in Europe.
These concerns have been compounded with the new development since 2011 of
hundreds of EuropeanMuslimyouth joining the ranks of extremist Islamicmilitant
organizations in their jihad against the Syrian regime, and some even taking part
in the atrocious wars of conquest undertaken by the IS. The net result of all these
developments was that they added fuel to the already existing concern that linked
‘Islam’ with ‘security’.
Turkey and the European Union
Turkeywas alreadyamemberof theCouncil ofEurope (whichalso includes countries
like Russia and Azerbaijan) and had applied for EU membership as early as 1959.135
The main obstacle, however, was the Turkish human rights track record and lack
of democracy. Turkey’s prime-minister Tansu Çiller argued in 1995 that a delay in
granting Turkey membership of the EU would not only be considered an insult to
the Turks, but would also play into the hands of the Islamist Refah Parti (the prede-
cessor to the AK Parti). According to Çiller, these Islamists would surely take Turkey
away from Europe and further into the fold of the Middle East: “Now it’s me versus
them [the Turkish Islamists – MB]. I represent Westernization, secular government,
liberalization, the link with Europe.”136 In 1999, the European governments offered
Turkey the concrete prospect of fullmembership of theEU, and the two sides entered
into protracted negotiations.
But then the political landscape in Turkey changed drastically: the Islamist AK
Parti won landslide victories in the elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011. Çiller’s dark
forebodings did not come true, however, because the Turkish government under
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the AK Parti has, more than any of its secular predecessors, actively campaigned
for Turkish membership of the European Union. This may seem remarkable, given
the generally assumed friction between Islamic politics and ‘the West.’ But it has
also been argued that the AK Parti aimed at linking up with European politics
where secularism enjoyed a happy marriage with a strong tradition of Christian
Democratic politics. This might have been very appealing to an Islamic party in a
country where secularismwas so strictly enforced that religiouslymotivated parties
had been dismantled and outlawed.137
When Turkey under AK Parti leadership was indeed making progress in fulfill-
ing the requirements for EU membership, a debate erupted among the European
partners about Turkish membership. Proponents held that fulfilment of require-
ments should lead to membership since that was promised, and that Turkey would
greatly contribute to the European economy, while opponents back-pedalled on the
prospect of Turkish membership for three different reasons. One was political: ad-
mission to the EU would make Turkey with over 70 million inhabitants the largest
of all the EU states and that would seriously change the balance of power within
the EU. Another reason for opposition was concern about security because the ad-
mission of Turkey would extend the borders of the EU to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran
and Syria and by consequence to a zone rife with conflict and instability. These op-
ponents thought it wiser to keep Turkey as the buffer state between the EU and Asia
Minor. An interesting aspect of these two arguments is that theyneglect the fact that
Turkey, as a member of NATO since 1952, has been co-responsible for the defence of
Europe, and has been sharing military and national security details relating to Eu-
rope ever since.
The third reason for opposition to Turkey as an EUmember state – even if it were
to fulfil the formal conditions for membership – was of a cultural nature, arguing
that Turkey was not ‘European’.138 We mentioned before the remark by a EU com-
missioner that the admittance of Turkey to the EU would render the liberation of
Vienna in 1683 “in vain”. This imagery was magnified with the concern that, once
admitted to the EU, millions of Turks would enter the EU looking for work and, in
consequence, raise Islam to the status of the largest religion in Europe. This was re-
butted in 2002 by the EuropeanCommission’s director general for enlargement,who
pointedout that theEU“isnot a clubofChristianpeoples” and thatmembershipwas
based on political, not religious or cultural principles.139 But the former president of
France and then head of the convention working on the EU’s constitution, Valerie
Giscard d’Estaing, replied that Turkey was “not a European country” and that its
admittance to the EUwouldmean “the end of the EU”.140
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The Turks themselves did not share these cultural arguments against their par-
ticipation in theEU. ForTurkey, Europe represented apolitical and economic cooper-
ation, not a religious or cultural unity. The alleged ‘Christian’ identity of Europewas
no cause for concern or debate in Turkey in that it might lose its Turkish orMuslim
identity by joining the EU. Of the approximately 5 million Turks living in Europe,
more than half perceived the EU as an economic integration project, and only 20 per
cent believed that the EU is a “Christian club”.141 Only the AK Parti used a moderate
Islamic discourse, but merely to present itself as a bridge between Christian Europe
andMuslim Asia andMiddle East.
International Actions against ‘Defamation of Islam’
Inparallel to theseEuropean endeavours thatweredirectly related to its border areas,
Europe also had to dealwith the effects of globalized politics. Europeanparticipation
in military interventions in Muslim lands could have repercussions at home, just
like incidents and politics at home in Europe might affect Muslim lands far away.
These exchanges took place on numerous levels, ranging from the Internet to meet-
ing rooms of the United Nations. Although Europe’s image in the Muslim world
was slightly better than that of the United States, several incidents (in particular the
Rushdie affair in 1982, the Danish cartoons in 2006 and the Dutch film Fitna in 2008)
were quite damaging. While the United States launched a new strategy of ‘public
diplomacy’ after 9/11, the European Union tried to engage itsMuslim neighbours in
dialogue, as we have seen above.
But while Europe tried to mend the fences by improving its image, the Muslim
perception of the West being anti-Islamic became so strong that Muslim countries,
united in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), initiated diplomatic pres-
sure to stop what they consideredWestern Islamophobia. The OIC did so by actively
campaigning for an international ban on the defamation of religion that would
force European countries to re-introduce the blasphemy laws that they were in the
process of gradually abolishing. This initiative started in 1999 when the OIC intro-
duced a resolution in theUnitedNationsHumanRights Commission142 demanding
that “defamation of Islam” had to be combatted. This resolution was passed, and
although it had no legal effect (resolutions in international law are non-binding
statements) it was definitely a diplomatic victory for the OIC. The resolution was
then passed again every year, although its title changed from defamation of ‘Islam’
to defamation of ‘religion.’ This agenda was pushed ever more forcefully after 2001
and again after the 2002 report on European Islamophobia,143 the Danish cartoons
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(in 2006) and the Dutch film Fitna (in 2008). From 2005 onwards, the resolution was
also passed annually by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
The ‘Western’ nations – mainly represented by Europe, North America and Aus-
tralia – did not budge, holding on to the freedom of opinion and expression, but
the situation was diplomatically quite uncomfortable, especially when the levels of
Islam-critique in theWest acquired forms that theWesterngovernments themselves
disagreed with but had to allow as a matter of freedom of expression. Even though
these instances were minor, and often the initiative of a single person (think of the
Burn a Quran Day in 2010, and the Internet film about the prophet Muhammad in
2012), they received wide attention in the Muslim world, fuelling the image of an
Islam-bashing West. In 2011, a diplomatic compromise was reached on the issue of
defamation: the Muslim countries united in the OIC agreed that blasphemy laws
were not needed in Europe to protect Islam, but that they would jointly combat in-
tolerance, discrimination and violence that was based on religion.144
III. Virtual Islam
We started this book with the premise that in order to understand Islam in Europe,
we need to understand the situation in Europe at each particular time, and how ‘Eu-
rope’ in that period was conceptualized by Europeans. With regard to Europe since
the 1950s, it has been argued that Europeans have continued their construction of
a common legacy or identity that has been called the “grand narrative of Europe”.145
According toTalal Asad, Europe “is ideologically constructed in such away thatMus-
lim immigrants can not be satisfactorily be represented in it.”146 What, then, is this
construction, this grand narrative?
With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the ‘Question of Europe’ emerged: the de-
bate on European identity, sovereignty and loyalty within the setting of the larger
Europe. The debate on the essentials of this ‘Europeanness’ focused primarily on po-
litical and judicial institutions, bypassing the cultural and religious dimensions of
European societies.147 Leading intellectuals in this debate, such as JurgenHabermas,
Charles Taylor, Alain Touraine andWill Kymlicka, who tried to eliminate differences
and forms of ‘otherness’ with notions like multiculturalism and pluriformity, dis-
cussed these issues in terms of citizenship, group recognition and rights.148
While these debateswere confined to the realmof political-legal discourse, a par-
allel debate took place within the domain of religious-cultural discourse. In these
debates the notion of Europeanness as a common civilization or culture was in-
troduced, often phrased in religious terms like ‘Judeo-Christian civilization’. This
idea was not new, but tapped into the nineteenth-century concept of ‘Europe-as-
Christendom’ thatwas setwithin thekeyof ‘Otherness’: “the constructionof the idea
of Europe was defined by means of the ‘Others’ which it excludes, and vice versa.”149
An interesting aspect of this religious-cultural identity is that by the late twentieth
century it had incorporated secularism as an integral part of that European civiliza-
tion. Even though the European was identified on the basis of his Judeo-Christian
heritage, secularism was conceived as a next progressive step in the European civi-
lizational narrative. The Other was then identified as being not secular.150
In the followingwewill elaboratehow this European self-perception reflected on
Muslims in Europe. We will be discussing the mechanisms of Islam-criticism and
of the negative image that Muslims generally have in Europe, but we must keep
in mind that in doing so we are talking about images and perceptions. This does
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not necessarily reflect reality. Yes, European Muslims may suffer from discrimina-
tion, but they are not second-class citizens as was the case in previous centuries;
they have access to education and are represented in high positions in the judiciary,
politics and government and gradually also in business, the media and academe.
Yes, the majority of European public opinion may have a negative impression of
Islam, but the European Muslim enjoys a religious freedom that is unparalleled
in most Muslim majority countries. Yes, many Europeans may have qualms about
Muslims and their un-European cultures, but Europe has embraced parts of these
same cultures in a manner that can be best described as neo-Turquerie: interior
decoration items like lamps and furniture with Moroccan and Afghan designs be-
came fashionable, just like the waterpipe cafes and certain forms of clothes like the
baggy pants and embroidered long-sleeved shirts, and both pop and classic mu-
sicians use Arabic or Pakistani music or collaborate with musicians from Muslim
lands.
1. Images of Islam andMuslims
Criticism and Islamophobia
We have seen that Islam and Muslims have been under heavy criticism since the
1990s, and in particular since 9/11. The sentiments, causes and justifications behind
this criticism are complex and often intertwined.
First, criticismof Islamhas a longstandingEuropean tradition, aswehave seen in
the previous chapters. But from the nineteenth century onwards Europe developed
a tradition of criticism of religion in general, and Christianity already had its fair
share of criticism and abuse, first in the nineteenth century and then again in the
1960s and 1970s. In European majority public and political discourse, religion does
not enjoy a status of prestige, as we have seen. The manifestation of Islam through
dress, behaviour, and manners of speech as is manifested in Western, and to a lesser
extent in Eastern Europe therefore runs counter to the dominant European notions
of the position of religion in the public domain.
The criticism of Islam from this perspective is mostly in line with the earlier
forms of criticism of religion that consider it backward, irrational and oppressive.
Some critics of Islam are therefore not necessarily targeting Islam as such but are
critical of religion in general, and they are concerned with the fact that in a quite
secularized Europe a new community is manifesting itself with a distinct religious
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identity. Other critics of Islam can be found among the devout Christians who are
continuing the centuries-old theological criticism of Islam as a ‘wrong’ religion. But
while the secular Europeans may distrust Muslims for being violent and fanatical,
religious Europeans are less inclined to think in that way about Muslims.151
Another source of criticism was related to social practices of EuropeanMuslims,
for instance their high rate of involvement in crime or their alleged lack of integra-
tion in European society. While these issues in themselves were indeed reason for
concern (crime rates among the youth of immigrant origin – not just Muslims –
were disproportionately high, and people of immigrant origin – again, not justMus-
lims – tended to isolate themselves in communities that had poor socio-economic
prospects), they were often linked to Islam. In the case of Moroccan or Pakistani
young criminals, for instance, their behaviour was explained by the fact that they
wereMuslim and that Islam as a violent religion instigated this behaviour. This was
a typical issue of the homo Islamicus: the actions of ‘Muslims’ were explained as be-
ingmotivated by Islam. These arguments were generally dismissed by the academic
andmost of the political community, butwere recurring themes in public discourse.
Quite a few new political parties have arisen since the 1990s that have adopted this
view by equating their opposition to further immigration in their countries with
strong anti-Islam rhetoric.152 Their popularitymay be seen as a reflection of such be-
liefs among the population.
A third important reason for the criticism of Islam was the many acts of intol-
erance and violence that were committed by Muslims in the name of Islam within
but even more so outside Europe during late twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies: Islamic regimes like those of Pakistan, Iran and Saudi-Arabia,movements like
the Taliban, Shabab or Boko Haram, the replacement of the secular PLO by the Is-
lamicHamas in Palestine, and the suicide attacks all over the world, including those
in Europe. Islam, so it seemed to the European observer, once it becomes part of a
political or societal discourse, is prone to becoming violent or oppressive. The man-
ifestations in Europe of intolerance and violence in the name of Islam were being
interpreted as dark forebodings of what was being witnessed in many parts of the
Muslimworld.
Criticism and anxiety about Islam and Muslims were therefore often rooted in
practical and tangible issues that were of public concern – a resurgence of funda-
mentalism, immigration, terrorism, loss ofnational identity –but inmany instances
tended to be focused on Islam and Muslims. This focus reached such proportions
in the late 1990s that a new word was coined for it: Islamophobia. The near impos-
sibility of defining this term – is it racism, religious intolerance, an equivalent of
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anti-Semitism? – has put many scholars to work.153 Suffice it here to say that some
define Islamophobia in terms of a behavioural attitude (hostility toward Muslims),
while othersdefine it as anemotion (unreasonable fear of IslamandMuslims). Islam-
ophobia is classedwith xenophobia and anti-Semitismbut, aswe have seen,whereas
the latter two target people (foreigners and Jews, respectively), Islamophobia com-
bines anti-Muslim with anti-Islam sentiments, which makes legal action against
this form of defamation difficult.
In addition to adismissive ordiscriminatory attitude towards aMuslimforbeing
somehow inferior (the centuries-old image of the irrational, fanatical Other), the
late twentieth-century Islamophobia has added a second component: the fear of
the compatriot Muslim as a potential threat (either because he cannot or refuses
to integrate, or because he may pose a security threat). While the first attitude puts
theMuslim in a very uncomfortable position shared bymanyminorities in Europe,
the latter attitude puts the Muslim in a corner fromwhich there is no escape but to
disappear, either by leaving, or by dissolving (assimilating) into the native society.
The call for assimilation shows itself in numerous ways: Muslims should not hold
foreignnationality (in several instances impossible since somecountriesdonot allow
nationalities to be revoked by their citizens); should pledge their allegiance to their
new state by a variety of means (including citizenship tests which, as an aside, are
failed bymost native citizens who have taken them for fun); and, most importantly,
should not show theirMuslim-ness (hence the fierce objections to the headscarf and
the mosques with ‘Oriental’ architecture). The extreme consequence of these views
on assimilation is that Muslims should give up their religion altogether – a liberal
version of the forced conversion of former times, and although hardly expressed in
those terms we see time and time again how Muslims who openly denounce Islam
are embraced by the critics of Islam.154
The ‘ThirdWave’
While in previous centuries theMuslim as the European Other was often physically
situated in a far-away place, that situation has altered dramatically for Western Eu-
rope since the 1970s. The comingofmigrantswho adhered to or identifiedwith Islam
was not merely a confrontation with the Other, but also reinvigorated the image of
Islam as a religion that is out for conquest. According to scholars like Bernard Lewis
and Bassam Tibi one needs to conceive themassive migration of Muslims to Europe
as a “thirdwave” thatmayprove successful after the first two ‘waves’were repulsed at
thebattles of Poitiers (732ce) andVienna (1683).155The imagery of the two ‘waves’may
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be psychologically powerful but, as we have seen in previous chapters, is historically
debatable. In the case of the battle of Poitiers in 732ce, historians have pointed out
that the defeated Muslims were not an invasion army out to conquer the heartland
of Europe, but one of themany raiding armies that for decades had crossed the Pyre-
nees for loot and spoils – a practice they continued even after the defeat at Poitiers.156
In the case of the siege of Vienna in 1683, we have seen that the ‘Europe’ as a repre-
sentation of a Christian commonwealth that was saved from the Turk at the battle
of Vienna in 1683 is a myth that was created retrospectively.157
The image of Islamic conquest is the source not only of fear for some Euro-
peans, but also of hope for some devoutMuslims. The famousMuslim scholar Yusuf
Qaradawi remarked in 2007 in a televised interview: “Perhaps the next conquest [of
Europe] will be the conquest of dacwa [preaching] and ideas. There is no need for con-
quest to be with the sword. We may conquer these countries without armies. We
want armies of preachers and teachers.”158 From a missionary point of view, these
remarks are understandable, but from the perspective of the current European sit-
uation, they merely confirm the notion of the Muslim’s hunger for conquest. This
fear was reinforced – or justified, according to some – by the Muslim extremist at-
tacks of 9/11 in 2001, and the consecutive attacks in European cities. The notions of a
‘thirdwave’ and of an aggressive Islam that is out to ‘take over’ tap into the European
collective memory of a perpetual conflict with Islam.
Although the notion of ‘taking over’ seems to reverberate through the centuries
of European-Muslim relations, it has distinctly different meanings to the modern
as opposed to the pre-modern European. To the pre-modern European ‘taking over’
meant the fear of actual conquest by Muslim armies. To the modern European, on
the other hand, the notion of ‘taking over’ is much more nebulous. Military con-
quest is surely not a realistic option, but other forms of domination apparently are
to be considered. To some, the notion of an Islam that ‘takes over’ is represented by
the physical presence ofMuslims in Europe and, consequently, the values they bring
with them. As early as in 1995 the secretary general of the trans-Atlantic military
coalition NATO argued that Islamic “fundamentalism” had replaced Communism
as the new threat to European “civilization”.159 Many more such warnings and anx-
ieties were to follow, whereby the allegedly anti-European tendencies among Mus-
lims in Europe were often directly connected with similar sentiments in Muslim
countries outside Europe. The threat was therefore not only from outside Europe,
but also fromwithin.
But what, then, is this threat? Since it cannot be the physical presence of Mus-
lims since their numbers are so small – except in certain cities where they live in
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concentrated numbers – it must be what they stand for: Islam. We must there-
fore rephrase the question ‘is Islam a threat to Europe’ into: does the presence of
Muslims in Europe represent a presence of Islamic values that contradict or even
threaten European values? And, if so, do these values represent an impediment to
integration or, worse, a set of values that Muslims want to impose on their en-
vironment? We have already seen that some authors warn that this is indeed the
case.160 European politicians have been elected on the basis of this view. The prob-
lem, however, is an assessment of these values – both the Islamic and European
values: what exactly do we mean by them? We will discuss this in the next sec-
tion.
A Conflict of Values
It would be too simplistic to reduce the values upheld by Muslims to the tenets of
Islamic theology.Wehave seen in theprevious sections thatMuslims inEurope – and
anywhere else, for that matter – are not necessarily believers. Neither is everything
a Muslim does inspired by Islam or in accordance with Islamic orthodoxy, nor is
everything that Islam prescribes adhered to by Muslims. On the other hand, there
are Muslims in Europe who claim that they strictly adhere to precisely these tenets.
But then again, they differ among each other on the correct interpretation of these
tenets.161 And what European Muslims actually hold to be Islamic rules or tenets
may very well differ from those upheld by Islamic doctrine. It is therefore almost
impossible to give definitions or general overviews of ‘Islamic values’ that may or
may not conflict with European values.
Rather than trying to define the Islamic values that Muslims in Europe adhere
to, wemight ask ourselves what European values are allegedly violated by European
Muslims in the name of Islam. In this approach it is helpful to make use of the two
aforementioned sets of European values: political-legal, and religious-cultural. The
political-legal values, such as democracy, liberty, equality, rule of law, are at the core
ofmodernEuropean legal andpolitical systems. The religious-cultural values, on the
other hand, are at the core of what is considered by many to be a European identity.
Acknowledging that these two sets of values arenot entirely clear in their definitions,
they do provide claritywhen discussing the confrontationwith Islamic values, as we
will do now.
European political-legal values are elaborated in political systems aswell as in le-
gal systemswhere they are enshrined in constitutions and in human rights treaties,
in particular the European Convention on Human Rights. How do the many dif-
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ferent Islamic theological values as practised by European Muslims relate to these
European political values? On the one hand, we may observe numerous practices
justified by Islam that are considered contrary to European values, such as gen-
der segregation, the position of women, face covering, the attitude towards non-
believers. At the same time, however, it is precisely a political-legal value like lib-
erty that allows people to behave in accordance with their own wishes or rules,
even if others find them reprehensible. This applies also to the notion of equality
that grants every person the right to enjoy an equal position before the law, but
does not determine what that person should do with that position. Equality and
liberty allow people to put themselves in a position that may be considered un-
equal and illiberal. In short, European political-legal values, including the rule of
law and the notion of equality, provide the freedom to be different.162 It is there-
fore not surprising that European Muslims support European political-legal val-
ues.163 Muslims may be angry about discrimination and Islamophobia, but they are
in need of the basic freedoms and liberties provided by the European political-legal
system in order to maintain their religious identity. It is the legal and political val-
ues of Europe that grant Muslims the freedom to be what they want to be: Mus-
lims.
Theanxiety aboutEuropeanvalues thatmay conflictwith Islamshould therefore
not be sought inMuslims’ alleged rejection of European political-legal values them-
selves, but their use (or abuse) of these values. An example is the notion of sharia.
Based on what we know from research so far, we may tentatively assert that the de-
vout and orthodox among European Muslims who want to live in accordance with
the rules of Islam (‘sharia’) focus on four domains: religious rituals, family law, fi-
nancial transactions, and interaction with the non-Muslim environment.164 While
most of these sharia rules as being practised by European Muslims are generally
allowed within a European context of legal liberty, there is distinct opposition in
Europe – mostly in Western Europe – to such practices. The reasons for this oppo-
sition are manifold. Some argue that a separate infrastructure of religious rules, in
particular related to family relations, creates a segregation that is undesirable from
a social as well as a legal perspective. Socially, such practices might be detrimental
to Muslim women, because their community might deny them the liberties of Eu-
ropean life by exerting considerable pressure on them to submit to the traditions
and laws of Islam.165 Legally, it is argued that a state’s rule of law should not per-
mit parallel legal structures. While all these arguments are valid by themselves, one
may point to different experienceswithin Europe. In Eastern Europe, for instance, as
we have seen above, the self-regulation of Muslims is muchmore institutionalized,
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and therefore strictly speaking ‘segragated’, mainly as the legacy of a centuries-
old practice (although, of late, these practices have also come under criticism and
scrutiny166). And in Western European countries there has been a long tradition of
Catholic, Protestant and Jewish family courts operating parallel to the national civil
courts.
The alleged infringement of ‘Islam’ on European values can also be surmised
from the angle of religious-cultural values.While political-legal values are relatively
easy to identify, the religious-cultural values are more ambiguous. They represent
the European grand narrative mentioned above. The religious component of this
narrative holds that Christianity, either as a religious value-system or as a religious
tradition or civilization, is said to have shaped the identity and unity that we call
Europe.167 It is important to note that this religious dimension of European values
is not exclusively embraced by devout Christians but also by the non-religious: to
them, Christianity represents the cradle of modern European civilization rather the
articles of faith of any of the Christian denominations.
The religious-cultural component of the European narrative is not only histor-
ical, but also very temporal. European values in this meaning represent values that
aremostly enshrined not in laws but in customs, and are held as self-evident truths:
‘the way we do things around here’. I contend that these values are central in the
conflict between ‘Europe’ and ‘Islam’. Apart from the terrorist attacks, most ‘con-
flicts’ between Islamic and European values that make headlines in European news
relate to differences of social interaction. The European public generally considers
not shaking hands withmembers of the other gender insulting, and the wearing of
headscarves degrading, to name the most conspicuous examples. Interestingly, the
European political-legal values allow for such behaviour, as no lawprescribes how to
greet or what to wear. It is precisely this difference between the two sets of European
values that causes much of the confusion about what is acceptable and what not in
a European society.
The two sets of values – political-legal and religious-cultural – togethermake up
for the peculiar situation of European secularism which is to some the most typical
confrontation with Islamic values. As we have discussed above, European societies
have developed the customary practice of not publicly manifesting religion, even
though that would be perfectly admissible by law. Religious dress in public has be-
come rare, and even self-proclaimed Christian politicians will seldom refer to Scrip-
ture tomake their point. Despite a strong tradition of Christian Democratic politics
inmany European countries, and regardless of references to the Christian identity of
Europe, religion is mostly absent from the European political and public domains.
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This is often referred to as secularism, and according to several observers this is the
point where Islam clashes with European values.168 I would argue, however, that the
issue here is not secularism but a typical European cultural tradition of handling re-
ligion. In the United States, for instance, we observe a completely different tradition
of secularism where religion plays a very prominent role in the public and politi-
cal domain.169 Manifestation of religion – whether Islam or any other religion – is
therefore bound to clash with the European way of handling religion, but not with
the American way. This clash is much less prominent, on the other hand, if secular-
ism is defined as a political-legal institution of separating religion and the state. It
is precisely this separation that is embraced by many European Muslims because it
guarantees their freedom to practise their faith according to their own wishes and
without state interference.170
The clash of values between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ therefore is not that European
Muslims adhere to values that are prohibited by law – on the contrary, the political-
legal values allow for diversity and liberty – , but by the religious-cultural objection
that ‘this is not how we do things here’. The French law of 2011 banning the face
veil illustrates this dilemma: on the one hand, the French State Council advised
against such ban on the basis of the political-legal principle of personal autonomy
which allows a woman freely to wear what she wishes;171 and, on the other hand, the
legislature deemed the face veil contrary to the cultural principle that open-faced
encounters in public are a matter of ‘social contract’.172
2. The Study of Islam
The study of Islam in Europe has changed considerably since the last decades of the
twentieth century, on the onehandbecause the study of Islamgainedpopularity and
European scholars have broadened this academic domain, and, on the other hand,
because EuropeanMuslims have now also engaged in an intensive study of Islam for
the purpose of knowing its foundations as well as of adopting these tenets in their
every-day lives in European societies.
European Scholarship
European scholarship of Islam after the 1950s was mostly still confined to the phil-
iological discipline of Arabic studies, but soon became immerged in area studies
(Asia,Middle East, Africa) where the disciplines of anthropology and political science
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dominated. In consequence, Muslims and Islam were to be studied not only as
representations of texts that dated from the past, but as living entities of today.173
The European scholars of Islam and the Muslim world received a wake-up call
with the publication of Edward Said’sOrientalism in 1979.174 He argued that the aca-
demic objectivity claimed by these scholars was false, since many were infatuated
with preconceived notions of Orientalism (see the previous chapter) about their ob-
jects of study. This image was perpetuated by the colonial supremacy of European
countries in the Muslim world, and was reinforced by scholars in their academic
work, Said claimed. Although Said’s accusations were too broad and not always suf-
ficiently substantiated,175 they did hit a nerve in the European academic world. The
word ‘orientalist’ gained a pejorative meaning, and various academic disciplines set
out to reconsider their academic premises and methodologies. (This self-reflexion,
in turn, sometimes swung too far the other way with academics blaming European
colonial domination for all kinds of shortcomings in theMuslimworld.)
In addition, the arrival of Muslims in the West brought a new challenge to the
European study of Islam. Until the 1980s, studying Islammeant a trip to the library
or to some faraway exotic land. But now Islam was in Europe, and Muslims were
fellow-citizens in European societies and fellow-students in European universities.
European scholars had to become used to the fact thatMuslims and Islam, as objects
of study, were part of the shared habitat of researchers, and that they responded to
lectures and studies about them.176 The fact that the politically and socially charged
atmosphere in (mainly Western) European societies had put Muslims in a perma-
nent spotlight during the late 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century
merely added to the complexity of this interaction.177
The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent attacks by Muslim extremists in European
cities have yet again changed the research agenda of Islam in Europe. During the
first decade of the twenty-first century, most of the research on Islam and Muslims
in Europe became embedded in the overall theme of security. This situationwas not
necessarily by scholarly design, but often prompted by the practical circumstance
that national research funds during this period tended to prefer research proposals
that had relevance to practical needs of the time.178
Nevertheless, a steady stream of studies on Islam andMuslims both within and
outside Europe emerged from universities, think tanks, and investigative journal-
ists. Most studies tended to discuss the Muslim identity in ethnic and national mi-
nority terms rather than religious terms. As opposed to what was quite common in
public and political discourse, very few of these studies referred to Islam as a source
ofMuslims’ actions. On the contrary, importance in this respect was attachedmuch
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more to culture, ethnicity and migration. Most scholars identified religion as a sec-
ondary motivator like faith or identity, which highlighted existing issues and con-
flicts rather than being their instigating factor.179
EuropeanMuslim Studies of Islam
While the theological approach was gradually removed from European academic
studies of Islam, EuropeanMuslims expressed the need for precisely that: the study
of Islam as theology. The purpose of that kind of study was different fromwhat was
conducted at most European universities, however: these Muslims were not study-
ing their religious behaviour or texts, but their own faith. In someEastern European
countries, such studies couldbepursued at Islamic theological institutions and sem-
inars. In Western European countries, on the other hand, there was an absence of a
tradition as well as an infrastructure for the theological study of Islam.180 Moreover,
the Muslim communities in these societies lacked religious authorities that could
guide or instruct them in these studies. This posed a problemwith the growingneed
since the 1990s among Muslims for knowledge of Islamic theology. Their response,
generally speaking, was twofold: some actually went abroad to study, while others
resorted to self-study.
ForWesternEuropeanMuslims in particular the self-studywasnot easy, for they
had limited access to Islamic theological literature and, more problematically, were
often unable to read it since they were losing the native language of their parents.
And even if they had overcome these hurdles, they needed some guidance in nav-
igating the voluminous body of Islamic literature. Most Muslim students tried to
find their way by means of the Internet; others by connections they might have
with religious insitutions abroad.181Private initiatives emerged: lecture series, classes
in mosques and Islamic centres, and the establishment of private Islamic seminar-
ies. The problem of finding instructors with sufficient theological background re-
mained, however. This situation was quite different from that in Eastern Europe
where Muslims might turn to their muftis or leaders, or might study at one of the
few Islamic theological faculties or seminaries. But even in that case, quite a few of
the Muslim youth in Eastern Europe preferred to study abroad, either in Turkey or
in theMiddle East.182
One particular feature of Islamic studies as pursued by European Muslims de-
serves further attention. This is the so-called ‘minority fiqh’, the scholarship of Is-
lamic theology that proclaims adaptations of Islamic rules to the particular context
ofMuslims living in theWest.183Theunderlying argument of this scholarship is that
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sharia serves the needs and interests of Muslims and should therefore accommodate
them rather than make their lives more difficult. As a result, rules of sharia should
be adapted to the circumstances if need be. For example, a strict interpretation of
sharia rule would oblige a Muslim in Scandinavia to fast the long hours of summer,
or prohibit him fromworking in restaurants or establishments where pork or alco-
hol is served, or from participating in elections or political processes in non-Muslim
countries; ‘minority fiqh’, on the other hand, would provide solutions for Muslims
in theWest to somehowmove forward on the social-economic scale by participating
without neglecting the essential tenets of their faith.184
While it is unknown towhat extent EuropeanMuslims actually follow the inter-
pretations of minority fiqh, the development of this scholarship by several interna-
tional Islamic organizations is an interesting example of globalizing Islam: Muslim
scholars of different nationalities, and even of both sunni and shiʾa origin, join in
regularmeetings todiscuss questions sentbyMuslims in theWest and, after longde-
liberation, issue their decisions ( fatwas).185 This particular branch of applied Islamic
theology therefore has become a truly global or at least transnational undertaking,
wherebyknowledge fromabroad is fed into a local European setting of political-legal
freedoms and religious-cultural rejection.186
Minority fiqh is not uncontested. The abovementioned procedure and its the-
ological methodologies are advocated by Islamic theologians like Yusuf Qaradawi
in Qatar and Taha Jabir Al-Alwani in the United States, but are criticized by their
colleagues from both the conservative and liberal sides of the theological spectrum.
Conservatives, predominantly from the Gulf region, reject the minority fiqh me-
thodology with the argument that Muslims are to abide by sharia rather than the
otherway round. Liberals, on the otherhand, reject the fact thatMuslims in theWest
are consideredminority or are given exceptional treatment within the Islamic theo-
logical framework; according to them, Islamic theology needs thorough revision in
order to meet the needs of allMuslims in the modern world.187
Whether this cauldron will – or should – lead to a ‘European Islam’, as some




Islamization of Europe, or Europeanization of Islam?
What do thirteen centuries of Islam in Europe tell us? Does the story of this inter-
action consist of a series of episodes and events that we have conveniently thrown
together under the title ‘Islam in Europe’? Or is it justified to speak of a single ex-
perience or narrative that continues through the centuries? And if so, how can we
characterize this experience? We have seen in the previous chapters that the Euro-
pean interaction with physical as well as virtual Islam has been very diverse. Mus-
lims have been enemies and allies, foreigners and compatriots, Us and Them. Their
civilization has been feared as aggressive and expansionist, but also praised for its
religious tolerance and its culture that has produced great and innovative artists,
scientists and intellectuals to which Europe is indebted. On the other hand, Europe
has consistently upheld the picture of the Muslim Other that embodied everything
that the European was not. Still, some patterns do emerge, and here the distinction
between physical and virtual Islam is helpful.
Historical Patterns
With regard to physical Islam, there are few, if any, patterns to be discerned in
the European interactions with Islam until the late nineteenth century. Both sides
have alternated in conquering each other’s territories and, in consequence, created
societies of religiously mixed populations. Both sides have for centuries more or less
continuously been active in raiding and enslaving each other’s populations. The
same mutuality applies to the exchange of diplomatic missions. The only forms
of interaction in which there was little initiative on the Muslim side were trade,
adventurous exploration and the establishment of resident embassies or commercial
outposts – throughout the centuries of interaction, these domains were dominated
by the Europeans.
In all these interactions one cannot speak of twounified blocks facing each other;
both the Muslim and Christian sides were fractured by internal differences and
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strife, and common interests often called for military alliances and commercial
treaties across the religious divide. On the other hand, both sides always upheld a
self-image that strongly identified with religion – if not in the sense of commonly
held religious beliefs, then at least as a shared culture. Religion as an identitymarker
was a source of many frictions within the Christian and Muslim communities, but
also served as a rallying pointwhen confrontedwith the other community. Let us ex-
amine thismechanism of diversity-in-unity by examining two issues: conquest and
coexistence.
Thirteen centuries of belligerent interaction between Islam and Europe is not one of
perpetual Muslim aggression vis-à-vis Europe, “the great jihad par excellence”.1 Both
the Islamic Arab and Christian Europeanworlds were driven by intermitted periods
of hunger for conquest, and it was geographical proximity thatmade the other a tar-
get, not religious fervour. Religion did play a role, however, as the additional driving
force that vindicated war. It is presumptuous and even a form of European self-
victimization to assume that Muslims, whether Moors in the eighth century or Ot-
tomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, saw Europe as theirmain target.
They did not. The ArabMuslim conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries were
targeting North Africa (westward) and Western Asia (eastward), while Spain was a
mere extension ofNorthAfrica. And theOttomans did indeed engage in regularmil-
itary campaigns in Eastern Europe, but also did so towards Persia; the European do-
mains made up only a part – albeit an economically and culturally important part –
of their vast empire that stretched fromTunisia to Iraq and fromYemen toHungary.
Even if the conquests in Europe were sideshows in Arab and Ottoman large-
scale military operations, let us be clear on the fact that Europe was part of these
conquests and consequently these wars are part of European history. But is it then
justified to speak of the Crusades, the Reconquista, or the BalkanWars as acts of Eu-
ropean self-defence against Muslim aggression, as some authoritative figures tell
us? Pope Urban II wanted his audience to believe so when he made his call for the
First Crusade: his argument was that Jerusalem had to be re-taken. However, that
call was made more than four centuries after the city had been taken by the Arab-
Muslim armies. Moreover, we have seen that the recruitment for the crusade was
successful for reasons that were more of an internal European nature than of for-
eign belligerency. In a similar vein, the historian Bernard Lewis claims that Euro-
peans, by fighting in Spain against the Moors and rising in the Balkans against the
Turk, were “restoring homelands to Christendom.”2 This is an odd remark from
a historian. In the case of Spain, for instance, the Catholic claim of Reconquista
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may have been a justifiable emotion for the Catholic Spaniards of that time, but
in the light of Spain’s history of seven centuries of Roman rule, followed by two
centuries of Visigoth Christian rule, and then eight centuries of Moorish Muslim
rule, the claim that Spain was originally a Christian homeland is spurious. And in
the case of the Ottoman Empire we have seen that many of the revolts were not
people’s uprisings against the yoke of the Ottoman, but often motivated by other
factors.
Lewis takes the argument of European defence against Muslim aggression fur-
ther when stating that the “complex process of European expansion and empire”
has its “roots in the clash between Islam and Christendom”: in his view, European
expansionism is a result of the “long and bitter struggle of the conquered peoples
of Europe, in east and west, to restore their homelands to Christendom and expel
the Muslim peoples who had invaded and subjugated them.”3 In this European re-
conquest it was “hardly to be expected” that the vanquished Muslims would be
merely left at the borders, and so “the victorious liberators, having reconquered their
own home territories, pursued their former masters whence they had come”. These
sweeping statements are simply untrue. The Europeans who engaged in imperialist
ventures in Muslim lands in Asia and Africa were not the Europeans who had been
former subjects of Muslim rule: of these formerMuslim subjects, the Spaniards and
Portuguese were mainly active across the Atlantic, and the Balkan peoples have not
engaged in any imperialist adventures at all. On the contrary, it was the European
peoples that had not been affected by Moorish, Ottoman or any ‘Islamic’ domina-
tion, such as the English, French, Russians and Dutch, who were the colonists and
imperialists in the African, Asian and Arab domains of the Muslim world. This can
hardly be called a reaction toMuslim aggression.
Moreover, the imagery of European Christians rising against and expelling the
dreaded Muslim occupier seems more a retroactive use of emotions and terminol-
ogy that belonged to the American Revolution or the Second World War than sub-
stantiated by historical facts. The European-Christian “victorious liberators” (Lewis’
terminology) in theOttomandomainshad to resort to carnage andconversion to cre-
ate a “Christian homeland” that they had only recently invented. And the Catholic
kings, when “liberating” Christian subjects from their Muslim rulers, did not take
them into the fold of Christendom but recognized them as a separate community,
first tolerated with their own religious courts and rites, just like the Muslims and
the Jews, and later persecuted by the Inquisition.
Iwould argue that thewars and insurgencies against the twomainMuslimpow-
ers in Europe – Ummayad (‘Moorish’) and Ottoman – were not Christian uprisings
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against centuries of bondage, but were part of a development on a much grander
scale that took place between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe: the
formation of nation-states where people with a single identity (cultural, ethnic, lin-
guistic, religious) livedwithin a single territory undermajority rule. Oppressive and
violent means were often deployed to achieve this goal, starting with the expulsion
and forced conversions ofMuslimsand Jews in Spain in the late fifteenth century (the
Jews of Western Europe had already experienced extradition in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries), then religious wars in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, followed by the fragmentation of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
Empires and, most recently, the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
An interactionof an entirely differentnature betweenEurope andphysical Islamwas
the coexistence of religious communities as a result of conquests by one of the par-
ties. It is not always clear to what extent the conqueror was welcomed; this seems
to have been the case when the Arabs conquered Spain and in some instances of the
early periods of Ottoman conquests in the Balkans; but suchwelcome seems to have
been absent during the Crusades in the Middle East and the Reconquista in Spain.
Nevertheless the reaction of subjugated peoples appears to have been more prag-
matic than principled: if the conqueror provided security, a reasonable tax burden
and a degree of religious and cultural freedom then he was acceptable to most peo-
ple.
In the situation of religiouslymixed societies religion played a prominent role in
the regulation of social order. Religious identity was such that it provided not only
a powerful self-identity, but also a social frame of reference. Social and political life
in religiously mixed communities might be determined by a variety of factors, and
piety among their peoples might differ from person to person, but the underlying
structure was controlled by the dichotomy of believer and unbeliever. Religion was
the most important identity marker that decided the demarcation lines between
the communities in terms of believers versus unbelievers and accordingly set the
rules of engagement between those communities. This order did not necessarily
have to reflect everyday reality in the interaction among people, but was imposed
fromabove: the ruling elite represented the believer and all other communitieswere
categorized under the single title of unbelievers.
Such was the case in the Christian as well as Islamic realms in Europe until well
into the nineteenth century. Religionwas themeasuring stick thatmaintained fixed
boundaries between believers and unbelievers (heretics as third category had to be
persecuted) that could at times perhaps be crossed socially and economically, but
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only within certain limits. Sexual relations, joining the military, being eligible for
slavery or becoming part of the ruling elitewere such limits, and crossing these lines
required that one converted. Tensions and revolts in realms with religiously mixed
societies in pre-modernEuropewere often for social or economic reasons, but almost
automatically acquired a religious dimension since that was the factor delineating
the structural differences in such society.
If there is any pattern to be seen in the interaction between Europe and physical Is-
lam, it is that they have interacted in a variety of ways like any other countries or
communities at any given time. Themain difference is that Europeans andMuslims
did not feel that theywere the same. Thiswas the domain of the interaction between
Europe and the Islam that we have called virtual Islam. Whereas we found few pat-
terns in the case of physical Islam, the interaction with virtual Islam – that is all
interaction involving ideas, images andknowledge about Islam–has beenquite con-
sistent through the centuries. This interaction can be summarized as conflict: in the
studies, polemics and images of Islam, Europeans have mostly – not always – main-
tained a position of antagonism towards Islam. Even the Protestants who claimed
preference for Turkish over Catholic rule still dismissed Islam as a heresy at best.
Islam representedmore than amere religion; it was presented as the opposite of Eu-
ropeanChristian identity, and this othernesswas discerned inmany aspects, some of
which have survived until now with remarkable tenacity: Islam is intolerant; Islam
is degrading towards women; Islam incites violence; Islam is anti-intellectual; Islam
prevents progress; Islam is against democracy and secularism – and to all of these we
must add: unlike us, Europeans of Christian stock. These conceptions and views of
Islam can easily be justified by historical facts. Butwemay equally easily find histor-
ical facts that will back up the opposite argument. The diversity of the interaction of
Europewithphysical Islamprovidesuswith sucha rich source ofhistorical realities –
intellectualism as well as ignorance, benevolent rule and despotism, religious toler-
ance and oppression of religion – that they can be used in any kind of argument. We
have seen in the Introduction to what different conclusions two eminent historians
likeBulliet andLewishave comeon thebasis of the samehistory of European-Islamic
relations.
The explanation for the negative image of Islam as the European Other must
therefore be sought not in physical Islam, but in virtual Islam. Physical Islam rep-
resents the inclusive Other who is different and strange and perhaps even repulsive,
but who at best is a source of fascination or admiration, and at worst is someone
one has to put up with in order to conduct business or keep diplomatic ties or
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maintain neighbourly relations. Virtual Islam, on the other hand, is a representa-
tion of the exclusive Other who is truly different in a negative way.4 Virtual Islam
allowed the European to develop ormaintain ideas about Islamwithout the need to
check with reality. Much, if not most, of the image of Islam and its adherents has
been developed, studied, cherished and passed on by the many Europeans who had
never met a Muslim in their lives. Insofar as they received first-hand information
fromOttoman lands and later also fromMuslim societies in European Empires, this
information was not provided to them by those who lived there, but by their com-
patriot Europeans who travelled or worked in those lands and returned with their
personal experiences. Even in societieswhereMuslims andChristians lived together,
as in the Balkans, the togetherness was mostly one of segregation: either they lived
removed from each other, or they knew little of each other.
Patterns into the Present
The European initiatives to create nation-states that were ethnically, linguistically,
culturally, and religiously homogeneous reached an apotheosis with the two great
wars in the first half of the twentieth century. After that, Europe took a radically dif-
ferent course by implementing a system that had already been under construction
for some time: a political and legal structure that allowed for diversity by guarantee-
ing fundamental rights and a rule of law. Religion as the main source of social and
legal structuringwas replaced by the notions of liberty and equality: each individual
was to pursue his own lifestyle, voice his own opinion and practise his own religion,
and in doing so all individuals were to be treated equally before the law regardless of
their religion, gender, colour or political affiliation.
In Western Europe the sudden and numerous presence of Muslims since the
1970s has challenged this new political-legal constellation, not because Muslims
were against it – on the contrary, it provided them with the freedom to maintain
their identity – but because it revealed that the underlying infrastructure of na-
tional, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religiousunitywas still inplace, either inprac-
tice or as anassumedquality of society. Itwas a self-imposedpredicament: Europeans
cherished thenewpolitical-legal values that granted freedoms to everyone, but these
same values demanded that Europeans allowed people to have and practise religious
and cultural values and customs that were alien to them. The antipathy that some
Western Europeans harboured against foreign migrants who came in large num-
bers from the 1970s onwards was therefore not only of a socio-economical nature –
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they were accused of stealing jobs and undermining European society by purport-
edly refusing to integrate – but also of a cultural nature: allowing different values
and customs that were allegedly not European was considered disruptive to Euro-
pean society. This applied in particular toMuslims, resulting in the particular form
of anxiety called Islamophobia.
Nevertheless, Muslims in Western Europe were gradually entering all echelons
of society. This is a dramatic change fromall previous centuries ofMuslim-Christian
coexistence where religion dictated one’s position in society. As mentioned, the new
political-legal constellation in Europe had replaced this social order with one based
on non-discrimination and personal liberty. These rights were arguably already in
place in earlier times (one needs to just think of the American and French bills
of rights of the late eighteenth century), but it took another century and a half
to put these rights into practice: Jews, coloured, women and gays all had to fight
prolonged battles to claim equal treatment. The EuropeanMuslims of todaymay be
suffering similar forms of discrimination, but they definitely benefitted from the
many minority struggles that preceded theirs. The rapid rise of some Muslims to
positions of prominence in European politics and government, and their gradual
formation into representative bodies and vocal lobby groups are mere examples of
their relatively advantageous position in this respect. In the particular case of the
Muslims, however, there are two factors that distinguish them from otherminority
communities: religion and historical ballast.
With regard to religionwehave seen thatmodernEurope is distinctively secular-
ized in twoways: religion is not important in the lives of the Europeanmajority, and
that same majority does not appreciate the manifestation of religion in the public
domain. This attitude has become incorporated into the European psyche andmany
Europeans therefore feel ill at easewhen confrontedwith actions and behaviour that
are of a distinct religious nature. We have seen that most modern scholars study
such actions and behaviour with a focus on issues like ethnicity, culture andmigra-
tion, with religionmerely being an additional factor thatmay compound social and
economic processes. Much of the political and public discourse, however, takes the
other extreme by explaining Muslim behaviour in terms of religion only. The sale
of Qurans in the Western world peaked after the attacks of 9/11, as did that of many
other books on Islam. This is a continuation of the centuries-old European tradi-
tion of studyingMuslims bymeans of Islamic scripture and texts.When I am invited
by teachers’ unions, police academies or medical schools to talk “about Islam”, they
never want to know about the prophet, the meaning of Ramadan or pilgrimage to
Mecca, or the tenets of Islam: they want to know if there is anything special about
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these people that makes them different – because that is what they experience in
their interactions with them at work – and assume that it is Islam.
Apparently religion has not disappeared from the social equation in Europe even
though it has dissipated as an official form of ordering society and modern Europe
has to a large extent secularized. Religion has stayed, but taken different forms.
While secularization gradually removed religion from the public domain, the great
European narrative of ‘Christian Europe’ is continued, albeit in a cultural man-
ner. This religious anchoring of European identity by default excluded Jews and
later also Muslims. Granted, it is fashionable to speak of ‘Judeo-Christian civiliza-
tion’, but the ‘Judeo’ part is only a politically correct supplement that came into
use after the horrors of the Holocaust. In addition to this cultural meaning, reli-
gion also plays a second, important role in modern Europe. In times when religion
is of much less importance to a majority of the European population,5 their under-
standing and consideration for those who are still religious have also become less.
From the perspective of religious people, regardless of their religion, such environ-
ment can be considered unfriendly or even hostile. This staunchly secular or even
anti-religious environment is not exclusively targeting devout Muslims, because it
targets all religious believers, but it has definitely contributed to theMuslims’ sense
of alienation, a feeling multiplied by the fact that they are mostly of foreign ori-
gin.
The second factor that distinguishes Muslims from other minorities is the his-
torical ballast of the old notion of the Muslim as the European Other. Here again
we see an uninterrupted continuation of Othering that has taken place in the previ-
ous centuries: Muslims are not European, because they are not secular, not woman-
friendly, intrinsically violent, primitive in their customs. An often-heard explana-
tion of this different attitude inserts a time element into this process of Othering:
the Muslim is placed in another, pre-modern time from that of the modern Euro-
pean, as if he is literally behind, so that the two live together but in parallel time
frames.6 Some add yet another element to the Muslim Other: he is not merely dif-
ferent, but a foreigner who does not belong here. We have seen this with regard to
the Moors and the Ottoman Turk, and nowadays again in the reaction to Muslim
radicals and terrorists. The European leftist radicals and terrorists of the 1970s were
feared, frowned upon and sometimes prosecuted, but never was it suggested that
they should be deported, as has been proposed with Muslim radicals and terrorists
who were born and raised in Europe. In the former case, the Other was ‘our’ prob-
lem; in the latter case the Other was a problem imposed on ‘us’ from the outside. A
large part of this sentiment has been attributed to the changing notion of borders;
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whereas they used to keep people out, they were crossed by immigrants and have
now beenmade permeable by globalism and transnationalism.7
That said, we must keep in mind that it does not hold for all Europeans; some
do not see a problem at all, and many Europeans work hard and conscientiously to
understand their Muslim patients, juvenile delinquents, students and neighbours
so that they canmore easily engage with them.
While the issues of religion and historical ballast may havemade the position of the
modern European Muslim different from that of other minorities, and while the
main obstacle to the devout Muslim may be the secular nature of modern Europe
(an obstacle the Muslim shares with devout Christians, Jews, Hindus and other
faithful), the most pressing problem in current times to my mind is the issue of
tolerance. I contend that tolerance has undergone a drastic transformation because
of the modern notion of equality.
In earlier times, racial, religious and gender differences were regulated by hier-
archical orders that gave everyone pre-fixed positions in the social order, whether
divinely or imperially ordained: “[i]mperial rule is historically the most successful
way of incorporating difference and facilitating (requiring is more accurate) peace-
ful existence.”8 Equality, on the other hand, demands an affirmative recognition of
others and of each other’s differences. Consequently, equality has drastically altered
the notion of toleration. Before, the ruling community or majority indulged itself
by allowing for certain differences in its subjects or theminority, respectively. From
its position of power, it determined what the limits of acceptable differences were
as practised by its subjects or minorities, and demanded full recognition of its own
ways. This situationno longerholds. Equality has turned thepowermechanism that
was essential to tolerance into a reciprocal process: we will recognize you (and your
differences) if you do the same to us.9
In the context of modern Europe, this change is a serious challenge to the per-
ceived self-evidence of the culture of themajority. According to theprinciples of their
own political-legal structure, native Europeans cannot claim amajority position de-
manding that their religious or cultural values are imposed on others. The notion
of tolerance has changed accordingly and has acquired a new meaning: as recogni-
tion. One is to recognize the differences of the other – within the framework of the
parameters set by the law, of course – but this has become subject to negotiation: the
European Muslim is asked to acknowledge loyalty to his society, while the Muslim
is prepared to do so only on the condition that he is recognized as Muslim, a notion
of religious identity that many secular Europeans find difficult to deal with.
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The transformation of the notion of tolerance lies at the heart of the European
struggle with immigrants and, more particularly, Muslims. The European demand
for cultural integration may contradict the immigrant’s or Muslim’s right to be
different, and to be treated as an equal in that respect. According to Talal Asad, this is
at the root of Europe’s identity crisis.He argues that Europeans arenot self-assuredly
declaring who they are, but anxiously demanding that Others recognize who they,
the Europeans, are: “(instead of) ‘This is my name,’ we now declare ‘I need you to
recognize me by that name’.”10
… To Be Extrapolated into the Future?
From this evaluation of the present let us now look into the future. How will the
interaction between Islam and Europe develop? Some observers speak hopefully of
the emergence of a “European Islam”; others are worried about the trend of ortho-
doxy among European Muslims and fear an ‘Islamization’ of Europe. Have Europe
and Islam indeed reached a juncture that will prove crucial to their future, so that
we are facing a choice between either “Islamization of Europe” or “Europanization
of Islam”, as some would have us believe?11
From a European perspective the notion of “Islamization of Europe” is not a
neutral observation indicating that Europe is experiencing more of the presence of
Muslims – and hence Islam – than it had before; it is a notion of concern, possibly of
fear. It is the anxiety about Europe losing its identity, irrevocably transforming into
something that it shouldnot.Wehave seen that it is hard to assess the exact numbers
of Muslims in Europe, and that it is almost impossible to gauge their religiousness,
but they are a tinyminority. Also, the fear that Islam by its nature drivesMuslims to
impose their values on their environment is not justified by the facts. Insofar as they
claim space in the secular Europeandomain to apply certain rules of Islam, it appears
to be exclusively for their own use. Of course there are zealous Muslims in Europe
calling for the spread of Islam and who welcome any convert to Islam, but they are
not unlike the many Christian missionary movements active in Europe. But even
if, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that Muslims have hidden agendas
of domination, it is quite striking that Europeans demonstrate so little faith in the
strength of their own values and structures to withstand the allegedly different
Islamic values of a very small minority.
Just as thenotion “Islamizationof Europe” is biasedbecause it reflects an anxiety,
so is its mirror-notion “Europeanization of Islam” based on preconceptions because
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it reflects – from the perspective of many Europeans – an optimistic anticipation.
It is the expectation that Muslims, under the influence of European liberalism and
enlightenment, will transform their Islam into a moderate religion. It is therefore
dumbfounding to many Europeans that the younger generation of Muslims in
Europe in particular is more religiously orthodox than the previous generation:
how can someone who is born and raised in a European secular, liberal society and
education system adhere to religion even more strongly than his or her parents?
The puzzlement about this alleged paradox is typical for Europeans; Americans, for
example, will have fewer problems understanding this situation because they are
much more accustomed to public intellectuals, scholars, scientists and politicians
who are also devout believers and publicly declare themselves to be so.
If there is any Europeanization of Islam, it is that Muslims are living in Europe,
and have adopted the European political-legal framework that provides them with
opportunities to practise their religion in ways they want to – opportunities that
they would not have in most Muslim-majority countries. At present many Mus-
lims in Europe use their freedom of religion to pursue an orthodox interpretation
of Islam, but this in itself does not justify the conclusion that such development is
anathema to European values or identity, nor that it will continue with the next
generations of European Muslims. What we are currently witnessing is Muslims
of migrant origin who are coming to terms with their particular European envi-
ronment as well as with an understanding of their identity, and consequently will
have to negotiate ways to adapt to a European religious-cultural and political-legal
environment and find ways to solve conflicts between that environment and their
Islamic tenets and identities. This dialectic of critical engagement byEuropeanMus-
lims is not new: it is a process that began in the period between the twoWorldWars12
and has regained its intensity from the 1990s onwards.13 An interesting role in this
respect is being played by BalkanMuslimswho have amuch longer and richer expe-
rience with Islam in Europe, and therefore deplore the fact that Western European
Muslims, as relative newcomers to the European scene, have so little, if any, interest
in their experiences.14
The two-choice question between Islamization of Europe and Europanization
of Islam, therefore, is a misguided way of looking at the phenomenon of ‘Islam in
Europe’. If there ever was a choice with regard to the future of Islam and its role in
Europe, it is a choice that Europe needs to make: will it adhere to its political-legal
values, such as liberalism, equality, human rights and democracy, and by conse-
quence allow for and recognize themany differences that new Europeanswill bring,
or will it block these differences by emphasizing a homogenuous set of – allegedly
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‘European’ – religious-cultural values? The burka bans in Belgium and France are a
typical sign of the latter: irrespective of whether one agrees or disagrees with those
bans, they were essentially a legalization of cultural values, of ‘this is how we do
things here’. Although enshrining cultural values in legal statutesmay reaffirm Eu-
ropean cultural identities, such an approach carries the distinct risk that it denies
other, fundamental values proclaimed by the European political-legal framework.
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Akgonül, Ahmet Alibašić, BrigitteMaréchal &ChristianMoe (eds.), Yearbook ofMuslims in
Europe (Volume 1), London/Boston: Brill, 2009, pp. 377–402.
& Ferhat Kentel, Euro-Turks. A Bridge or a Breach betweenTurkey and the EuropeanUnion?
A Comparative Study of German Turks and French Turks, Brussels: Centre for European Policy
Studies, 2005.
Kecmanovic, Dusan, Ethnic Times. Exploring Ethnonationalism in the former Yugoslavia. West-
pot/Connecticut/London: Praeger, 2002.
Kedar, Benjamin, Crusade and Mission: European Approaches towards the Muslims, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984.
, ‘The subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant’ in: James M. Powell (ed.), Muslims
under Latin Rule (1100–1300), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 135–174.
bibliography | 325
Kennedy, Hugh, The Great Arab Conquests: How the spread of Islam changed the world we live in,
London: Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 2007.
Khaduri, Silat al-diblumatikiyya bayn Rashid wa Sharlaman, Bagdad, 1939.
Khalili, Jim Al-, TheHouse ofWisdom:HowArabic Science Saved Ancient Knowledge andGaveUs the
Renaissance, London/NewYork: Penguin Press, 2011.
Khodarkovsky,Michael,Russia’s steppe frontier: themaking of a colonial empire, 1500–1800, Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
Khosrokhavar, R., L’ islam des jeunes, Paris: Flammarion, 1997.
Kiel, Machiel, Studies on the OttomanMonuments of the Balkans, Aldershot: Variorum, 1990.
King, Preston, Tolerance, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1976.
Klausen, Jytte, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Koliopoulos, Giannes, Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–
1912, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz,Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th–18th century): an annotated edi-
tion of ʿahdnames and other documents, Leiden: Brill, 2000.
Koningsveld, P.S., ‘Muslim Slaves and Captives in Western Europe During the Late Middle
Ages’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 1995 (Vol. 6. No. 1), pp. 5–23.
Kraft, Sabine, Neue Sakralarchitectur des Islam in Deutschland (PhD thesis), Theology Faculty
Marburg, 2000.
Kramer, Martin, Islam Assembled, the Advent of the Muslim Congresses, New York: Colombia
University Press, 1986
Kreutz, Barbara, ‘Ships. Shipping, and the implications of change in the earlymedievalMedi-
terranean’, Viator, 1976 (Vol. 7), pp. 79–110.
Kritzeck, James, Peter the Venerable and Islam, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.
Krstic, Tijana, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Kse, Ali & Kate Miriam Loewenthal, ‘Conversion Motifs Among British Converts to Islam’,
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2000 (Vol. 10, No. 2), pp. 101–110.
Kullolli, Arben, Proselytization in Albania byMiddle Eastern Islamic Organizations (thesis), Mon-
terey: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009.
Kunst, Jonas R. & David L. Sam, ‘Relationship between perceived acculturation expectations
andMuslimminority youth’s acculturation and adaptation,’ International Journal of Inter-
cultural Relations, 2013 (Vol. 37), pp. 477–490.
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
Ladas, Stephen-Pericles, The Exchange ofMinorities: Bulgaria, Greece andTurkey, New York:Mac-
millan, 1932.
326 | bibliography
Laiou, Angeliki, ‘Byzantine trade with Muslims and Crusaders’ in: Angeliki Laiou & Roy
Mottahedh (eds.),TheCrusades from thePerspective of Byzantiumand theMuslimWorld,Wash-
ington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001.
& Roy Mottahedh (eds.), The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim
World, Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001.
Lakhdar, Mounia, Genevive Vinsonneau, Michael J. Apter & Etienne Mullet, ‘Conversion
to Islam Among French Adolescents and Adults: A Systematic Inventory of Motives’,
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2007 (Vol. 17, No. 1), pp. 1–15.
Lane, Ann, Yugoslavia. When ideals collide. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2004.
Laqueur, Walter, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent, New York: St Martin’s
Griffin, 2009.
, ‘The Terrorism To Come’, Policy Review, 2004 (Aug-Sept), pp. 49–64.
Larsson, Göran,Muslims in the EU – Cities Report: Sweden, Open Society Institute, 2007.
, ‘The Fear of SmallNumbers: Eurabian Literature andCensuses onReligiousBelong-
ing’, Journal ofMuslims in Europe, 2012 (Vol. 1, No. 2), pp. 142–165.
Latham, R.G., ‘Contributions to the Minute Ethnology of Europe, with Special Reference to
a Treatise by Biondelli, Entitled Prospecto Topographico-Statisco delle Colonie Straniere
d’ Italia’, Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London, 1861 (Vol. 1), pp. 105–111.
Lathion, Stéphane, ‘The impact of the minaret vote in Switzerland’ in: Stefano Allievi (ed.),
Mosques in Europe. Why a solution has become a problem, London: Alliance Publishing Trust,
2010, pp. 221–223.
Latouche, Robert, The Birth of Western Economy. Economic Aspects of the Dark Ages, London:
Methuen, 1967.
Laurence, Jonathan,TheEmancipation of Europe’sMuslims: The State’s Role inMinority Integration,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Lea, Henry, AHistory of the Inquisition in Spain (Volumes 1–3), New York: MacMillan, 1906–1907.
, The Moriscos of Spain. Their Conversion and Expulsion, Philadelphia: Lea Brothers and
Co., 1901.
Lederer, Gyorgy, ‘Contemporary Islam in East Europe’, NATO Academic Forum, May 1999
(online publication available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97--99/lederer.pdf).
Leiken, Robert S., Europe’s AngryMuslims, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Lewis, Bernard, Europe and Islam, Washington: The AEI Press, 2007.
, Islam in theWest, New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
, TheMuslimDiscovery of Europe, New York/London: W.W. Norton, 1982.
, ‘The Third Wave: Muslim Migration to Europe’, New Perspectives Quarterly, 2007
(Vol. 24), pp. 30–35.
& D. Schnapper (eds.),Muslims in Europe, London: Pinter, 1994.
bibliography | 327
Lewis, David, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, New York: Norton & Company,
2008.
Lewis, Geoffrey,Modern Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1955.
Lewis, Philip, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity Among British Muslims, London: I.B.
Tauris, 2002.
, Young, British andMuslim, London: Continuum, 2007.
Lieber, Alfred, ‘Eastern Business Practices and Medieval European Commerce’, Economic His-
tory Review, 1968 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 230–243.
Lofland, John & Norman Skonovd, ‘Conversion Motifs’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Reli-
gion, 1981 (Vol. 20, No. 4), pp. 373–385.
Lopez, Fernando Bravo, ‘Towards a definition of Islamophobia: approximations of the early
twentieth century’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2011 (Vol. 34, No. 4), p. 556–573.
Lopez, Robert, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages: 950–1350, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
, ‘TheTradeofMedieval Europe: the South’ in: StephanBroadberry&KevinO’Rourke,
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Lorant, Karoly, The demographic challenge in Europe, Brussels: European Parliament, 2005.
Lowry, Heath W., The nature of the early Ottoman state, Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2003.
, The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350–1550: Conquest, Settlement & Infrastructural
Development of Northern Greece, Istanbul: Baçesehir University Publications, 2008.
Lucassen, L. & C. Laarman, ‘Immigration, intermarriage and the changing face of Europe in
the post war period’, TheHistory of the Family, 2009 (Vol. 14, No. 1), pp. 52–68.
Lüdke, Tilman, Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence in the
First WorldWar, Münster: Lit, 2005.
Lyons, Jonathan, The House of Wisdom: how the Arabs transformed Western civilization, London:
Bloomsbury Press, 2009.
MacCulloch, Diarmaid, A history of Christianity: the first three thousand years, London: Penguin
Press, 2009.
Macfie, Alexander,Orientalism: A Reader, New York: New York University Press, 2001.
Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, London: Bantam Classics, 1984 (orig. 1513).
Magas, Branka, The Destruction of Yugoslavia. Tracking the Break-up 1980–1992, New York/Lon-
don: Verso, 1993.
Makdisi, George, ‘On the Origin and Development of the College in Islam and the West’ in:
Khalil Semaan (ed.), Islam and the Medieval West. Aspects of Intercultural Relations, Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1980.
, ‘Scholasticism andHumanism in Classical Islam and the ChristianWest’, Journal of
the American Oriental Society, 1989 (Vol. 109, No. 2), pp. 175–182.
328 | bibliography
, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1991.
Makdisi, John, ‘The Islamic Origins of the Common Law’, North Carolina Law Review, 1999
(Vol. 77, No. 5), pp. 1635–1739.
Malik, J. (ed.),Muslims in Europe-From theMargins to the Centre, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004.
Mandaville, Peter, Global Political Islam, London: Routledge, 2007.
, ‘MuslimTransnational Identity and StateResponses inEurope and theUKafter 9/11:
Political Community, Ideology andAuthority’, Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 2009
(Vol. 35, No. 3), pp. 491–506.
, ‘Towards a critical Islam’ in: Stefano Allievi & JørgenNielsen (eds.),MuslimNetworks
and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003, pp. 127–145.
, Transnational Politics. Reimagining the umma, London/New York: Routledge, 2001.
Mann, Vivian&ThomasGlick (eds.), Convivencia: Jews,Muslims andChristians inMedieval Spain,
New York: George Braziller, 1992.
Mantran, Robert, Istanbul dans la seconde moité du XVIIe siècle, Paris: Libaraire Adrien Maison-
neuve, 1986.
, ‘The transformation of trade in the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century’ in:
Thomas Naff & Roger Owen (eds.), Studies in eighteenth century Islamic history, Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1977, pp. 217–235.
Maréchal, Brigitte, ‘Mosques, organisations and leadership’ in: Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano
Allievi, Felice Dassetto, Jørgen Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe (Muslim Mi-
norities, Volume 2), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003, pp. 109–111.
,TheMuslimBrothers inEurope:Roots andDiscourse (MuslimMinorities, 8), Leiden: Brill,
2008.
, ‘The Question of belonging’ in: Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto,
Jørgen Nielsen (eds.), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe (Muslim Minorities, Volume 2), Lei-
den/Boston: Brill, 2003, pp. 5–18.
Marks, Jon, ‘High hopes and low motives: The new euro-mediterranean partnership initia-
tive’,Mediterranean Politics, 1996 (Vol. 1, No. 1), pp. 1–24.
Maussen, Marcel, Constructing Mosques: The governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands,
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2009.
Merdjanova, Ina,Rediscovering theUmma.Muslims in the Balkans betweenNationalism andTrans-
nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
March, Andrew, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The search for an overlapping consensus, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009.
Marriott, John, The Eastern Question. A Historical Study in European Diplomacy, Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1940.
bibliography | 329
Mas,Albert,LesTurcs dans la littérature espagnoleduSiècle d’Or: recherches sur l’ évolutiond’un thème
littéraire (2 Volumes), Paris: Impr. Follope, 1967.
Matar, Nabil, Europe through Arab Eyes, 1578–1727, New York: Columbia University Press,
2009.
, Islam in Britain, 1558–1685, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Matsuki, Eizo, ‘TheCrimeanTatars and theirRussian-Captive Slaves. AnAspect ofMuscovite-
Crimean Relations in the 16th and 17th centuries’, Mediterranean World, 2006 (Vol. 18),
pp. 171–182.
Mattar, Philip, TheMufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian nationalmove-
ment, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
Mattingly, Garrett, Renaissance Diplomacy, Dover Publications, 1988 (first published by
HoughtonMifflin Company, Boston, 1955).
Maussen, Marcel, Constructing Mosques: The governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands,
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2009.
Maziane, Leïla, Salé et ses corsaires, 1666–1727: un port de course marocain au XVIIe siècle, Havre:
Université de Rouen, 2007.
Mazower, Mark, Salonica, City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950, New York:
Vintage, 2006.
, The Balkans. A short History, New York: TheModern Library, 2002.
McCarthy, Justin, Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of OttomanMuslims, 1821–1922, Prince-
ton: The Darwin Press, 1995.
, ‘Muslims inOttoman Europe: Population from 1800 to 1912’,Nationalities Papers: The
Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 2000 (Vol. 28, No. 1), pp. 29–43.
, ‘OttomanBosnia, 1800–1878’ in:MarkPinson (ed.),TheMuslims ofBosnia-Herzegovina.
Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Harvard:
Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 54–83.
McCormick, Michael, Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce ad 300–
900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
McGowan, Bruce, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: taxation, trade, and the struggle for land,
1600–1800, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
McKee, Sally, ‘Domestic Slavery in Renaissance Italy’, Slavery & Abolition, 2008 (Vol. 29, No. 3),
pp. 305–326.
McKinnon, Catriona, Tolerance. A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge, 2006.
McLoughlin, Sean, ‘The State, New Muslim Leadership and Islam as a Resource for Public
Engagement in Britain’ in: Jocelyne Cesari & Sean McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims
and the Secular State, London: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 53–69.
McNeill, William, Europe’s Steppe Frontier 1500–1800, Chicago/London: The University of Chi-
cago Press, 1964.
330 | bibliography
McRae, Kenneth (ed.), The six books of a commonweale, New York: Arno Press, 1979.
Mehmet, Ozay, ‘Turkey and the European Union: A Troubled Relationship or a Historic
Partnership?’ in: Tareq Yousif Ismael & Mustafa Aydin (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the
Twenty-First Century: A ChangingRole in theWorld, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003,
pp. 41–58.
Meijer, Roel&EdwinBakker (eds.), TheMuslimBrotherhood inEurope,NewYork: Columbia
University Press, 2013.
Menocal, Maria, TheOrnament of theWorld: HowMuslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of
Tolerance inMedieval Spain, Boston: Little Brown, 2002.
Metcalf, Barbara,MakingMuslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkeley/London: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1996.
Metcalfe, Alex, Muslims and Christians in Norman Sicily, London: Routledge Curzon Taylor &
Francis Group, 2003.
, TheMuslims of medieval Italy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Meyer, Eve, ‘Turquerie andEighteenth-CenturyMusic’,Eighteenth-CenturyStudies, 1974 (Vol. 7,
No. 4), pp. 474–488.
Meyerson, Mark D. & Edward D. English (eds.), Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and
Early Modern Spain. Interaction and Cultural Change, Notre Dame (I.): University of Notre
Dame Press, 2000.
Minkov, Anton, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans, Kisve bahasi petitions and Ottoman social life,
1670–1730, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004.
Mintchev, Vesselin, ‘External Migration and External Migration Policies in Bulgaria’, South­
East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs, 1999 (Vol. 3), pp. 123­150.
Mirdal, G.M., ‘The Construction of Muslim Identities in Contemporary Europe’ in: F. Das-
setto (ed.), Paroles d’ Islam-Individus, Societes et Discours dans l’ Islam Europeen Contemporain,
Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000, pp. 35–49.
Modood, Tariq, Ethnicity, nationalism, and minority rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004.
, ‘Introduction: the politics of multiculturalism in the new Europe’ in: P. Werbner
& T. Modood (eds.), The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and
Community, London/New York: Zed Books, 1997, pp. 1–26.
, ‘The Place of Muslims in British Secular Multiculturalism’ in: N. Alsayyad, M.
Castells & L. Michalak (eds.), Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe, University Press of
America: Lexington Books, 2000
Mohammad, Robina, ‘Marginalisation, Islamism and The Production of the ‘Other’s’
‘Other’ ’, Gender, Place and Culture, 1999 (Vol. 6, No. 3), pp. 221–240.
Mondal, Anshuman A., Young British Muslim Voices, Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing,
2008.
bibliography | 331
Moore, Robert, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950–
1250, London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001.
Morrison, Kenneth, Wahhabism in the Balkans, Shrivenham: Cranfield University, Defence
Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, 2008.
Motadel, David, ‘Islam and the European Empires’, The Historical Journal, 2012 (Vol. 0, No. 3),
pp. 831–856.
Muldoon, James, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1979.
Munʾim A. Sirry, ‘Early Muslim–Christian dialogue: a closer look at major themes of the
theological encounter’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 2005 (Vol. 16, No. 4), pp. 361–
376.
Naimark,NormanM.&HollyCase,Yugoslavia and ItsHistorians.Understanding theBalkanWars
of the 1990s, Stanford, California: Standford University Press, 2003.
Nalborczyk, Agata S., ‘Islam inPoland: thepast and thepresent’, Islamochristiana, 2006 (Vol. 32),
pp. 229–234.
Nebelsick, Harold P., The Renaissance, The Reformation, and the Rise of Science, Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 1992.
Necipoglu, Gülru, ‘The Life of an Imperial Monument: Hagia Sophia after Byzantium’ in:
R. Mark & A. Çakmak (eds.), Hagia Sophia from the Age of Justinian to the Present Day, Cam-
bridgeMA: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Neumann, Iver B., Uses of the Other. ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
& Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the
literature on international society’,Reviewof International Studies, 1991 (Vol. 17), pp. 327–348.
Newman, David L., An Imam in Paris: Al-Tahtawi’s visit to France (1826–31), London: Saqi Books,
2004
Nicol, Donald, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations, Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Nicosia, Francis R. The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, London: Tauris, 1985.
Nielsen, Jørgen S., ‘Book reviews’, Journal ofMuslims in Europe, 2001 (Vol. 1), p. 217.
,Muslims InWestern Europe, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004 (3d ed.).
, Towards a European Islam, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
& Lisbet Christiffersen (eds.), Shariʾa as a Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter
with Europe, Burlington: Ashgate, 2010.
Nielsen, Jørgen S., Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić, and Brigitte Maréchal, Christian Moe
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Muslims in Europe, Volume 5, Leiden: Brill, 2013.
Nieuwkerk, Karin van, Women embracing Islam: gender and conversion in the West, Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2006.
Nirenberg, David, Communities of Violence: Persecution ofMinorities in theMiddle Ages, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996.
, ‘Sexual Boundaries in theMedieval Crown of Aragon’ in: Salma Khadra Jayyusi (ed.),
The Legacy ofMuslim Spain, Leiden: Brill, 1992, pp. 141–160.
Nonneman, G., T. Niblock, & B. Szajkowski (eds.), Muslim Communities in the New Europe,
Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 1996.
Nordbruch, Götz,Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The Ambivalence of the GermanOption, 1933–1945,
Routledge, 2009.
Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans. Religion and Society Between Europe and the ArabWorld, Univer-
sity of South Carolina Press, 1993.
, Islam in the Baltic. Europe’s earlyMuslim community, London: Tauris Academic Studies,
2009.
O’Brien, Peter, European Perceptions of Islam and America from Saladin to George W. Bush: Europe’s
Fragile Ego Uncovered, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
O’Callaghan, Joseph, AHistory ofMedieval Spain, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983.
O’Connell, James,TheMakingofModernEurope: Strengths,Constraints andResolutions,University
of Bradford Peace Research Report no. 26, Bradford: University of Bradford, 1991.
Öniz, Z., ‘Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey’s JDP in Perspective’ in: Peter Bur-
nell (ed.), GlobalizingDemocracy: Party Politics in EmergingDemocracies, London: Routledge,
2006, pp. 1–27.
Otterbeck, Jonas, ‘TheDepiction of Islam in Sweden’,TheMuslimWorld, 2002 (Vol. 92), pp. 143–
156.
Özyürek, E., ‘Convert alert: GermanMuslims and Turkish Christians as threats to security in
the new Europe’, Comparative Studies in Society andHistory, 2009 (Vol. 51, No. 1), pp. 91–116.
Pace, Michelle, ‘Imagining Co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of Dia-
logue’,Mediterranean Politics, 2005 (Vol. 10, No. 3), pp. 291–312.
Pagden, A. & J. Lawrence (eds.), PoliticalWritings, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Pancevski, Bojan, ‘Saudis fund Balkan Muslims spreading hate of the West’, TimesOnline,
March 28 2010.
bibliography | 333
Panzac, Daniel, Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800–1820, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2005.
Parekh, Bhikhu, Europe, Liberalism and the “MuslimQuestion”, Leiden: ISIM&AmsterdamUni-
versity Press, 2008.
, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Houndmills/Lon-
don: Macmillan Press, 2000.
Pargeter, Alison, TheNewFrontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, London/NewYork: I.B. Tau-
ris, 2008.
Parvev, Ivan,HabsburgsandOttomansbetweenViennaandBelgrade, 1683–1789,NewYork:Colum-
bia University Press, 1995.
Peev, Y., ‘Courants islamiques en Bulgarie’, Les Annales de l’Autre Islam, 1997 (No. 4), pp. 183–197.
Perica, Vjekoslav, Balkan Idols. Religion andNationalism in Yugoslav States, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
Perkins, Mary Anne, Christendom And European Identity: The Legacy Of A Grand Narrative Since
1789, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004.
Perry, Mary Elizabeth, ‘Moriscos and the Limits of Assimilation’ in: Salma Khadra Jayyusi
(ed.), The Legacy ofMuslim Spain, Leiden: Brill, 1992, pp. 274–289.
, The handless maiden:Moriscos and the politics of religion in early modern Spain, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005.
Peter, Frank (ed.), Authorizing Islam in Europe (MuslimWorld, special edition), 2006, (Vol. 96).
, ‘Individualization and Religious Authority in Western European Islam’, Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, 2006 (Vol. 17, No. 1), pp. 105–118.
Peters, Edward, Inquisition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
Peters, Rudolph, Jihad inMedieval andModern Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1977.
Petrovich,Michael,AHistory ofModernSerbia: 1804–1918,NewYork:HarcourtBrace Javanovich,
1976.
Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, Heinrich, A Short History of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna,
Vienna: Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 2008.
Pick, Thomas M., Anne Speckhard & Beatrice Jacuch, Home-Grown Terrorism: Understanding
and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation Among Groups With an Immigrant Heritage in
Europe, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009
Pinson,Mark (ed.),TheMuslims ofBosnia-Herzegovina.TheirHistoricDevelopment from theMiddle
Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993.
Pirenne,Henri,Mahomet et Charlemagne: Byzance, Islam etOccident dans le hautMoyenAge, Paris:
Jaca Books, 1987.
Pisoiu, Daniela, Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: AnOccupational Change Process, London: Rout-
ledge, 2013.
Pogonowski, Iwo, Poland: a Historical Atlas, New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987.
334 | bibliography
Potz, Richard, ‘Covenental and Non-Covenental Cooperation of State and Religions in Aus-
tria’ in: Richard Puza & Norman Doe (eds.), Religion and Law in Dialogue, Leuven: Uitgev-
erij Peeters, 2006, pp. 11–19.
Poumarède, Geraud, Pour en Finir avec la Croisade: mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs aux
XVIe et XVIIe siècles, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004.
Powell, James, Muslims under Latin Rule, 1100–1300, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990.
, ‘Frederick II and the Rebellion of theMuslims of Sicily, 1220–1224’,Uluslararasi Haçli
Seferleri Sempozyumu, 23–25 June 1997, Istanbul, pp. 13–22.
Powers, Gerard F., ‘Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia and Yu-
goslavia’, Journal of International Affairs, 1996 (Vol. 50, No. 1), pp. 221–252.
Qaradawi, Yusuf Al-, Fiqh of Muslim Minorities: Contentious Issues & Recommended Solutions,
Al-Falah for Translation Publications Distribution, 2003.
Quataert, Donald, The Ottoman Empire 1700–1922, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005.
Ragaru, N., ‘Islam et coexistence communautaire en Bulgarie’ in: Bougarel, X. & N. Clayer,
Le nouvel Islam balkanique – Les musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990–2000, Paris:
Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001, pp. 241–288.
Rais, Mahmoud, The Representation of the Turk in English Renaissance Drama, Thesis Cornell
University, 1973.
Ramadan, Tariq, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009.
,WesternMuslims and the Future of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Rambo, Lewis R., ‘Theories of Conversion: Understanding and Interpreting Religious
Change’, Social Compass, 1999 (Vol. 46, No. 3), pp. 259–271.
Ramet, Sabrina Petra, Balkan Babel. Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia, Boulder/San
Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press, 1992.
Rath, J., R. Penninx, K. Groenendijk, & A. Meyer, Western Europe and Its Islam: The Social Re-
action to the Institutionalization of “New Religion” in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United
Kingdom, Leiden: Brill, 2001.
Rawls, J., ‘The priority of rights and the idea of good’, Philosophy andPublic Affairs, 1988 (Vol. 17),
pp. 251–276.
Raz, J., Ethics in the public domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994.
, TheMorality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Reeber, M., ‘Les khutbas de la diaspora: enquete sur les tendencies de la predication dans les
mosques en France et dans plusieurs pays d’Europe occidentale’ in: F. Dassetto, Paroles
bibliography | 335
d’ Islam – Individus, Societes et Discours dans l’ Islam europeen contemporain / Islamic Words –
Individuals, Societies and Discourse in Contemporary European Islam, Paris: Maisonneuve &
Larose, 2000,
Rehman, Fatima Tabassum & Sophia F. Dziegielewski, ‘Women Who Choose Islam. Issues,
Changes, and Challenges in Providing Ethnic-Diverse Practice’, International Journal of
Mental Health, 2003 (Vol. 32), pp. 31–49.
Renan, Ernest, L’ Islamisme et la Science, Paris: Calmann Levy, 1883.
Riley-Smith, Jonathan, The Oxford History of the Crusades, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002.
Roald, Anne Sofie, ‘The conversion process in stages: new Muslims in the twenty-first cen-
tury’, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 2012 (Vol. 23, No. 3), pp. 347–362.
Rodinson, Maxime, Europe and theMystique of Islam, London: Tauris, 1988.
,Muhammad: Prophet of Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002
Rohe, Matthias, MuslimMinorities and the Law in Europe: Chances and Challenges, Global Media
Publications, 2007.
, ‘Reasons for theApplicationof Sharia in theWest’ in:Maurits S. Berger (ed.),Applying
Shariʾa in theWest. Facts, fears and figures, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013, pp. 25–46.
Roose, Eric, ‘Fifty Years of Mosque Architecture in the Netherlands’, Electronic Journal of Ori-
ental Studies, 2005 (Vol. 8), pp. 1–46.
Rothman,E.Nathalie, ‘InterpretingDragomans: Boundaries andCrossings in theEarlyMod-
ernMediterranean’, Comparative Studies in Society andHistory, 2009 (Vol. 51, No. 4), pp. 771–
800.
Rotman, Youval, Byzantine slavery and the Mediterranean World, Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 2009.
Rouillard, ClarenceD.,TheTurk inFrench history, thought and literature (1520–1660), Paris: Boivin,
1940.
Roy, Jean-Henry& JeanDeviosse, LaBataille de Poitiers: Trente journées qui ont fait laFrance, Paris:
Gallimard, 1966.
Roy,Olivier, ‘AClash of Cultures or aDebate onEurope’s Values’, ISIMNewsletter, 2005 (Vol. 15),
pp. 6–7.
, ‘Islam in Europe: Clash of religions or convergence of religiosities?’ in: Krzysztof
Michalski (ed.), Religion in the New Europe, Volume 2, New York: Central European Univer-
sity Press, 2006, pp. 131–142.
,Globalized Islam: The Search for aNewUmmah, Columbia: Columbia University Press,
2006.
, Secularism confronts Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
, Vers un islam europeen, Paris: Editions Esprit, 1999.
336 | bibliography
Runnymede Commission Report, ‘Islamophobia: a challenge for us all’, London: Runnymede
Trust, 1997.
Ruthven, Malise, ‘ “Born-again” Muslims: cultural schizophrenia’, Open Democracy, 10 Sep-
tember 2009 (online publication: http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-islamicworld/
article_103.jsp).
Sabbides, Alexes, Byzantium in the Near East: its relations with the Seljuk sultanate of Rum in
Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, ad c.1192–1237, Thessalonike: Kentron
Buzantrinon Ereunon, 1981.
Sahas, Daniel, Byzantium and Islam: An Encounter of two Theocracies: mutual administration and
exclusion, Toronto: Greek Canadian Association of Constantinople, 1993.
Said, Edward,Orientalism.Western Concepts of the Orient, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
,Cultureand Imperialism, London:RandomHouse, 1993 (repr. byVintageBooks in 1994).
Saliba, George, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, Boston: MIT Press,
2007.
Salvatore, Armando, ‘Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the Enlighten-
ment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam’, Muslim World, special
edition ‘Islam and Authority in Europe’, 2006 (Vol. 96), pp. 543–561.
Samad, A. Yunas & Kasturi Sen (eds.), Islam in the European Union: Transnationalism, Youth and
theWar on Terror, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Savage, TimothyM., ‘Europe and Islam: CrescentWaxing, Cultures Clashing’,TheWashington
Quarterly, 2004 (Vol. 27), pp. 25–50.
Sayyad, Nezar Al- & Manuel Castells (eds.), Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam. Politics, Culture, and
Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002.
Sayyid, Salman, ‘BeyondWestphalia: Nations andDiasporas – the Case of theMuslimUmma’
in: B. Hesse,UnsettledMulticulturalisms:Diasporas, Entanglements, Transruptions, NewYork:
Zed Books, 2000.
, Thinking Through Islamophobia, London: Hurst & Co., 2010.
Shah, P., Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with Cultural Diversity in Law, London: Cavendish,
Glasshouse, 2005.
Shatzmiller, Maya (ed.), Islam and Bosnia. Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic
States, Montreal & Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002.
Shmuelevitz, Aryeh,The Jews of theOttomanEmpire in the Late Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Century,
Leiden: Brill, 1984.
Saunders, John, AHistory ofMedieval Islam, London: Routledge, 1965.
Schechtman, Joseph, ‘Compulsory Transfer of the TurkishMinority fromBulgaria’, Journal of
Central European Affairs, 1952 (Vol. 12), pp. 154–169.
Schlueter, E., B. Meuleman & E. Davidov, ‘Immigrant integration policies and perceived
bibliography | 337
Group Threat: A multilevel study of 27 Western and Eastern European Countries’, Social
Science Research, 2013 (Vol. 42, No. 3), pp. 670–682.
Schwanitz, Wolfgang G., Djihad made in Germany: Deutsche Islampolitik im 19. Und 20. Jahrhun-
dert. Politik, Wirtschaft, Militär und Kultur, Berlin: Trafo, 2005.
Schwoebel, Robert, The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk, Nieuwkoop:
B. de Graaf, 1967.
Scott,H.M.TheEmergence of Eastern Powers 1756–1775, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,
2002.
Sedgwick, Mark,Muhammad Abduh, London: Oneworld Publications, 2009.
Selby, Jennifer, ‘Hijab’ in: Jocelyne Cesari (ed.), TheOxfordHandbook of European Islam, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012.
Sell, Louis, SlobodanMilosevic and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham/London: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 2002.
Sells, Michael, ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion, and Violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina’,
Sociology of Religion, 2003 (Vol. 64, No. 3), pp. 309–331.
Setton, KennethM., ‘Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril’, Balkan Studies, 1962 (Vol. 2), pp. 133–
168.
,WesternHostility to IslamandProphecies ofTurkishDoom, Philadelphia: AmericanPhilo-
sophical Society, 1992.
Shachar, Ayelet, ‘Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale fromReligious Arbitration in Fam-
ily Law’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2008, (Vol. 9), pp. 573–607.
Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities:
Muslims in the European Union, Leuven: Peeters, 2002.
(eds.), Islam and Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in
Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996.
(eds.),Religious Freedomand the Position of Islam inWesternEurope, Kampen: Kok Pharos,
1995.
(eds.), The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos,
1991.
, ‘The Negative Image of Islam and Muslims in the West’ in: W.A.R. Shadid and
P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of
Islam in the European Union, Leuven: Peeters, 2002.
Shah-Kazemi& SoniaNurin,Untying theKnot,MuslimWomen,Divorce and the Shariah, Nuffield
Foundation, 2001.
Shaw, Stanford, ‘The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914’, International Journal
ofMiddle Eastern Studies, 1978 (Vol. 9, No. 3), pp. 323–338.
Sholod, Barton, Charlemagne in Spain: The Cultural Legacy of Roncesvalles, Geneva: Droz, 1966.
338 | bibliography
Shryock, Andrew, Islamophobia/Islamophilia: Beyond the Politics of Enemy and Friend, Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 2010.
Silvestri, Sara, ‘EU Relations with Islam in the Context of the EMP’s Cultural Dialogue’,
Mediterranean Politics, 2005 (Vol. 10, No. 3), pp. 385–405.
Smit, Timothy James, Commerce and Coexistence: Muslims in the Economy and Society of Norman
Sicily, (dissertation), University of Minnesota, 2009.
Sokolovic, Dzemal, ‘How to Conceptualize the Tragedy of Bosnia: Civil, Ethnic, Religious
War or …?’, War Crimes, Genocide, & Crimes against Humanity, 2005 (Vol. 1, No. 1), pp. 115–
130.
Somun, Hajrudin, ‘Wahhabism in the Balkans: a threat to regional stability?’, Today’s Zaman,
4 March 2010.
Southern, Richard, Western views of Islam in the Middle Ages, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1962.
Spencer, C., ‘Europe and political Islam: defining threats and evolving policies’ in:M. Kramer
(ed.), The Islamism Debate, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997.
Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith. Explaining the Human Side of Religion, Berke-
ley/London: University of California Press, 2000.
Steyn,Mark,LightsOut: Islam,Free SpeechAndTheTwilightOfEurope,Montreal: StockadeBooks,
2009.
Stoianovich, Traian, ‘The conqueringBalkanOrthodoxMerchant’, Journal of EconomicHistory,
1960 (Vol. 20, No. 2), pp. 234–313.
Stoye, John (1964), The Siege of Vienna: The Last Great Trial Between Cross & Crescent, London:
Collins, 1964.
Sugar, Peter, South-eastern Europe under ottoman Rule, 1354–1804, Seattle/London: University of
Washington Press, 1977.
Sunier, Thijl, ‘Constructing Islam: Places of Worship and the Politics of Space in the Nether-
lands’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2005 (Vol. 13, No. 3), pp. 317–334.
&N. Landman,Diyanet, the TurkishDirectorate for Religious Affairs in a changing environ-
ment, Amsterdam/Utrecht: VU University and Utrecht University, 2011.
Taggar, Yehuda, TheMufti of Jerusalem and Palestine Arab Politics, 1930–1937, New York: Garland
Publications, 1987.
Tahzib-Lie, Bahia, ‘The European definition of freedomof religion or belief ’,HelsinkiMonitor,
1998 (Vol. 9), pp. 17–27.
Taylor, Charles, ‘Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ ’ in: A. Guttmann (ed.),
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Tebbakh, Sonia,Muslims in the EU – Cities Report: France, Open Society Institute, 2007.
bibliography | 339
Temel, Safiye, Greek-Turkish Population Exchange: An Analysis of the Conflict Leading to the Ex-
change, Thesis Standfort University, 1949.
Tenniswood,Adrian,Pirates ofBarbary:Corsairs,Conquests andCaptivity in theSeventeenth-Century
Mediterranean, London: Riverhead Trade, 2011.
Thornton, Bruce,Decline&Fall: Europe’s SlowMotion Suicide, NewYork: Encounter Books, 2007.
Tibi, Bassam, Political Islam,World Politics and Europe, New York: Routledge, 2008.
Tietze, Andreas, Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen, Vienna: Verlag des Verbandes der wis-
senschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1985.
Tolan, John, Saint Francis and the Sultan: the curious history of a Christian-Muslim encounter, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
, Sons of Ishmael: Muslims through European eyes in the Middle Ages, Gainesville: Univer-
sity Press of Florida, 2008.
, Saracens. Islam in theMedieval European Imagination, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002.
,Medieval Christian perceptions of Islam: a book of essays, New York: Routledge, 2000.
Toledano, Ehud, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840–1890, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982.
Toumarkine, Alexandre, Les Migrations des Populations Musulmanes Balkaniques en Anatolie
(1876–1913), Istanbul: Editions Isis, 1995.
Toynbee, Arnold, ‘The Ottoman Empire in World History’, Proceedings of the American Philo-
sophical Society, 1955 (Vol. 99, No. 3), pp. 119–126.
, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. A Study in the Contact of Civilizations, New
York: H. Fertig, 1970.
Treadgold, Warren, A Concise History of Byzantium, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, The Rise of Christian Europe, London: Thames and Hudson, 1965.
Tsitselikis K., Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers,
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012.
Tyler, Aaron, Islam, theWest, and Tolerance, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Udovicki, Jasminka & James Ridgeway (eds.), Burn this House. The Making and Unmaking of
Yugoslavia, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1997.
U.K. Government, The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England. Stopping people
becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists, HMSO London, 2008.
UK Home Office, Improving Opportunity; Strengthening Society: The Government’s strategy to in-
crease race equality and community cohesion, January 2005.
Vangeli, Anastas, ‘Religion, Nationalism and Counter-secularization: The Case of the Mace-
donianOrthodoxChurch’, Identity Studies, 2010 (Vol. 2), pp. 1–15 (available online at: http://
identitystudies.iliauni.edu.ge/?page_id=11).
340 | bibliography
Varisco, Daniel Martin, Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid, Seattle: Washington Univer-
sity Press, 2007.
Vasil’ev, Alexander, Henri Grégoire & Marius Canard (eds.), Byzance et les Arabes, Bruxelles:
Éditions de l’ Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales, 1935.
Vaughan, Dorothy, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, Liverpool: University Press Liver-
pool, 1954.
Velikonja,Mitja,Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Texas: A&M
University Press, 1992.
Verlinden, Charles, L’ esclavage dans l’Europemédiévale, Tome I: Péninsule Ibérique-France, Bruges:
Persée, 1955.
Versteegh, Kees, ‘The Arab presence in France and Switzerland in the 10th century’, Arabica,
1990 (Vol. 37, No. 3), pp. 359–388.
Vertovec, Steven, ‘Diaspora, Transnationalism and Islam: Sites of Change and Modes of re-
search’ in: Stefano Allievi & JørgenNielsen (eds.),MuslimNetworks and Transnational Com-
munities in and across Europe, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003, pp. 312–326.
, Transnationalism, London: Routledge, 2009.
&Alisdair Rogers (eds.),MuslimEuropeanYouth:ReproducingEthnicity,Religion,Culture,
London: Ashgate, 1998.
& Charles Peach (eds.), Islam in Europe. The politics of religion and community, Lon-
don/Basingstoke: MacMillan & St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
Vielau, Helmut-Wolfhardt, Luther und der Türke, Göttingen: Buchdruckerei von J. Särchen,
1936.
Vitkus, Daniel (ed.), Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary CaptivityNarratives fromEarlyMod-
ern England, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
Voetius, ‘Over het mohammedanisme’ in: J. van Amersfoort & W.J. van Asselt (eds.), Liever
Turks dan Paaps? De visies van Johannes Coccejus, Gisbertus Voetius en Adrianus Relandus op de
islam, Zoetermeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 1997.
Volpi, F., ‘Regional community building and the transformation of international relations:
the case of theEuro-MediterraneanPartnership’,MediterraneanPolitics, 2004 (Vol. 9,No. 2),
pp. 145–164.
Vrcan, Srdjan, ‘The War in ex-Yugoslavia and Religion’, Social Compass, 1994 (Vol. 41, No. 3),
pp. 413–422.
Vreg, F., ‘Iluzije o evropskem multikulturalizmu’, Teorija in praksa, 1993 (Vol. 30, No. 7–8),
pp. 659–663.
Vryonis, Spyros, ‘Religious change and continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the
fourteenth through the sixteenth century’ in: Speros Vyronis Jr. (ed.), Islam and Cultural
Change in theMiddle Ages, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973.
bibliography | 341
, ‘Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans: 14th–16th Centuries’ in: H. Birn-
baum & S. Vryonis (eds.), Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change, Paris/The Hague:
Mouton, 1972.
, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the
Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century, Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1971.
Waardenburg, Jacques, L’ Islamdans lemiroir de l’Occident:Comment quelques orientalistes occiden-
taux se sont penchés sur l’ Islam et se sont formé une image de cette religion: I. Goldziher, C. Snouck
Hurgronje, C.H. Becker, D.B.MacDonald, LouisMassignon, Paris: Mouton, 1963.
, Muslims as Actors: Islamic Meanings and Muslim Interpretations in the Perspective of the
Study of Religions, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.
,Muslims andOthers – Relations in Context, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003.
Walzer, Michael,On tolerance, NewHaven/London: Yale University Press, 1997.
Warraq, Ibn,Defending theWest: A Critique of Edward Said, New York: Prometheus Books, 2007.
Watson, Andrew, Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World. The Diffusion of Crops and
Farming Techniques, 700–1100, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Watson, William, Tricolor and Crescent: France and the IslamicWorld, Westport: Praeger Publish-
ers, 2003.
Waugh, Scott & Peter Diehl (eds.), Christendom and its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution and
Rebellion, 1000–1500, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Werbner, Pnina, Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims: The Public Performance of Pak-
istani Transnational Identity Politics, Oxford: James Currey, 2002.
Wheatcroft, Andrew, The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe, Lon-
don: Pimlico, 2009.
Wintle, Michael (ed.), Culture and Identity in Europe, Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.
Wolf, Kenneth Baxter, Christian Martyrs in Muslim Spain, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988.
, Conquerors and Chroniclers of Early Medieval Spain, Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 1990.
, ‘Mohammed as Antichrist in Ninth-Century Cordoba’ in: Mark D. Meyerson &
Edward D. English (eds.), Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain.
Interaction and Cultural Change, Notre Dame (I.): University of Notre Dame Press, 2000,
pp. 3–19.
Woltering, Robert,Occidentalisms in the Arabworld: ideology and images of theWest in the Egyptian
media, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Yalcinkaya,MehmetA.,TheFirst PermanentOttomanEmbassy inEurope, Istanbul: The Isis Press,
2010.
342 | bibliography
Yeʾor, Bat, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, Madison (NJ): Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,
2005.
, The Dhimmī: Jews and Christians under Islam, London/Toronto: Associated University
Press, 1983.
Yıldırım, Onur, Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Popula-
tions, 1922–1934, New York: Routledge, 2006.
Yilmaz, I., ‘The challenge of post-modern legality and Muslim legal pluralism in England’,
Journal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 2002 (Vol. 28), pp. 343–354.
Yurdusev,Nuri, ‘Perceptions and Images inTurkish (Ottoman)-EuropeanRelations’ in: Tareq
Yousif Ismael & Mustafa Aydin (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A
Changing Role in theWorld, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003, pp. 77–100.
Ziaki, Angeliki, ‘Greece: Debate and Challenges’ in: Maurits S. Berger (ed.), Applying Shariʾa in
theWest. Facts, fears and figures, Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013, pp. 125–139.
Züricher, Erik Jan, Turkey: a modern history, London: Tauris & Co, 1993, repr. 2005.
Index
Abbasids, 42, 62







Adriatic Sea, 53, 112, 129, 134, 136, 138
aggression in Islam, aggressive Islam,




Albania, 18, 117, 119, 156, 166, 169, 174, 200,
206




Algeria, 168, 218, 221
Algiers, 129, 134
Alphonso VI, King, 86
America, Americans, 151, 194, 195, 204,
219, 220, 224, 234, 237, 249
Amin Hussain, 178
Andalus, 41–43, 43, 46, 49, 51, 55,
74–76
anti-Semitism, 179, 212, 228, 229, 298
Antichrist, 24, 64, 71
Apocalypse, 71, 144
apostasy, apostates, 50, 85, 90, 164, 204
Arab Spring, 220
Arabs, 43, 45, 47, 52, 54, 56, 62, 74, 103–104,
242
architecture, Islamic, 23, 103, 115, 145, 196,
204, 205, 229
Arianism, 98
Armenian, Armenians, 120, 154, 166, 173,
176, 185, 223
Asia, 18, 38, 40, 43, 58, 70, 79, 80, 101, 110,
151, 152, 180, 184, 186, 187, 194, 218, 223,
224, 234, 240, 241
assimilation, 85–88, 115, 124, 127, 172, 202,
208, 214, 229
asylum, 61, 197, 221
Austria, 164, 167, 176, 284
autonomy, religious communal, 48, 49,
54, 77, 85, 86, 87, 119, 160, 162–165, 174,
209, 300
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), 99, 104
Avicenna (Ibn Sina), 99, 104
Ayasofia, SeeHaga Sophia
Baghdad, 38, 39, 53, 62, 218
BalkanWars, 130, 153, 154, 167, 169, 172,
184, 240
Balkans, 19, 20, 62, 109, 110, 116–120, 156,
172–174, 196, 197
Baltics, Baltic states, 73, 80, 82, 114
banks, bankers, 36, 93, 94, 123
Barbarossa, Hayder, 134, 136
Barbary
corsairs, 16, 55, 126, 129, 133, 134, 140
states, 140, 141
Belarus, 80, 113, 200
344 | index
Belgium, 199, 202, 209, 250
Beethoven, 182
beraʾt, 162, 165
Berber, 41–42, 43, 74, 134, 202
Berlin, 175, 178, 226
Congress, 169
Bible, 31, 64, 182
Black Sea, 61, 81, 101, 118, 134, 167
Bosnia-Hercegovina, See Bosnia
Bosnia, 18, 117, 119, 156, 157, 163, 164,
165, 167, 169, 174, 179, 206, 214,
221
Bosniaks, 159, 163–164, 168, 169, 197, 202,
214, 215, 222
boy levy (dev̧sirme), 118–119, 157, 159, 269
Bulgaria, Bulgarian, 79, 156, 159, 163, 166,
168, 169, 172, 173, 176, 185, 199, 206, 209,
214, 215, 216
burka, See veil, full-face
Byzantine Empire, 36, 37–38, 40–41, 53, 61,
62, 69, 74, 78, 79, 83, 95, 98, 110–111, 120,
184
Cairo, 61, 70, 79, 84
caliph, caliphate, 35, 38, 41–42, 52, 54,
60–62, 70, 74, 75, 118, 121, 152, 155, 279




Carolingians, 37, 52, 59, 61, 62, 133
Catholic Church, see Church
Catholics
and the ‘Turk’, 16
French protectorate of, 161
in the Ottoman Empire, 79, 87, 88,
109, 125, 166, 240
on war against the Ottomans, 75, 143
views of the Ottomans, 92, 186
Charlemagne, 36, 37, 44, 54, 62, 63, 218
Charles V, King, 109, 127, 129, 135
China, Chinese, 31, 38, 180





family of nations, 185
Christianity, 14, 25–28, 36–37, 40–42, 44,
46, 48, 50–51, 54, 62, 64, 69, 71, 80, 82,
85, 90–92, 98–102, 109, 114, 118, 121,
124–125, 144, 146–147, 164, 171, 183, 184,
186, 188, 194, 216, 227, 233
Church
Catholic, 36, 72, 87–88, 109, 121, 125,
145
Orthodox, 71, 78, 118, 120, 121, 166, 216
churches
converted to mosques, 121, 123, 136




in the Ottoman Empire, 119, 122, 163,
165, 166
in the West, 226, 229
civil society, 157
civilization, 14–15, 29, 30, 35, 187–188,
215
Arab-Norman, 77
Arab-Islamic, 42–43, 69, 103, 144
Arab, 97
Byzantine, 37, 44
Christian, 28, 58, 71, 233
index | 345
European, 19, 30, 35, 59, 69, 104, 185,
186, 226, 230
European-Christian, 69, 103
Islamic, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 30, 40,
42, 45, 92, 104, 168, 180, 182–184,
188, 239
Judeo-Christian, 226, 246
cizye, See poll tax
cleansing, religious and ethnic, 76, 82,
124, 161, 166, 171–174, 214
clergy
Christian, 36, 69, 71, 72, 73, 87, 125,
126, 127, 144, 146, 194
Islamic, 174, 187, 188, 204, 210
coexistence, 22, 28, 40, 44, 76, 81, 82, 84,
114, 123, 156, 214, 242, 245
coffee house, 181
collective memory, 16–17, 53, 57, 58, 59, 80,
131, 133
colonialism, colonial rule, 20, 30, 43,
81, 88, 112, 151–153, 171, 178–180, 183,
186–188, 235, 241
commerce, 22, 26, 38–39, 40, 48, 52, 60, 61,
63, 70, 78, 83, 94, 115, 123, 128, 154, 157,
159, 160, 162, 218
between Byzantine and Islamic
Empires, 41, 60, 78, 95
between Europe and Islamic Empire,
62, 70
between Europe and Ottoman
Empires, 93–95, 113, 128, 136–139,
174–176
commonwealth, Christian, 18, 19, 97, 109,
132, 135, 143, 230
Constantinople, 31, 37, 39, 40, 42, 53, 62,
79, 95, 130, 136
Muslims in, 47, 60, 83, 116, 121
sacked by crusaders, 35, 78
siege of, 41, 59, 69, 74, 112
contamination, religious, 82, 87, 89–90
consul, consulates, 139, 161, 165
see also embassies
conversion, 90, 97, 101, 102, 243
forced, 20, 44, 57, 59, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91,
113, 118, 172, 241, 242
to Christianity amongMuslims,
75–76, 82, 85, 88, 90–92, 101, 102,
124, 125, 128, 242
to Christianity in Europe, 37, 41, 44,
46, 69, 73, 76, 82, 97, 164
to Christianity in Ottoman Empire,
87, 116, 118
to Islam among Tatars, 81
to Islam in Balkans, 117
to Islam inmodern Europe, 50,
203–204, 248
to Islam in Ottoman Empire, 116–118,
121, 123, 140–141
to Islam in Spain, 41, 49–50, 75
to Islam in the Islamic Empire,
44–46
convivencia, 74–76, 86, 89
Copernicus, 104
Cordoba, 48, 51, 61
caliphate of, 54, 55, 62, 70, 74, 75, 83,
118, 218
emirate of, 42, 62
martyrs of, 50–51, 102
corsairs, See pirates
Cossack(s), 81, 113, 114, 129, 134
Council of Europe, 18, 194, 222
council, sharia, See sharia council
see also courts, religious
courts, religious, 123, 166, 174, 210, 233, 241
346 | index
Crete, 53, 96, 122, 159, 166, 170
Crimea, 114
CrimeanWar, 167, 179, 185
criticism, of Islam, 23, 51, 162, 186, 202,
205, 211–213, 226, 227–229, 237
Croatia, Croats, 112, 129, 166, 197, 213–215
Crusades, Crusaders, 17, 25, 47, 63, 70, 72,
78, 79–80, 97, 101, 102, 110, 143–144, 240,
242
and trade, 93–95
First, 61, 63–64, 72–73, 83–84, 93, 218,
240
in Europe, 73, 75, 81, 82, 97, 129,
143–144
see also Reconquista
Cyprus, 96, 112, 121, 138, 139
Damascus, 35, 38, 42, 101
Danish cartoons, 224
debates, theological, 63, 100, 101
defamation, of religion, 212, 216, 224–225,
229




dev̧sirme, See boy levy
dhimmi, 48–49, 49, 76, 77, 80, 82, 85, 119,
120, 123, 160, 162, 164, 165
dialogue, 102, 218
see also debates, theological
EU-Arab, 219
interreligious, 219
diplomats, diplomacy, 22, 24, 40, 52,
59–62, 63, 112, 128, 142–143, 160,
173–175, 177, 187, 224
see also consul; embassy
discrimination, non-, 212, 213, 245
discrimination, 48, 85, 88, 122, 158, 225
against Christians, 121, 123
against Jews, 47
against Muslims, 76, 86, 91, 217, 227
dragoman, 161, 162
dress codes, laws, 51, 158, 165
Dubrovnik, 112, 122, 134, 138
Duchy of Lithuania, see Lithuania
Duchy of Moscovy, seeMoscow
Dutch Republic, 83, 127, 135, 137–138, 151,
182
see alsoNetherlands
Edirne, 110, 154, 174, 176
Egypt, 70, 102, 118, 138, 152, 168, 177, 182
El Cid, 74
embassy, embassies, 55, 59–60, 135, 174,
175, 239
emir, emirate, 41–43, 60, 62, 70, 74–75, 83,
152, 168
England, English, 82, 121, 124, 127, 135,
144, 145, 151, 152, 198, 294
Enlightenment, 30, 142, 182, 186
equality, 85, 158, 164–165, 177, 186, 206, 212,
231–232, 244, 247, 249
ethnicity, 55, 157, 159, 197, 202, 215
Eurabia, 199
Europe-Mediterranean Partnership, 219
Europe, Council of, 18, 194, 222
Europe
Christian, 16, 59, 63, 71, 80, 82, 97,
99–100, 102, 109, 132, 164, 177, 224,
240, 246




European Convention on Human
Rights, 194, 207, 212, 231
European Union, 18, 193, 199, 200, 218,
219, 224
Convention of the, 14
Turkishmembership of, 131, 185, 218,
222–224
exchange of population, 61, 113, 173
exotic, exoticism, 181, 182, 186
expulsion, deportation, 20, 76, 83, 85, 104,
109, 124, 159, 168, 173, 241, 246
of Jews from Spain, 242
of Moriscos from Spain, 128
of Muslims from Sicily, 78, 91, 92
of Muslims from Spain, 88, 91,
126–128
of Muslims from Sicily, 78, 91, 92
extremists, Muslim, 196, 198, 203, 213,
216–217, 218–221, 230, 235
Fatimid, Fatimids, 61, 70
fatwa, 131, 171, 237, 279




fiqh al-aqalliyat, Seeminority fiqh
Fitna (movie), 224, 225
Florence, 95, 100
fondaco, see funduq
France, French, 16, 37, 53–55, 58, 61, 62,
77, 95, 110, 113, 124, 132, 135–137, 139,
152, 161, 167, 168, 175, 177, 179, 181,
199, 200, 202, 206–208, 211, 221, 223,
250
Francis I, King, 109, 135–136
Francis of Assisi, 102
Franciscans, 102
Franks, 37, 58, 62, 74, 92, 160
Frederick II, Emperor, 77, 82
freedom, 30, 166, 177, 186, 194, 220, 232,
237, 244
of expression, opinion, 178, 212–213,
216, 225
of religion, 40, 47, 48, 49, 80, 87, 88, 91,
115, 119, 120, 140, 145, 160, 163, 164,
194, 204, 208–211, 214, 221, 227, 234,
242, 249




Genoa, Genoese, 60, 78, 95, 110
Germany, German, 41, 53–54, 73, 79,
81, 112–113, 124, 132, 153–155, 168,
171, 176, 178–179, 199–200, 207, 209,
217–218
ghazza, ghazi, 56, 129, 130
Gibbon, Edward, 57, 59, 183
globalism, globalization, 21, 176, 193, 197,
198, 221, 224, 237, 247
Goethe, 182
Granada, 74, 75, 83, 88, 90, 91, 124, 125
Greece, 20, 53, 167, 168, 174, 195, 196, 200,
208, 209
Greek
language, 37, 43, 79, 166
Muslims, 159, 166, 207
Orthodoxy, 72, 97, 166
see also Church, Orthodox
sciences, 38, 104–105
Greeks, 60, 77, 104, 111, 117, 122, 138, 154,
155, 159, 160, 163, 166, 170, 173
348 | index
Habsburgs, Habsburg dynasty, 109,




headscarf, 88, 115, 127, 205–206, 229, 234
see also veil, full-face
Henry VIII, King, 109, 121
heresy, heretics, 24, 26, 29, 71, 73, 82, 92,
101, 134, 242
Hindu(s), 202, 210, 247
Hittin, battle of, 17
Holland, SeeNetherlands
Holy Roman Empire, 16, 77, 110, 112, 114,
135–136
homo Islamicus, 188, 228
House of Wisdom, 39, 103
human rights, 194, 206, 210, 212, 222, 231,
249
Hungary, 69, 111, 113, 132, 167, 172, 176,
240
Iberian Peninsula, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 49,
57, 58, 61, 63, 73, 74, 76, 77, 195
see also Spain
Iceland, pirate raids on, 133, 134
iconoclasm, 47, 165, 172–174
identity, 15, 17, 51, 52, 75, 87, 92, 109, 188,
193, 204, 215, 216, 224, 226, 233, 240,
242, 243, 247, 248
European, 19, 29–31, 71, 104, 226, 231,
246
Muslim, 14, 21, 46, 56, 197–198,
200–202, 206, 208, 211, 228, 235,
244, 249
Ottoman, 115, 119, 120–123, 158, 163,
166
religious, 52, 197, 202, 232, 242, 247
imam, 101, 115, 174, 198, 217, 221
immigration, Seemigration
imperialism, 151–153
India, 38, 39, 152, 180
British, 152, 168, 177, 186
Indonesia, 152, 177, 178, 186, 188
infidel(s), 28, 29, 53, 57, 64, 73, 84, 87, 102,
109, 110, 129, 130, 135, 143, 144
see also pagan(s)
Inquisition, 71, 92, 125–128, 241
insurgency, see revolts
integration, 194, 196, 204, 205, 207–208,
217–218, 224, 228, 229, 231, 245,
248
intelligence services, 205, 217, 218
interbellum period, 69, 75
interest, ban on, 36
Internet, 55, 198, 199, 225, 236
Iran, 35, 123, 152, 153, 219, 222
Ishmaelites, 20
Islam, transnational, 197–198, 237
see also transnationalism
Islamic
courts, See sharia courts
institutions, 21, 39, 94, 160, 164, 166,
174, 177
orthodoxy of, 23, 220, 231, 232, 248,
249
religion, 14, 21, 23–28, 29, 30, 44, 46,
48, 49, 50, 55–57, 59, 83, 90, 98, 119,
122, 130–131, 144, 160, 164, 169–174,
182–183, 199, 200–202, 204, 205,
215, 233–234, 240, 242, 245–246,
248–250
theology, 26, 45, 92, 143, 177, 232,
236–237
index | 349
Islamic empire, 38–39, 41, 42, 45, 56, 61,
70, 80, 94
Islamic State (IS), 222
Istanbul, 119, 123, 164, 182, 218
population of, 117, 156
Italy, Italians, 49, 53, 54, 70, 77, 78, 91–96,
110, 136, 138, 168
Izetbegovic, 215
Janissaries, Janissary, 118, 121, 142, 153,
157–158
Jesus Christ, 44, 100, 145, 146, 183
Judaism, 28, 30, 44, 48, 50, 101, 194, 212
Jews
in Europe, 22, 44, 47, 61, 82, 83, 87, 124,
137, 209, 210, 229, 245
in Islam, 45, 98
in Sicily, 77
in Spain, 48, 75, 76, 86, 92, 124, 125,
128, 242
in the Ottoman Empire, 83, 116, 117,
120, 121, 122, 123, 134, 138, 158, 166,
176
Muslim, 116, 122, 159
jihad, 25, 56, 57, 129–131, 143, 171, 198, 203,
240
see alsowar, holy
jizya, See poll tax
Kosovo, 174, 206, 213, 214
Kurds, Kurdish, 20, 47, 202
Lateran Councils, 71, 87
Latin Kingdoms, 74, 79–80, 82, 87, 92–94
Latin rite, 37, 72, 241
Latin-Orthodox schism, 28
Lausanne, Treaty of, 173, 185
law, 57, 84, 86, 92, 158, 194, 212, 224,
232–234
Islamic, 28, 46, 48, 50, 51, 94, 103, 117,
120, 160, 161, 188, 203, 210
see also sharia
Islamic family, 48, 166, 207, 210
Lewis, Bernard, 14, 31, 199, 229, 240, 241
liberty, 158, 204, 210, 220, 231, 232, 234, 244,
245
Lipka Tatars, See Tatars
Lithuania, 16, 20, 73, 80–83, 113–114, 196,
209
London, 117, 175, 178, 181, 196
Louis XIV, King, 137, 181




see also Protestant(s), -ism
Macedonia, 169, 206, 216
Mahomet, SeeMohammed
Mahound, SeeMohammed
marriage, 115, 122, 146, 157, 201, 202,
203
betweenMuslim and Christian, 50,









media, 55, 181, 198, 199, 221, 225, 227,
299
350 | index
Mehmet II, sultan, 116, 121
Middle Ages, 14, 18, 20, 29, 36, 49, 72, 184
migration, 15, 17, 20, 35, 49, 59, 75, 83,
88, 92, 115, 122, 151, 173, 193, 196, 197,
202, 207–208, 218, 219, 228, 229, 244,
248
millennium, 69, 71, 78, 93, 97, 123
millet
communities, 157–159, 161, 162, 165,
166, 172
courts, 166
see also courts, religious
system, 119–120, 123, 154, 156, 160, 162,
163, 166, 172, 174, 209
minorities, 46
see also subjects
ethnic, 116, 158, 160, 170, 235, 245
religious, 46, 49, 51, 76, 81, 116, 119,




rule, 45, 46, 81, 82
missionaries, missionary activities, 44,
82, 91, 97, 102
Mohammed, 35, 50, 65, 94
biographies of, 183
European legends of, 98–99
Mohammedans, 20, 152, 180
Mongols, 79, 81, 101–102
Moors, Moorish, 16, 20, 53, 61, 74, 98, 240
Moriscos, 88, 109, 124–127, 137
Moroccan, Moroccan




mosques, 22, 23, 47, 86, 115, 121, 178, 202,
205, 217, 221, 236
destruction of, 47, 172, 173
converted to churches, 84
see also churches converted to
mosques
mozarabs, 51, 75, 76, 86
Mozart, 182
mudéjars, 76, 81, 85, 92
mufti, 174, 178, 209, 236
multiculturalism, 196, 207, 226
Muslim rule, 46, 49–51, 57, 60, 61, 64, 76,
77, 80, 83–84, 102, 241
end of, in Ottoman Europe, 89–90,
151
end of, in Sicily, 20, 74, 77




identity, 14, 21, 46, 56, 197–198,
200–202, 206, 208, 211, 228, 235,
244, 249
migrants in Europe, 14, 15, 196
powers, 19, 36, 38, 40, 70
puritan, 123, 201, 205, 206, 213
Muslims, number of
in Balkans, 117, 156
in Constantinople, 60, 83
in Europe, 14, 23, 199–200
in Ottoman Empire, 116–117, 156
in Sicily, 43, 78
in Spain, 51, 75–76, 92, 126, 128
in the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth, 114–115
in the West, 151
mustaʾmin, 160, 162
index | 351
Napoleon, 152, 168, 182, 185, 210
narrative, European, 30, 140, 226, 233, 246
nationalism, 120, 151, 154, 156, 163–164,
171, 178–179
nationality, 160, 162, 171, 207, 229
double, 198
Nazi sympathies, 178
Nestorian(-s, -ism), 98, 101–102
Netherlands, Dutch, 139, 151, 178, 199,
200, 202, 207, 209
niqab, See veil, full-face
Norman(s) in Sicily, 43, 77
Organization of Islamic Conference, 224
Oriental, 23, 181, 205, 229
Orientalism, 168, 180, 185–187, 235
Orthodox Church, see Church
Other, Othering, 21, 25, 27, 55, 64, 97, 105,
142, 180, 185, 202, 205, 226, 229, 239,
243, 246–248
definition of, 28–31
inclusive and exclusive, 180–186, 243
Otto I, King, 51, 55
Ottoman alliances
with England, 135
with France, 135–137, 175
with Sweden, 135
Ottoman relations with Europe
commercial, 112, 138, 139, 176
diplomatic, 174–176
Ottoman Empire, 110–113, 116–117,
122–123, 126, 140, 143, 153–155, 165,
167
pagan(s), 30, 45, 46, 64, 71, 73, 81, 82, 91, 97,
98, 101
pan-Islamism, 171, 189
Paris, 117, 175, 177, 178, 181
Patriarch, patriarchate, 118, 120
Pax Islamica, 38, 70
persecution, religious, 22, 26, 40, 49, 61,
71, 76, 83, 89, 90, 101, 114, 124, 125–126,
146, 212, 221, 241, 242
see also Inquisition
Persia, 40, 45, 47, 133, 182, 240
Peter the Venerable, 98, 101
Phillip II, King, 127
philosophy, philosophers, 77, 99, 104, 146,
183, 186
pilgrims, 54, 55, 142
pirates, 16, 53, 128, 129, 133–134, 140
Arab (Tunisian), 43, 53, 54, 134
Barbary, 16, 55, 126, 129, 133–134, 137,
140
Catholic Uskoks, 129, 134
Christian, 16, 53, 61, 133–134, 176
Muslim, 35, 43, 53, 55, 61, 73, 96, 173
Poitiers, Battle of, 16, 17, 57–59, 63, 131, 132,
229–230
Poland, Polish, 16, 20, 80, 81, 83, 113, 115,
137, 196
see also Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth




political parties, 211, see also AK Parti
Christian Democrat, 209, 211, 219, 223,
233
Islamic, 211, 223
poll tax ( jizya, cizye), 45–46, 48–49, 57, 85,
117, 119, 165
Pomaks, 159, 166, 202
352 | index
pope, 37, 47, 132, 145–146
Gregory VII, 71
Urban II, 218, 240
prisoners of war, Muslim, 47, 178
prophet Mohammed, SeeMohammed
Protestant(s), -ism, 16, 109, 110, 113, 122,
124, 125, 135, 137, 166, 170, 209, 201
views of holy war, 143–144
views of Islam, 145, 243
views of the Turk, 144–146
qadi, 115
Qaradawi, Yusuf, 211, 230, 237
Quran, 45, 48, 58, 72, 98, 99, 100, 245
radicalism, radicalization, 71, 144, 165,
196, 205, 211, 216, 217, 220, 221, 246
Ragusa SeeDubrovnik, 138
raids, 42–43, 52–55, 58, 61, 63, 95–96, 126,
129–130, 133–134, 230
Ramadan, Tariq, 211




Reconquista, 73, 76, 87, 124, 125, 240, 242
Reformation, 110, 143





resettlement, Ottoman policy of, 116, 117
revolts, 154, 163, 241, 243
against colonial rule, 188
against Arab-Norman rule in Sicily,
49, 78, 91
against Catholic rule in Spain, 88,
126–127
against Ottoman rule, 167, 168–170,
188, 241
Tatar, 115
Riccoldo daMonte di Croce, 100, 183
Roger II, King, 77, 95
Roman Empire, 35–37, 43, 122
see alsoHoly Roman Empire
Romania, 80, 112, 211
Rome, 35, 37, 62, 117, 129, 132
sack of, by Arab pirates, 54
rule of law, 177, 193–194, 231–232, 244
Rumeli, 112
Russia, Russian Empire, 18, 80, 84, 113,
114, 134, 135, 154, 161, 167
salafis, salafism, salafi, 201, 202, 205
Saloniki, 116, 122, 159
Saqaliba, 62, 118
Saracens, 20, 53–55, 58, 63–65, 74, 87,
98
Saudi Arabia, 222, 228
sciences
from previous civilizations, 104
Arab, 21, 39
European, 103, 177, 184
scourge of God, 146, 181
secularism, secularization, 30, 164,
170, 183, 186, 193, 194, 196, 200, 206,
208–211, 215, 222–223, 226, 227, 233, 234,
246–247, 248
securitization, 198, 218
security, 38, 70, 217–218, 219, 222, 235
national, 218, 223
segregation, 28, 49, 85, 86–89, 123, 206,
232, 244
index | 353
Serbia, Serbs, 159, 166, 172, 173, 197, 202,
213–214, 215
sharia, 232, 237
courts, councils, 23, 28, 48, 49, 60, 101,
119, 123, 165, 188, 210
Sicily, 35, 40, 53, 74, 91, 195
Arab-Normandic, 77–78, 92
Arab, 43, 45, 49
slave trade
Byzantine, 60–62





slaves, slavery, 48, 53, 89, 90, 96, 129, 133,
142, 186, 243
and conversion, 92
and ransom, 96, 139–141
and religion, 89
Christian, 16, 84, 87, 90, 126, 140
in North Africa, 49, 133–134, 140
in Ottoman Empire, 118, 133, 140
Muslim, 92, 95, 140, 177
soldiers, 118
see also boy levy
Slavs, 53, 62, 118
Slovenia, 112, 167, 169, 214
Sobieski, King Jan, 116, 132
Song of Roland, 53, 54, 63
Spain, 13, 31, 44, 45, 46, 54, 63, 96, 109, 110,
111, 114, 135, 137, 145, 151, 217, 240
see also Iberian Peninsula
Catholic, 16, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85–88,
91–92, 124–128, 159
Moorish, Muslim, 19–21, 42, 58, 64,
73, 74, 75, 77, 83, 97, 98, 196
Spanish Civil War, 179
subjects, 82, 88–89, 114, 151, 154, 157, 159,
164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 173, 241
see also citizens; minorities, 176
Christian, 90, 91, 185, 241
Muslim, 20, 46, 47, 76, 83–85, 87, 88,
158, 165, 178, 186, 195
non-Muslim, 45, 48, 57, 117, 118,
119–120, 122–123, 124, 145, 160,
161, 162, 163, 165, 169, 174
sufi Islam, Sufism, 118, 241
Suleyman theMagnificent, sultan, 145
sultan, sultanate, 102, 111, 116–117, 119, 121,
126, 129, 131–132, 134–135, 137–138, 143,
145, 152, 157–158, 165, 171, 173, 181, 185
Sweden, 135, 146, 199, 200
Switzerland, 54, 205
Syria, 99, 138, 168, 203, 205, 216
Tahtawi, Rifaʾa al, 177
Tanzimat, 165–166, 169, 185
Tatars, 80–81, 102, 114, 133, 134, 178
Lipka, 80, 115–116
taxes, 116–118, 157
see also poll tax
terrorism, terrorist, 14, 15, 24, 193, 198, 203,




Thrace (Greece), 173, 174, 200, 207
Toledo, 75, 86, 103
tolerance, religous, 37, 47, 49–50, 74, 76,
77, 82, 83, 85–89, 115, 121, 122–123, 138,
142, 145, 146, 147, 161, 186, 206, 211, 212,
213, 225, 228, 239, 241, 243
definition of, 27–28, 247–248
354 | index
Toulon, Ottoman fleet in, 136
trade, See commerce








Tunisia, Tunis, 35, 43, 83, 111, 129, 140, 168,
218
‘Turk’, the, 16, 20, 22, 129, 132, 135, 137,
142–147, 172, 181, 184–186
Turkey, Turkish Republic, 18, 36, 41, 53,
79, 155, 166, 173–174, 200, 214, 220
and the EU, 131, 218, 222–224
Ukraine, 80, 113, 129, 176, 200
ʿulama, See clergy, Islamic
umma, 193, 197, 198, 221
United Kingdom, 199, 202, 203, 207, 210
see also England
United States, See America, Americans
university, -ies, 104, 144, 177, 206, 235, 236
uprising, See revolts
usury, See interest, ban on
values, 19, 205, 208, 231, 245, 248, 250
cultural-religious, 195, 226, 233, 247




veil, full-face, 88, 115, 206, 234, 250
Venice, Venetians, 53, 61, 78, 96, 110, 112,
113, 134, 138, 139, 181
Vienna, 117, 164, 175, 178
Congress of, 185
siege of, 59, 112, 131–133, 136, 137, 184,
230
Vikings, 69, 77, 133
violence in Islam, violent Islam, See
aggression in Islam





Balkan, 130, 153, 154, 167, 169, 172, 184,
240
Crimean, 167, 179, 185
First World, 154, 168, 171, 173, 179, 188
holy/religious, 25, 30, 55–58, 69,
72–73, 84, 96, 129–131, 143, 146,
161, 171, 213–216, 240, 242
see also jihad
SecondWorld, 56, 153, 213
Thirty Years, 30, 113, 124, 143
Yugoslavian, 25, 197, 213–217, 221, 242
Westernization, 164, 207, 222
women in Islam
European image of, 99–100, 188, 206,
243
position of, 115, 203–204, 232
xenophobia, 229
Yugoslavia, 25, 197, 213–216, 221, 242
